Rowland Martin, Jr. v. Edward L. Bravenec and 1216 West Ave., Inc. ( 2015 )

Case No. 04-14-00483-CV
ROWLAND J. MARTIN TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant CO
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FOR THE FOURTH DIST«feT rn ^3
EDWARD BRAVENEC AND 1216 y; '"' *x> 7", ""'7
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Appellees BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS ^ u> : I
APPELLANT'S ADVISORY ON FRAUD ON THE COURT. FURTHER NOTICE'OF t\
BREIFING AMENDMENTS. AND SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellant Rowland J. Martin, reserving all arguments and authorities cited in his earlier
briefing submissions of record except asotherwise noted below, files this "Appellant's Advisory
On Fraud On The Court, Further Notice ofBriefing Amendments, and Second Supplemental
Appendix, "to give notice that his affirmative defense in the above styled case asserts a
paramount interest in title to the property known as 1216 West Ave., San Antonio, Texas, of
which Torralba Properties, LLC is the record owner, cf, Zuniga v. Grose, Locke, &Hebdon, 878
S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App. SanAntonio 1994, writref d), and that immunity is claimed from
the res judicata effect of the choice of law and judgment in Martin v. Grehn, Case No. SA 11-
CV-0414 for the reasons set forth in his briefings of record and in the supplementations below,
Batzelv. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,1025 (9th Cir. 2003), cert, denied 541 U.S. 1085 (2004)..
SUPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 30, 2015, Appellees filed a pleading which, though styled as a motion to
dismiss, to replead or for extension of time, makes no reference to any element of the cause of
action they originally plead, and appears instead to prosecute a line of argument that was not
presented in the trial court proceedings leading to the orders designated for interlocutory appeal.[
Out of an abundance of caution to aid the Court in its duty to ascertain interlocutory jurisdiction
or the lack thereof, Appellant amends his brief of record to incorporate the terms set forth in the
Court's order, that "in disposing of this appeal, this court will consider only those issues raised in
appellant's brief that relate to the orders this court has expressly identified as the subject of this
appeal." Appellant construes the order in conformity with statutory criteria for review of live
issues in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 27.011(b). While the defenses, privileges and
immunities presented in Appellant's briefings of record are faithful to the statutorily authorized
standards, Appellant has cause to believe that Appellees forfeited key parts of their litigation by
transferring the subject property to Torralba Properties on July 8, 2014, by replacing their
tortious interference claim with a "First Amended Petition" the same day, and by withholding
disclosures about the transfer in proceedings from July 17, 2014 to December 8, 2014. N.Y.
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1990).
APPELLANT'S FOURTH ISSUE FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW:
EVIDENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A FRAUD ON THE COURT QUESTION
VITIATES THE PRESUMED LEGITIMACY OF BOTH ORDERS UNDER REVIEW.
Appellees' lawsuit was brought for the improper purpose of suppressing future lis
pendens speech, and was moot as of July 9, 2014 when they prosecuted motions to secure such
1 Careful examination reveals that paragraphs 3 and 5 contain false and misleading statements that
tend to distort the true facts surrounding Bravenec's chain of title. In paragraph 3, Appellees state that the
foreclosure of 1216 West Ave. took place on October 3, 2003. But see, Court Reporters' Transcript for
Hearings on July 9, 2014, p. 22, lines 18-20 ("Q: In 2006, a foreclosure took place on that property? A;
Yes, sir."). In paragraph 5, Deadman creates the false impression that the foreclosure in McKnight and
Bravenec v. Reliant Financial, Inc. et al, Case No. 2006-CI-15329, preceded the bankruptcy petition filed
on May 2, 2006 in In re Moroco Ventures, LLC, Case No. 06-50829. But see, "Results Obtained" section
on Page 3 of the Final Account Of Attorney John Tutt in Exhibit A of Appellant's Second Supplemental
Appendix (noting that the going concern value of the Debtor deteriorated "due to continuing interference
from certain creditors," and that reorganization plan was withdrawn after the primary asset was foreclosed
by them in October 2006.) In paragraph 25, moreover, Deadman misleads the Court again by stating that
Appellant failed to comply with the order on December 4, 2014, thus obscuring the fact that a response
was both filed and ruled upon on December 8, 2014.
relief without disclosing changed jurisdictional circumstances arising from the transfer of the
subject property from Appellee Bravenec to Torralba Properties LLC on July 8, 2014.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A comparison of deed and docket records shows a pattern of conduct by Attorneys
Bravenec and Deadman in which they fabricated fact issues in pleadings filed on July 8, 2014
and in testimony on July 9, 2014 and July 17, 2014, for the purpose of maintaining a legal action
to suppress lis pendens speech that had not occurred at the time they filed their action.
A. On July 8, 2014 Bravenec Transferred The Subject Property To Torralba
Properties, And On The Same Day, Deadman Filed An Amended Pleadings Which
Concealed The Transfer To Suggest That Bravenec Was Still The Owner.
The underlying motive for the Appellees' legal action is clearly reflected in Attorney
Deadman's exchange with the trial court on May 23, 2014:
The Court: Okay. And your request for injunction is to prevent him filing the
lis pendens.
Mr. Deadman: That's the sole purpose, Judge .... In addition, we've asked that
they not contact the lender. What's happened in the past is, even if
there's not a lis pendens, he will contact the lender or the purchaser
to let them know verbally, there's clouds on title, he has an
interest...
Court Reporters' Transcript from May 23, 2014, at p. 6, in Exhibit D of Appellant's Second
Supplemental Appendix. While Appellant disputes the Appellees' characterization of events,
there is no material dispute that Appellees sought to suppress communications noticing a judicial
proceeding, and criticizing the quality of legal services provided by Bravenec's firm as
Appellant's former attorneys of record, not to mention a matter of public concern relating to
Bravenec's candidacy for judicial office. See, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 27.001 (3) and
(4); and see, Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (TCPA
case involving issues about speech criticizing provider of legal service).
The entire record of Appellees evidence, consisting of hearing transcript of Bravenec's
testimony, an order in Case No. 2006-CI-15329, and seven orders in Federal District Court Case
No. SA ll-CV-0414 and the appeal therefrom in U.S. Court of Appeals Case No. 13-50070 ("the
2010 case") leads to the same conclusion. In short, Appellees responded to the anticipated
exercise of the right to file unpublished lis pendens notices in the future, and the exercise of the
right to petition for collateral review of purchase money covenants and equitable servitudes
ancillary to the 2010 case.
Two events that occurred on July 8, 2014 establish probable cause to believe that
Attorneys Bravenec and Deadman engaged in conduct to mislead the trial court. Bravenec
recorded a deed attesting to the fact that he had conveyed the subject property to Torralba
Properties, LLC. The deed to Torralba records exceptions to conveyances and warranties
relating back to Appellant's purchase money interests, and was executed subject to a recorded
notice of lis pendens in the docket of Case No. 2014-PC-07644. The same day, Attorney
Deadman filed a "First Amended Petition" in the docket of Case No. 2014-PC-07644. The
pleading conceals the transfer from the trial court, and attempts to create the impression that
Bravenec is still the owner, the pleading voluntarily alleges that the contracting parties were
aware of clouds on Bravenec' title, and that the purpose of the pleading was to suppress
Appellant's ability to communicate with pendent lite purchasers and the courts.
B. The Trial Court's Pre-Stay Orders Denying TCPA Dismissal Relief On July 9, 2014
And July 17, 2014 Were Predicated On Bravenec's Concealment of Deed Records
And Deadman's Lack of Candor To The Trial Court.
On July 9, 2014 and July 17, 2014, unaware that Bravenec had recorded a deed
conveying the subject property, the trial court entered oral and written orders respectively
effecting the denial of dismissal relief that is the subject of the instant interlocutory appeal. In
proceeding to enter these orders, the court relied heavily testimony from Attorneys Deadman and
Bravenec on July 9, 2014 about prospective transactions and about Bravenec's supposed injuries
from lis pendens speech:
THE COURT: And there is a prospective buyer now?
DEADMAN: There is.
THE COURT: Name the buyer. I just want to make sure that I don't know them.
DEADMAN: I believe that it's One For Autism.
Court Reporter's Transcript for July 9, 2014, at p. 11. According to Bravenec and Deadman,
every lis pendens notice that Appellant filed prevented One For Autism from completing a
purchase transaction with Bravenec, and refers to only a single property interest which
Appellant's recorded in defiance of the judgment in Martin v. Grehn in his capacity as successor
to Chapter 11 Debtor Moroco Ventures, LLC. Id. at p. 42, lines 4 -9.
In reality, Deadman's representation to the trial court, professing the belief that One For
Autism was the prospective purchaser, gave cover to Bravenec's testimony on cross-examination
in which he deceitfully concealed that a transfer to Torralba had occurred the preceding day.
Q. Are there - you would agree that there are parties in a closing transaction who
have interests different than the seller?
A. Of course.
Q. So, would you agree that information that might be disadvantageous to the seller
might enable other parties to the transaction to protect their interest?
A. In this case or in abstract?
Q. Both. All of the above.
A. In abstract yes. In this case no.
Q. And why is that not in this case?
A. Because you lost the lawsuit in 2010 and you have no legal interest in the
property. So all you're really doing is keeping us from selling it by alerting a title
company that you might keep suing ...
Court Reporter's Transcription For July 9, 2014 at p. 45 - 46 (emphasis added). Later, Bravenec
states as a matter of fact without qualification: "... I have been trying to sell this property for at
least nine months and he has kept mefrom doing so." Id. at p. 35, lines 1- 3 (emphasis added)
The exhibits that Appellees cite to support their res judicata theory refer to a federal
district court case that culminated where the final order specifically disavows the finality of the
judgment in that case as applied to one of the purchase money lis pendens notices that Appellant
filed in 2014. See, Defendant's Exhibit 2 in Court Reporters Master Index, dated December 4,
2014. When challenged on cross-examination at the hearing on July 9, 2014, Bravenec's
testimony was again obscure and duplicitous. When asked to show where Appellant's
unamended original complaint in Martin v. Grehn refers to a lien interest litigated by Appellant
in his capacity as a lien holder, he answered "... I cannot show you... " Id. at p. 46, lines 13 - 16.
When asked about his understanding of the terminology "third party purchase money lien," he
responded that "I don't know how to answer that," and eventually stated, "I don't know what that
is, sir," Court Reporter's Transcript For July 9, 2014 at p. 51 - 52.2 In pleadings filed for the
hearing on August 14, 2014, he specifically recanted allegations about the inadequacy of
monetary damages that he had relied upon to secure preliminary injunctive relief on May 23,
2014.3
2 Judge Hudspeth, the presiding judgeinMartin v. Grehn, expressly disavowed jurisdiction to
expunge Appellant's 2014 lis pendens notice. Record For July 9, 2014 Hearing, Defendant's Exhibit 2,
Order Denying Motion To Expunge. Judge Clark, the presiding judge of Adversary Case No. 11-5141,
opined that there was no reason why the purchase money controversy could not be resolved in state court.
Record For July 9, 2014 Hearing, Defendant's Exhibit 7 (see bankruptcy order attached to perfected lis
pendens notice).
3 See, references to Defendant's Exhibit E in Court Reporter's Transcript For August 14, 2014, at
p. 18 ("THE COURT: Well, it's an admission against interest of an adverse party."
C. Bravenec's Concealment And Deadman's Lack Of Candor On July 9,2014 Negate
The Legal and Factual Predicates For The Post-Stay Gag Order On July 17,2014.
Though the transfer to Torralba altered the legal and jurisdictional position of the
controversy, and though the conditions precedent for automatic stay relief were met with a
written order denying dismissal on July 17, 2014 and the earlier filing of a notice of appeal on
July 9, 2014, the trial court deferred to the Appellees' position that Section 27.003 does not
authorize an automatic stay, and proceeded on July 17, 2014 over Appellant's objections to
finalize its gag order form the week before. See, Temporary Injunction Order of July 17, 2014.
The first ordering clause of the gag order purports to enjoin the filing of "any document
whatsoever with this court, any other court, [or] the Bexar County Deed Records Office that in
any way relates Plaintiffs or the real property ..." Although consistent with the oral order that
"[y]ou are not only not to file Lis Pendens anywhere, you are not to put any prospective
purchasers on any kind of notice that you have any claim in this property directly or indirectly,
either through agents, employees, servants attorneys, etcetera," Court Reporter's Transcription
For July 9, 2014 at p. 73, the written version was crafted so absurdly that it could literally be
construed as an attempt to prohibit the filing of even a statutorily authorized notice of appeal.
The second ordering clause directs the Bexar County Clerk to cancel ... "any document
filed by Rowland J. Martin, Jr. entitled 'Notice of Apparent Liability For Purchase Money
Claims' .. ..'"Perfected Lis Pendens' or any like titled document." The perfected lis pendens
document existed before July 9, 2014, but not when the temporary injunction motion was set for
hearing on May 23, 2014, and is noticed only in Appellees' pleadings in their First Amended
Petition filed on July 8, 2014 with no supporting evidence of a nexus to the 2010 case to warrant
suppression. The last phrase covers any filing that even remotely concerns the subject property,
not just the post-petition foreclosure transaction that was the subject of Martin v. Grehn.
The third ordering clause purports to enjoin communications with "any title company,
any potential buyer, bank or otherwise interfering with the potential sale of the Property in any
manner whatsoever." This clause is unsupported by reference to any chain of title evidence
bearing on purchase money lien interests alleged to run with the land in favor of Appellant.
The fourth ordering clause prohibited "joining any third parties or additional defendants
to this suit without prior approval of the court." The need for this clause was obviated by the
deed to Torralba Properties on July 8., 2014, but severely prejudiced Appellant's TCPA
protected right to petition for relief as the defendant and cross-plaintiff party.
Lastly, the fifth ordering clause compels Appellant to appear at a trial that was scheduled
for December 8, 2014. Although the cancellation of the trial schedule accompanying the
reinstatement of Case No. 04-14-00483-CV on December 4, 2014, and the Court's order
affirming the automatic stay on December 8, 2014, effectively dissolved the temporary
injunctive proceeding, it is worthwhile to note the gag order failed to specify a trial location.
In summary, all four decretal clauses bearing on the exercise of the right to free speech
and to petition restrain future communications within the meaning of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Sec. 27.011. But see, Kinney v. Barnes, No. 13-0043 (Tex. 2014), at p. 10 (an injunction
against future speech based on past adjudications of the same or similar statements is
presumptively unconstitutional as a prior restraint). Appellant timely objected on constitutional
and jurisdictional grounds, but the trial court relied on the legal and evidentiary theories
propounded by Appellees. See generally, Court Reporter's Transcript For July 17, 2014.
D. Bravenec's Concealment Of Deed Records And Deadman's Lack Of Candor
Subverted The Judicial Process And Continued A Prior Pattern Of Misconduct.
Appellees continued to prosecute claims for relief under false and misleading pretenses
despite an automatic stay and various noticed and unnoticed changes in circumstances affecting
their underlying case. For example, Attorney Glenn Deadman filed a trial court pleading on
December 8, 2014 in which he requested trial court sanctions for supposed discovery violations
without disclosing the transfer to Torralba in pleadings or in open court. Deadman continued his
nondisclosure in this Court on January 30, 2015 with pleadings alleging that it is "impossible for
the rightful owner of the Property, Bravenec, to sell or market the same." Appellees' Motion at
para. 10. Bravenec and Deadman were also mutually responsible for an earlier act of deceit in
which Bravenec gave pleading testimony and Deadman filed pleadings and made statements in
open court accusing Appellant of criminal contempt for the filing of a lis pendens notice in the
docket of Case No. 2014-CI-07644. See generally, Court Reporter's Transcript For July 1, 2014.
The obscure and duplicitous nature of Bravenec and Deadman's conduct, as reflected
both in pleadings and in open court, calls into question the trustworthiness and probative value of
the briefing they proffered on January 30, 2014, especially in the context of the subject matter
the Court expressly designated for the interlocutory appeal. According to the Court's decision
upholding trial court sanctions in Bravenec v. Flores, Case No. 04-11-00444-CV (Tex. App. -
San Antonio, 2013), Attorney Bravenec leveled baseless claims and malicious personal attacks
against an opposing party and witness in an effort to deflect attention from his own wrong-doing
in a foreclosure contest.
State authorities publicly reprimanded Attorney Deadman for deceitful conduct on
August 30, 2003. See, The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Glenn J. Deadman, Misc.
Docket No. 02 -9051, at p. 4, in Exhibit C of Appellant's Second Supplemental Appendix. In the
latter proceeding, the commission found that
Respondent made false statements to third parties, to include staff members with the
Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Service, opposing counsel, and the ad
litem for Hannah Flaherty ... The conduct of Respondent described above constitutes
violations of the following Disciplinary Rules: ... Rule 4.01(a) -In the course of
representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact
to a third person... Rule 8.04(a)(3) -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Id. The trial court clearly underestimated the risk that Bravenec and Deadman are repeating the
same wrongful conduct that led authorities to sanctions them in other litigation. By all
indications, Bravenec and Deadman willfully deceived the trial court process on July 9, 2014
with a collateral attack on Appellant's purchase money defense that conflated two separate
transactions to make it appear that Appellant's rights were extinguished in 2006, and with false
statements to create the impression that Appellant had blocked Bravenec from selling to One For
Autism when in fact the contracting parties executed the sale to Torralba on July 8, 2014.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant's fourth issue for interlocutory review invites an inquiry into whether the rules
of construction call for judicial notice of fraud of the court issues in determining the sufficiency
of dismissal orders designated for interlocutory appeal. Section 27.011 of the Act resolves the
inquiry in the affirmative with the provision in subsection (a) that "[t]his chapter does not
abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other
constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions," and in subsection (b) that
"[t]his chapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully." Id.
On its face, Section 27.011 (a) and (b) calls for a treatment of chain of title claims and
fraud on the court issues that gives effect to rules of construction under Tex. Prop. Code Section
202.003(a) (requiring liberal construction of purpose and intent of restrictive covenants). See,
James, et al, v. Calkins, Case No. 01-13-0018-CV (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] August 21,
2014) (enforcing TCPA coverage of lis pendens notice noting mootness doctrine in TCPA lis
10
pendens case), and Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d
71; (Tex. App - 1st Dist. - Houston 2013) (crediting movant's tortious interference defense).
Questions of law about fraud on the court pertaining to jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.
State v. Holland, 221 S.WJd 639, 642 (Tex. 2006). See also, Jones v. Beckman, 2007 Cal. App.
LEXIS 8326 (Cal. App., 2007) (rejecting unnoticed request for affirmative relief by non-movant
as an extra-jurisdictional cross-appeal), and Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal. 4th
180, 192 (2005) appealed in Super. Ct. No. CV780187 (Cal. 2005) (lack of trial court jurisdiction
due to automatic stay). "Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of
interlocutory orders ... only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction." Thrivent Fin.
for Lutherans v. Brock, 251 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
"Texas courts strictly construe statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals because a statute
authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order is in derogation of the general rule that only
final judgments are appealable." Id. "Jurisdiction over an interlocutory order when not expressly
authorized ... by statute is jurisdictional fundamental error." N. Y. Underwriters, Id. While the
rule requiring strict construction of interlocutory appeals has not been read to preclude
interlocutory review of Anti-SLAPP automatic stay issues, Varian, Id, it arguably does preclude
review of moot controversies, James, Id., and unnoticed cross-appeals by non-moving parties
who seek statutorily unauthorized affirmative relief. Jones, Id. Thus, the presentation of moot
issues, or even live issues presented for the first time on appeal unsupported by a notice of cross
appeal, a petition for extraordinary relief or proof of fundamental error, is generally improper.
The TCPA's provisions for interlocutory appeals imply authority to address fraud on the
court through its core provisions to promote the First Amendment's right to petition the
government, Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972), and from
11
the American ideal that "the courthouse door is open to everyone," NAACP v. Meese, 615 F.
Supp. 200, 205-06 (D.D.C. 1985). "It has never been the theory of free institutions that the
citizen could say only what courts or legislatures might license him to say, or that his sentiments
on any subject or concerning any person should be supervised before he could utter them.
Nothing could be more odious, more violative or destructive of freedom, than a system of only
licensed speech or licensed printing." Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920).
For that reason, the presumptive unconstitutionality of injunctions against future speech is
especially compelling where fraud on the court issues are involved: "Given the inherently
contextual nature of defamatory speech, even the most narrowly crafted of injunctions risks
enjoining protected speech because the same statement made at a different time and in a different
context may no longer be actionable. Untrue statements may later become true; unprivileged
statements may later become privileged." Kinney v. Barnes, Id., at p. 17.
Lastly, "[t]he TCPA treatment of [sanctions] is equivalent to that permitted for vexatious
litigation tactics in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 37,as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1927." Williams v.
Cordillera Communications, Inc., Case No. 2:13-CV-124 (S.D. Tex., November 24, 2014), at p.
2. In this regard, the TCPA grants the courts of appeals express authority to sanction a plaintiffs
retaliatory conduct in derogation of a defendant's good faith attempt to exercise of the right to
participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law. Farias v. Garza, 426
S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. filed May 6, 2014) (crediting movant's first
amendment defense). As this Court has previously enunciated, "[f]or the law to countenance ...
abrupt and shameless shift[s] of positions would give prominence (and substance) to the image
that lawyers will take any position, depending upon where the money lies, and that litigation is a
12
mere game and not a search for truth ... On balance, we conclude that the costs to the legal
system ... outweigh its benefits..." Zuniga v. Grose, Locke, & Hebdon, Id. at p. 318.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ON APPELLANT'S
FOURTH ISSUE FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
The gross insufficiency of the Appellees' justifications for their attacks on Appellant's
exercise of the rights to lis pendens speech and to petition for enforcement of a purchase money
lien is best shown by preponderant evidence of a presumptively unconstitutional cause of action
to suppress future speech, Markel V. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1996, no writ) (enforcing rule against prior restraints), by evidence of probable cause for fraud
on the court by Bravenec in securing a post-stay gag order during his recent campaign for
judicial office, and by briefing issues that Appellees either failed to timely raise, abandoned or
deliberately misrepresented, and thus forfeited on appeal. NY. Underwriters, Id. Equally
important, the conveyance to Torralba they sought to conceal demonstrates the failure to meet
their TCPA burden to produce clear and specific evidence that Appellant interfered with the
contracting parties' rights. Further, as parties opposing enforcement of the "separate transaction
rule" of res judicata doctrine, Appellees' just as clearly failed to meet their TCPA burden to
produce clear and specific evidence of a nexus between the purchase money transaction alleged
by Appellant - in terms of time, place, origin and motivation - and the 2010 case they ask to
enforce. Anderson v. Law Firm of Shorty, Dooley & Hall, (E.D. La. Feb 17, 2010) aff'd in 393
Fed. Appx. 214 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2010) (applying separate transaction rule to client dispute).
Transactional And Evidentiary Errors
7th Point of Error: The trial court's rulings on evidence relating to Appellant's beneficial
interest in restrictive covenants from the purchase in 2003 and equitable servitudes
litigated in bankruptcy court in 2012, were insufficient due to departures from Tex. Prop.
Code 202.003(a).
13
The trial court erred by sustaining Appellees' relevance objection to the concluding part
of Appellant's line of cross-examination showing that Bravenec did not know what was meant
by the terminology "third party purchase money lien claim." Appellant produced clear and
specific evidence to support allegations about time, place, original and motivation for the
purchase money transaction in 2003, to establish that the fact situation here is analogous to the
one in Rose v. Rothrock, Case No. 08-3884 (E.D. Penn, 2009), where the lis pendens notice of
an interest holder of an executory contract was upheld.4 Appellees offer no evidence to affirm or
denythe particulars of the separatetransaction defense other than Bravenec's testimony that he
did not what was meant by the term, third party purchase money lien interest, and that he could
not offer a citation to the Court to show where the text of the judgment in the 2010 case that
supported his conclusions about its res judicata effect. Bravenec's testimony was relevant to
establish that Appellees' offer no evidence with which to dispute the applicability of Rose, Id.,
and that their reference to only a single transaction is accounted for by a lack of hornbook
knowledge on creditorrights, whether actual or pretended, and that this factor directly accounts
for his view that Appellant had filed lis pendens notices with no legally enforceable interest in
the subject property to supporthis claim. Bravenec's testimony clearly shows that Appellees
failed to meet their burden with clear and specific evidence on the particulars of time, place,
origin and motivation as needed to rebut Appellant's invocation of the separate transaction rule.
4 As shown by document referenced in the "Court Reporters Master Index" filed on December 4,
2014, Defendant's Exhibit 7 establishes the time that the purchase money transaction occurred. Exhibit 8
establishes that place the purchase money issue was litigated was in the bankruptcy court as opposed to
the federal districtcourt. The supporting attachments to Exhibit 7 establish conclusively that Appellant
was the origin of the purchase money that was advanced to Moroco Ventures, LLC, and that the
motivation for the transaction was to enable Moroco to execute a purchase fromRoy Ramspeck, et al.
Defendant's Exhibits also establish the time, place, origin, and motivation for the separate and collateral
foreclosure transaction in the 2010 case. See generally, Defendant's Exhibits 2, 4 and 5.
14
8th Point of Error. The insufficiency of the trial court's rulings on evidence relevant to the
foreclosure transaction litigated in federal district court in the 2010 case caused undue
prejudice to Appellant's case.
The trial court erred at least twice in rendering evidentiary rulings related to Appellees'
reliance on the 2010 case as the law of the case. Specifically, the trial court overruled
Appellant's objections to testimony suggesting that the trial court was obligated to give res
judicata effect to the 2010 as an adverse ruling on purchase money issues. Court Reporter's
Transcription For July 9, 2014 at p. 32. The trial court later sustained objections to cross-
examination by Appellant raising questions about the impartiality of the federal court process
arising among other things from relationships between Appellee Bravenec's father, and the
presiding federal court judge, that the line of questioning "has nothing to with what my decision
is today," Court Reporter's Transcription For July 9, 2014 at p. 62. Although Appellees also
produced testimony and documentary evidence on time, place, origin and motivation factors to
prove the transaction from the 2010 case that supports their lis pendens controversy, there is no
material disagreement about the meaning of the evidence except that Appellees' evidence
substantiates a single transaction from 2006 litigated in the 2010 case, and attempts support a
fact theory analogous to the one in Wallace v. Kelley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56472 (D. Neb.
Aug. 1, 2007). In contrast, Appellant's evidence establishes two transactions, one in 2006 and
one relating back to the acquisition of the subject property in 2003. The trial court's treatment of
evidence conflating the two mistakenly suggests that authority in Wallace applies, and thereby
misconstrues that covenants that run with the land in favor of purchase money lien interests.
Jurisdictional And Constitutional Errors
9th Point Of Error: The gag order findings are legally insufficient due to the non-
justiciability and mootness the subject matter due to jurisdictional fundamental errors.
15
Applying NY. Underwriters, Id., an expedited dismissal is justified by Sec. 27.011 to
reflect changes in jurisdictional circumstances that limit the Court's authority to conduct an
interlocutory appeal. Cf, Smith v. O'Neill, 813 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex.1991); City ofSeagoville v.
Smith, 695 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ). Here, as in Jones, a California
Anti-SLAPP case dismissing an unnoticed cross-appeal in opposition to a lis pendens filing, the
briefing proffered in the Appellee's motion for extension of time rests implicitly on changed
circumstances that arose when the Appellee replaced their tortious interference theory on July 8,
2014 with a de novo claim for fraud that requires an affirmative grant of extraordinary relief
before it can be properly presented to the Court. Desai v. Reliance Mach. Works, Inc., 813
S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). Alternatively, the actions taken
by the trial court with a complete lack of jurisdiction vitiate the original controversy and render it
abstract. Here as in James, where certain appellees non-suited their claims, the transfer of the
subject property deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the parties except for applying
sanctions. Id. Here as in Markel, Id., the presumptive unconstitutionality of the Appellees' legal
action to suppress future lis pendens speech deprived subject matter jurisdiction. Lastly, here as
in Varian, the trial court lacked capacityto enter a gag order after the on-set of an automatic stay.
Arguably, Appellees' reliance on unnoticed changes in position also warrants the
summary forfeiture of their claims for mootness. Their prosecution of gag order relief on tortious
interference grounds, after amending their original petition to abandon that claim, invites a
conservative reading of the jurisdictional requirements of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Section
51.014(a) in pari materia with the mandate for liberal construction in Section 27.011(b), and
with the guiding principle that "[t]he protection of [The Texas] anti-SLAPP statute is a
substantive immunity from suit." Batzel v. Smith, Id. Enforcement of immunity principles is
16
clearly justified because the case they offer to prosecute stems - not from organic issues the
Court has designated for review in accordance with TCPA standards - but from false testimony
and prima facie fraud on the court by Bravenec and Deadman on July 8, 2014 and July 9, 2014 in
instigating unconstitutional gag order findings on false pretenses and in violation of an
automatic stay. Varian, Id. Because Appellees depart from legal and factual theories in their own
live pleadings of record, they are not entitled to the benefit of the Court's appellate jurisdiction to
aid them with affirmative relief unsupported by a timely notice of cross appeal or the filing of
meritorious petition for extraordinary relief. Jones, Id.
10th Point Of Error: The dismissal denial order and gag order are insufficient due
to fundamental errors involving unlawful prior restraints in derogation of constitutionally
and statutorily protected rights to free speech and to petition.
A gag order in civil judicial proceedings will withstand constitutional scrutiny under
Texas law only where there are specific findings supported by evidence that (1) an imminent and
irreparable harm to the judicial process will deprive litigants of a just resolution of their dispute,
and (2) the judicial action represents the least restrictive means to prevent that harm. Markel, Id.
Here, Appellees procured a gag order from the trial court on July 17, 2014 that is presumptively
unconstitutional according to the criteria applied in Markel, Id., was moot for voidness from its
inception, and was further mooted by changed circumstances including the transfer of the subject
property without the benefit of a final order to remove clouds from title, James, Id.
Regarding the first element, Appellant's core objection to the gag order under Markel is
that the trial court relied on inherently suspect evidentiary representations by Appellees in giving
res judicata effect to the judgment in Martin v. Grehn, Case No. 14-50070 (5th Cir. 2013) (order
denying rehearing entered December 4, 2014) as an adverse ruling on matters that remain under
on-going litigation in Martin v. Bravenec, Case No. 14-50093 (5th Cir.). On November 24, 2014,
17
the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered that Appellant's motion to strike Appellee federal appellate
brief be carried with the case, thus signifying that Martin v. Grehn is not final with respect to the
matters that remain under collateral review in Martin v. Bravenec, et al. In short, the trial court's
gag order was addressed to a foreclosure transaction readily distinguishable from the purchase
money transaction that is documented in Appellant's 2014 lis pendens notices. As further set
forth Appellant's First And Second Briefing Issues and in his First, Second, Third, And Fourth
Points of Error, the failure to meet the first element is further underscored by the fact that there is
no independent cause of action under Texas law to enjoin lis pendens speech as Appellees
anecdotally presumed. Thus, there was no potential risk of a disruption of the juridical process.
Regarding the second element, the gag order was clearly not the least restrictive means to
address Appellees contentions about the need for injunctive relief based on lis pendens notices
expunged in the past in light of public records showing that Bravenec recorded a conveyance to
Torralba on July 8, 2014 and considering the alternative of remedy of requesting monetary
damages: Considering Bravenec's recantation on the issue of Appellant's financial condition,
the least restrictive alternative to avoid undue disruption was to allow joinder so all the interested
parties could be heard on protective orders relief as the standards apply. Markel, Id.
Fundamental Public Policy Errors
11th Point of Error: The dismissal denial order and gag order are legally insufficient due
to bad faith conduct for an improper purpose by Attorneys Bravenec and Deadman.
It is well settled as a matter of public policy that bad faith in the judicial context involves
than bad judgment or negligence, but is the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest,
discriminatory or malicious purpose, and improper motive is an essential element of the claim.
See, Bravenec v. Flores, Id. Here, discrepancies between deed and docket records imply that
Attorneys Bravenec and Deadman acted consciously to pass off a special warranty deed on
18
Bravenec's transferee in lieu of a general warranty deed, and that their motive was to deprive the
value of compensation owed to Appellant as a beneficiary of restrictive covenants and equitable
servitudes that run with the land. Given the duplicity between his representations to the trial
court in pleadings filed on July 8, 2014, and the representations he made in pleadings on January
30, 2015 to secure extensions relief, Bravenec's posture in this matter was dishonest towards
Torralba as the purchaser, and discriminatory from a due process standpoint toward Appellant. It
was also malicious per se for Deadman to prosecute a gag order on a tortious interference theory
on July 9, 2014 the day after amending Appellees' petition on July 8, 2014 to abandon that
claim, since those acts deprive Appellant of meaningful notice of the underlying controversy and
create an abstractions which can only serve to multiply and distort the overall litigation. As a
person accused of wrongdoing, therefore, Appellant asserts a Sixth Amendment right to confront
his accuser, Deadman, about the contradictory implications of his disciplinary history and his
present dual role as an attorney and witness for Bravenec. Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof1Conduct
R. 3.08(a); and In re Brittingham, 2010 WL 1608885 (Tex. App., 2010, orig. pet.).
12th Point of Error: The existence of a substantial and material fact issue about fraud on
the court, due to corrupt abuse of judicial process, indicates that Appellees' trial court
showing to meet their burden under the TCPA's clear and specific evidence standard, or to
demonstrate the applicability of exemptions, was grossly insufficient.
A corrupt abuse of judicial process by attorneys differs from mere bad faith conduct by a
litigant for an improper purpose, and is cognizable as a species of fraud on the court, where
attorneys engage in conduct involving extrinsic or intrinsic fraud that defiles a court's internal
capacity to administer justice in an orderly manner. Navarro v Browning, 826 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.,
1987).5 The rendition ofperjurous testimony on a matter extrinsic to the litigation qualifies as a
5 Not unlike the situation here, theNavarro court noted that"... for various reasons [the appellant]
has never had consideration, by either the federal or state courts, of the merits of his colorable claim that
the state court judgment resulted from the corrupt abuse of the judicial process." Id. The court then
19
form of extrinsic fraud, and an attorney's failure to disclose a material jurisdictional fact
qualifies as intrinsic fraud. 6TCPA policy goals were defiled with colorable fraud on the court
here from Bravenec's testimony alleging inability to complete a sale he already executed, and
Deadman's false statement in open court that One For Autism was the prospective purchaser.7
PRAYER FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF
Appellant requests (1) reversal of the dismissal denial order and dismissal gag order
appeal as moot; (2) render an expedited judgment of dismissal with prejudice to the Appellees
and their successors in interest; and (3) award sanctions taking due account of past disciplinary
actions against Bravenec and Deadman to deter a repetition of egregious TCPA violations.
proceeded to hold that "extrinsic fraud, that is, fraud that was not the subject of the litigation, that infects
the actual judicial process, is grounds to set aside a judgment as procured by fraud ... [and that Supreme
Court precedent also] allows a judgment to be attacked on the basis of intrinsic fraud that results from
corrupt conduct by officers of the court." Id.
6 Texas law holds that a person commits perjury under the Texas Penal Code if, with intent to
deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning when: (1) he makes a false statement under oath
or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made; and (2) the statement is required or authorized
by law to be made under oath. Penal Code s 37.02. An affiant commits aggravated perjury if, in addition,
the false statement: (1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and (2) is material.
Penal Code Section 37.03. The comments to Rule 3.03 of Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct are equally relevant: "An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared
for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein ...
However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer
or a representation of fact in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion
is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances
where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation
prescribed in Rule 1.02(c) not to ... assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation."
7 According to TCPA standards, the mere existence of fraud on the court issues such as these
justifies dismissal and extraordinary writ relief allowing Appellant to reopen Case No. 04-14-00841-CV
(Exhibit E) so the original lien grant to Bravenec can be disposed as a legal service expenditure. For
remedial purposes, Appellant computes the value of restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes in
controversy at an amount equal to the value of his purchase money investment in 2003 of $135,000 plus
the value of the bridge loan commitment in the amount of $296,000 in Exhibit F. See Archerv.
Blakemore, 367 S.W.2d 402, (Tex. App. Austin -1963) (quiet title case involving client request to cancel
deed used for in-kind payment). Zuniga authorizes a remedy for an assignment to a law firm of a chose in
action on a client's legal malpractice claim, the attorney client relationship with McKnight and Bravenec
which enabled them to acquire a second lien interest from Appellant's former corporate estate, and later a
first lien interest from an third party, warrants the immunity from the entire transaction.
20
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that the Court grant relief
in all things, for such other reliefboth in law and in equity as he maybe justly entitled. 8
Dated: February 19, 2015 Respectfully Submitted,
Rowland J. Mar
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Tx 78207
(210) 323-3849
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I mailed a copy of this "Appellant's Advisory On Fraud On The Court, Further Notice of
Briefing Amendments, and Second Supplemental Appendix to Glenn Deadman and Torralba
Properties, LLC on February 19, 2015.
Rowland J. Mai
8 The other live defect in Bravenec's chain of title relates back to his post-petition foreclosure of a
bankruptcy case, under color of first lien note of which he did not own at the time of the foreclosure,
while still appearing as Appellant's attorney of record on the docket of Probate Case 2001-PC-1263 until
march 19, 2014. See, "Administrator's Response To Motion To Expunge" in Defendant's Exhibit 5 in the
Court Reporter's Master Index dated December 4, 2014; cf., Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Brown, 821
S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1991) (malpractice claim due to wrongful foreclosure tolled by suit in a suit litigation).
In requesting contingent leave to reopen and consolidate his original petition for extraordinary
relief, see Order in Case No., 04-14-00841-CV in Exhibit E of Appellant's Second Supplemental
Appendix, Appellant attaches significance to language Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Sec. 27.005
providing that the moving party may establish "by a preponderance of the evidence each
essential element of a valid defense to the nonmovant's claim," and related language in Section
27.008(b) which authorizes the courts of appeals to expedite "an appeal or other writ, whether
interlocutory or not..." Sec. 27.007 further provides that a court can rule on issues tending to
establish "whether the legal action was brought to deter or prevent the moving party from
exercising constitutional rights and is brought for an improper purpose, including to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of litigation." In Jennings v. Wallbuilder
Presentations, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 519, 527 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2012, pet. filed), the court of
appeals found that "[i]f no interlocutory appeal is available when the trial court expressly
rules on a motion to dismiss by signing an order then the phrase 'from a trial court order on a
motion to dismiss' appearing after the phrase 'whether interlocutory or not' is rendered
meaningless," and that this factor indicated that it "must carefully analyze the costs and benefits of
granting mandamus relief," and "whether mandamus review will spare litigants and the public the
time and money wasted'enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.'" Id.
Appellant respectfully submits that the preponderance of evidence supports his estoppel by deed defenses,
and that if necessary, reopening his petition for extraordinary relief for consolidation with the instant
interlocutory appeal will aid prospective enforcement of TCPA public policy objectives.
21
Case No. 04-14-00483-CV
ROWLAND J. MARTIN TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant
v. FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT
EDWARD BRAVENEC AND 1216
WEST AVE. INC.
Appellees ) BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
APPELLANT'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
A First And Final Account Of Attorney John Tutt in In re Moroco Ventures, LLC, Chapter
11 Bankruptcy Case No. 06-50329.
B Deed From Edward Bravenec To Torralba Properties, LLC dated July 8, 2014.
C. Document From The Commissionfor Lawyer Discipline v. Glenn J. Deadman, Misc.
Docket No. 02-9051.
D. Court Reporters Transcript From Hearings in Case No. 2014-CI-07644 On May 23, 2014.
E. Order and Memorandum Opinion in In re RowlandMartin, Case No. 04-14-00481 -CV.
F. Commitment Letter To Rowland Martin For $296,000 Secured Real Estate Loan
22
A
23
06-50829-rbk Doc#64 Filed 11/21/06 Entered 11/21/06 12:36:13 Main Document Pg 1 of
18
United States Bankruptcy Court
Western District of Texas
San Antonio Division
In re:
Case No. 06-50829 RBK
MOROCO VENTURES, LLC
Chapter 11
DEBTOR
COVER SHEET FOR FIRST AND FINAL APPLICATION FOR ALLOWANCE OF
LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES TO JOHN M TUTT, ATTORNEY FOR
MOROCO VENTURES, LLC
1. Applicant: John M. Tutt
10010 San Pedro, Suite 660
San Antonio, TX 78216-3804
2. First and Final Application
3. Client: Moroco Ventures, LLC
P 0 Box 5279
San Antonio, TX 78201-5279
4. Time Period Covered: 5/01/06 through 11/21/06
5. Total Amount Requested: $15,881.77
(A) Fees: $15,760.00
(B) Expenses: $121.77
06-50829-rbk Doc#64 Filed 11/21/06 Entered 11/21/06 12:36:13 Main Document Pg 2 of
18
United States Bankruptcy Court
Western District of Texas
San Antonio Division
In re:
Case No. 06-50829 RBK
MOROCO VENTURES, LLC
Chapter 11
DEBTOR
SUMMARY FOR FIRST AND FINAL APPLICATION FOR ALLOWANCE OF
LEGAL FEES AND EXPENSES TO JOHN M TUTT, ATTORNEY FOR
MOROCO VENTURES, LLC
I. Client: Moroco Ventures, LLC
II. Requesting Applicant: John M Tutt, Attorney for Moroco Ventures, LLC
III. Total Amount of Fees and Costs Requested: $15,881.77
a. Fees: $15,760.00
b. Expenses: $121.77
c. Pre-petition retainer: $10,000.00 which remains as a retainer
d. Time period covered: 5/01/06 through 11/21/06
IV. Breakout of Current Application:
A. John M. Tutt spent 78.8 hours @ $250.00 per hour = $15,760.00
[Adjusted downward for no charge time; Minimum Fee Increments are .1
hours]
B. Expenses:
1. Parking expense $26.00
2. Postage expense $64.77
3. Filing fees $26.00
Total Expense $121.77
C. Amount allocated for preparation of this fee application: $500.00 (2hours)
V. Prior Applications:
None.
06-50829-rbk Doc#64 Filed 11/21/06 Entered 11/21/06 12:36:13 Main Document Pg 3 of
18
VI. Other Co-Equal or Administrative Claimants in Case:
Name Party Represented
U S Trustee (quarterly fees)
VII. Results Obtained:
The going concern value of the Debtor deteriorated which Debtor pursued its
reorganization efforts, due to continuing interference from certain creditors with Debtor's
business activities. Post-petition, the Debtor's business showed improvement initially
and then deteriorated and ultimately lost its primary asset. The Debtor's Disclosure
Statement and Plan of Reorganization was filed but was withdrawn after the primary
asset was foreclosed in October 2006.
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN M TUTT
10010 San Pedro, Suite 660
San Antonio, TX 78216-3804
(210)366-9676
(210) 366-0412 fax
John m Tutt
SBOT: 20347000
jtutt@quixnet.net
ATTORNEY FOR DEBTOR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on November 21, 2006, a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Summary for First and Final Application for Allowance of Fees and Expenses
to John M Tutt, Attorney for Debtor, has been transmitted by first class mail, to the
parties on the attached service list.
B
24
;;Book 16765 Page S75 3pgs ^ ---"" ~ •-••••• -•- ' Doc# 20140116444
STCGF* 1402942377
NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY RIGHTS: IF YOU ARE A NATURAL PERSON, YOU
MAY REMOVE OR STRIKE ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM
ANY INSTRUMENT THAT TRANSFERS AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY BEFORE IT
IS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE PUBLIC RECORDS: YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER OR YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER,
WARRANTY DEED WITH VENDOR'S LIEN
STATE OF TEXAS " §
§ KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
COUNTY OFBEXAR §
THAT, EDWARD L. BRAVENEC, hereinafter called Grantor (-whether oneor more), for
and in consideration of the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS and other good and valuable
considerations in hand paid by TORRALBA PROPERTIES, LLC, hereinafter called Grantee
(whether, one or more), whose mailing address is: 18507 Canoe Brook
• San Antonio, TX 78258 >me receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and
for the further consideration of the sum of £239,200.00, to Grantor in hand paid by
PROSPERITY BANK, which amount is advanced at the special instance and request of the
Grantee herein, and as evidence thereof, the Grantee has executed and delivered one certain
promissory note of even date herewith for the sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($239,200.00), payable to the order
of PROSPERITY BANK, whose mailingaddress is as setforth in the hereinafter mentioned Deed
of Trust, bearing interest and payable as in said note provided; said note containing the usual
provisions for attorney's fees and acceleration ofmaturity in case ofdefauj£,..and being secured by
Vendor's Lien herein and hereby expressly retained in favor of the Graptor, on the property
hereinafter described, and as further security forthe payment ofsaidnote,the SUPERIOR TITLE
and VENDOR'S LIEN to said property are hereby transferred and conveyed to PROSPERITY
BANK without recourse against Grantor, said note being also secured by Deed :ofTrust of even
date herewith to DAVE) ZALMAN, Trustee; has GRANTED, SOLD and CONVEYED and by
these presents Grantor does hereby GRANT, SELL and CONVEY unto Grantee herein, the
following described real property together with all improvements thereon situated in Bexar
County, Texas, describedas follows, to-wit:
Lots 1, 2 and 3, Block 50, New City Block 8806, LOS ANGELES HEIGHTS
ADDITION, City of San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, according to plat
thereof recorded in Volume 105, Pages 284-286, Deed and Plat Records of
Bexar County, Texas, SAVE AND EXCEPT 0.00049 of an acre, being 21.51
square feet out of Lot 1, as described by Deed to the City of San Antonio
recorded inVolume 5180, Page 1873, Real Property Records ofBexar County,
Texas; and
Lots 23, 24 and 25, Block 50, New City Block 8806, LOS ANGELES
HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION, City of San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas,
according to plat thereof recorded in Volume 8100, Page 97, Deed and Plat
Records of Bexar County, Texas.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described premises, together with all and' singular
the rights and appurtenances thereunto in anywise belonging unto the said Grantee herein,
Grantee's heirs, successors and/or assigns forever. And Grantor does hereby bind Grantor,
Grantor's heirs, successors and/or assigns, TO WARRANT and FOREVER DEFEND all and
singular the said premises unto the Grantee herein, Grantee's heirs, successors and/or assigns
against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming orto claim the same or any part thereof.
Grantee assumes taxes for the current year onthe property hereby conveyed.
This conveyance and the warranties oftitle given herein are made subject to any and all
restrictions, easements, setback lines, covenants, conditions and reservations, of record affecting
the property herein conveyed.
1216 West Avf. San Aufnnin Tfvae 780(11
EXECUTED ON THE FOLLOWING DATE: JUL 0. 8 2014
Ch~
EDWARD L. BRAVENEC
(ACKNOWLEDGEMENT)
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF BEXAR
instrument was/ACKNOWLEDGED before me, on this .the / day of
" 20 /l .by EDWARD L BRAVENEC.
'Pubhc,§tafeef,L™„. .
••&cp
""i/miun^
AFTER RECORDING RETURN TO: PREPARED TNTHE OFFICE OF:
Torralba Properties, LLC WEST &WESTATTORNEYS, P.C.
1S507 Canoe Brook, 2929 Mossrock, Suite 204
San Antonio, Texas 78258 San Antonio, Texas 78230
1216 West Ave.. San Antonio. Texas 7R2M
c
25
ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
Misc. Docket No. 02 - »'tlJJ-
Appointmentof a District Judge to Preside
in a State Bar Disciplinary Action
The Supreme Court ofTexas hereby appoints the Honorable Jeff K. Work, Judge ofthe
189th District Court of Harris County, Texas, to preside inthe Disciplinary Action styled
The Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Glen J. Deadman
filed in the District Courtof Bexar County, Texas.
The Clerkof the Supreme Courtshallpromptly forward to the District Clerkof Bexar
County, Texas, a copy of the Disciplinary Petition and this Order for filing pursuant toRule
3.03, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
As ordered by the Supreme Courtof Texas, in chambers,
With the Seal thereof affixed at the City
OfAustin, thisr"iay ofFebruary, 2002.
ADAMSrCLERK
COURT OF TEXAS
This assignment, made by Misc. Docket No. 02-9051 is also an assignment by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Texas Government Code §74.057.
Signed this 2Lday of February, 2002.
c
Thomas R. Phillips y
Chief Justice
No.
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
DISCIPLINE §
§
V. § BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
§
§
GLENN J. DEADMAN § JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY PETITION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Comes now, Petitioner, COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, a committee of the
State Bar of Texas, complaining of Respondent, GLENN J. DEADMAN, and in support thereof
would respectfully show the Court the following:
Parties
Petitioner is the COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, a committee ofthe State Bar
ofTexas. Respondent, GLENN J. DEADMAN, State Bar Number 00785559, was, at the time the
followingallegedacts ofprofessional misconduct occurred, an attorney licensedto practicelawinthe
State ofTexas and a member ofthe State Bar ofTexas. Respondent may be served with process at,
309 South Main Avenue, San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas 78204, his usual place of business.
Venue
Atthe time thealleged professional misconduct occurred, Respondent maintained a lawoffice
inSanAntonio, Bexar County, Texas. Thealleged actsofprofessional misconduct occurred inwhole
or in part in Bexar County, Texas. Accordingly, pursuant toTexas Rules ofDisciplinary Procedure
3.03, venue is proper in Bexar County, Texas.
Original Disciplinary Petition - Glenn J. Deadman
Page 1
Discovery Level Designation
1.
Pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 190.1, Petitioner designates that discovery in this action should
proceed pursuant to Level 2 (Tex.R.Civ.P. 190.3).
Professional Misconduct
2.
Petitionerbringsthisdisciplinary actionpursuantto State Bar Act, Tex.Gov't. CodeAna, Sec.
81.001. etseq. (Vernon 1988). the Texas DisciplinaryRules ofProfessional Conduct and the Texas
RulesofDisciplinary Procedure. Thecomplaint whichforms the basisofthis disciplinary actionwas
filed with the State Bar of Texas by Brian D. and Mary K. Flahertyon July 21,2000. The acts and
conduct ofRespondent, as hereinafter alleged, constitute professionalmisconduct.
3.
On August 30, 1996, Brian D. and Mary K. Flaherty signed a twenty percent (20%)
contingent fee contract with the Law Offices of Samuel B. Katz. Respondent later accepted the
Flaherty's case as a referral from Judge Katz. The contract entered into by the Flaherty's and the
Law Offices of Samuel B. Katz, as witnessed by Glenn J. Deadman, was "to represent Brian and
Mary Flaherty and their Minor Child, Hannah Flaherty for any and all injuries sustained from her
stepping on an in-ground barbecue pit and includes any and all possible causes of action stemming
from same including actions taken by USAA."
4.
The Case was settled for $265,000.00 and the funds distributed by friendly suit on
December 16,1997. Of the total settlement, respondent was paid $53,000.00 in attorney fees and
Original Disciplinary Petition - Glenn J. Deadman
Page 2
$1,256.48 for costs incurred. The Judgment further ordered $94,968.75 be placed in the registry
of the Court to be held until the court is notified of the total ofthe medical lien sought by Brooke
Army Medical Center (BAMC) for the medical treatment of the Minor Child, Hannah Flaherty.
The Judgment ordered that upon demand by BAMC saidbill is to be paid, in an amount not to
exceed $94,968.75. Ifthere are any funds left after the payment of the BAMC bill the funds are
to be distributed seventy-five percent (75%) to the benefit of Hannah Flaherty and the lesser of
twenty-five percent (25%) or $10,000.00 to Brianand MaryFlaherty.
5.
BAMC refused to compromise their lien for medical treatment and sought to collect from
the Flaherty's seizing their tax refund. Respondent refused to assist inthe negotiation ofa
reduction inthe lien unless his clients signed a newcontingent fee contract for thirty-three percent
(33%) ofthe entire $94,968.75 deposited with the court for the medical lien. Brian Flaherty's
signature appears on a new contingency contract dated December 16,1999. Respondent
negotiated a settlement ofthe Uen for $47,484.38 on March 20,2000. Respondent retained
$31,339.69 as attorney fees.
6.
Respondent had an obligation to continue negotiating with BAMC for areduction ofthe
medical lien. Respondent's insisting on asecond contingency contract to continue to negotiate
the reduction ofthe BAMC Uen resulted in Respondent coUecting an iUegal orunconscionable fee.
The second contingency fee taken out ofthe money ordered deposited into the registry ofthe
court amounted to the taking oftwo contingency fees from the same settlement funds covered
Original Disciplinary Petition - Glenn J. Deadman
Page 3
under the original contingency fee contract covering aU possible causes of action arising from the
injury to Hannah Flaherty.
7- .
During the course ofthe representation,Respondent made false statements to third parties, to
include staff memberswith the Department ofDefense Financeand Accounting Service, opposing
counsel, and the ad Utem for Hannah Flaherty. Respondent indicated that a settlementwasreachedin
the underlyingcase in December 1997 at least partly on the basis that Respondent reduced hisfeesby
fifty percent (50%). Respondent, infeet, received the fuU contingency fee oftwenty percent (20%) as
stated in the original contract ofAugust 30,1996.
8.
Theconduct ofRespondent described above constitutes violations ofthefoflowing Disciplinary
Rules:
Rule 1.04(a) - A lawyer shaU notenter into anarrangement for, charge, or coUect aniUegal fee
or unconscionable fee.
Rule 4.01(a) - Inthe course ofrepresenting a cUent a lawyer shaU not knowingly make a false
statement ofmaterial feet to a third person.
Rule 8.04(a)(3) - Alawyer shaU not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner prays that ajudgment ofprofessional
misconduct be entered against Respondent imposing an appropriate sanctionas the fects shall warrant
and that Petitioner have such other reUef to which it is entitled, including costs ofcourt, Utigation
expenses and attorney's fees.
Original Disciplinary Petition - Glenn J. Deadman
Page 4
The Supreme Court of Texas
CHIEF JUSTICE
THOMAS R. PHILLIPS CLERK
201 West 14th Street Post Office Box 12248 Austin TX 78711 JOHN T. ADAMS
JUSTICES Telephone: 512/463-1312 Facsimile: 512/463-1365
NATHAN L. HECHT EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
CRAIG T. ENOCH WILLIAM L. WILLIS
PRISCILLA R. OWEN MAR 07 2002
JAMES A. BAKER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASST
DEBORAH G. HANKINSON JIM HUTCHESON
HARRIET O'NEILL
WALLACE B.JEFFERSON ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ NADINE SCHNEIDER
Mr. Robert E. Kaszczuk
Assistant DisciplinaryCounsel, StateBar of Texas
425 Soledad, Suite 300
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Glenn J. Deadman
309 South Main Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78204
Dear Mr. Kaszczuk and Mr. Deadman:
Pursuant to Rule 3.02 ofthe Texas Rules ofDisciplinary Procedure, Ihereby notify you that
the Supreme Court ofTexas has appointed the Honorable JeffK. Work, Judge ofthe 189* District
Court, Houston, Texas to preside in
Commission forLawyer Disciplinev. Glenn J. Deadman
Sincerely,
SIGNED
John T. Adams
Clerk
The Supreme Court of Texas
CHIEF JUSTICE
THOMAS R. PHILLIPS CLERK
201 West 14th Street Post Office Box 12248 Austin TX 78711 JOHN T. ADAMS
JUSTICES Telephone: 512/463-1312 Facsimile: 512/463-1365
NATHAN L. HECHT EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
CRAIG T. ENOCH WILLIAM L. WILLIS
PRISCILLA R. OWEN
JAMES A. BAKER
m 07 2002 DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASST
DEBORAH G. HANKINSON JIM HUTCHESON
HARRIET O'NEILL
WALLACE B.JEFFERSON ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ NADINE SCHNEIDER
The HonorableReagan Greer
District Clerkof Bexar County
100 Dolorosa Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205-1205
Dear Mr. Greer:
Pursuant to Rule 3.03 ofthe Texas Rules ofDisciplinary Procedure, Iam sending for filing
State Bar ofTexas Disciplinary Action styled: The Commissionfor Lawyer Discipline v. Glenn J.
Deadman, and acopy ofthe Supreme Court's order appointing the Honorable JeffK. Work, Judge
of the 189* District Court, Houston, Texas, to preside in this Disciplinary Action.
Sincerely,
SIGNED
John T. Adams
Clerk
cc: Honorable Jeff K. Work
Mr. Robert E. Kaszczuk
Mr. Glenn J. Deadman
The Supreme Court of Texas
CHIEF JUSTICE
THOMAS R. PHILLIPS CLERK
201 West 14th Street Post Office Box 12248 Austin TX 78711 JOHN T. ADAMS
JUSTICES Telephone: 512/463-1312 Facsimile: 512/463-1365
NATHAN L. HECHT EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
CRAIG T. ENOCH WILLIAM L.WILLIS
PRISCILLA R. OWEN MM? 07 2002
JAMES A. BAKER DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASST
DEBORAH C. HANKINSON JIM HUTCHESON
HARRIET O'NEILL
WALLACE B. JEFFERSON ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
XAVIER RODRIGUEZ NADINE SCHNEIDER
Honorable Jeff K. Work
Judge, 189th District Court
610 Civil Courts Building
301 Fannin Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Dear Judge Work:
We enclose for your information a copy of the order of assignment, a copy of the
Disciplinary Action, acopy ofthe notification letter to Mr. Deadman and Mr. Kaszczuk, and acopy
of the letter to theDistrict Clerk ofBexar County.
Itis recommended that, six to eight weeks after receipt ofthis letter, you or your coordinator
contact the Bexar County Administrative Office (956-335-2300) to find out the district court to
which this disciplinary case has been assigned, names and addresses of counsel, etc. We then
recommend that, either before or immediately after you set the case for trial, you contact the
Presiding Judge ofthe Administrative Judicial Region into whichyou have been assigned (210-769-
3519) to reserve acourtroom, obtain acourtreporter, obtain claims forms for your expenses incident
to presiding over this disciplinary case.
Sincerely,
SIGNED
John T. Adams
Clerk
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
#7099 3220 0000 0580 7266
January 4,2002
John T. Adams, Clerk
Supreme Court of Texas
P.O. Box 12248
Austin, Texas 78711
RE: Commission for Lawyer Disciplinev. Glenn J. Deadman
Dear Mr. Adams:
Enclosed please find an original and three (3) copies of a Disciplinary Petition being filed by the
Commission for Lawyer Discipline against Glenn J. Deadman. Mr.Deadman hasdesignated Bexar
County as his principal placeof practice. Request is hereby madethat the Court appoint an active
District Judge who doesnotreside intheAdministrative Judicial Region inwhich Respondent resides
to preside in this case. Upon appointment, request is made that you notify the Respondent at the
address shownbelow and the undersigned ofthe identity and address ofthe judge assigned:
Glenn J. Deadman
309 South Main Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78204
As a practical matter, I would respectfullysuggest that you inquire with the judge to be appointed as
to whether he or she will be able to comply with the 180 day deadline by which the case must be set
for trial as set forth in Section 3.07 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. If not, I would
respectfully request that an alternate appointmentbe made.
Once a trial judge has been appointed, please forward the original and three (3) copies of the
Disciplinary Petition, thefiling feecheck, also enclosed herewith, andtheCourt's appointing orderto
the District Clerk of Bexar County, Texas, with the request that the suit be filed, servicebe obtained,
and a filemarked copy ofthe petition be returned to the undersigned.
425 SOLEDAD, SUITE #300, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205, (210) 271-7881
Ako enclosed are apre-addressed envelope for your use in transmitting the petition, etc., to the
District Clerk ofBexar County, Texasand areturn envelope to be sent to the District Clerk ofBexar
County, Texas, for the Clerk's use in returning afilemarked copy ofthe petition to the undersigned
Thank youfor yourcourtesies in this matter.
Sincerely,
Robert E. Kaszd
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
Enclosures
REK/apr
D
26
1
2 2014-CI-07644
3 BRAVENEC * IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT
4 V. * 5 7TH DISTRICT COURT
5 MARTIN * BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
6
7
8
9
10
11 REPORTER'S RECORD
12 HONORABLE DICK ALCALA
13 MAY 23, 2014
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 On the 23rd day of May, 2014, the
21 above-entitled cause came on to be heard before the
22 Honorable Dick Alcala in the 288th District Court of
23 Bexar County, Texas, whereupon the following proceedings
24 were taken by machine shorthand.
25
1 APPEARANCES
2 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Mr. Glenn Deadman
3 SBOT # 78 5559
705 S. Main
4 San Antonio, TX 78204
210.472.3900
5
6 DEFENDANT
Mr. Rowland Martin, Pro Se
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
r~~
1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2 THE COURT: All right, then, we'll get on
3 the record at this time in cause number 2014-CI-07644,
4 Edward Bravenec and West Avenue, inc., the plaintiff,
5 versus Rowland Martin. It's Rowland, R-o-w-1-a-n-d,
6 Martin Junior, the defendant.
7 Just announcements, state your name and
8 who you represent, please.
9 MR. DEADMAN: Glen Deadman. I represent
10 the plaintiffs, Edward L. Bravenec and 1216 West Avenue,
11 inc. Mr. Bravenec is here with me, both in his
12 individual capacity, and as a representative of 1216
13 west Avenue, inc.
14 Judge, we had a hearing before Judge
15 Mery, who entered a restraining order, and the
16 injunction hearing was set for today. The defendant
17 Rowland Martin was served. He's filed an answer and a
18 counterclaim, and we'd ask the court to take judicial
19 notice of the file, but that is in the file.
20 THE COURT: I will do so.
21 MR. DEADMAN: The bailiff for Judge
22 Casseb said he was here yesterday afternoon trying to
23 seek a continuance and did file a continuance. His name
24 was called this morning, and he has not attended, so
25 he's not here this morning.
1 THE COURT: All right.
2 MR. DEADMAN: We do have for the court a
3 binder of evidence that we wouldn't -- we were going to
4 present, tab 1 through 19, and we'd move for the entry
5 of those exhibits.
6 THE COURT: okay. These exhibits are
7 admitted.
8 MR. DEADMAN: Judge, this case has a long
9 history. I would -- I can put Mr. Bravenec on the
10 stand, but the documents I put in front of you are all
11 from prior court proceedings and court orders, if you
12 start at the front, you'll see that there was an
13 injunction that involved Mr. Bravenec and the relevant
14 parties concerning the foreclosure on a piece of
15 property which is the subject matter of this suit. That
16 was back in 2006.
17 THE COURT: All right.
18 MR. DEADMAN: The injunction was denied,
19 and the property was set for foreclosure and was meant
20 to go forward on a foreclosure. Since 2006, the
21 defendant in this case, Mr. Martin, has pretty much been
22 to every court, including federal court, probate court,
23 continually filing lis pendens to stop the sale of this
24 property. Probably most poignant to the case is some of
25 Judge Hudspeth's orders that are set forth at tab 6,
1 which are orders back in 2013 where he actually ordered
2 Mr. Martin to remove the lis pendens. Mr. Martin
3 refused. The judge ordered him to expunge the lis
4 pendens. He did not. There were ex parte notices filed
5 and continued to be filed, until finally -- I believe
6 there's an order at tab 15, again, by Judge Hudspeth,
7 but found part way down through his order that the court
8 observes that for years the plaintiff in this, being
9 Rowland Martin, has engaged in a campaign of harassing,
10 frivolous, and dutiful litigation. His lawsuits serve
11 no purpose other than to increase the litigation costs
12 of defendant and waste judicial resources.
13 Once again, this property has been placed
14 on the market for sale, once again, he has filed a lis
15 pendens. We obtained a restraining order to have that
16 taken off. we're now seeking assistance of this court
17 to turn that into an injunction so the sale will not be
18 stopped again. And, obviously, if he does this again,
19 this time we're going to ask for criminal contempt.
20 Mr. Bravenec, you've heard the
21 representations I've made to the court, is there
22 anything inaccurate or incorrect?
23 MR. BRAVENEC: No. There's been at least
24 four lis pendens, and there is a buyer right now that
25 wants to purchase the property, but every time there's a
1 sale, he files another lis pendens to stop it. This has
2 been going on, the sale, for about eight months.
3 THE COURT: Okay. And your request for
4 injunction is to prevent him from filing the lis
5 pendens.
6 MR. DEADMAN: That's the sole purpose,
7 Judge. I tender to the court a copy of the injunction.
8 in addition we've asked that they not contact the
9 lender. What's happened in the past is, even if there's
10 not a lis pendens, he will contact the lender or the
11 purchaser to let them know verbally there's clouds on
12 the title, he has an interest, you can't transfer the
13 title.
14 THE COURT: okay. What date did you want
15 to set that?
16 MR. DEADMAN: Any particular date for
17 trial?.
18 MR. BRAVENEC: Not in October or
19 November. I don't care otherwise.
20 MR. DEADMAN: How about any date in the
21 first week of February next year, Judge?
22 THE COURT: The 9th of February?
23 MR. DEADMAN: That will work, Judge.
24 THE COURT: All right. Here you go.
25 MR. DEADMAN: Thank you, Judge. May we
1 be excused.
2 THE COURT: Yes.
3 (Proceedings adjourned.)
4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Martin's here
5 in this hearing. I've just signed an injunction, sir.
6 You want to be heard on that?
7 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor. First I'd
8 like to say that I was served with the process for this
9 court date yesterday. I was informed of an original
10 court date on May the 27th, and I had filed an answer
11 and counterclaims on Wednesday in preparation for a
12 hearing that I thought was taking place on Tuesday.
13 Thursday, yesterday, less than 24 hours
14 ago, I was served with the motion for resetting and a
15 resetting order that I believe we signed, and so I'm not
16 prepared, Your Honor, to go forward with the case. I
17 just found out my -- my showing of cause why the
18 injunction should not issue is fact intensive. I have
19 witnesses that I would need to call, and I would also --
20 to have a fair hearing, I would also need to at least
21 consult with a member of the Texas Bar.
22 I identified two attorneys, and I've
23 previously spoken to one, but I have not had an
24 opportunity to consult with them about the merits of
25 this matter, and I would be irreparably harmed --
8
1 THE COURT: Just have a seat.
2 MR. martin: okay, sure. I would be
3 irreparably harmed, Your Honor, if the plaintiffs were
4 to receive an injunction and then proceed to a sale of
5 the subject property without a fair and meaningful
6 opportunity for me to be heard. I do have -- there are
7 substantial grounds for my show cause position in the
8 pleading that I filed on Wednesday, and I have -- I
9 have -- in the time that I had, I did prepare a
10 supplemental answer and counterclaims, but which has not
11 been filed.
12 THE COURT: All right.
13 MR. MARTIN: As a matter of fact --
14 THE COURT: This involves the same
15 property that is in the federal district court of which
16 Judge Hudspeth's entered several orders?
17 MR. MARTIN: it's actually on appeal,
18 Your Honor, to the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
19 in case 1450093. Here is the pleading that I filed on
20 Wednesday.
21 MR. DEADMAN: Judge, with regard to the
22 appeal, you'll actually file that -- the appeal was
23 dismissed with an order never to file anything again.
24 MR. MARTIN: That's not correct, Your
25 Honor. I have current correspondence from the Fifth
1 Circuit Court of Appeals showing otherwise. The letter
2 is from a deputy clerk extending the time for filing of
3 a brief in case number 1450093, and the pleading
4 supporting --
5 MR. DEADMAN: That's a different case
6 number, Judge.
7 MR. MARTIN: Well, nonetheless, it is an
8 appeal from the case that we're referring to, and it
9 involves matters that are part of the subject matter of
10 this proceeding.
11 THE COURT: What about the notice he's
12 saying on this injunction matter?
13 MR. martin: There's the service of
14 process that I received, and the order that you signed
15 is attached, if you refer to the return of service,
16 you'll see the initials for Harry McCain, and it shows
17 that he delivered it on the 22nd.. He entered 22 in the
18 space for indicating when the return was served -- when
19 the matter was served.
20 THE COURT: Mr. Deadman?
21 MR. DEADMAN: Judge, may I confer with
22 Mr. Martin for a second.
23 THE COURT: Yes.
24 (Discussion off the record.)
25 MR. DEADMAN: Judge, in deference that
10
1 the defendant is pro se, I'll agree to continue the
2 matter 45 days, as long as a restraining order stays in
3 effect, and we'll reset it for a hearing on a date
4 that's convenient for Mr. Martin.
• 5 MR. MARTIN: That's fair.
6 THE COURT: All right. Now, you're
7 talking about the restraining order -- the ex parte
8 restraining order that's in effect?
9 MR. DEADMAN: Yes, sir.
10 MR. MARTIN: So the -- there might have
11 been some events that transpired before I got here. I
12 heard you refer, Your Honor, to an injunction. Are you
13 referring --
14 MR. DEADMAN: Today is the injunction
15 heari ng
16 THE COURT: Today's the injunction
17 hearing.
18 MR. DEADMAN: And the judge actually
19 signed the injunction, but with the court's permission,
20 I'll withdraw that signature and withdraw the
21 injunction, and we'll do the continuance.
22 MR. MARTIN: Very good. Thank you, Your
23 Honor.
24 THE COURT: All right. But the
25 restraining order remains in effect.
11_
1 MR. DEADMAN: Yes, sir.
2 THE COURT: whatever restraining order
3 was signed before today.
4 MR. DEADMAN: Yes, sir.
5 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
6 MR. DEADMAN: if you could give me a day
7 that's 45 days from now, Judge, and I'll write it in the
8 order. What this says, that your continuance is
9 granted, we're going to put a date in.
10 MR. martin: okay.
11 MR. deadman: The conditions of the
12 restraining order remain in effect, and you'll have your
13 hearing at whichever judge we get assigned to.
14 MR. MARTIN: Very good.
15 (Discussion off the record.)
16 THE COURT: 7th of July?
17 MR. DEADMAN: May I check.
18 THE COURT: check your calendars.
19 MR. DEADMAN: Yes. Thank you, Judge.
20 (Discussion 'off the record.)
21 THE COURT: Any day that week, I suppose,
22 if you wanted to, July 7th, after 45 days.
23 MR. MARTIN: I would propose the Friday
24 might be more convenient for witnesses.
25 THE COURT: The 11th? He's proposing the
**>£•. "-"-^.^H^
12
.•£L-
1 11th. He's checking his calendar.
2 (Discussion off the record.)
3 MR. deadman: July 9, Your Honor.
4 THE court: okay.
5. MR. DEADMAN: 9 o'clock.
6 THE COURT: All right. Then the parties
7 agree to reset this matter for July 9th, 2014 at 9 a.m.
8 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
9 MR. DEADMAN: In presiding.
10 THE COURT: In presiding, that's correct
11 And I did sign an injunction based on what I heard, but
12 that order is withdrawn. The temporary restraining
i ( 13 order is agreed between*the parties, remains in effect.
14 MR. DEADMAN: Yes, Sir.
15 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
16 the COURT: All right. So ordered.
17 MR. DEADMAN: I present to the court the
18 motion for continuance, if the court just wants to put
19 the date in there.
20 THE COURT: July 9th, 2014.
21 MR. DEADMAN: And for the record I'm
22 tendering a copy of the same order to Mr. Martin.
23 THE COURT: Okay.
24 MR. deadman: Thank you, Your Honor.
25 the COURT: I'm going to allow the
13
1 withdrawal of the matters that were submitted to the
2 court.
3 MR. deadman:. Appreciate it, Judge, and
4 the notebook
5 MR. MARTIN: May I have a copy -- signed
6 copy also?
7 MR. DEADMAN: I can get a photocopy.
8 MR. MARTIN: okay. Thank you.
9 MR. deadman: May we be excused, Judge.
10 THE COURT: Yes.
11 MR. DEADMAN: Thank you.
12 THE COURT: Thank you.
13 (Exhibits withdrawn.)
14 (Proceedings adjourned.)
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
14
1 STATE OF TEXAS
2 COUNTY OF BEXAR
3
4 I, Kayleen Rivera, Certified Court Reporter in
5 and for Bexar county, State of Texas, do hereby
6 certify that the above and foregoing contains a true
7 and correct transcription of the proceedings
8 requested in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
9 of which were reported by me.
10
11 I further certify that the total cost for the
12 preparation of this Reporter's Record was paid by
13 Mr. Glenn Deadman. / /
14 Tp^ which I certify on this the *OLh day
15 of bA£k£^i___, 2oH
16
17
18 u^_
KayTseen [Rivera, CSR 5364
19 Auxiliary official Court Reporter
Criminal' District Court Administration
20 101 W. Nueva, Suite 301
San Antonio, Texas 78205
21 Telephone: 210.335.2081
Exp: 12-31-2014
22
23
24
25
A
L
E
27
jfourtl) Court of ^Lppeate
^>an Antonio, tEexas;
December 8, 2014
No. 04-14-00841-CV
IN RE Rowland MARTIN
ORDER
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
On December 3, 2014, relator Rowland Martin filed a petition for writs of mandamus and
prohibition. On December 8, 2014 relator filed an emergency motion for temporary relief. The
court has considered the petition and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief
sought. Accordingly, the petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition is DENIED. See Tex.
R. APP. P. 52.8(a). Because this court has issued a stay in the related and currently pending
interlocutory appeal, No. 04-14-00483-CV, relator's emergency motion for temporary relief in
this proceedingis DENIED AS MOOT. The court's opinion will issue at a later date.
It is so ORDERED on December 8, 2014.
M OF Ap% }A4A^J J
ustice
WHEBSSQj^J have hereunto set my hand and affbced the seal of the said
courtan tins ™TErr!ber,li014.
-§& Keith E. Hottle
Clerk of Court
Jfourtf) Court of Sppeate
B>an Sntonto, ZEexa£
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-14-00841-CV
IN RE Rowland MARTIN
Original Mandamus Proceeding1
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 17, 2014
PETITION FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION DENIED
On December 3, 2014, relator Rowland Martin filed an original proceeding seeking writs
of mandamus and prohibition. On December 8, 2014, relator filed an emergency motion for
temporary relief pending a ruling on the petition. The court has considered relator's petition and
is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writs
of mandamus and prohibition is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). Because this court has issued
a stay in the related and currently pending interlocutory appeal, No. 04-14-00483-CV, relator's
emergency motion for temporary relief is denied as moot.
PER CURIAM
1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2014C107644, styled Edward L. Bravenec and 1216 West Ave., Inc. v.
Rowland Martin Jr., pending in the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Solomon
Casseb, III presiding.
F
FISHER ENTERPRISES LLC
senior debt placement corporate finance
September 21, 2006
Mr. Rowland Martin
Moroco Ventures, LLC
1216 West Avenue
San Antonio, XX 78201
Up- Sffifrflnn Secured Real Estate Bridge Loan
Dear Mr. Martin:
As per our conversations with you and a review of the submitted information concerning the above
referenced transaction, attachedis our fee agreement for your review. If it is acceptable, please sign
it and return it along with the retainer so that we may proceed. We represent a specific lender, to
whom we are correspondent, and with whom we have reviewed your transaction. Based upon the
rcoresentations that have been made, both verbally and in •writing and subject to successful
completion of due diligence, ourlender will fund your loan request.
The lender that wcrepresent will provide up to a 65% advance against the current ^as is' value of the
strip center that you seek to refinance, secured with a first Uen on the property. The lender will
confirm the exact value of the real estate after an on site inspection and appraisal. The current cas is'
value is defined as the price that could be obtained in a 6 month marketing period. The loan will be
priced at approximately 12%, interest only, with 3 to 4 points to the lender at closing as an
aclminisLrative fee. Basedon a $298,000 loan amount (65% of $459,000) the monthly paymentwould
be $2,980. The lender must be satisfied that you can cover the monthly debt service and that there is
a viable exit strategy. If necessary, you canplace a portion of the initial loan amount into an interest
reserve account to cover the monthly debt service for some period of time. They will normally offer
a 2 to 3-year agreement, with no pre-payment penalties. Prior to closing you will be required to pay
for the customary expenses and fees of the lender with respect ro their necessary due diligence
performed in connection with the closing of this loan. You can expect the loan to take
approximately 30 days to close, subject to Bankruptcy Court approval. Our lender specializes in
financing distressed real estate throughout North America.
Please feel free to call me if there are any questions regarding either of these proposed packages.
'tanklin
Managing Member
DAF:cam
THE RODIN STUDIOS, 200 WEST 57™ STREET, SUITE 602
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019
212-223-10-*-* FAX 21 2-223- 26 9 4 WWW.h-ISHHS.ENTERPRISESLI-C.COM