Alexandria Tammy Hampton v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00700-CR
3833789
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/20/2015 4:29:14 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-000700-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF AUSTIN, TEXAS
TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/20/2015 4:29:14 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
********
ALEXANDRIA TAMMY HAMILTON
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
********
ON APPEAL FROM THE 426th DISTRICT COURT
OF BELL COUNTY, TEXAS
Cause No. 72513
******
STATE’S BRIEF
******
HENRY GARZA
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
BOB D. ODOM
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 540
Belton, Tx 76513
(254) 933-5215
FAX (254) 933-5704
DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us
SBA No. 15200000
Oral Argument Not Requested
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ITEM PAGE
Index of Authorities …………………………………………………………………… 4
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ………………………………………….. 6
Statement of the Case ………………………………………………………………… 6
Statement of Facts ……………………………………………………………………... 7
Summary of State’s Argument ……………………………………………………. 11
Argument and Authorities …………………………………………………………. 11
First Issue on Appeal ……………………………………………………………… 11
(Appellant’s Points 1-8)
TRIAL COURT ABUSE DISCRETION IN ADMITTING
EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE UNDER RULE 404(b)
Standard of Review ………………………………………………………….. 12
Application and Analysis ………………………………………………….. 12
Second Issue on Appeal ………………………………………………………… 23
(Appellant’s Points 9-15)
TRIAL COURT ABUSE DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBATIVE VALUE OF NOT OUTWEIGHED BY
PREJUDICIAL AFFECT UNDER RULE 403.
Standard of Review ………………………………………………………… 23
Application and Analysis ………………………………………………… 24
2
Prayer …………………………………………………………………………………....... 28
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 9 ……………………………………...... 29
Certificate of Service …………………………………………………………………. 29
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Bisby v. State, 907 S.W.2d 949 (Tx. App. Ft. Worth ………………………. 16
2nd Dist. 1995 rev. ref.), Cert den. 528 U.S. 849 (1999)
Boswell v. State, No. 03-11-00117-CR, 2012 Tex. App. ………………… 14
LEXIS 7177 (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2012 no pet.),
not designated for publication.
Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441 (Tx. Cr. App. 1982) ………………………. 16
Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315 (Tx. Cr. App. 1987) ……………………. 26
Hegar v. State, 11 S.W.3d 290 ……………………………………………………. 14
(Tx. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1999 no pet.)
Lomaugh v. State, 514 S.W.2d 758 (Tx. Cr. App. 1974) ……………….. 16
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tx. Cr. App. 1990) …………..12, 17
Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841 (Tx. Cr. App. 1999) …………………… 24
Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879 (Tx. Cr. App. 2002) …………………… 24
Will. v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675 (Tx. Cr. App. 2009) …………………12, 13
OTHER
Texas Penal Code
Section 22.02(b)(1) ………………………………………………………… 20
Texas Family Code
Section 71.0021(b) …………………………………………………………… 20
4
Texas Rules of Evidence
Rule 403 …………………………………………………………… 11, 23-24 & 28
Rule 404(b) ………………………………………………11-14, 16-17 & 22, 23
5
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not request oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Alexandria Tammy Hamilton, was indicted for the
offense of Aggravated Assault. The indictment charged that she “…did
then and there intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause serious
bodily injury to Antonio Jennings by stabbing the said Antonio Jennings
with a knife, and...did then and there use a deadly weapon, to-wit: a
knife, during the commission of said assault, and the said Antonio
Jennings was a person with whom the defendant has or had a dating
relationship, as described by Section 71.002(b) of the Texas Family
Code.” (CR-5).
She was tried before a jury in the 426th District Court of Bell
County, Texas, Judge Fancy Jezek presiding, and found guilty by the jury.
(CR-62; RR12-62). Upon her election (CR-17), the same jury assessed
punishment at 60 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
(CR-63; RR15-39).
The Appellant gave timely notice of appeal (CR-81) and the trial
court certified her right to do so. (CR-77).
6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant and Antonio Jennings had been dating for some
time and lived together off and on. (RR8-61, 63, 64). Their relationship
became stormy, however, because of her jealousy, principally over his
continued contact with Crystal Whiteside, the mother of his children.
(RR8-70, 71, 75, 79, 81, 83, 84, 93, 94). He and Ms. Whiteside were in
the process of trying to reconcile their differences so that they could act
as co-parents to their children. (RR8-65, 67; RR9-109).
The Appellant began confronting Jennings about the relationship,
provoking a number of arguments that became intense. (RR8-92, 93,
94).
On the day of the stabbing, Jennings had gone with Crystal
Whiteside to “Chuck E. Cheese” for their daughter’s birthday. Jennings
planned to attend her birthday party the following evening. (RR8-93,
94; RR9-107, 108).
That night the Appellant and Jennings were drinking and playing
cards with friends when she became angry about his time with his “baby
momma” and started demanding to know why he was going to his
daughter’s birthday. (RR8-94).
7
She went into the bedroom where he joined her to attempt to
diffuse the situation. They sat on the bed and gradually began to
become intimate. (RR8-93, 94, 95). When he attempted to have
intercourse, however, she again became angry and aggressive and again
complained of Crystal Whiteside. (RR8-95, 96, 97). As he was getting up
from the bed she grabbed a knife and stabbed him a number of times.
She then just walked out of the room without saying a word. (RR8-99).
He was bleeding profusely and managed to leave the duplex
apartment and to go to his sister, Cheleste Jennings, who lived in
another of the duplex units. (RR8-100, 101, 102). They called 911 and
Cheleste and her boyfriend, Dantral Felton, ministered to him until the
police and paramedics arrived. (RR9-58, 59, 93, 94, 95).
Jennings was taken to Darnall Army Hospital in Killeen and then
to Baylor Scott and White in Temple. He was stabbed three times in the
torso and also suffered a cut on his arm and lacerations of his finger.
(RR8-101; RR9-79). About 40% of his blood had to be replaced. His
kidney was lacerated and he had a collapsed lung. Surgery was required
to remove clotted blood so that the lung could expand. (RR9-81, 81).
His injuries were life threatening. (RR9-83).
8
When the police arrived at the scene of the stabbing, the Appellant
claimed that she had stabbed Jennings in self-defense because he was
sexually assaulting her. (RR8-40, 42, 54). She pointed to a number of
items in the apartment that had been overturned. (RR8-22, 54, 55). By
examining the blood splatters and other physical evidence, however, the
investigating officers became suspicious that the scene had been staged.
All of the furniture in disarray had been turned over after the blood had
been deposited. (RR9-153).
Immediately after the stabbing and prior to the arrival of the
ambulance, the Appellant told Jennings’ sister, Cheleste Jennings, that
she was “done with him” and tired of him breaking her stuff. She did not
mention any sexual assault. (RR9-57, 58, 61, 62).
The Appellant was taken to the hospital where a sexual assault
examination was performed by a SANE nurse. (RR10-73). She told the
nurse that Jennings had sexually assaulted her and that she grabbed the
knife and stabbed him only after he hit her in the course of the assault.
(RR10-80, 81, 82, 85).
Later that day, the Appellant went to the Killeen Police
Department of her own accord. She told the officer that she was being
followed by associates of Jennings; however, the police were unable to
9
locate the vehicle she described. (RR10-41, 42). She also claimed that
she had been sexually assaulted by Antonio Jennings; however, she
refused to give a statement concerning that alleged offense and quickly
left the police station. (RR10-43, 44, 46, 47, 48). Later, she agreed on
three occasions to speak with Detective Brank about her sexual assault
allegations, but failed to keep any of the appointments. (RR10-20, 21).
At trial the Appellant consistently maintained that she had
stabbed Mr. Jennings in self-defense. Her counsel extensively
questioned the perspective jurors on the issue (RR4-99-104) and cross
examined the responding police officers about her claim that she had
been defending herself from sexual assault. (RR8-40, 42, 57; RR10-26).
She also offered testimony from the SANE nurse who examined her
containing her account of the events and allegations of sexual assault by
Jennings. (RR10-70-100).
Her actions after the offense, however, rebutted her claims and
indicated her continued jealousy and animosity directed against Crystal
Whiteside and her relationship with Jennings. (RR9-10-13, 63-67, 110-
115, 137-139). There was also evidence that, in explaining her
subsequent actions, she admitted to Antonio Jennings’ brother, Jerry
Jennings, that she had stabbed Antonio and that she did it because she
10
felt betrayed by his being around the mother of his baby, Crystal
Whitesides. (RR9-137).
SUMMARY OF STATE’S ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
extraneous offense complained of because it was relevant under Rule
404(b) both to prove motive and to rebut the Appellant’s defensive
theory of self-defense.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the
danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the
evidence under Rule 403 because the issue of self-defense and motive
was the only contested issue in the trial and the evidence was
compelling and vitally needed in order to resolve those issues. Given
the primacy of the issue the State did not expend excessive time in the
presentation of that evidence nor can it be said that there was a danger
of an irrational and indelible effect upon the jury as the issue was relied
upon exclusively by Appellant.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
First Issue on Appeal (Appellant’s Points of Error One
through Eight)
11
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the admission of
extraneous offenses and misconduct under Rule 404(b) of the Texas
Rules of Evidence?
Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Williams v. State, 301
S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tx. Cr. App. 2009). Thus, the trial court’s decision will
not be disturbed on appeal as long it was within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tx.Cr.App.
1990).
Application and Analysis
Appellant’s Brief
The Appellant includes eight points of alleged error in a single
issue presented to the court, arguing them all together. Therefore, it is
necessary for the State to respond in kind.
She includes the following in those points:
Point One: Mention of her prior conviction in Virginia.
Point Two: Her subsequent burglary of the apartment of the victim’s
sister.
12
Point Three: Her subsequent vandalization of the car belonging to
Crystal Whiteside.
Point Four: Her subsequent vandalization of the car belonging to the
victim’s brother, Jerry Jennings.
Point Five: Her subsequent attempted burglary of Crystal Whiteside’s
car.
Point Six: Her threat to hire someone to get Crystal Whiteside before
the commission of the offense.
Point Seven: Her threat to beat Crystal Whiteside before the stabbing.
Point Eight: Her stalking of Crystal Whiteside.
Rule 404(b)
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show conformity therewith.
Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, the absence of mistake or accident.
The rebuttal of a defensive theory is one of the purposes for which
evidence of extraneous offenses may be admitted under Rule 404(b).
Williams at 687.
13
Admissibility of extraneous offenses under Rule 404(b) is not
confined merely to those occurring prior to the offense charged. Hegar
v. State, 11 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tx. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1999 no pet.); see
also Boswell v. State, No. 03-11-00117, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7177 (Tx.
App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2012, no pet.), not designated for publication,
following Hegar.
This Case
In this case the Appellant filed her Request for Notice of Intent to
Offer Evidence of Extraneous Conduct (CR-20) as well as a Motion in
Limine Regarding Extraneous Offenses (CR-18). The State responded by
filing its notices of such extraneous acts (CR-43, 47). See Rule 404(b).
Prior to the presentation of evidence to the jury the trial court
took up the Appellant’s motion in limine. At the conclusion of the
hearing the trial court held that prior assaultive behavior by the
Appellant against the victim, Antonio Jennings would be admitted. The
Appellant does not contest that ruling on appeal as none of her
complaints go to that testimony. With respect to the other matters the
court withheld its ruling. (RR7-57).
The threshold question is whether or not the evidence had
relevancy beyond character conformity under Rule 404(b). In each
14
instance it was relevant both to rebut the defensive theory of self-
defense and to show motive.
In this case it was uncontested that the Appellant stabbed Antonio
Jennings multiple times with a knife. The only issue in the case was
whether or not she did so in self-defense. Mr. Jennings testified that the
Appellant had long been upset because he continued to see and co-
parent his children with their mother, Crystal Whiteside. He stated that
on the night of the stabbing she was angry because he had spent part of
the day with his daughter and her mother celebrating the child’s
birthday. Jennings said that, after an attempt to reconcile that led to a
moment of intimacy, she again expressed anger about Crystal and
grabbed the knife and repeatedly stabbed him.
The Appellant, on the other hand, claimed to the responding
officers that she had stabbed Jennings in self-defense because he was
sexually assaulting her. He also went to the police department to make
that claim, but refused to give a statement concerning the alleged
assault. During trial she consistently urged that she had acted in self-
defense in the voir dire of the jury panel, cross examination of the
State’s witnesses, and in the evidence she offered, including the
testimony of the SANE nurse giving her detailed account of the events.
15
By pursuing the defensive theory of self-defense, she also placed
motive in issue. Proof of motive for the crime tends to negate claims
that the accused acted only in self-defense. Lomaugh v. State, 514 S.W.
2d 758 (Tx. Cr. App. 1974).
The Appellant attempts to dismiss the question of motive out of
hand by observing that motive was not one of the elements of the
offense charged, however, evidence of motive is always admissible
because it is relevant as a circumstance tending to prove the
commission of the offense. Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tx. Cr.
App. 1982); Bisby v. State, 907 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tx. App. Ft. Worth 2nd
Dist. 1995 rev. ref.), cert. den. 528 U.S. 849 (1999).
The defensive theory of self-defense was raised and relied upon
by the Appellant and, therefore, the State was entitled to rebut it. Proof
of motive was one way to do so. Antonio Jennings testified that the
Appellant stabbed him as a result of a festering jealousy of his continued
contact with the mother of his children. The Appellant contended that
she did so only in order to defend herself from a sexual assault.
The only question under Rule 404(b) was whether or not the trial
court abused its discretion in finding relevancy with respect to the
evidence admitted beyond mere character conformity. Evidence is
16
admissible under the rule where it logically serves to make more or less
probable an elemental fact; serves to make more or less probable an
evidentiary fact the inferentially leads to an elemental fact; or where it
serves to make more or less probable defensive evidence that
undermines an elemental fact. Such evidence has relevance beyond
mere character conformity. Montgomery at 387.
In each instance complained of by the Appellant the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence relevant under Rule
404(b).
Crystal Whiteside
The Appellant complains of the admission of five instances of
extraneous conduct directed at Crystal Whiteside. (Appellant’s Points of
Error 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8). First, she cites testimony that indicated that she
vandalized Crystal Whitehead’s car shortly after the commission of the
offense charged. Antonio Jennings testified that after he was released
from the hospital he stayed off and on with Crystal Whiteside and
during that time sugar was put in Whiteside’s gas tank and her tires
slashed. (RR9-10). Ms. Whiteside testified that the Appellant began
harassing her and related the incident of vandalism of her vehicle. (RR9-
106, 110). She also stated that she heard the Appellant admit that she
17
was the one who vandalized the car. (RR9-115). The Appellant
admitted to her friend, Angela Gomez, that she had put the sugar in
Crystal’s car and slashed her tires and had burglarized her home.
(RR10-65, 66, 67).
Next, she complains about testimony which she characterizes as
evidence of her attempted burglary of Whitesides’ car. This involves
testimony concerning an incident after the stabbing in which she and
Whiteside were arguing and the victim’s brother, Jerry Jennings,
separated them. Crystal Whitesides got into her car and locked the door
and the Appellant attempted to open the driver’s door and get into
Whitesides’ car. (RR9-13, 115, 116). She also alleges that the trial court
erred in admitting evidence that she “stalked” Crystal Whiteside after
the offense. Whiteside testified that the Appellant repeatedly drove by
her residence (RR9-111). Angela Gomez was with the Appellant when
she went out of her way to drive by Whiteside’s house. (RR10-66).
Then turning to the time prior to the stabbing of Antonio Jennings,
the Appellant complains of testimony that she had threatened Crystal
Whiteside. Antonio Jennings sister, Cheleste Jennings, testified that
prior to her brother’s stabbing the Appellant had told her that she did
not like Crystal Whiteside and that if she was back home she could pay
18
someone a bag of weed to do something bad to her. (RR9-66). Cheleste
also testified that the Appellant told her about a time when she said that
she and Antonio were in a car and saw Crystal Whiteside and the only
thing that prevented her from getting out to “beat her ass” was that
Antonio stopped her and she had a cast on her ankle. (RR9-66).
Did this evidence logically serve to make more or less probable
the defensive theory that she stabbed Antonio Jennings in self-defense
from sexual assault? Clearly it did. It also served to show the
Appellant’s true motive for the stabbing which the defensive theory had
placed squarely in dispute. The victim testified that the Appellant
stabbed him out of long term jealousy and animosity toward Crystal
Whiteside and that it all came to a head because of time he spent with
her that day for their daughter’s birthday. The Appellant’s defensive
theory was that she did not act from the jealousy motive but only to
defend herself from sexual assault. Clearly a pattern of animosity
toward Ms. Whiteside both before and after the stabbing made the
motive of jealousy more probable and the defensive theory of self-
defense unrelated to Jennings' relationship with Whiteside less
probable.
19
Cheleste Jennings and Jerry Jennings
After the stabbing the Appellant broke into the house of Antonio
Jennings' sister, Cheleste Jennings, and vandalized her car. (RR9-9, 63,
65). The Appellant admitted that she had done so to Angela Gomez.
(RR10-66).
Also after the commission of the offense, the Appellant vandalized
the car belonging to Antonio Jennings’ brother, Jerry Jennings. She
admitted that she had slashed his tires and offered to reimburse him for
his loss. (RR9-137, 138).
Neither Cheleste nor Jerry Jennings had experienced any problem
with the Appellant prior to the stabbing. (RR9-65, 134 ). Her anger once
again reasonably tended to make her defensive theory less probable.
Prior Conviction in Virginia
The indictment alleged that at the time of the assault the
Appellant and Antonio Jennings were in a dating relationship as that
term is defined in Section 71.0021(b) of the Texas Family Code. See
Section 22.02(b)(1), Texas Penal Code. That section of the Family Code
defines “dating relationship” as a relationship between individuals who
have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate
nature. In determining whether such a relationship exists the code
20
provides that the length of the relationship, the nature of the
relationship, and the frequency and type of interaction between the
persons involved. It also states that a casual acquaintanceship or
ordinary fraternization in a business or social context does not
constitute a dating relationship.
It was thus incumbent, in order to prove an element of the offense
charged in the indictment, that the Appellant and Mr. Jennings were in
such a dating relationship. The evidence showed that they had become
intimate within three or four weeks after they met (RR8-61, 64) and
moved in together shortly thereafter. The Appellant’s young son and
niece also resided with them. (RR8-64, 65). In exploring the nature of
their relationship as more than a casual acquaintanceship or ordinary
fraternization, the State asked the following:
“Q. And at some point did you end up caring for the
defendant’s children?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Okay, how did that come to be?
A. She went to see a—her probation officer.” (RR8-67)
At that point the Appellant objected and the trial court took up the
matter outside the presence of the jury. The Appellant advised the court
21
that she believed this was leading to proof of extraneous conduct
involving assaultive behavior and her prior conviction. (RR8-67).
The State responded by assuring the court that it had no intention
of offering proof of the prior conviction or the underlying facts of that
conviction, but the fact that the victim cared for the Appellant’s children
for an extended time during her absence as part of the context of the
offense and relevant in order to prove the necessary elements of that
offense. (RR8-67, 68).
The trial court overruled the Appellant’s objection. (RR8-68).
Then, in the presence of the jury the State asked Mr. Jennings if he had
been the sole caretaker of the Appellant’s children for a period of at
least two months and that he continued to reside in the residence with
those children during her absence. (RR8-68, 69). There was no further
mention of why the Appellant was absent. This testimony was relevant
and probative on the issue of the type and nature of the relationship
between the Appellant and the victim and that the relationship was
neither casual nor ordinary. To the extent that the brief mention before
the jury that the Appellant had gone to visit her probation officer
constitutes an extraneous matter under Rule 404(b) it was clearly and
22
reasonably relevant to an essential element of the offense charged and
reasonably tended to make that element more probable.
Conclusion
The ruling of the trial court admitting the evidence complained of
is certainly within the scope of reasonable disagreement and was not an
abuse of discretion. The Appellant relied upon the defensive theory of
self-defense and placed her motive for the offense directly in question.
All of the evidence the admission of which is complained of reasonably
and logically made her defensive theory less probable and her
motivation as stated by the victim more probable. It was thus
admissible under Rule 404(b).
Second Issue on Appeal (Appellant’s Points of Error Nine
through Fifteen)
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the same
evidence over the Appellant’s objection that its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as
prohibited by Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence?
Standard of Review
The standard of review is the same as in the first issue on appeal.
23
Application and Analysis
Rule 403 provides that, although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. The rule assumes the admissibility of all relevant evidence
and such evidence may be excluded only when the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. Mozon v. State, 991
S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tx. Cr. App. 1999).
In examining the trial court’s ruling under Rule 403, four factors
must be considered: (1) how compellingly the evidence makes a fact of
consequence more or less probable; (2) the potential for the evidence to
impress the jury the jury in and irrational but indelible way; (3) the time
during the trial that the State requires to develop the evidence; and (4)
the State’s need for the evidence. Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888
(Tx. Cr.App. 2002).
Compelling?
Does the evidence compellingly serve to make a fact of
consequence more or less probable? The Appellant contends that it was
not relevant to any issue in the case. This is simply incorrect. She
24
placed her motive squarely in issue by relying throughout the trial upon
the defensive theory of self-defense. Thus whether or not she stabbed
Antonio Jennings in self-defense during the course of a sexual assault or
whether she intentionally and knowingly did so out of jealous anger
became the crucial issue in the case. In fact, she never contested the
stabbing at all but only her motive for it. The evidence that she was
jealous and harbored animosity as a result of Mr. Jennings continued
contact with Crystal Whiteside, the mother of his children, a revealed by
her actions before and after the stabbing were certainly compelling as to
that issue.
Irrational, Indelible Impression?
The Appellant says that a “seemingly unending parade” of
extraneous acts must have created an irrational impression upon the
thought processes of the jury. The trial court not only charged the jury
fully upon the law of self-defense as relied upon by the Appellant, it also
instructed the jury that it was not to consider any extraneous offenses
unless it first found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant
committed those offenses, and even then only in determining motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, accident, or to rebut a defensive theory, and for no other
25
purpose. (CR-55). The Appellant had no objections to the charge.
(RR12-4).
It must be presumed that the jury followed the trial court’s
instructions. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 324 (Tx.Cr.App. 1987).
There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise.
The evidence was admitted by the trial court because it was
directly and compellingly germane to the motive and to the defensive
issue. The jury was instructed as to that purpose. It certainly did not
impress the jury in any irrational way.
Time Necessary
The Appellant contends that the time spent on the extraneous
conduct evidence was such that it could have “distracted the jury from
consideration of the indicted offense”. Her defensive theory, however,
arguably made that evidence part and parcel of that offense. She did not
claim that she did not stab Mr. Jennings, but only that she did so for a
different reason than he claimed, in self-defense. It was necessary for
the State to meet those allegations in order to prove the charged
offense. While several witnesses testified concerning these matters,
their testimony relevant and highly probative of the issues at hand.
Contrary to the Appellant’s assertions it cannot be said that the time
26
spent on those matters was in any respect disproportionate to that
involving the facts of the charged offense.
State’s Need
The Appellant concedes that the trial court found that the State
needed the evidence in question. She claims, however, that this is not
the case because “the evidence was clear that Hampton stabbed
Jennings”. (Appellant’s Brief at 33). She is correct in that assertion, but
her argument is disingenuous. Without doubt the evidence that the
Appellant stabbed Antonio Jennings was not only clear but uncontested.
But it certainly does not follow that the State did not need the other
evidence. To the contrary that admission, coupled with the Appellant’s
claim of self-defense, made that testimony vitally necessary. The only
persons present at the time of the offense were the Appellant and the
victim. The victim said that the Appellant stabbed him in a fit of jealous
rage and long standing resentment of his relationship with Crystal
Whiteside. The Appellant claimed that the victim was sexually
assaulting her and she was only defending herself when she stabbed
him. That became the only real issue in the case. The need of the State
to show the Appellant’s history of jealousy and resentment arising from
27
Mr. Jennings continued contact with Whiteside and her actions
afterward in keeping with that jealous anger was indeed grave.
The decision of the trial court to admit the evidence in question
over the Appellant’s Rule 403 objection was well within the scope of
reasonable disagreement and was not an abuse of discretion.
PRAYER
The State of Texas respectfully prays that the judgment of
conviction herein be, in all things, be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
HENRY GARZA
District Attorney
/s/ Bob D. Odom
BOB D. ODOM
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 540
Belton, Tx 76513
(254) 933-5215
FAX (254) 933-5704
DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us
SBA No. 15200000
28
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9
This is to certify that the State’s Brief is in compliance with Rule 9
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be
included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 4,223 words.
/s/ Bob D. Odom
BOB D. ODOM
Assistant District Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of this brief has been
served upon, Richard E. Wetzel , Counsel for Appellant, electronically
addressed to him at wetzel_law@1411west.com on this 20th day of
January, 2015.
/s/ Bob D. Odom
BOB D. ODOM
Assistant District Attorney
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