Ray Basaldua v. George Farinacci, Ladona Farinacci and Jim House ( 2015 )

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NO.04-14-00774-CV
TO THE
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
OF TEXAS
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e
RAY BASALDUA,
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Appellant
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V.
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GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONNA FARINACCI, & LI LUO
SKELTON
• Appellee
On Appeal from the 408"' Judicial District Court
Of Bexar County, Texas
The Honorable Larry Noll, Presiding Judge
Trial Court Case Number 2014-CI-05926
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Ray Basaldua
PROSE
P.O. Box 1982
gfi Lytle, Texas 78052
Telephone: (210) 912-3256 '- .
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NO.04-14-00774-CV
TO THE
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
OF TEXAS
RAY BASALDUA,
Appellant
V.
GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONNA FARINACCI, & LI LUO
SKELTON
Appellee
On Appeal from the 408th Judicial District Court
Of Bexar County, Texas
The Honorable Larry Noll, Presiding Judge
Trial Court Case Number 2014-CI-05926
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Ray Basaldua
PROSE
P.O. Box 1982
Lytle, Texas 78052
Telephone: (210) 912-3256
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
ISSUES PRESENTED 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1,2
ARGUMENT 2,3
PRAYER 4
APPENDIX
u
NO.04-11-0077V-CV
RAY BASALDUA,
Appellant
v.
GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONNA FARINACCI, & LI LUO
SKELTON
Appellee
The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court's order that is
the subject of this appeal, as well as the names and addresses of all trial and
appellate counsel.
PARTIES COUNSEL
Appellant: ("Basaldua") Ray Basaldua
Ray Basaldua ProSe
P.O. Box 1982
Lytle, Texas 78052
Telephone: (210) 912-3256
Appellees: ("INDIVIDUALLY") Amy M. Vanhoose
George Farinacci, Frank O. Carroll III
Ladoanna Farinacci, & Attorney at Law
Jim House 2800 Post Oak Blvd., 57th
Houston, TX 77056
Fax:713-840-9404
in
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.
1993);
Coastal CementSand Inc. v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc., 956
S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied);
Khan v. Yazdchi, No. 01-02-00918-CV, 2003 WL 21513628, at*4 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (mem. Op.).
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996).
Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1997).
RULES
TRCP 166 (a)c
IV
STATEMENT OF THIS CASE
This is an appeal of the Trial Court's abuse of discretion in granting
Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment.
ISSUES PRESENTED
THE FIRST ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion in granting
£ the Appellee's a Motion For Summary Judgment when the Appellee's failed
^ to establish that all of the Appellant's claims were legally insufficient.
£ THE SECOND ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion in
•a
„$ granting the Appellee's Motion For Summary Judgment when the trial court
m
% lacked Personal Jurisdiction.
^ STATEMENT OF FACTS
& On October 30th, 2014, the Trial Court heard the Appellee's Motion
m
J For Summary Judgment. The Court granted Appellees a Judgment and
j signed an order disposing of all the Appellant's claims. The Appellee's
~ Motion For Summary Judgment was only seeking relief on one claim,
* Breach of Contract. The Appellants Third Amended Petition consists of
Five claims: Fraud, Tortious Interference With existing Contract, Tortious
Interference With Prosepective Relations, Breach of Contract and Aiding
and Abetting.
Furthermore, The Appellee's Motion For Summary Judgment lacked
jurisdictional content as the Appellee's were seeking relief for "Volunteer
Board Members". "Volunteer Board Members" are not party to this case.
ARGUMENT
FIRST ISSUE: The trial court abused its discretion in granting the
Appellee's a Motion For Summary Judgment when the Appellee's failed to
establish that all of the Appellant's claims were legally insufficient. (Exhibit
1) It is improper for a court to grant summary judgment on an issue (lack of
legal duty) that is not pled or argued in the summary judgment pleadings.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858
S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993); Coastal CementSand Inc. v. First Interstate
Credit Alliance, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, pet. denied); see also Khan v. Yazdchi, No. 01 -02-00918-CV, 2003
WL 21513628, at*4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (mem.
Op.). The Appellee's Motion For Summary Judgment was only seeking
relief on one claim, Breach of Contract. (Exhibit 2) The Appellants Third
Amended Petition consists of five claims: Fraud, Tortious Interference With
existing Contract, Tortious Interference With Prosepective Relations, Breach
of Contract and Aiding and Abetting. (Exhibit 3) A Motion For Summary
Judgment must stand or fall on the grounds expressly presented in the
motion. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996).
A trial court errs in granting more relief than requested, Inglish v. Union
State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. 1997).
SECOND ISSUE: Appellee's have identified the defendants in this
Motion For Summary Judgment as "Volunteer Board Members", stating
that they are immune from liability. (Exhibit 2) Appellant OBJECTS, the
Third Amended Petition clearly identifies the defendants as individuals,
George Farinacci, Ladonna Farinacci and Jim House. (Exhibit 3) The Clear
Springs Park Property owners Association was never sued or served and
brought under the Jurisdiction of the Court.
3.
PRAYER
Ray Basaldua respectfully requests lhat this Court reverse the Trial
Court's ruling granting Appellees Motion For Summary Judgment Order In
part or whole and reverse the trial Courts Order, and remand the case back to
the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
Ray - Pro Se
P.O. Box 1982
Lytle Texas 78052
Tel. (210)-912-3256
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This certifies that the undersigned served this APPELLANT'S BRIEF by
certified mail to the following counsel for Appellees on February /^, / 7
2014.
Amy M. Vanhoose
Frank O. Carroll III
Attorney at Law
2800 Post Oak Blvd. 57* Floor
Houston, TX 77056
Telephone: 713-840-9404
Ray Basaldua Pro Se
P.O.Box 1982
Lytle Texas 78052
Tel. (2IO)-912-3256
APPENDIX
Exhibit 1 Summary Judgment Order
Exhibit 2 Motion For Summary Judgment
Exhibit 3 Third Amended Petition
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CAUSE NO. 2014-CI-05926
RAY A. BASALDUA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
v.
§ 73RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONA §
FARINACCI & U LUO SKELTON § BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTTNQ DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On this day
, 20i4, the Court heard LaDona Farinacci,
George Farinacci, and Jim House's (collectively referred to as "Defendants") Motion
Smnmary "
(the "Mot.on"eT^idering the^tolmn, the se,
fiV Response toT"n^ Motion for
are hereby su^t^, and^uch eviden^ 1S
herebystricken as folWs
STAJNED
STRIC
Exhibit A toPlaintiffs
The Court, having considered the Motion, Response, £p]y, and a/gume^ToT
counsel, if any, is of the opinion that the Motion is good and should be, and hereby
is, in all things GRANTED.
This Order disposes of all Plaintiffs claims against Defendants
0RDEK Granting defendants' Motion for Summary judgment
by the Court__
All court costs to be borne by Plaintiff.
Signed tbiaj> day d^&^C^ . 2014.
-G>r
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
CAUSE NO. 20M-CI-05!)26
RAY A. BASALDUA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
v- § 73*0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONA §
FARINACCI & LILUO SKELTON BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
DEFENDANTS GEORGE FARINACCI. LADONA FARINACCI. AND JIM
HOUSE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Come now George Farinacci, LaDona Farinacci, and Jim House and file this
Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment and in support thereof would
respectfully show the Court as follows:
I. PARTIES
Plaintiff, Ray A. Basaldua ("Plaintiff') is a project manager/builder who was
hired by Defendant Li Luo Skelton ("Skelton") to construct an addition to the
Skelton's home in the Clear Springs Park community.
Defendant. Li Luo Skelton ("Skelton") is the owner of property located in the
Clear Springs Park community in Bexar County, Texas. Skelton owns the residence
located at 4051 Running Springs, San Antonio, Texas 78261 ("Property"). Skelton's
Property is subject to the Protective Covenants, Restrictions, and Lot Assessments
of Clear Springs Park Property Owners Association, Inc. ("Declaration"), along with
the Clear Springe Park Property Owner's Association, Inc.'s Bylaws ("Bylaws"),
which are enforced by Clear Springs Park Property Owner's Association, Inc.
("Association").
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOB SUMMARY JUDGMENT !'.u;i: loKU
Defendants George Farinacci, LaDona Farinacci, and Jim House (collectively
referred to as the "Volunteer Board Members") are current members of the
Association's Board of Directors and owners of property in the Clear Springs Park
community.
H. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Volunteer Board
Members on three grounds: First, the Volunteer Board Members are immune from
liability under well-established Federal and Texas volunteer immunity statutes.
Second, regardless of immunity, the Volunteer Board Members cannot be held liable
under the standards set forth in the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. Third,
Plaintiff cannot succeed on his breach of contract claims because there is no basis in
law or in fact to suggest that a valid contract exists between the Volunteer Board
Members and Plaintiff.
For the above reasons, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of
the Volunteer Board Members.
III. BACKGROUND
The Association is a non-profit homeowners' association located in San
Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. The Association is operated by its Board of Directors,
comprised of the Volunteer Board Members. The properties located within the Clear
Springs Park community are subject to the Declaration. This lawsuit stems from
Plaintiffs dissatisfaction with the administration of the Association. More
specificaUy, Plaintiff has brought a claim of breach of contract against the Volunteer
•EFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMSIARY JUDGMENT PAGE 2 OF 9
Board Members claiming the Volunteer Board Members prevented Plaintiff from
performing on his contract with Defendant Skelton. Plaintiff claims these
allegations have resulted in actual, consequential, and punitive damages not
exceeding one-million dollars ($1,000,000.00).'
Plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim for breach of contract against the
Volunteer Board Members as a matter of law because there is no contract between
the Volunteer Board Members and Plaintiff.
IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Federal and State volunteer immunity statutes preempt
Plaintiffs' claims.
The Association is a non-profit corporation duly formed and operating under
the laws of the State of Texas for civic and public benefit and to serve the welfare of
the community. 2 The Volunteer Board Members are individual volunteer members
of the Board of Directors of the Association, who have been sued in their individual
capacities.3 The Volunteer Board Members are not compensated for their service to
the Association.4 Under the Volunteer Protection Act and the Non-Profit
Corporation Act, the Volunteer Board Members cannot be liable to Plaintiff in the
capacity in which they have been sued. As a matter of law, summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiffs causes of action against the Volunteer Board Members is
proper.
• See Plaintiffs' Original Pet., currently on file with the Court and incorporated herein by reference.
2 See Affidavits of Volunteer Board Members, attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 3.
3 See Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3.
*Id.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT " " pAGE 3 OF 9
1. The Federal Volunteer Protection Act (the "Federal Act")
preempts Plaintiffs claims against the Volunteer Board
Members.
In an effort to encourage volunteerism in the United States of America and to
limit the potential liability of the volunteer, the Federal Government set forth
statutory protections for volunteers such as the Volunteer Board Members.5 The
Federal Act states, in relevant part:
(a) Liability protection for volunteers - Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (d) of this section, no volunteer of a nonprofit
organization or governmental entity shall be liable for harm6 caused by
an act or omission of the volunteer on behalf of the organization or
entity if:
(1) the volunteer was acting within the scope of the volunteer's
responsibilities in the nonprofit organization or governmental entity at
the time of the act or omission;...
(3) the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct,
gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant
indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the
volunteer. . .7
The Federal Act also states that a "nonprofit organization"8 includes the
Association, because it is a "not-for-profit organization, which is organized and
3 See Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 USC § 14501, et seq.
6 See 42 USC § 14505. Definitions. For purposes of this chapter, the term "harm" includes physical,
nonphysical, economic, and non-economic losses.
7 See 42 USC § 14503.
8 42 USC § 14505. Definitions. For purposes of this chapter, the term "nonprofit organization" means
(A) any organization which is described in section 501(c)(3) of such title and exempt from tax under
section 501(a) of Title 26 and which does not practice any action which constitutes a hate crime
referred to in subsection (b)(l) of the first section of the Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 USC 534 note);
or (b) any not-for-profit organization which is organized and conducted for public benefit and
operated primarily for charitable, civic, educational, religious, welfare, or health purposes and which
does not practice any action which constitutes a hate crime referred to in subsection (b)(l) of the first
section of the Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 USC 534 note).
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Page 4 of 9
conducted for public benefit and operated primarily for charitable, civic,
educational, religious, welfare, or health purposes." The Association levies its
assessments and manages the properties to promote the health, safety, welfare,
recreation, or pleasure of the residents. The Association is also operated in
furtherance of the important public pohcy of preventing dilapidation in housing and
unhealthful conditions described in Section 201 of the Texas Property Code.0 In all
times relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants were acting in a volunteer capacity.
Plaintiffs' claims against the Volunteer Board Members are based on acts or
omissions of these volunteers on behalf of the Association.10 In sum, the Association
is a non-profit corporation in whose service the Volunteer Board Members cannot be
held liable. Thus, the Volunteer Protection Act is a statutory bar to Plaintiffs'
claims against the Volunteer Board Members.
2. The Volunteer Board Members are not liable under the Texas
Non-Profit Corporation Act.
Finally, the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act (the "Act") protects the
Volunteer Board Members from liability. Chapter 22 of the Texas Business
Organization Code pertains to non-profit corporations, which are defined as
"corporation^] no part of the income of which is distributable to a member, director,
or officer of the corporation."» Officers of non-profit corporations are immune from
individual civil liability under Chapter 22.12 Specifically, the statute states:
9 Tex. Prop. Code § 201.002.
10 See Plaintiffs' Original Pet.
11 Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.001(5).
12 Id. at §22.235.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Page 6 OF 9
(a) An officer is not liable to the corporation or any other person for an
action taken or omission made by the officer in the person's capacity as an
officer unless the officer's conduct was not exercised:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with ordinary care; and
(3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interest of
the corporation.13
At all times relevant to this matter, no part of the Association's income was
distributable to a member, director, or officer, and further, all Volunteer Board
Members were officers of the Association. In all times relevant to Plaintiffs' claims,
Defendents were acting as officers of the nonprofit corporation. There is no evidence
to suggest that Defendants were acting in bad faith, failing to exercise ordinary
care, or acting absent reasonable belief that there actions were in the best interest
of the corporation. Therefore, Chapter 22 of the Texas Business Organization Code
applies to the issue of Volunteer Board Members' liability for Plaintiffs' claims.
Pursuant to Chapter 22, Volunteer Board Members are entitled to summary
judgment.
B. Plaintiff cannot succeed on his breach of contract claim
because the Volunteer Board Members do not have a contract
with Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs claim that the Volunteer Board Members have breached the
contract by preventing Plaintiff from performing his contractual obligations.*4 The
contract which forms the basis of Plaintiffs claims is a contract between Defendant
Skelton and Plaintiff, to which the Volunteer Board Members are not a party.
In order to succeed on a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
13 Tex. Bus. Org. Code § 22.235.
14 See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, on file with the Court, at 1ffl 7-35.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Page 6 OF 9'
prove the existence of a valid, enforceable contract, that the plaintiff performed,
tendered performance, or was excused from performing under the contract, that the
defendant breached the contract, and that the defendant's breach caused the
plaintiff injury.15 A defendant breaches a contract by failing or refusing to perform a
contractual duty.1G Whether a defendant breached a contract is a question of
law to be decided by the court.17
Plaintiffs allege that the Volunteer Board Members have breached the
contract by preventing Plaintiff from performing his prior contractual obligations
with Defendant Skelton.
In sum, no valid contract exists between the Volunteer Board Members and
Plaintiff. Because the Volunteer Board Members have no contract with Plaintiff, the
Volunteer Board Members cannot breach this contract by exercising their discretion
to enforce the Declaration. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his breach of
contract claim as a matter of law and the Court should grant summary judgment in
favor of the Volunteer Board Members.
C. Traditional Summary Judgment Standard.
Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166(a)(c), a defendant is entitled to
summary judgment if it either establishes its own defense as a matter of law or
negates an element of the plaintiffs cause of action as a matter of law.18 Because a
plaintiff must establish each element of his/her causes of action in order to prevail,
15 Snyder v. Eanes I.S.D., 860 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied).
16 Townwest Homeowners Ass'n v. Warner Comm., 826 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, no writ).
>" Bank One v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Page 7 of 9
a defendant who proves that even just one element of the plaintiffs claim is legally
insufficient is entitled to summary judgment.19
V. PRAYER
Wherefore, premises considered, LaDona Farinacci, George Farinacci, and
Jim House request that this Honorable Court grant their Motion for Summary
Judgment as to the above-referenced causes of action, and for such other and
further relief, at law and in equity, to which LaDona Farinacci, George Farinacci,
and Jim House may show themselves to be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS MARKEL WEINBERG BUTLER
HAILEY PC
Amy M^var
TBA No. 24042085
Frank O. Carroll III
TBA No. 24082785
2800 Post Oak Blvd, 57th Floor
Houston, TX 77056
Telephone: (713) 840-1666
Fax: (713)840-9404
avanhoose@rmwbhlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS,
GEORGE FARINACCI, LADONA
FARINACCI AND JIM HOUSE
18 Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Griffin v. Rowden, 654 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Tex. 1983).
19 Manoogian v. Lake Forest Corp., 652 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE 8 OF 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
served upon the parties listed below by facsimile, messenger, regular U.S. certified
mail, return receipt requested and/or electronic service on this the 8th day of
October, 2014.
Ray A. Basaldua
P.O. Box 1982
Lytle, Texas 78052
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Page 9 of 9
NO. 2014-01-05926
RAY A. BASALDUA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
V. §
§ 407* JUDICIAL DISTRICT
GEORGE FARINACCI, §
LADONA FARINACCI, &
LI LUO SKELTON BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED PETITION
NOW COMES RAY A. BASALDUA, Plaintiff, files this Third Amended Petition
complaining of Defendants, Jim House, George Farinacci, LaDona Farinacci & Li Luo Skelto
and shows ihe court the following:
DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN
Plaintiff intends that discovery in this matter be conducted under Level 2 pursuant to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
PARTIES
Plaintiff, Ray Basaldua is an Individual who can be found at, Mailing address: P.O. Box
1982 Lytle, Texas 78052.
Defendant, Jim House is an Individual who resides in Bexar County, Texas, and may be
served with citation at the following address or wherever else he may be found: 8526 N New
Braunfels, San Antonio, Texas 78217.
Defendants, George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci are Individuals who reside in Bexar
County, Texas, and may be served with citation at the following address or whenever else they
o
maybe found: 3930 Mark Alan, San Antonio, Texas 78261-2126.
to
Defendant, Li Luo Skelton is an Individual who resides in Bexar County, Texas, and may
be served with citation at the following address or wherever else they may be found: 4051
Running Springs, San Antonio, Texas 78261-2126.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
This Court has jurisdiction because the amount in controversy meets or exceeds
jurisdictional limits of this court and the Defendants reside in Bexar County Texas.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Ray Basaldua was the Independent Project Manager/Builder for Dr. Li Skelton
owner of the property located in the Clear Springs Park Subdivision at 4051 Running Springs,
San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. Plaintiff Ray Basaldua was conducting site work in
preparation for an addition to the home located on this property.
On November 9th, 2012, the Plaintiff Ray Basaldua received a call from Dr. Li Skelton
that she had been sued for not submitting plans to the Clear Springs Park Property Owners
Association. Furthermore a Temporary Restraining Order was placed on Dr. Li Skeltons
construction project and the Plaintiff Ray Basaldua had to stop work.
On November 14th, 2012 the Plaintiff and Dr. Li Skelton's attorney met with the
Defendant LaDona Farinacci, alleged President of the Clear Springs Property Owners
Association, and their attorneys to resolve the alleged issue in good faith. During this meeting
the Defendant LaDona Farinacci claimed she was representing the property owner next to Dr. Li,
who resides at 4111 Running Springs for an alleged easement issue and that was really why she
sued Dr. Li. Skelton. Furthermore, Defendant LaDona Farinacci stated that she was not a friend
with Dr. Li. Skelton because she was a Scientologist.
The Defendant LaDona Farinacci interfered with the existing contract and business
relationship between Ray Basaldua and Dr. Li Skelton by intentionally filing Fraudulent
documents with the Court, Restraining the Plaintiff from building Dr. Li Skeltons home addition.
The Defendants George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci lack standing to bring forth the
suit filed against Dr. Li Skelton and maliciously obtained a Restraining Order.
Near the end of 2013, Dr. Li Skelton called the Plaintiff and informed him that he has
been excused from performing the construction project, as she had agreed with the Defendant's,
George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci, not to work with the Defendant, breaching the contract.
As a result Plaintiff Ray Basaldua has now lost all work to be performed on Dr. Li
Skeltons home addition and future projects; has had to incur unnecessary costs, and lost his
profits from the construction project.
Furthermore, On July 28th, 2014, LaDona Farinacci expressed under oath in a deposition
that several Attorneys were advising her, generally "Jim House" and that these Attorney's
i
instigated the issue's stated above.
CAUSES OF ACTION
Defendants' conduct, acts and failures individually, collectively, jointly andj severally
were the cause and proximate cause of very substantial expenses, losses, and damages to
Plaintiff. The acts, conduct and failures of Defendants, individually, collectively, jointly and
severally, constituted violations of legal duties giving rise to at least the following; causes of
action.
FRAUD
The Defendants, individually, collectively, jointly and severally, have caused to be filed
a frivolous lawsuit with an ulterior motive, which was to represent the homeowner located at
4111 Running Springs over an alleged easement issue even though they are not licensed
attorney's. The Defendant LaDona Farinacci actions are malicious/vexatious in character as she
clearly stated to the Plaintiff Ray Basaldua and Dr. Li 's Skelton's attorney, "I am not a friend of
Dr. Li Skelton's because she is a Scientologist." Defendant George Farinacci an alleged officer
of the Clear Springs Park Property Owners Association participated in implementing the cause of
action, Defendant Li Luo Skelton subsequently agreed.
The Defendants, George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci individually, collectively, jointly
and severally, have caused to be filed fraudulent documents with the court misrepresenting
themselves as officers of the Clear Springs Park Property Owners Association who have the
Authority to receive and approve construction plans for and from all property owners in the
Clear Springs Park Subdivision.
The Defendants George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci have caused to be filed a frivolous
lawsuit misrepresenting themselves as officers of the Clear Springs Park Property Owners
Association, who have the Authority to institute a legal action based on covenants of the Clear
Springs Park Subdivision.
I
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TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACT
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The Defendants, George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci individually, collectively, jointly
and severally, intentionally interfered with the existing contract between Plaintiff Ray Basaldua
and Dr. Li Skelton consisting of a Seventy Thousand Dollar ($70,000.00) agreement to construct
the exterior of the home addition at 4051 Running Springs. By filing fraudulent documents with
the Court, the Defendant's Restrained Plaintiff from building the home addition at 4051 Running
Springs and caused him damages. Butnara v. Ford Co., 84S.W.3d 198,207(Tex.2002)
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE RELATIONS
The Defendants, George Farinacci & LaDona Farinacci individually, collectively, jointly
and severally, intentionally interfered with the prospective business relationship between
Plaintiff Ray Basaldua and Dr. Li Skelton, as their goal was to bring the property value of 4051
Running Springs up to Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00). The Defendants,
individually, collectively, jointly and severally, severed the business relationship between
Plaintiff Ray Basaldua and Dr. Li Skelton, additionally damaging the Plaintiff for further
planned work amounting to One Hundred forty Thousand Dollars ($140,000.00). Wal-Mart
Stores v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711,726 (Tex.2001)
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The Defendant's actions have prevented the Plaintiff from performing his contractual
obligations, and was excused from performing under the contract causing the Plaintiff injury.
Krayem v. USRP (PAC) ,L.P., 194 S.W.3d 91,94 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet., denied).
AIDING AND ABETTING
The Defendant's have encouraged, advised and instigated the actions stated above.
Kinz-bach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W 2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942)
DAMAGES
As a proximate result of the Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages.
Plaintiff requests the Court award the following damages as a result of Defendant's conduct:
1. Actual Damages;
2. Consequential Damages;
3. Punitive Damages; and
4. Costs of Court, and Appeals Court
i
5. Monetary Relief over $ 100,000 but not more than $ 200,000
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff requests a trial by jury and tenders the appropriate fee.
REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
Defendants are hereby requested to disclose, within 50 days of service of the Original
Petition, the information or material described in Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 194.2, (a)
through (I).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays that upon final hearing,
Plaintiff have and recover against Defendants those damages stated above, costs of court, and all
other relief to which Plaintiff may show himself to be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY A. BASALDUA, Pro Se
P.O. BOX 1982
Lytle, Texas 78052
Tel. (210)912-3256
Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the Plaintiffs Third Amended Petition has been served on the Attorneys of
record by email this I** day of October, 2014:
Amy M. Vanhoose
Frank O. Carroll III
Atorney at Law
2800 Post Oak Blvd., 57th Floor
Houston, Texas 77056
Ray Basaldua