Frederick Dawson Graham v. Dena Marie Turner ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
12-14-00336-CV
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM
CATHY LUSK
CLERK
NO. 12-14-00336-CV
______________________________
FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE TYLER, TEXAS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS 4/23/2015 3:09:33 PM
AT TYLER, TEXAS CATHY S. LUSK
Clerk
______________________________
FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM
VS.
DENA MARIE TURNER
FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM,
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
DENA MARIE TURNER,
PETITIONER/APPELLEE
______________________________
Appealed from the County Court at Law of
Nacogdoches County, Texas
______________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
______________________________
TOM RORIE
State Bar No. 17238000
210 North Street
Nacogdoches, TX 75961
(936) 559-1188
FAX (936) 559-0099
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
In accordance with Rule 38.1(a) of the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE , Appellant
Frederick Dawson Graham provides the following list of all parties, and the names and addresses
of all counsel:
Appellant: Frederick Dawson Graham
Counsel: Mr. Tom Rorie
210 North Street
Nacogdoches, TX 75961
(936) 559-1188
FAX (936) 559-0099
trorie@sbcglobal.net
Appellee: Dena Marie Turner
Counsel: Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle
One Riverway, Suite 1700
Houston, TX 77055
(713) 907-8668
FAX (713) 840-6351
jarettlarochelle@yahoo.com
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Identity of Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Statement of the Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Points of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Argument and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Point of Error No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Appellee An
Ownership Interest in Appellant’s Residence
Point of Error No. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Parties were Tenants in
Common in Appellant’s Separate Property Residence Because
the Evidence is Insufficient to Support that Holding
Point of Error No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Trial Court Erred by Divesting Appellant of One-Half of His
Ownership in His Separate Property Residence and Awarding that
Interest to Appellee
Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Basis for the Trial Court’s Ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Court Should Decline to Follow Harrington and Aaron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Evidence is Not Sufficient to Support a Finding that the Parties
were Tenants in Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
iii
Existence of Joint Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership . . . . . . 9
Was there a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence? . . . . 10
Prior Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds . . . . 11
Appellant Paid off the Residence Quickly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent . . . . . . . . . 13
The Trial Court had No Discretion to Divest Appellant of Any
Interest in His Separate Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Point of Error No. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Find that the
Residence was Not Purchased with Appellant’s Separate Property
Funds When the Evidence Conclusively Showed a Purchase with
His Separate Funds
Point of Error No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion when it Disregarded
Uncontradicted Evidence that Appellee Committed Fraud on
the Community Estate
Point of Error No. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Disregarding Evidence
of Substantial Benefits Received By Appellee During the Marriage
Point of Error No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Finding that Appellant at
Fault in the Break-Up of the Marriage by Considering Evidence
that was Not Relevant in Time and Not Supported by the Evidence
Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee on Eight Occasions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
iv
Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage are Not
Relevant as Fault in Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Point of Error No. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Ordered Appellant
to Pay Spousal Support to Appellee Although He had No Ability to Pay
Point of Error No. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding a Disproportionate
Part of the Tract Adjoining the Residence
Conclusion and Prayer for Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Aaron v. Aaron
2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bowers
393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. V. McShane
239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex.2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company
84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex.2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Cameron v. Cameron
641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14, 15
Chavez v. Chavez
269 S.W.3d 763 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008) no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Davis v. Huey
571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer
554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Griffin v. Birkman
266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17
Harrington v. Harrington
742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Hooks v. Bridgewater
229 S.W. 1114 (Tex. 1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
In re Allstate Insurance Company
232 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.App-Tyler 2007, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
In re Bass
113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
vi
In re Case
28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
In the Interest of M.C.F.
121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Jackson v. Smith
703 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Knight v. Knight
301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc.
724 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 17
Lozano v. Lozano
2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL 4882816 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.) 7
Mangum v. Turner
255 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.-Waco 2009, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
McKeehan v. McKeehan
355 S.W.3d 282 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 28
Mea v. Mea
464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Powell v. Powell
822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 1991, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Puntarelli v. Peterson
405 S.W.3d 131 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Schlueter v. Schlueter
975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Verhage v. Verhage
2006 TexApp LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (TexApp-Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.) . 8, 9, 14
Walker v. Packer
827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
vii
Wilhoite v. Sims
401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no writ hist.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Zagorski v. Zagorski
116 S.W.3d 309 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2003, pet. den.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Codes, Rules and Statutes Page
TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
viii
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant and Appellee were married in 2007 and in 2012 Appellee filed for divorce. The
issues in the divorce case all involved property. A hearing on a request by Appellee for temporary
orders was held on March 24, 2014, and Appellant was ordered to pay temporary spousal support
to Appellee in the amount of $2,000 per month.
Trial on the merits was conducted by the trial court on May 30, 2014; July 17, 2014; and July
18, 2014.
The court granted the divorce, divided various items of personal property, and held that the
residence acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage was owned by the parties as tenants in
common. The trial court ordered a disproportionate division of the proceeds of the sale of a lot
adjoining the residence to Appellee, ordered Appellant to pay $8,000 in unpaid temporary spousal
support, and awarded Appellee $10,000 in attorney’s fees.
ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a native of the United Kingdom who was trained as an accountant and worked
for Texaco for 28 years. His specialty was in the field of accounting for the oil and gas industry.
He held a number of very responsible positions. In that capacity he was also Texaco’s
representative to international organizations that developed and implemented software and
accounting systems for that industry.
Appellant was married and has three daughters. He retired from Texaco when that company
was taken over by Chevron and had both vested retirement benefits and received what he called a
“redundancy,” another term for severance pay. He received those benefits both in a lump sum and
in periodic monthly installments of retirement benefits.
In 2001 Appellant was employed by Shell Oil Company in Houston, Texas and living in an
apartment. Appellee was one of his neighbors. They met and began a romantic relationship.
Eventually they moved in together into Appellee’s apartment. Appellant began divorce proceedings
to be divorced in the U.K. While the divorce proceeding was pending Appellant altered or forged
some documents in order to mislead Appellee as to the status of his divorce.
Appellant explained at trial that in the UK one can be divorced either by separation, which
is a longer process, or by alleging cruelty or adultery. Because of his concern about his family and
in particular one daughter about whose mental health he had concerns, he wanted to seek a divorce
by the less traumatic but slower divorce process. He modified the papers sent to him from the UK
to represent that divorce was imminent when the process was actually slower.
Appellant left Shell and began to work as a international business consultant, taking jobs with
oil and gas producers in Mexico, Asia, and other places where he would work for several months by
x
contract for an agreed contract amount. In 2006 he formed an LLC named Graham Global
Consulting to which his income as a consultant was paid. Appellant and Appellee lived together
at the time but Appellee was not shown as an owner of the company.
Appellee wanted to move to Nacogdoches, her home town. The parties looked at residences
in Nacogdoches to consider purchase. In 2006 Appellant purchased a residence in Nacogdoches.
He paid the initial down payment and closing costs with funds sent to him by wire transfer from the
UK in the amount of $85,000. The residence was conveyed to Appellant alone as grantee and he
alone signed the note and deed of trust in order to secure a loan for payment of the balance.
Appellant paid off the balance in monthly installment payments of several thousand dollars sent to
him by wire transfer, and in less than two years had paid off the entire balance owed.
Appellee claimed at trial that the parties had purchased the residence together with the
agreement that both would own it, and that Appellant had orally agreed to convey an interest in the
home to her. Appellant denied any such agreement.
The parties were married on January 31, 2007. At the time of marriage Appellee had no
property of any value. She had defaulted in payment of student loan debt and Appellant showed at
trial that he had paid $63,000 of her student loan debt during their relationship.
In 2008 a lot adjoining the residence lot became available for purchase. Appellant purchased
it in his name only and again solely signed a promissory note and deed of trust in order to secure a
loan. He paid several thousand dollars down. The parties made several payments on the lot, but
eventually they defaulted. Shortly before trial Appellant borrowed approximately $15,000 from his
sister and brother in law to pay off the balance owed on the lot to avoid foreclosure.
xi
During the marriage Appellee seldom worked and earned little income. The parties lived on
income earned by Appellant in his consulting business. Appellant also had some income from his
retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and some funds he received from his father’s estate after
the father’s death.
Appellant experienced numerous health issues. He had four strokes, two heart attacks, and
epileptic seizures. Both his physical health and mental capacity declined. He suffered from residual
effects on his mental functioning, slurring of words at times, problems maintaining his balance or
equilibrium, and memory problems. He has not worked since 2010. On several occasions he had
funds wire-transferred from the UK to pay living expenses and by the time the parties had separated
he had expended all his funds. At the time of trial his only income was his Texaco retirement check
from which he netted $1,856 per month.
The parties had a tumultuous relationship, with numerous arguments and disputes. By the
end of 2011 they were discussing divorce. At this time Appellee was aware of Appellant’s health
issues. She testified at trial that she took him to see several medical specialists. She told Appellant
at that time she it was her turn to take care of him. However, the parties continued to bicker and
argue. In April of 2012 Appellant accompanied Appellee to Houston to help do repairs to the home
of an aunt of Appellee. The parties again argued and Appellant decided to leave to drive back to
Nacogdoches. They wrestled over the car keys which Appellee refused to give to Appellant.
Appellee claimed at trial that on this occasion Appellant assaulted her. Appellant drove home and
when he arrived at his residence he discovered Appellee’s father removing personal property from
the residence.
xii
The parties again discussed divorce and Appellant prepared a written document as evidence
of their agreement to divide their property. He secured $20,000 from the UK to pay to her as part
of a settlement. Appellee accepted the money but later denied she was bound by any agreement
because Appellant had “breached” that agreement because he had not executed all the documents
necessary for divorce before he left for a trip to the UK.
According to Appellee’s divorce petition, the parties separated July 1, 2012. A few weeks
later Appellant traveled to the UK to see his family members and attend the wedding of a daughter.
While Appellant was in the UK Appellee discovered that while he was there he had visited
some porn sites on line and she discovered the papers regarding his divorce from his previous spouse
that he had altered or forged.
Much of the trial was consumed with Appellee’s evidence, presented in numerous three-ring
binders indexed and tabbed, itemizing all the wrongs that Appellant had done her, including
numerous counts of fraud, allegations that Appellant had committed adultery, numerous allegations
of assault or emotional distress, allegations that Appellant had visited porn sites while in the UK,
and evidence of the substantial income she could have earned in her occupation had she not married
Appellant. She testified at great length that her services to Appellant in connection with his
consulting business were critical to his ability to perform his job, to the extent that she should be
considered a partner in his business.
Appellant’s response was that Appellee had no experience in accounting, much less the
specialized area in his expertise, that she never provided any services to a client, that she never
worked in a client’s workplace, that he had clerical and secretarial support from his clients in the
work place, and that he had never charged nor collected any compensation for any services by
xiii
Appellee. He further showed that while she may have proof-read reports to clients, she lacked the
knowledge and expertise to write any such reports.
In March of 2014 Appellee set a hearing on a request for temporary orders, including a
request for temporary spousal support. Appellant appeared pro se, telling the court that his attorney
had withdrawn due to his inability to pay, he had just returned from the UK where he had suffered
another stroke, and that he could not pay spousal support. The trial court ordered him to pay to
Appellee temporary spousal support of $2,000 per month. He has not done so. The trial court
ordered him on final hearing to pay that support for four months, or $8,000.
In a hearing held after the trial on the merits Appellant showed the trial court that he had
borrowed money to pay off the note on the lot which adjoined the residence and the trial court
modified its ruling to allow payment of that debt out of the proceeds of any sale before the parties
divided the remaining proceeds.
xiv
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by judicially finding and declaring that Appellant and
Appellee are tenants in common as to the residence purchased by Appellant prior to their marriage.
The purported oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is not enforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds, found in TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE 26.01.
If an oral agreement for the conveyance of an interest in real property is permitted under
Harrington v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.) and Aaron
v Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.), the evidence
heard by the trial court is insufficient to support an oral agreement in this case.
To grant an interest to Appellee in Appellant’s residence is to divest him of an interest in his
separate property, which is an abuse of discretion.
Any finding by the trial court that Appellant’s residence was not purchased with his separate
funds is unsupported by the evidence, as Appellant conclusively established that his funds earned
or acquired prior to marriage was the source of the down payment and mortgage payments.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the
community property of the parties acts by Appellee which constitute fraud on the community estate
and involve an amount of money that is significant in relation to the total community estate.
The trial court abused its discretion in failing and refusing to consider in its division of the
community property of the parties financial benefits Appellee received, including Appellant’s
payment of her student loans incurred prior to the marriage, when the amount involved was
significant in relation to the total community estate.
xv
The trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence of alleged wrongful acts by
Appellant both prior to the marriage and after the parties had separated and agreed to divorce
because such evidence was not relevant to the issue of the breakup of the marriage.
The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal support
to Appellee when the evidence showed that the amount ordered was in excess of his income, he was
disabled and unable to work, and he had no resources with which to pay support.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding to Appellee a disproportionate ownership
interest in a lot adjoining Appellant’s residence acquired during the marriage when the evidence
showed that Appellant provided the down payment and incurred debt to pay off the mortgage note
when foreclosure was threatened.
xvi
POINTS OF ERROR
POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
APPELLEE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES
WERE TENANTS IN COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 3: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF
ONE-HALF OF HIS OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE
AND AWARDING THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE
PROPERTY FUNDS WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE
WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 5: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DISREGARDED UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD
ON THE COMMUNITY ESTATE.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 6: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE
DURING THE MARRIAGE.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 7: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
APPELLANT AT FAULT IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING
EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
xvii
POINT OF ERROR NO. 8: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ORDERED APPELLANT TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD
NO ABILITY TO PAY.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 9: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE.
xviii
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
Appellant shows the court that the trial court in this divorce case abused its discretion and
committed errors as a matter of law that in reasonable likelihood caused or contributed to an unjust
or improper decision. Those errors are grouped by subject matter and argument is combined in
order to avoid duplication. All issues involve either the division of marital property or temporary
spousal support.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 1:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE AN
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN APPELLANT’S RESIDENCE.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 2:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN
COMMON IN APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE BECAUSE THE
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THAT HOLDING.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 3:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DIVESTING APPELLANT OF ONE-HALF OF HIS
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY RESIDENCE AND AWARDING
THAT INTEREST TO APPELLEE.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in a family law case is clear: whether the trial court abused its
discretion. “Abuse of discretion” occurs if a trial court makes a decision that is so arbitrary or
unreasonable that it amounts to a clear error. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex.2003). As long as
the trial court does not abuse its discretion it may divide the marital property in such a way as it
deems right. Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.–Tyler 1971, no writ hist.). Despite that
1
broad discretion there must exist some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the property of
the parties. Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2009, no writ hist.).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a finding without sufficient facts on which to
rationally base its ruling. Griffin v. Birkman, 266 S.W.3d 189 (Tex.App.–Austin 2008, pet. ref’d).
While a trial court has discretion to weigh evidence that supports its decision, if the evidence is
legally insufficient to support that decision the court abuses its discretion. In the Interest of M.C.F.,
121 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d).
When a trial court fails to analyze or apply law correctly it may abuse its discretion. There
is no discretion in either determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v.
Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992); In re Allstate Insurance Company, 232 S.W.3d 340
(Tex.App.–Tyler 2007, no writ hist.). Even evidentiary rulings may abuse a trial court’s discretion
if they violate the Rules of Evidence. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931
(Tex.App.–Austin 1987, no writ hist.).
THE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
From comments made during the trial and the multitude of findings by the trial court against
the interest of Appellant the trial judge’s disapproval of Appellant’s conduct is obvious. However,
the court recognized that there was little community property and what is acquired prior to marriage
cannot be community property (RR Vol. 2, p.80.) The evidence showed that Appellee already had
almost all of it. She had all the operating motor vehicles the parties had acquired; had received
$20,000 from Appellant, which he secured to carry out an agreement between them in contemplation
of divorce (Ex. D-46, D-44); and she had emptied Appellant’s business bank account by taking
2
$9,400 without his consent, leaving that account overdrawn (Ex. D-44). The parties had already
divided their personal property with a few exceptions.
The only property of any significant monetary value remaining was Appellant’s residence,
purchased by him prior to marriage. Under the facts and law the trial court was limited in what it
could do regarding that residence. The evidence was clear that the residence had been purchased
prior to marriage and that all the closing documents showed Appellant as the sole owner (Ex. R-11,
R-12, R-13). The substantial down payment made at closing of the purchase came from funds
acquired by Appellant prior to marriage. Appellant was able to trace all the payments made on the
mortgage note to their sources, his retirement benefits earned prior to marriage and his inheritance
from his father.
There was no evidence of an enhancement in value of the residence by use of community
funds, so Appellant neither sought nor did the trial court award any reimbursement to the community
estate from Appellant’s separate estate.
Under these circumstances, if the trial court wanted to award property to Appellee only one
option remained: find a way to give Appellee an interest in Appellant’s residence. So the trial judge
adopted a theory advanced by Appellee, that the parties jointly acquired Appellant’s residence as
“tenants in common.” The trial court then awarded Appellee an undivided one-half interest in
Appellant’s residence and ordered it sold.
That theory has been adopted in only two cases of which Appellant is aware. In Harrington
v. Harrington, 742 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1987, no writ hist.), the court affirmed a
finding by the trial court that the parties were “tenants in common” in a residence acquired solely
in the husband’s name two years prior to marriage solely in his name. In 2012 the 14th Court of
3
Appeals followed Harrington as precedent in Aaron v. Aaron, 2012 Tex.App. LEXIS 769
(Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2012, no writ hist.). There the court found that the parties had an oral
agreement to jointly own a residence purchased in the name of the husband solely as a matter of
convenience.
The Findings of Fact signed by the trial judge are puzzling. For example, Findings 27 and
28 purportedly state that the funds used to purchase Appellant’s residence were not his separate
funds. Yet the trial court did not find that the residence was community property, and the actual
judgment declares Appellee to be a tenant in common, not an owner as community property.
Finding 27 also finds that neither the down payment nor the monthly payments were made with
funds from Appellant’s money market account. And Finding 24 finds (incorrectly) that the down
payment was made with Appellant’s business income, not separate funds. Yet the purchase of the
residence and the payment of the down payment occurred prior to marriage, and there is no evidence
that Appellee ever contributed any monies of hers to the purchase. All monies used to purchase the
residence were earned or acquired by Appellant prior to the marriage: by definition those funds must
have been his separate property.
Since the Final Decree of Divorce signed by the trial judge adjudicates that the parties are
tenants in common in the residence, Appellant focuses on that issue.
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO FOLLOW
HARRINGTON AND AARON
It is public policy that any agreement to convey an interest in real property must be in writing.
TEX . BUS. & COMM . CODE § 26.01(b)(4). This means that when any performance of an agreement
requires a transfer of property in land, that agreement must be in writing. Mangum v. Turner, 255
4
S.W.3d 223 (Tex.App.–Waco 2009, pet. den.). Traditionally this rule has been referred to as the
“Statute of Frauds” and dates back to the earliest Texas jurisprudence. Even if the parties only agree
to a future conveyance of an interest in real property a written contract is nonetheless required.
TEX .PROP .CODE § 5.072(a).
In the very limited instances in which Texas courts have allowed exceptions to the “Statute
of Frauds,” specific evidence and performance by the vendee is required. The most common
exception is that based on Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex.1921), which allows
a party to enforce an oral agreement provided that he can show (1) payment of consideration, in
either money or services, (2) possession by the vendee, which must be exclusive, and (3) the making
by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements to the property. This case does not show
evidence that meets the Hooks v. Bridgewater standard. There is no evidence that Appellee paid any
consideration for an interest in Appellant’s residence, that her possession was exclusive, or that she
made any valuable and permanent improvements to the property (and if any improvements were
made they were funded by Appellant’s income).
Given the public policy of Texas against oral agreements to convey real property, is there
anything about the facts in this case that justified the trial court ignoring that public policy?
Appellant will show that given the facts in this case, and in all cases involving oral promises between
persons in intimate relationships, there is even less reason to ignore that public policy and enforce
such promises.
It is the policy of the State of Texas that promises between spouses or those who reside
together without marriage should only be enforceable if they are in writing. TEX . BUS. & COMM .
CODE §26.01(b)(3). Texas recognizes that promises made in an intimate relationship may be less
5
reliable than arms-length transactions because of the nature of the relationship. The requirement
of written agreements avoids elevating “pillow talk” to enforceable agreements.
Oral agreements between parties engaged in an intimate relationship are less likely to be
confirmed by any written evidence or documentation. In arms-length transactions it is common to
find communications between the parties, whether mailed correspondence as in the past or
communications sent by email, or telecopier today. Those communications are available to a court
as evidence that can either confirm or deny the existence of an oral agreement. When promises are
made in intimate relationships written documentation is much less likely to be found because any
communications are likely private.
In cases to enforce oral promises made by those in intimate relationship it is much less likely
that any third party witnesses will be aware of the communications between the parties and available
to testify. In arm’s length transactions it is much more likely that some third party, whether a
realtor, real estate appraiser, loan officer at a potential lender, or property surveyor may have some
knowledge of any oral agreement between the parties. Those engaged in intimate relationships are
likely to discuss issues privately and without any witnesses.
Another reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements between persons in intimate relationships
is that they almost always require reliance on testimony by an interested party. Testimony by an
interested witness always requires a different level of scrutiny than other types. It has been
recognized that in some instances the testimony of an interested witness may amount to no evidence
at all. The exception to the interested witness rule is that evidence by an interested witness may be
considered if it is not contradicted by any other witness or circumstances and is “direct and positive”
and free of any contradiction, inaccuracy , or other conflicting circumstances. Anchor Casualty Co.
6
v. Bowers, 393 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1965); Lozano v. Lozano, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 9620, 2009 WL
4882816 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2009, no writ hist.). Such testimony may be quite difficult to
find in cases involving persons in intimate relationships.
Finally, a reason to refuse to enforce oral agreements to convey real property between those
in intimate relationships is that the language used in those relationships may differ from that which
would be usual and customary in an arms-length transaction. For example, if two persons who do
not co-habit and do not have an intimate relationship make mention of “our land” or “our property”
the language used has some legal significance, i.e. that each of them owns an interest in the property.
On the other hand, if two people in an intimate relationship speak of “our home” that word has
several possible meanings other than joint ownership. It means where they live. Parties can have
a “home” in an apartment, in a rent house, in a mobile home in a mobile home park. Thus the words
“our house” or “our home” may not be as reliable an indicator of ownership as in other
circumstances.
With the increased frequency of co-habitation by unmarried persons it is likely that more
cases of this nature will arise. The adoption of a theory of “tenancy in common” by those
contemplating marriage threatens to become the exception that consumes the rule.
Harrington and Aaron are not based on the TEXAS FAMILY CODE or any other statutory
provision adopted by the State of Texas. The theory of “tenancy in common” ignores the public
policy of the state against enforceability of oral agreements for conveyances of land, strong
presumption that ownership of property should be governed by its characterization as either
community or separate under the Texas Constitution and the TEXAS FAMILY CODE, and the policy
that agreements between spouses must be written. Those cases offer no reason why the courts
7
should uphold one rule prohibiting oral agreements in most cases but adopt a different rule for those
who cohabit.
This court has recognized that rulings regarding ownership of real property of spouses must
not disregard the distinction between separate and community property. Verhage v. Verhage, 2006
Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.). To adopt a
theory that a spouse or potential spouse can acquire an interest in the separate property of the other
party by some oral agreement threatens to upend the accepted rules of characterization of property,
to simply allow a party to make an “end run” around accepted law.
Other than the Harrington and Aaron, Texas courts have declined to adopt a theory that
persons in intimate relationships, or those who marry, may become tenants in common based on
alleged oral promises. This court should likewise decline to adopt the reasoning of Harrington and
Aaron and find that the trial judge abused his discretion in enforcing an alleged oral agreement
between the parties to convey an interest in Appellant’s residence to Appellee.
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
A FINDING THAT THE PARTIES WERE TENANTS IN COMMON
Even if the court declines to reject the reasoning of Harrington and Aaron the purported oral
agreement in question in this suit should not be enforced as there are substantial differences in the
facts between those cases and this one. The evidence in this case is insufficient to support the trial
court’s ruling. Evidence that is so slight that any inference would be in effect a guess is no evidence
at all. McKeehan v. McKeehan, 355 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. den’d).
8
Existence of Joint Tenancy Is a Question of Law:
It is well established that a trial court hearing a divorce case has substantial discretion in
dividing a marital estate. But the trial court does not have the same discretion on a question of law.
For example, although the court has discretion to decide what evidence it gives weight to, whether
the agreement between the parties is governed by the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. Wilhoite
v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2013, no writ hist.). The trial court has no discretion
at all to award to one spouse an interest in the separate property of the other. Cameron v. Cameron,
641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982); Powell v. Powell, 822 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] 1991, no
writ hist.); In re Case, 28 S.W.3d 154 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2000, no writ hist.); Verhage v.
Verhage, 2006 Tex.App.LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.).
Looking for a Residence Together is Not Evidence of Ownership:
Appellee testified that she and Appellant looked for a residence together. In Harrington the
court noted the testimony of the wife that the parties referred to the residence as “our home.” This
leads to a simple question. How else would the parties who are co-habiting in a residence refer to
it? Joint occupancy is not the same as joint ownership. So how legally significant is the use of the
term “our house” or “our home?” At the time Appellant purchased his residence the parties had co-
habited for several years and intended to continue to do so. Appellant expected that Appellee would
reside with him in any residence he acquired, whether rented or owned. Doubtless he would have
consulted with Appellee before acquiring any residence in which he expected both of them to reside,
whether community or separate. It would be unusual indeed for one party to unilaterally make a
decision to choose a residence for both of them without consulting with the other party.
9
Appellant’s testimony as to the circumstances under which the parties looked for a residence
in Nacogdoches is consistent with this narrative (RR Vol. 3, pp. 79-80).
To illustrate this point, assume that the parents of one of the parties offered to purchase a
house for their son or daughter in expectation of marriage, as a gift to their child. The betrothed
couple then search for a house together in which they will begin their married life. They go to the
closing of the conveyance together. Does their joint search convert the separate property acquired
by gift into jointly owned property? The answer is clearly no.
To further illustrate the point, assume one party owns a separate property business which he
or she either owned prior to marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance. The other party works there.
She or he refers to the business as “our business.” Does that language convert the ownership from
separate to community?
That the parties jointly searched for a residence acceptable to both is not an indicia of
ownership, but a recognition that one member of a couple is likely to consider the wishes of the other
in selecting a place for them to reside. Therefore, that evidence is of little import.
Was There a Common Plan or Design in Acquiring the Residence?
One factor mentioned in both Harrington and Aaron is evidence of a common plan or design
to divide or allocate the expenses of the purchase of the residence and their living expenses. In
Harrington the appellee testified that “she spent much of her separate property income on the house
and on living expenses of the children.”
In Aaron the appellee testified that she paid the closing costs for the purchase of the
residence, that she paid the mortgage payments for the first six months after they acquired the
10
residence, and that when the appellant began to make the mortgage payments she paid for their food
and utilities, a contribution that was equal to the monthly mortgage payment.
The contrast between those cases and this case could not be more clear. The evidence
showed that:
!Appellant paid the entire down payment and all closing costs with his separate funds
received by him by wire transfer from his accounts;
! Appellant paid, with his separate funds, all the mortgage payments after the purchase and
fully paid the balance due on the note made to purchase the residence;
! Appellant paid all the living expenses of the parties, while Appellee paid none except with
his income (RR Vol. 3, p. 47).
Appellee used any income she earned during their relationship for her own purposes and not
as part of a common plan: Appellant paid all their living expenses. (RR Vol. 3, p. 47) There is no
evidence that Appellee contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the purchase of the residence.
Prior Conduct:
In Harrington the court noted that the parties had lived together “for about three years in
residences leased in both their names.” In this case, there is no such indication of a prior joint
residence. In fact, when asked whose residence the parties lived in prior to their marriage Appellee
insisted it was her residence (RR Vol. 2, p. 82).
Appellant Made a Substantial Down Payment with Separate Funds:
In Aaron the court noted that the wife was not able to “contribute” as much toward the down
payment as the husband, clearly implying that there was a joint effort to accumulate funds in order
to purchase the residence. In this case it is clear that all the funds used to purchase the residence
11
were acquired or earned before the parties even knew each other, as a result of Appellant’s long term
employment with Texaco.
The size of the initial payment made by Appellant is significant evidence of his intent to
purchase the home as his own (Ex. R-17; also see p. 20 of Exhibit P-4 showing instructions to wire
transfer the funds and Ex. R-14 which shows the amount required for the closing). If Appellant’s
intent was to acquire a jointly owned residence why commit such a large portion of his separate
funds to the down payment instead of paying for the residence during the marriage?
Appellant Paid Off the Residence Quickly:
If one assumes that the parties intended their relationship to last and it was agreed, as
Appellee argues, to jointly own the residence, why would Appellant agree to such a short note term
and such large monthly payments? He paid off the residence in less than two years after he
purchased it with separate funds he had accumulated prior to the relationship of the parties (Ex. R-
19). If the parties’ intent was to jointly own the residence why not utilize a more common 15 to 25
year mortgage to be repaid by the earnings of the parties during their marriage?
The short payment schedule for payment of the mortgage on the residence is some evidence
of Appellant’s intent to primarily rely upon his separate property funds to pay for the residence
instead of community income he earned during their marriage. This shows an intent to treat the
residence as his alone. Appellant provided the court with an itemized statement tracing all the funds
used to make the monthly house payments to their source (Ex. R-19). Likewise, Respondent traced
all the income earned during the marriage and how it was disposed of, what funds he had on hand
at the time of the marriage, and showed that none of his post-marriage income was sent to the UK
12
and could have been the source of the funds used to make the payments on the residence (Ex. R19a-25).
The Subsequent Conduct of the Parties is Evidence of Intent:
Appellee testified that Appellant told her that the residence would be theirs and that he would
convey record title to her. Yet in 2008 Appellant purchased an adjoining lot in his name only (Ex.
R-26, R-27, R-29, and R-33). Appellee was aware of this purchase.
If Appellee had an agreement that the residence would be conveyed to her and jointly owned,
why did she not object to Appellant also acquiring title to the second tract in his name alone after
their marriage? At the time of the second purchase she was aware that he had never conveyed any
ownership interest in the residence to her although she says he had promised to do so. Her silence
is evidence that contradicts her claim.
Appellee testified that “[i]t was joint ownership of everything, because we built the business
together from 2003 forward.” (RR Vol. 2, p. 109). In 2006, the same year as when Appellant
purchased the residence, he created an LLC named Global Energy Consulting (RR Vol. 2, 84-85)
which showed Appellant as the only owner. So there again, even though she claimed they were
“joint owners” Appellee knew she was not shown as an owner of the LLC.
For the reasons outlined above, the evidence is simply insufficient as a matter of law to
support a finding that the parties agreed to purchase Appellant’s residence and own it jointly, and
the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a one-half interest in that residence to Appellee.
13
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO DIVEST
APPELLANT OF ANY INTEREST IN HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY
The Texas Supreme Court directly addressed an award to one spouse of an interest in the
separate property of the other in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982). The court
explained the distinction between community and separate property this way:
Community property owes its existence to the legal fact of marriage,
and when the parties to that compact determine their relationship
should end, property acquired during the marriage is and should be
divided among them in a just and right manner. By way of contrast
separate property, in the community property setting, owes its
existence to wholly extramarital factors, things unrelated to the
marriage. In relation to that property, the parties are, in essence,
strangers; they are separate. Any property that arises independently
of marriage as a means of “equitably” balancing the spouse’s
positions on divorce cannot be justified.
An award of an interest in Appellant’s separate property residence to Appellee is actually an
attempt to characterize his separate property as some other form of property so that the trial court can
“equitably balance” the positions of the parties, exactly what the Texas Supreme Court said is not
permissible.
As this court said, in Verhage v. Verhage, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 5735, 2006 WL 1791565
(Tex.App.–Tyler 2006, no neg. writ hist.).
Any judicial divestiture of separate property would essentially
disregard the constitutionally mandated distinction between the
separate and community property of spouses. . . . . Moreover,
allowing a trial court to divest separate property from one spouse and
award it to the other spouse as part of the latter’s separate estate
would impermissibly enlarge the exclusive constitutional definition
of separate property.
If the trial court mis-characterized Appellant’s separate property as either community
property of the parties or as the separate property of his spouse, that error is reversible error, because
14
the effect would be to divest the spouse of his separate property. Tex.Const., art. 16, § 15;
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977); Cameron v. Cameron.
This court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in divesting Appellant of his
separate property and awarding Appellee an interest in it. The court should reverse and render
judgment that Appellant’s residence remains his sole and separate property, not subject to sale by
the order of the trial court, and that Appellee has no ownership interest therein.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 4:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
RESIDENCE WAS NOT PURCHASED WITH APPELLANT’S SEPARATE PROPERTY FUNDS
WHEN THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED A PURCHASE WITH HIS SEPARATE
FUNDS.
As Appellant noted above, some confusion exists as to the effect of the trial court’s finding
of fact that his separate property funds were neither used to pay the down payment on the residence
nor the mortgage note payments, when the court then did not find the property to be community
property. The purchase was made prior to the marriage of the parties with Appellant’s funds, so
how could the funds used be anything other than separate property? Appellant is not aware of any
authority that a spouse has a claim to income earned by the other spouse prior to marriage.
Appellant is also confused by the findings by the trial court because, if in fact community
funds were used to improve or pay down debt against the residence the remedy or relief would be
a right of contribution, not a transfer of ownership. Characterization of property is determined at
the property’s inception of title. Chavez v. Chavez, 269 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2008,
no pet.); Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th] 2003, pet.den.)
15
Confusion also arises from the court’s finding because the actual evidence is at such odds
with Findings of Fact 24, 25, 27, and 28. Appellant reviews the evidence regarding the purchase
of the residence to explain the events and to make clear that the findings of fact by the trial court do
not add up to the result.
Appellant’s residence was purchased on August 25, 2006 (Ex. R-11). Appellant was required
to pay at the closing $83,934.95 (Ex. R-11, R-17). Appellant wire-transferred his funds for the down
payment three days prior, on August 22, 2006, in the amount of $85,000 (Ex. R-18). The parties
were not married until January 31, 2007.
Appellant showed the source of each payment made. He showed that the funds used for
payments were sent to him by wire transfer from the United Kingdom and he traced each payment
made to those funds. In support of his claim that his separate funds were used to make the payments
on the residence he offered the testimony of an officer of his bank that he sent no monies abroad to
the UK except for some specific funds used for a specific purpose (RR Vol. 3, p. 9-12). The
purpose of that testimony was to establish that no funds had been transferred by Appellant to the UK
after the marriage of the parties; therefore, any funds that came into the US to Appellant must be his
separate funds because they had to be in the UK prior to the marriage of the parties.
Appellee’s testimony, that the payments made on the residence were actually funded by
community income, is so weak as to be laughable. She claimed the source of the down payment was
income earned by Appellant as a payment for his services through his business and those funds,
coupled with a little of this and a little of that, somehow added up to the amount used to fund the
purchase of the residence. Appellee failed to show how the parties could pay their living expenses
with Appellant’s income, pay income taxes on it, and yet have 100% of it available as a down
16
payment on the residence. And no explanation was given as to how Appellant’s income prior to
marriage became community funds.
If the trial court relied on Appellant’s testimony to support her claim that she should be an
owner of Appellant’s house it clearly abused its discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact, if it
even relied upon them, are at such odds with the credible evidence that it is raises the question if the
trial judge even read them. A trial court abuses its discretion if it relied on facts that are so
unreliable or weak to form a sufficient basis for a rational decision. Griffin v. Birkman, p. 197. A
trial court that makes a decision which is not based on sufficient facts to make a decision either way
abuses its discretion. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., p.938.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 5:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISREGARDED
UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT APPELLEE COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE
COMMUNITY ESTATE.
Appellant offered evidence that during his marriage to Appellee she had used community
funds to improve the residences of both her mother and her aunt (Ex. R-37; R-38a-38i) as well as
payment of other expenses of her family members. He corroborated that testimony with checks and
other records that showed the expenditures (Ex. R- 38a-38i). Appellant testified that these
expenditures were made without his knowledge and consent, and only discovered by him at a later
date (RR Vol. 3, p. 107-111; Ex. R-37; Ex. R-38A-38H; Ex. R-39-39E). Appellee never denied
making those expenditures and never claimed that Appellant was either aware of or had consented
to her expenditures.
The use of community funds by a spouse to improve the property of a relative, without the
knowledge and consent of the other spouse, is what has been termed “fraud on the community.”
17
Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998). Fraud on the community occurs when one
spouse breaches his fiduciary duty to the other by disposing of community property without the
consent of the other. Puntarelli v. Peterson, 405 S.W.3d 131, 137-138 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st] no
pet.). Once a spouse produces evidence of such a transfer the burden shifts to the other spouse to
rebut the presumption of constructive fraud. Jackson v. Smith, 703 S.W.2d 791, 795-796
(Tex.App.–Dallas 1985, no writ). Once Appellant produced evidence of use of community funds
for the use and benefit of Appellee’s relatives the burden shifted to her to rebut the presumption that
her expenditures were fraudulent.
Appellee was never required by the trial court to provide any explanation for her use of
community funds to enhance the value of her relative’s residences. In fact, the court simply ignored
this evidence. And Appellee never offered any evidence to rebut the presumption of fraud.
Appellant concedes that the trial court had discretion to hear this evidence and to consider
it in making a fair and equitable division of the estates of the parties. But can the trial court simply
ignore it? Appellant also acknowledges that if the amount involved is minimal in relation to the
overall estate being divided by the court that the court may be justified in ignoring it. But in this case
the amount involved was equal to or greater than the value of the community property the court was
dividing.
A trial court has discretion to base its decision on conflicting evidence. Davis v. Huey, 571
S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978). And a trial court has discretion to decide an issue if there is some
evidence of a “substantive and probative character” to support a decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor
Company, 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex.2002). But if there is no evidence that the use of funds by a
spouse was for the benefit of the community estate and made with the consent of the spouse it is an
18
abuse of discretion for a trial court to ignore that evidence, especially when the amount involved is
as great at the community estate being divided.
Appellant requests that the trial court remand the division of the community estate of the
parties with directions to the trial court to consider the fraud on the community estate committed by
Appellee in its division of the community estate.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 6:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF
SUBSTANTIAL BENEFITS RECEIVED BY APPELLEE DURING THE MARRIAGE.
The testimony at trial showed that Appellant had by the time she met Appellant defaulted in
repayment of her student loans1. Appellant provided evidence of payments of her student loans with
his income of $63,000 (Ex. R-41). While Appellee questioned the amount paid, she did not question
that Appellant had in fact paid her pre-existing student loan debt (RR Vol. 3, p. 178). The trial judge
makes no mention of the payment of Appellee’s student loan debt in his findings or fact and there
is no indication that these payments were even considered. While a trial judge has discretion to
weigh evidence in making a just and right division of the parties to a divorce action, he has no
discretion to simply ignore evidence. While the court has discretion to ignore transactions involving
minimal amounts of money or amounts that are small in relation to the total estate of the parties, the
amounts that Appellant paid toward Appellee’s student loan debt is approximately two times the
value of the community estate the court divided. To ignore such evidence and facts is an abuse of
discretion.
1
Appellee’s inability to pay her pre-existing student loan debt is puzzling in view of her testimony of her
exceptional ability and the lucrative career she gave up to be married to Appellant.
19
POINT OF ERROR NO. 7:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT
IN THE BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT
RELEVANT IN TIME AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The trial court found that Appellant was at “fault” in the breakup of the marriage (FF 32). If
that finding had no effect on the rulings of the trial court Appellant would not address it; however,
since it appears that this finding was the foundation for the trial court’s decision to award Appellee
an interest in Appellant’s residence, Appellant must address it.
Appellant and Appellee had at times a rocky relationship, without any doubt. However,
Appellee’s testimony is characterized by gross exaggerations and dramatization of events that the
actual testimony frequently does not support.
Appellee alleged that several events occurred supporting her claim that Appellant’s conduct
was the reason for the dissolution of the marriage of the parties. In her typical fashion, those events
are documented at great length (“127 counts of fraud”). However, an examination of the actual
evidence shows that she often testified more about her “conclusions” or “feeling” than about the
actual facts of the event. An example is her testimony that they had a dispute over money while
driving in a car one day, which she characterized as “financial terrorism.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 47).
Appellant raises this issue because that the evidence in the record does not actually support the
findings of the trial court on several of these points, and the trial court has no discretion to ignore the
actual evidence.
Appellant “Assaulted” Appellee On Eight Occasions:
Finding of Fact No. 6 by the trial court finds that Appellant assaulted Appellee on eight
different occasions. There are two major problems with this finding.
20
First, there is a complete lack of corroboration of any of these claims. There is no evidence
that Appellee ever reported to any law enforcement officer that she had been assaulted. There is no
evidence that she ever sought medical treatment. There is no photographic evidence that she was
assaulted. No witness testified as to seeing any assault or sign of assault. And it is almost a
certainty that anyone as verbose as Appellee would have told someone had she been assaulted; yet
no family member, friend, or neighbor was called to confirm that Appellee had made a
contemporaneous report of an assault.
Second, there is a marked disparity between the actual testimony and what Appellee referred
to as an “assault.” The first instance of “assault” referred to by Appellee relates to events while the
parties were traveling through Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Appellee says that “there
was a violent explosive that he has lunging and I went flying.” Yet there is no actual evidence that
Appellant ever even touched Appellee.
The next instance which Appellee testified about concerned an event at home (RR Vol.1, p.
50). Appellee said that they had an argument. Even though she and her brother were having an
argument about their mother’s care and they were “crosswise” by the time of trial it was Appellant
who was solely responsible for their dispute. She went upstairs and he followed her, he was
“screaming” and “she slid down the wall.” Nowhere is there any evidence that Appellant ever
touched Appellee, much less assaulted her.
In the next event that Appellee related, a trip to Hot Springs, Arkansas, an argument between
the parties occurred (RR Vol. 1, p. 54). Appellee says there was no reason for Appellant to be upset
about anything. Appellant testified that he became upset when Appellee said to her friends that she
wished she was not with him, which humiliated him in front of her friends (RR Vol. 3, pp. 139-140).
21
Appellant was upset but there is no evidence that he touched anyone, much less assaulted Appellee.
He went to bed, got up early the next morning, and drove home.
Next Appellee testified about an incident in which she claimed Appellant became angry over
a power cord (RR Vol. 1, p. 56). She said he “got into a Rugby stance” and she was “fearful.”
However, there is no evidence that Appellant ever touched her.
According to Appellee there was another instance at the residence in which Appellant flew
into a “rage” (RR Vol. 1, p. 60). She further said “he yelled at me and came at me. He didn’t hit me,
but he came close. I raised my fist and I backed up.” She says that Appellant then ran around the
house destroying personal property, one of many occasions on which she claimed he destroyed
personal property. If in fact Appellant had destroyed the personal property of the parties as many
times as Appellee claimed in her testimony there would have been no property for the court to divide.
The most telling incident is one that Appellee related at her aunt’s home in Houston (RR Vol.
1, p. 69.). The parties had gone to the aunt’s home to make repairs. Appellee yelled at Appellant.
She said that Appellant grabbed her, threw her up against the wall, and choked her. Appellant’s
testimony was that he did not assault her but was trying to get his car keys which she refused to give
to him so he could return home (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). Appellee herself admitted that they were in a
tussle over the car keys, her refusing to give them to him. What is most interesting about these
events is that when Appellant returned to his home in Nacogdoches he found Appellee’s father parked
at the house removing his personal property. (RR Vol. 3, pp. 51-53).
Appellee admitted that she told her father to go the residence and gather up property from the
house (RR Vol. 2, p. 104-105). The argument over the car keys was not because Appellant was
being unreasonable but because Appellee wanted to detain him as long as possible in Houston while
22
her father cleaned out the house (RR Vol. 3, p. 143). It is also instructional that when law
enforcement was called it was not for the purpose of charging Appellant with a crime but rather to
ascertain if he was safely driving to his residence in Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 69-71). And,
Appellant, the man who had assaulted her, called her when he reached home to tell her he had arrived
safely (RR Vol. 1, p. 71).
Of the eight instances of “assault” there is actual testimony of any touching by Appellant of
Appellee on only one occasion, at Appellee’s aunt’s home, and the testimony there is conflicting and
supports the conclusion that a disagreement arose when Appellee attempted to detain Appellant in
Houston for a sufficient period to allow her father to clean out his residence of his personal property.
When the events of that day are understood in context it is more likely that no assault actually
occurred but instead a “tussle” over the car keys happened.
On another occasion Appellee testified that “[h]e assaulted me.” (RR Vol. 1, p. 121). She says
not that he hit her, or knocked her down, but instead “I broke down. I completely just fell out to the
point of not being able to physically get up.” Again, while Appellee characterizes as an “assault”
lacks any evidence of any touching by Appellant.
Appellant Held Appellee Captive Abroad:
Appellee testified that Appellant had essentially held her captive for a period of five months
on a trip to Malaysia and Thailand (RR Vol. 1, p. 47). Again, there is no evidence that Appellee
reported that event to any authorities nor made any attempt to “escape.” There was no contact made
reporting her status to local United States Diplomatic authorities. There is no evidence of how
Appellant could have imprisoned Appellee in a hotel room and kept her there while he worked at the
offices of the company for which he was contracted to provide consulting services. When Appellee
23
returned to the United States she sought no protection, from law enforcement or anyone else. She
returned to her residence with Appellant, the man who she claimed held her captive abroad for five
months.
Evidence of Conduct Before or After Marriage Not Relevant As Fault in Marriage:
The evidence showed that prior to the marriage of the parties Appellant altered or modified
some documents relating to his divorce from his previous spouse in the United Kingdom and showed
those to Appellee. Appellant admitted to such conduct. (RR Vol. 3, p. 24-27). He explained at trial
that in the UK there are different ways of seeking a divorce, the shorter procedures requiring proof
of either cruelty or adultery, and that he chose the more lengthy option of separation in consideration
of his family.
Appellee testified that she discovered Appellant’s forgery of divorce documents in September
of 2012 after the parties had separated and after he had left the country to return to the UK for a
family visit. Appellant objected to all this evidence on the basis of relevance. Evidence of conduct
prior to the marriage is not relevant to the issue of fault in the breakup of the marriage, particularly
when it is not discovered until the parties have already separated and filed for divorce.
Appellee had already decided to divorce Appellant the previous December. She said she
remained with him only to care for him, and intended to stay no longer than one year.
She filed a petition for divorce herself on September 21, 2012. She contended that she was
not bound by any agreement with Appellant to accept $20,000 and items of personal property because
he had “breached” their agreement. The way he had done so? By not executing all the documents
in full satisfaction of her claim to the community assets needed to finalize the divorce by the time he
left to travel to the UK in July of 2012.
24
The evidence conclusively showed that Appellant’s action regarding his divorce papers
occurred prior to the marriage and that Appellee did not discover his action until months after the
parties had separated and filed for divorce. Therefore, that conduct could not have been a material
factor causing the divorce.
Likewise, Appellant testified that learning that Appellant had visited pornographic web sites
while he was in the UK was relevant to the issue of “fault” in the marriage. Again, this conduct
occurred after the parties agreed to divorce, the parties had already separated, and Appellant left for
the UK.
Appellant objected to all this testimony when offered on the grounds of relevance, i.e., that
what occurred before the marriage and after the marriage over could not be relevant to the issue of
fault in the breakup or dissolution of that marriage. Evidence must be both relevant and material.
Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231 (Tex.2007).
Appellant concedes that a trial court has discretion to hear and weigh the evidence and reach
conclusions based on it, that any evidentiary rulings by the trial court are committed to its discretion,
and that reversal is justified only when the error probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment. Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, p. 234). But relevance has limits. Under
Rule 401, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , the court is to determine the purpose of offering the evidence
and whether there exists some logical or direct connection between the evidence offered and what the
offering party seeks to prove. What is the scope of admissible evidence to prove fault in the breakup
of the marriage?
First, the event must have happened during the marriage. Evidence of some act by Appellant
before the parties married cannot, by definition, constitute fault during the marriage.
25
Second, the event must have happened prior to the decision of the parties to “break up.” Once
the decision to terminate the marriage has been made, no act afterwards can be considered a cause of
the decision to divorce.
The trial court found “fault” by Appellee and awarded both an interest in his separate property
and a disproportionate part of the community property to Appellee; therefore, it cannot be said that
this evidence was harmless or that it was not a cause of the trial court’s division of the marital estate.
Consideration of evidence which is not legally relevant is a breach of discretion.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 8:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED APPELLANT
TO PAY SPOUSAL SUPPORT TO APPELLEE ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO ABILITY TO PAY
A trial court has substantial, but not unlimited, discretion to order one party in a divorce
proceeding to pay spousal support to the other. In this case the order of the court for payment of
temporary spousal support was an abuse of discretion. The ability to pay support was not based on
any actual evidence of ability, but upon mere suspicion or surmise.
At the time the trial court ordered Appellant to pay $2,000 monthly in temporary support
Appellant was over 60 years of age and had suffered four mini-strokes (including one shortly before
the hearing on temporary orders), and epileptic seizures, and two heart attacks. His physical condition
prevented him from working and his last income was over two years before in 2010. While at one
time his services as an accountant in the oil and gas industry were in demand, companies in that
industry had completed their adoption of the accounting system he had helped develop so there was
less demand for his services (RR Vol. 4, p. 40). In fact, he had experienced a stroke about a week
before he returned for the temporary orders hearing (RR Vol. 3, p.138).
26
Appellant’s only source of income was his retirement benefits in the amount of $1,856
per month. That amount is less than he was ordered to pay Appellee as temporary support. His living
expenses were $1,574. (RR Vol. 3, p. 72-73; Ex. R-9, R-10, R5-8).
Appellee herself, perhaps without meaning to do so, confirmed the decline in Appellant’s
health and his inability to support even himself. In her testimony about the events that occurred at
her aunt’s house in Houston she mentioned that she did not want Appellant on a ladder and that she
thought it unsafe for him to drive himself home to Nacogdoches (RR Vol. 1, p. 70). She also
acknowledged not long before she filed her petition for divorce that rather than expect Appellant to
take care of her, she expected that his needs required her to take care of him (RR, Vol. 2, p. 120-121).
In the course of her testimony about their conversation at the time she emphasized that “I went all
over the State of Texas for months running him to cardiologists and neurologists and post stroke
specialists, biochemical specialists, speech therapists.” Yet this is the person she contends shall be
supporting her.
Appellee herself is both younger and in substantially better health than Appellant. And if her
testimony is to be believed she is capable of making literally hundreds of thousands of dollars from
her occupation.
The only basis on which the trial court could have found an ability by Appellant to pay
temporary spousal support is if it was believed that Appellant owned or controlled substantial funds
in the United Kingdom. Appellee testified that he did, but her testimony was not based on any actual
knowledge, but only on suspicion or surmise. If there was evidence that Appellant had funds in the
UK available to him and there was a dispute over whether they were available for payment of support
the trial court had discretion to decide who to believe. But when the only evidence is that “he has
27
money in the UK” without identifying those funds, that testimony amounts to nothing more than
surmise or suspicion. Evidence of that nature is no evidence at all. McKeehan v McKeehan,, 365
S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.App.–Austin 2011, pet. den’d). The only actual evidence of Appellant’s
ownership of any assets in the UK was his divorce decree from his previous spouse, which awarded
all his assets in the UK to her. Even if the trial court simply concludes “I do not believe Appellant
when he says he has no money in the UK” that does not prove that he does have money. It does no
more than raise a suspicion. A suspicion is no evidence at all.
The only asset in the US which could possibly serve as collateral for a loan by Appellant to
pay spousal support was his residence, but Appellee had filed a lis pendens as to that property which
precluded any access to funds (RR Vol. 3, p.135; Ex. R-54, R-55). Thus he showed he had no
capacity to borrow funds for that purpose.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to pay temporary spousal
support to Appellee in an amount in excess of his monthly income and without reliable evidence that
he had any other source of income or property to pay that support.
POINT OF ERROR NO. 9:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING A
DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE TRACT ADJOINING THE RESIDENCE
The trial court awarded a disproportionate part of the lot adjoining Appellant’s residence to
the parties, 60% to Appellee and 40% to Appellant. Under the circumstances that disproportionate
award is an abuse of discretion.
The adjoining lot was purchased for $54,000. Appellant paid at closing $10,681.07 in
addition to $500 he had already deposited as earnest money (Ex. R-30). After he became unable to
28
work and his business income ended, he fell behind in making payments, risking foreclosure. The
balance due to avoid foreclosure was $15, 229.64 (Ex. R-29, R-30). Appellant secured a loan from
his sister and brother-in-law to pay off the lot, avoid foreclosure, and retain it (Ex. R-31).
Thus the trial court has awarded a disproportionate part of the lot to Appellee despite the fact
that the purchase was only possible by the use of Appellant’s separate property at the time of purchase
and his borrowing money to pay it off and avoid foreclosure. It was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to award to Appellee a greater interest in property she would never have had except for
Appellant’s expenditure of his separate funds and which she would have lost except for Appellant’s
action in borrowing money to preserve it.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Appellant, Frederick Graham requests that the court reverse the Final Decree of Divorce
signed by the presiding judge of the Nacogdoches County Court at Law on September 3, 2014.
Appellant further requests that the court render judgment that Appellee has no ownership
interest in his residence located at 3704 Raguet Street in the City of Nacogdoches, Texas.
Appellant further requests that the court remand the other issues regarding the division of the
community property and spousal support of the parties to the Nacogdoches County Court at Law with
instructions to (a) consider the evidence with regard to expenditures made by Appellee with
community funds, (b) financial benefits received by Appellee during the marriage, including but not
limited to payment of Appellee’s student loan debt, (c) the disproportionate division of the tract or
parcel of land adjoining Appellant’s residence, and (d) the award to Appellee of temporary spousal
support by order of that court on March 31, 2014.
29
Appellant further requests that he be awarded all costs of this appeal, that all costs be taxed
against Appellee, and that he have such other relief as he may show himself entitled to receive.
Respectfully submitted,
Tom Rorie
Tom Rorie
State Bar No. 17238000
210 North Street
Nacogdoches, TX 75961
(936) 559-1188
FAX (936) 559-0099
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that this brief
contains 9,141 words (excluding any caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral
argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented,
statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service, certification,
certificate of compliance, and appendix). This is a computer-generated document created in
WordPerfect, using 12-point typeface for all text. In making this certificate of compliance, I am
relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.
Tom Rorie
Tom Rorie
30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served on counsel for Appellants this
23rd day of April, 2015, by e-file notice, to-wit:
Mr. Jarett T. LaRochelle
Attorney at Law
One Riverway, Suite 1700
Houston, TX 77055
jarettlarochelle@yahoo.com
Tom Rorie
Tom Rorie
31
NO. 12-14-00336-CV
______________________________
IN THE
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
AT TYLER, TEXAS
______________________________
FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM
VS.
DENA MARIE TURNER
FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM,
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
DENA MARIE TURNER,
PETITIONER/APPELLEE
______________________________
Appealed from the County Court at Law of
Nacogdoches County, Texas
______________________________
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF
______________________________
TOM RORIE
State Bar No. 17238000
210 North Street
Nacogdoches, TX 75961
(936) 559-1188
FAX (936) 559-0099
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
APPENDIX
No. Document
1. TEXAS BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE §26.01
2. TEXAS PROPERTY CODE §5.072(a)
3. TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE , Rule 401
4. TEXAS CONSTITUTION , Article 16, §15
5. Original Petition for Divorce
6. Temporary Orders
7. Final Decree of Divorce
8. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
9. Respondent’s Exhibit 52 - UK Decree of Divorce
10. Respondent’s Exhibit 11 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Raguet House
11. Respondent’s Exhibit 17 - Cashier’s Check for Raguet House Purchase
12. Respondent’s Exhibit 18 - Wire Transfer to Fund Raguet House Purchase
13. Page 20 of Petitioner’s Exhibit 4 - Email regarding Money Transfer
14. Respondent’s Exhibit 14 - Settlement Charges on Raguet House Purchase
15. Respondent’s Exhibit 19 - Schedule Showing House Payments
16. Respondent’s Exhibit 19a - Bank Statement Showing Pre-Marriage Balance
17. Respondent’s Exhibit 20 - Schedule Showing Transfers From Savings
18. Respondent’s Exhibit 21 - House Payment Transaction History
19. Respondent’s Exhibit 22 - Savings Account Summary 2006-2008
20. Respondent’s Exhibit 23 - Savings Account Summary 2007-2008
21. Respondent’s Exhibit 24 - Savings Account Spreadsheet
22. Respondent’s Exhibit 33 - Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien for Back Lot
23. Respondent’s Exhibit 26 - Real Estate Lien Note to Back Lot
24. Respondent’s Exhibit 27 - Deed of Trust to Back Lot
25. Respondent’s Exhibit 29 - Receipt of Payoff Amount for Back Lot
26. Respondent’s Exhibit 37 - Loans & Taxes Summary on Appellee’s Mother’s Home
27. Respondent’s Exhibit 38a-38i - Checks for Repairs to Appellee’s Family’s Homes
28. Respondent’s Exhibit 39-39e - Tax Receipts for Appellee’s Mother’s House
29. Respondent’s Exhibit 41 - Schedule of Appellee’s Student Loan Payments
30. Respondent’s Exhibit 9 - Spreadsheet of Income and Living Expenses
31. Respondent’s Exhibit 10 - Incoming Pension Wire Transfer
32. Respondent’s Exhibit 5 - Pension Letter from Chevron (2/26/14)
33. Respondent’s Exhibit 6 - Pension Letter from Chevron (7/30/13)
34. Respondent’s Exhibit 7 - Screen Shot of Pension Amount
35. Respondent’s Exhibit 8 - Monthly Payslip
36. Respondent’s Exhibit 54 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Raguet House
37. Respondent’s Exhibit 55 - Notice of Lis Pendens on Back Lot
38. Respondent’s Exhibit 31 - Loan Agreement with Robert & Kathleen McCatty
l(A ,^ -, _ ;.),/1 i
"o L|'LL$(015 'v(//,,)-
-,a.| l.,-
L.:,!,
,
-
IN THE I\IATTER OF rN TtrE l)rsTntc'l'co@ '
THE MARRIACE OF $
s e.^
vtP^
-'
DENA MARIIi TURNER
ANI)
$
N
LIW*
4 W-
LrlA-
.ruDrc'r^L,r,r',
.tuDtc'tnl-

I)ate: 1 I April 2014 1i:02:53 RST
To : " e rn i e grlgz hrl!:r ai I c o nl " .
.
Subject: FW: Divorce documentation
From: Slough County, Enquiries tnAf[aifuSg111eg@SlqUgh.Cpg1irygagd.S5l.SBy.Ukl
Sent: 11 April 2014 A7:47
To: Erin Graham
Subject: RE: Divorce documentation
The flle is currentiy in storage, once the file is received I wili notiiy you of the Cour-t fee The file can take a
number cf weeks to be received.
I{erm-za tBrougftton
Mrs K Broughton
Slough County Court
Tel 01753 690300
I am not authorised to bind my Department contractually or to make representations or other statements
whrch mav brnd the Department in any way via electronrc means.
ttrt
Hil COURTS &T$A{'NAL$ $€RVICE
ffiffiffi Tle fardly ffit *t-Sl.o*gh
Thr .Lar'.Cfil,t't:
Win&orHoad
St€itgft
Bsrkshlrs
sllzhrE
DX 98000 SLOIJG|. 3
BHIGID GRAHAU
T Or7&3 690300
34 AZAUAWAY
F 01?53 573S{X}
GEORGE GREEN tfinicon Vll 0i91 47814?6
(HEfpIns ts th€ deaf snd llard of hsartngl
SLOI'GH
BERKgHIRE *tw'l5laorffi -rslrloe. gw-uk
SI3 6RN
Our ret:
Vanr rd: srnnlsrvbbn 7BA5&
25thApril2014
Dear Brigidcr*am
Case number: Sl.o4DOl14O
j4.
Gratram vs. Graham
!t,F ti\ ' '44e*" -
' ' '}
Follsrtpg ysur sna[ dat€d fre l?th of frpfff 2Sl4 the be for a copy d your Becree Absolute
iacrmsed trg gr0 6 a r€s-iltdchmgstoffre cerfB syEtern on ihe 22nd of April 2014.
Fsrtity Section
Exbnsion:
,rr
'YnP
-. 9:;1^ ?r_l
- )lo't'ICE ot'CI0NITIDENTIALITY RrGlIl's: Il: You ARE A NAt.tiRAL pnRSoN. yoti o
NlAY REI\{0VE OR STRIKE ANY O!'THE FOLLOIVING IN!'OIL\[A.'UON FROII 1 HIS
fi,
INSI'RU]VIENT BEFORE IT IS FILED FOR RECORD IN ]'HF], PUI}LIC R!]CORDS:
YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY \TIMBER OR YOUR TJRIVI.:R'S I"ICI.]NSI] NUI\,IB}:R. li
WARRAN'I'Y D[,F],D WITI{ VNNT'OR'S LIEN l,t
l)ate: ,\ugust 15, 2$lfi
tt
Grtntor: S'I-EVF.N LUTZ and wifc, SIL4.NNON l-Ul'Z
Grantor's Mailing Address (including ccu nry]:
II
r:!
(lrantee: FREDERICK DAWSON GRAHAM
(irantce's l\lailing Address (including couniv):
3704 Raguet
Nacogtloches. Te-ras 75965
Nacoi:doches Countl,
Con siderstion:
l'hN AND NOll()il DOLTARS ($1{}.(it}) and olhtr vaiuablc conside ration. anii a lore gl c'1r
datc thar is in the principal ;imounr cf NINETY F'lvF.THousAND FIVE HUNDRF.D ANI)
NOii0t) DOI--I-'\RS ($95,-5(j0.00)and is e xccuteti bv (irantcc. p:r1'ablc {o the ,:rdrr oI FIRST
IIANK&TRUSTtTASl''fEXAS.'I'he noteissecuredbyaven' by stevtrr
L-'.rtz and wife, Shennon L.utz.
f7- ,Z
STATE OF IIXAS NOTARY PT,;BLIC STATF d? TEXKS
iltCotflr Erp. tOA2DSs
( j !rn, tj .f.\1 ,.i.lra. A.,(.:\l{int0(Jf .1$ril
rdfD€ roc{rttor.6l
!r-Ral€* At rEatfrY*tou,ll tt Purchagert Receifl-R*dn For Your Hecords
")c ffi rlr cancrl a'tcr( 0f nG
s€orfiE!
gr{rJ
gltat rS €{rsEDOA itrrncD Xttt
n t LoBt. tcPurDoq tr(I'lrr
31 95sS
hrct*rd 9V
InFSrtfr
FWO&ICK CflAIUH
o rE __4ryr 25r ;t{6
gInIfLIn?, ruDmffil & fLJgt}r fiISIIE
fun&ta To
s,3?934.95
? li$! I ,s q $F
'',1
*f ilEir {ili$,' r"r-E 'Dcs"r.
Cnsrmn's Crmcr
rn3 l95qgn rl I lll I lg0rrr: rOO IEO? Ig?r
S:-e-r ---'+
RE$PONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 17
$rnrpplnNr LIF Acccum
8*le Arlr&w, CDec6ot rfitrment
Au$Bt 1, 20oi0 to Augurt 3"1,2O0G
Basic Business Checking: 1ss1 1al667
ATM/Iloblt Card transactlons thls etatoment psrlod (confnrnd|
BrBS
ilo|qnsa
9dr Artgtnf nFfibor
Aug i4 .6.{B Vl$A Terget Oo0t9ffi8 Gbndate CO r+{8834{53S
A!i$ 15 -1,s0 Pdi ATM thago Fee - Wil) Fm DDA 8+fiEfr0fles
A,;g 16 -2.W Other gar* ATU Fee S4SO+0&Sil
Aug 15 WDAt556 17th St.,Suite IEO Denrr€r CO 848g0t'Ce$g
Aug 16 Vl$A Exenph Phyrician t+eturg03-40g.ggto CO lit+ jj-;, :- 'ti" 488mO584
Ar.rg"f 6 VISA 0056 Wild trsl00005€0 Denrrer CO {jrir f, e48$ggo580
Aug 16 -10.00 Vl$A Ampco Parkhg Eroadway Dorn"er CO e4ES{FOSS2
Aug 2t -40.16 VISA K&g P€tncb5t610042605 Ce*rta Rock CO
Asg gr
Avg22
ffi
-2?.00
Vl$A Fedor $hp 08f15e6 Abr 857-3541b75S9 TN lLir, f r r._i,i{i
VISA The Lcoplianltor.r Spgs GO
s
8498*8571 !
8488686?13
s4g$o1+3?d
Ar424 .'1.50 Pu'l ATM Usrg€ Fe6 - WD Fm DOA 848SO008s6
Aug ?t -2.00 Othar Bank AIU Fs€ 8{8€000887
Atrg24 -Yro.gg WDAI 555 lnh Et, Suit6 t50 Dorne( CO 8{S000008s
Aug zrt -10.oo Vl$A Ampco Pe#ng Broedlray Denror CO s{8e{?9110
Aug ?8 -1.60 Pull ATM tbsge fur, - V{lD Fn DOA 84{Xr00086s
Aug 28 "1.50 Full ATM tlugc fuc - WD Frn DDA 84&)00088!
Aug 28 -1.60 Puli ATM tieage Fc€ - WD Fm DOA B.+8e000788
AugZB -2.00 Oths Benk ATM F.€ Ejti!900086f)
Aut 28 -2.18 Qther Bank ATtli Fee 848900{t8€3
Aug 28 -?.00 Oths 8ar* ATM Fee B4A0CO078e
Aug ?8 -5C0.00 WIDAT 8cs 2400N. $e Naoogadoches fX 84890008E8
Aug 28 -400.oo WlOAt4822North$treol Nemgdootree TX 848e00086t
Aug
AW 28
Alrg 30
Zg
w-21.60
2
W/D At Bca 2zt(F N. St Nacocodocheg TX
!i
Vl$A Ctear $prirqs Bee*aura t taooiaoArea fX f $-r
VISA Lowe'e tl 772 Nacog3039424046 CO 9488821 2S2
Aug 3l "27_44 ViSA Rudy'a I ltacogdah€s TX 94888?1264
Totsl ATliyDobli c|'d w[B8rrh: +8/1?.00
Totll nrnber ot ATtllllabB Card wf$drewrts: 4g
Electron lc wlthdrawals tlrls Btatonront perlod
Refcrrm nufibdr
Ddt Artroui{t} Artu|tr.r *|t*
Aug @ 3,930.31 VISA Peyrnont Erick O. Graham 444s140498
Aug 72 -45.oco.@ W€ t 0O4O88 8nt Frpd Graham fu * OOO13S 9485m(}849
To{rl Elcctrcnk W6rdrerrrlar .f91 3t0.31
Totrl nmb€r of Elstronic YlltMruuats: 2
Lowest dally balance
Your b,u€ct daity balance ltda Etatcrnont penod wB6 $eeso.Sd
on lq0urt28.200€.
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 1B
From: jirt[iil:L::A:
To; r;_l A.tkrr lCcajtel,..;.cpnlels.ir.cr,;]]j
SubJectl FW: Transfers
D!t€: Tuesday, August ?f 2006 10:36:2g AFI
:,.ia.,"tt) 1.,.;.rit lit:.),..: :);t:tj.::{: t;it,;}n}4: iht: Srrtnunl lf .lhe
iran${er fttn $i:4 r:];(t iil s5,i]1rl
i r',e,:i. ;r.::-t
.----Onginal Mcssage----
f rorn; Graham, Fred
5snt: Monday, Au€ust 2!, 2005 4:14 pM
I
To: D D Allen (ddallen@comcrica.com) !
Subject: Transferx \"w
1,"
Dav;n can you pleas€ arrange for the transfer From my cornpany acc.unl
xxxxx1667 $g4, r:gg 1;11",*
loilov/ing account First Eank& Trust East Texas, 1009 N university
Drive, Nacogdocfres TX /s96x.
fioutrng number 11J1?2904 Account Number g01037g8g
l-hank yc,.i rf'\
.{"
/
?
{
I
Page 2Q ot 23
r._ TOTAL SALES/BROX€R'S coMMISSIoN
ilAsEao{PFrc6 s 185, oao, oo i)AtD Fflof.,t
5 % -- $-q, t5O. oo
AC)RRO\,r,18 P'.:
iSION OF CQMMISSION {LINE 7OO) AS FOLLOWS tsi_lt,f)J
:2i_:-Lt3t_ss SE T LE METJI 51-r :i!,taN,
f0 i .!. .r'g.Fls. rF
t!:r MJ.ri 1fi lc Ed PoaJ
95 !6dsr f@b^ h
AL.6 Urtgrge,.r,trr ,3.@n{.r4. ie lc
trll Ars,rrbl ie
?ica FaTfl,fbo stomater tesearci
?1; \ro-?,9. Mc. e..m,rm ,)'
'^s!
Tl !rer4 n6!:ro r!*um br
s2 , o59. OA
*. 4el . R , Ot.-nr., tcl
^..t
iO!1 d*rri ,rBrqdo d#, @
'!12 Mo.a.& r.ivrr^ce
ATut\ . ;
6" .{\)4.'..1
.trg9r9qate Lccoun+-! Escrou )djustheol :i!'
i rol y$ffil of .lcEi.O lE rd
.i4q Pederten Fl LLP (341
L.-d_?rl?! t Floyd LLp
I t0/ Anohrt't ht to
&w! itffi Numbtg
Nacrigdoc,4oc .tbatraor S X-tttE Ca. t rrp,
I llno$tu.bdeil.Gltu;b!r3
sfo0- oo s95,5OO.00 I
r.1.19.oll!r_6i!|4y"Egr9 _- .. . $1t3lo..qo,, .... { SlSSioOO-oo )
r?Ol Feordrn!1C*3
1?o2 C[t/qMty ldslry
203
?)r
205
5Loo. oo
ota Lc Home Protectiod 5320.OO
305 fedex F9e . s20. oo
\6vs €rgfully rdiow€d lhe HUD'1 Sgttlomsnt Sldmonl and to tha bost of my know!€dgo gnd b€tiet. lt is a lrm ad accurato Etalqm€nl ot a[ reoipls and disbursom€nts mado
,r^rrgbr:7;,
lelluo'l. $lemsnlStatementwhichlhavepropa€disaku€andaccurateaccountotthistransactron.
.dvc Pr bPdec rs a rrue ano acculare ac thdo€ussd( the hJy)tLe ur5bursed In dccordadcc
th thrs srardmenr
lxa6e
.Ja,e
_ se{,Fnon A-aen.
W -"" g/afb,
AFINING: ;5 2 6r;6re lo knoeingly maks laJso sbtsents b lh€ Unh€d States on lhis or any olher similar torm penaliles upon convrcron
11
€n irctude a /ine and ioofls.)n
!il Fo.deEil€ sae rll. 18 U S Codo Secriod tOOr and Sdio^ teto
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 14
A.'Settt(,ment Slatement
11 ent ; -l ;r.iA lle
| 3 [ Conv. Unrns Number {,oao Nqrtbgr
I crahan,
1 ,I vA ; fl Conv. rr:s Frederrck Dawson
;I !redefJCk Dawson I
ll
tn*;' -"t A--.'= f*r -;. ", t* -.;;.;;;, ;
fiems a cc weta
n)ark(ttj ii o
llems n)ark.(nj wer".paiij
Drrrl nir(,.ra
orlsrL]e ot rt^Grn^ . - . .,',Jwri
^f ciosrnq. they are shown r.ere to,;ntorr iticl,.ir iu,fi;,;;;;;;1,;;,;,:;.j;;,r:',,.';l:;:;,
l NAME AND ADDUSSS OF BORFTOIV8 H: Frcderlc* Abwl|'n Gfehrm
37M Roguet, Nsegdoches, fX 75
E NAIIF ArlD ADORi:SS Oi SFrrFF Slcven lulz
Nacogdoches, TX Shannon Lutz
Nacogdoches, TX
; r.lltv€ANDADDRF-ssoFLINDER --W
tAOg N. Univssily Dr.. f*acogdoches, TX 76961
iruof 'r'qtY Tio4*a;*A
.-OCA f lrlN Nacogdaches, rx75 5
I SETIr-ilviENT AGENl: Stripling Psdersn Flayd LLp
Pi-ACF OF Si:T-iLlrvlEN r 1 18 E Uospitsl St Ste 4O0, Nacogdehes TX 75961
751624274
I slrll1,i t.^l_r.lr i)ATf osi25i2006 I FtFSC,S-;,Of! DAIf
,00. tiRSSS AMOi.iNl Dl
.0O. GROSS AiVIOUNT D"jF t0 SFl,.t i:F
4Oj Conl.aci Sai6 Prce
I 5,.1 qs, q!{i . qq
a0:a Persrral i'.rcei! i
f,l .sen?r:enrs marq* l0 Lror.ajwe'
I
rat- rre I?3fi) s585, O0
A3.]U!iTIIE I']IS iOtr ITI'MS F'AiD AY SEL.LE[:I iN ADVAIJCT A{]JI]STMiN.iS FoFI rTFMS;..AID tsY SLLi cR iN AI]VAN{:{
4C6 C{ylown Iues t0 {
aol aou^ry Tates
lCa Asse6!frqnts
J2'J CHC)SS AVOLiNI DUE iAOM SORF{OV/FN i sr85,585 42o GFTOSS Af,4O'JN] l),J[ I() SFL,I_ER i s t8t|, o?0 0?
ZIJ' AMOUN;S PAID BY OR IN BE|JALF O': BORROWER 500. FEDUCTIONS jN AMOLrn"l DUE IO SiLLIR
',4'_'5: n .r,
is?sr d rs icaats)
La Optzor Fee
.1; Cr-edi t for ! Credit {or repait-s
::-- _._--_r_F i
Ail_, S:MS\-S r,J;r , : V5 _NFA,-, a. 5cr. ADJJSTIVIENI S TO'T J;EI'4S U\I,AiD i-iv SI-,.I i:R I
,-,a i.riy1?,wotaxrs rr: l
__)6 j_
IF_=-=:
::"J ""^' '
I JounlrBles o)/O112006 t) OE/25/2406 | s2rOSA,03 5j 1 Couniy,a@ O) /0i/20A6 5/?006 i s2 o5c 05
^--;;;t S
f--*-
,0 jCTAi- i,ArD tsv.FOF 520 IOTAL REDU{;IIOIIS
.\1i5.50J 85
SCqBOWr-nl iN AMOUNi DI.JE TC SIi,LER
i a- q!T-Tt EMEAJ' ! FiJMTO BCT]AO',VE
601 . Gaoss arrcNn,'oue 1o :ieiier lirrre 42C) j j5: 1o:l- 1/-''
2 Less amounl lBid bv./l'. bqrdwet lline 224\, slot,6so.05 602 !*s re,Juctions
'n ami Coe selle.
{i,nc 52q) s!4i,50!.86
llASir 1flrn1tr,r, iIror BoqnowER: i 58.J,934.95 60-1 cAsfl rIIrlrovr rfirr.r
HUD-1 {3-86) - R€SPA, HB 4305.2
PAGE I
A. Setiti,inent Statemenl
': ,,1 '- I /t
C. NOTE;':Us tarm is hlrnished io g've yorJ a siatemenl ot actuat setllemenl cosls. Aolorrnls pard
ano oy tir senieryrent aqent a,e siown
nailed c o c we,e pard cutsrde ol cigsing: lbey ate show. here,o, intormalioral loot,i,loses
liexrs
A'i:J irF no, r.ctude(] ir !ire 1-,^,.
O NAMF: AND AODRFSS OF BORROWER: Ftcdrftc,' Otysd|n Grrhrn
3704 Raguat, Ntegdoxhes, fX TS A
Stcvon Lstz Shennon Lutz
Ndcogdoches, TX Necogdoches, TX
I NAM,E AND ADDRESS of LIND$ffi
,o@ N. Urrivssity Or-, Necogduhca, TX 79gf,,
G PCOPS|IIV 3704 R,gusl
I OCAI TON Nacagdochds. fX 75 5
H. SETTI 6I/}FNT AGFNT: Stripling Ptd*nn noyd LLp
E'!ACE OF SET'IIEMENT l le E, Hotpittl 3L Sto 4OO, Nscogd*he!, TX 7S$1
T iN, 75152a274
I SET;I EMENT iA;E 08/25/?ffi BESCISSION
i DA"TT,
1Ca GROSS AMOTJN 4OO GROSS AMOIJNT DUF TO SELi ER
l: a. n! ,c !;a'€s 5'lcl 4Cl Conlaai Sd6 Pra€
_-rj
_ _ _ -
l^ rt,.bD
3.ggY-:"3f:S_+ag:_g -
@
c
o
anaO D
3 3 8b5b os.'ia,;+?;::3EBB
NNNTNT c
:
. 5 a Eiir
1
- :^-=
i:dil=lT:iUE:;:
;:>:'::<,oo.:i-:5f- 6'r
o
E
f
o
--m- mdr'- o
Nd9h or€-::::::::33
o
6
a ar)d
E SEEssFcEa=-
c^ 2
c
c -
i
=
\
i.:
-9'.XC
^!:f;-
N
c-N
-
;1 6
l<
F=*:=iiFtKseds
<3*srr<*vgs\t: t?
u
'z
to =v-xc
olf
l*
a
:qNyo 3
>
-1 6^-
'd:
HFiFEE€EiEEg€i
- x:.
IoJ
l-
c
C-
:E
-AOXon
I ts": I c
.rc!6Y'
::aEgsEslEillI
O
6 _ _ ,t _ E
F l
a
:; *i:a ';
i- i".l
r>:
= o
'-- tv 7 ?4- iFriEEE=i:iiiE a
C
.
a.:-FFg!!
l?-4d€d-
:
e J
==
=:
(!
ci?oa44e1ooeci
-+-a*-Fts-c o
-o
-_.=oloX 7e-*!zr'odoz€d06azdo.=
-*- i:=;:f;;=:ff==- cl
rl
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 19
'iE
6
'-
\J
f,s
t\ 8Fg
\ -**.
f;e \\i\6?
o 5
oq, 3
cc EE f
E.]: Su o
OQ ol E
.oo <)d
99P !p-
.=;.!6 ro{,
coco o oo
0000 aQ. N
rc
CL o O. o oo,
OTJ OI {,J !-o
BEfrE 4
R e
D N rrr F-r rxr
s. D
TFNThNTNT
s- D}S
NF rhr
&- co- 66@
rrrrhNrtsr
€6A66cO.O@O
ra E
**gR
e-k;
s.s.'s qg qqs €r+trlqsrq.c= YYYYYYYYY
v,
5G
.9
8
o Ro
xo ooooPQ^Q ,q
E
2 c ee
oo 8888EHFEU
OC)OOHYHYq
60
tsr ppppxi-';K'>
N l4
Nts
c
A-q;r
dx
NXYO:
>6
:
A
:g
n; For
tol
dO ::::iitii
9.q99fi;3Hft
N
0 €
F
I
EK
:: R
E
ER
R* .9ii on
88 EHgHggHEi
o
ro
F
ad
d !
tr
e
s.?
;E ;
R
:-i
EH€
H5E
PsP
r
(J rr
N:IT::RS1
Nrrlt\-lAY t
(faox><:
E 6> E o
F aro{ E
-:- &=>
3 F=s {E5o E >: e o
* s;; >
:;. q
;2: h=; z
zz. Tzzzzzzz- E
o c
o 0
(J
4 F Fq oo:e E:t 999399998 : t
oiF-FF!
J :J':
d JJ c go
N oU ododb F FI-FFFFFF€
3 <4 E5? o, ad odoE.Uo{06o5"6"t?
f fE s e*-H dPc rsffreScS = :i
,E
Stnrnmmwr {)r Acsrrsr
ao787
ll,,rl,lrlrl'l',,ll,,tl,lr,,l,llr,lt,l,,llr,l,tflrrl
FBEOERPK D GRAHAM
?ro ELM $'r
N A{)OriDoc H Es TX 79965-2 848
Your llonay Market lnysstrnenf
$fatemcnt
August eg, 20O8 to $rptanrbcr It, lgOS
Aeoouft t numbir 7001 1 iteSeB
Your account surnmary
Beglnning balence
@
Csll
on Augrret 25, 2O0€ $186,07O.t1 rr13) 8118'3400
l-learing lmpaitsd ffDD 214 58S4r55)
Plua &nolsita
lntarpet s406.24 Vlclt d,r rub altr
www.oomerka.csn
Lss*wlthdrawab Yltltc io ut
Electmnic iEFTj wifndrawule €e5,070.a1 COMERICABANK
- p.o.Box850282
bd;wi*'d;#; $4,OOO.0O DALLAS, TX 7526$'?82
Feea and eevhr chargos -$1o.oo
Entsng balanco
on gtptcmbcr 27,2{lOG $157,396.24
@
The Gomerkm Vis Gilt Card b the perlec{ gift tot
evefyarle and ersry omaslrn - blrthdaya.
Swnmary ol intercgt youle earncd holHays, graduathrn. w€ddkrgts and more. Pick
. lnlereel paid io you this statem€nl psriod $,106*?4 up your Vba Gitl Card todqy al any Soamrba
r Annual percenlage yiold eamsd thls slat€manl parlad: g-55% locallon or prrcheee or{in€ al trrrn€ric&.€orrr.
r Tctal inlsrsst Fid to you this year: 93,935.48 Sorn€ rsstridio&s appry.
I@
Thank you lor belng a Comsr*x dlEtofi*r. Wo
valua tha lrud andoonfrdene€ that yvu wtfrntJ€
ta ptaca ift us.
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 19a
TRANSFERS FROM SAVINGSFUNDS IRANSF[RR[D TROM SAVINGS ACCOUNT 7CO].142996 REPORT -]
F tiNDS TRANSFFR To co A BANK A/c 7aort4297a INVENTORY SUPPORT 4.3 REPORT 3
I].A.TL DETAILS AMOUNT BANK REF{
30-Mar^06 WEB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 800 00 w888807324
17'Apr'-06 WiB IRANSFER FROM AC7OOTL42996 8.500,00 w888800292
26-Apr'06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC7OAN42996 6,0c0.00 w888807604
7-i u n-06 WE B TRANSFER FROM AC7OOL1.4299' 8,000 00 w888808096
7-Juq-OBWt3 TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,C00 00 w888807612
n-06 WtB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996
7-l u 2,C00.00 w888801374
6-lul 06 W[B TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,500 00 w888804059
13-J u l-C6 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888806871
24-)ui-46 \#LB TRANSFFR FROM AC 70C1142996 r",s00.00 wB88808548
10"Aug"0i; Wt8 TR,qNSFFR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888801800
-iRANSFER
21-Aug-06 WEB iROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 w888802796
29-Aug 06 w[B iRANSrt_R FROM AC 7001142996 3,000 00 ow50023399
5'Sep-06 WTB TRANsFER FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50073167
1,1"Se p-06 W[B TRANSFTR FROM.qC 7001142996 3,000.00 ow50079976
21-Sep-06 WE3 TRANSFi_R FROM AC 7001142995 12,000.00 ow50062130
20-Dec-06 WEB TR.ANSFIR FROM AC 7OO].142996 6,000.00 0w50082172
Pre House purchase 62,300"00
1-Mar'07 WTB IRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50001709
2B-Mar-07 WEB TRANSFIR FROful AC 70C1142996 1,000.00 ows0009599
3-Apr.07 V/EB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000.0c cw500356lE
3 0-J u l-07 wt 8 TRANSFIR IROM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ows0082796
30-Aug-07 WEB ] R,AI]SFER FRCM AC 7C01142996 5,000 00 ow5005 2155
10-Scp-C7 WT B TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 s,000 00 olv50038 12 1
7-i'Sep-47 wts rRANS[ER FROM 4C7441,142996 7,500.00 cw50063723
u/tB TRANSTTR FROM AC 7001142995 2,750.00 ow50026027
30-Oct 07 WIB TRANSFFR AC 7001142996 7,000 00 ows0039801
30-Nov 07 WtB IRANSFtR ':ROM FROM AC 7OO1].42996 6,000.00 ow50087670
14'Dec-0 7 WiB TRANSFTR FROM AC 7001142996 3,000.00 cw50049096
24-Dec-Al WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 3,O00.00 cw504447247
2 Jan-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 6,500.00 o 8w50002 52 9
2-Jan O8 V\lEB TRAI.JSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000.00 cw50006201
30-i an'08 WEB TRANSFER FRCM AC 7001142996 5,000.00 ow50076060
d - [ eb-08 WTB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 1,000.00 ow50037633
- 1 i.. ^;-Li3 WEB TRANSFER FROI,/4 AC 7001142996 3,000.c0 ow5001,0336
l, N'i;rr iil WL3 TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 6,000.00 ow50094999
1C-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001T42996 3,C00 00 ow5c0581"54
2a-Mar-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 2,000 00 ow50076107
I -Apr ud \ /tB TRANSFER FROM AC 7001142996 5,O00.00 ow50075748
1-4 Apr-08 WEB TRANSFER FROM AC 7OO]-142996 1,400,00 ow50029213
18-Apr'08 W[B TRANSFTR i'ROM AC 7001142995 1,OO0 00 ow50014828
:ompletion of house Purchase 92,150.00
28-Apr WTB TRANSFIR ;ROM AC 7CO1I-42996 1,000 001w50064000
6'tu1dy WEB TRANS| FR FROM AC 700114299fi 6C0.C0 ow500374s3
2 3-fv1ay WEB TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 200.00 ow5002782 2
27-May WEB TRANSFER FROlvi AC 7001142996 300.00 ow50092365
2f -Mav V/[B TRANSFIR FROM AC 7001142996 300.00 o\ll5c056130
Total 156,850.00 march 06-may 08
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\lr4y Documents\drvorce hard drive\divorce 3 rourt infomatrr RESpONDENT'S
PURCHASE\cOMIRICA ac7AAIL42970 HOUSE PURCHAS xIsx EXHIBIT 20
Fill
tE-.frl
rrr'
IIII
Frrst Btni<
1009 N. Universqty Drive
O-'TL
dg rrust ffi
Nn*gOoches, TX7596I
(936) ssss100
.ir ' ) '
:riL : i)
!;(:'6 Y !r'r:1.r; ', '
!:^., i.,::
t:,,' '-' t:;
:..i ..
,i:.r: rrl'
''.;'a, '1a
-J,
.1 lri, l :r, !i. I j,
!?,.' .t i,?
t-
-:r l:3
11)1- / ^
a:l: )l , )ra,li: .:.!i, i.,;,
ll, .; '.: jl
t )") : '::: ,-: t' :
!,i:,) ,)
"
.','' ...
t:;
, .:, ".i.
'{
,::1..i i:,.:
ir j _iil 'I;i1,,,
.r.rl.i,
;.- i:,.i,lii :;3
:li: : i.i
..),,ii
?),
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 21
PnYr"ielti-C
llgse First Bank
&T?ust ffi
1009 N. UniversitY Drive
Nacogdoches, TX 75961
tDEs) sse-sloo
.(nOt.r)crtr\
F
c
o
O- tEdJN(o l--f\NtOO{\l
U Eg "3 i*i r
*rl NCDNr-{ ;
:x
lJ6
(u U;
e ao
qq x
6 Yx
:+
E
-,tno
35
l! no- sf -/OJI--
.9 r{
l- :o
o 'o6 c.)
E rUo
!_c
,qEr\E 00)0
(o.g 3E
Y& ?E 3? 9bo
E5 u=
o.
q 6e 66 m\.o
ry F
k eeu
.Ero tr qoE
t3l sro Y c'.1
S
.;
Rs!9 Eg. EE
-r.r;' EiY,
E8.gE .Ez F*
ao
.2
.=
a..l
FE $$?,5 iE $$ q
tu
'13
()
O
f.\
U
EEEHEHEg=E..,EE 3
(!
:c'
.g
OJ
ac
oo
>
i=gERR;E.'g:fif;RR
E E P P a aP E E; P
E; P.2. A='^'I',
P .:
3
tl
c
ro
grv{-rtrilr.rroHtrfr c
--
bsfish
OJ
I
OJ
r
-c
LJ
*EE22.-
a,S.Err Egi-2
s.Err
E{J
.2
E
U
.f
(J
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 22
(-)
o
rrJ
AJ
92ro 9eo' d! t r 7
-{r !n fr vrg
{-A
-l
--, o
3
9.
:l
0a
F
0)
q)
A
afr
o(D
EqJ
o=
{./i
(D
{='J
q? d *s
f,)(tJvl
8+ oo
i r
ea fix
s3
35
,oii
J
f)
6J
+
= ?:r
o (/) O- 3J
iL^rt
fD
oil
3
o-
o)o
f3
fru1
os.
Ft 0.)
6g
=3
s
qv,
-{t
w NJ
B
=
o(1
(''! or gq E; 3
9.
so qc)
oq
5
3 4
(:f xo
=r)
;fi
=0rD
1P
il
7)
U
61
".1
5
e OJ d
-T1
*Y
qt- P3rr
E mF
3. o a
v a)- a)frtD Ffi
rn i;
6'
0p
)
I
!gl rt!l a rr6
a u
vF. o;n oe
x
f
LJ :t
m
c lJf
gO- ae {r,
3 c:
o
:
ftJ
f.l Q
t0u
Co+
3&
\J+
{
-
O cof
c
3 !
-o 3 o,
:t
:
(9
N
€
{^)
)J
o
tJl
a'
L
n
o
o
ro
{a !
9,,
t
f
O cq, o
o- o
lr
o -1
:"
al
o_ g,
3. 5
lv
shJ \j
{Jl
gl
(9
(o s.
- PO
-o
d
Or s{^3
(D
l>
w
o
fr
ft
o
c
a I c
3'
P
tvN
t\)
c)
(o
Ol
|\J :'
J
o
f
I\J
f\,1 ()u,
itl
p9
i) (*l
&
o
ul
!n
(^,
c)
o
o !^,}
m o5 o I P
{r, Fr
: tv oq) (f C) tI) F
r l\|
(a
r9
cn
r?I
?
7
{1
m
9qo
rb
ll(Do rb lt UJ
c6'=.n'
l,\ xo
P92 ro
3 =OrO)
8 B i H o
:t
a
f.
o
U
x.Drb
6ef o9
3-()fa)
frP &
o
o 6*3 gl.+*J)
{ Qoro)
;i:lf Fv (DK c
5o)0,
6 (Dx
9.
P
5 Vq
!3.
RA a
-\o
i('t or
,-O o
rs. sP
o;
!-3
-s o
a@
-(f,r nl
xX
xe ,7
9B
RE$POT{DEHT'S
EXHIBIT 23
9r'?r: qii. 33
tt33< ??9r,i-
FS
: TA
oo EB33t
313
Pi+? ??sq?
a
& :
666
odt
orF oo t>- h. a
EH g
;
p 35
2
t
z
,.i ,r. ; !!
88 sgsg*5 8389s
'll o;
= q
P
6 {
a
:
*g?
I Ed 7
i
o , U-Ll o,
5.
iEcq;'H
o
:q'{*1:
s**t h J
d6rfi9
oo i:
6;-46;6 o -
"2nE
!!
(D
o
no
I
o
".
o
RESPONDENT'$
EXHIBIT 24
\,F-f-i'r!
:
;;Jtr:;;
ifo
??>
u^Jc*tF
c l
e
-r..jr o
acoScooa--
i € 5 ; r ;El-- r Ee!'!bsa:-.
:>>>>=il 1 - -3-
cYY:!!!a
I €?s?eiialili; occaoco
:;;:sllgll:
- t:r:.:
3 ;;;;l::T
o;;--;50
f
g
f 6 Z 6 6 6 i. P slRl.; s
:*:,:.i-e; -lsl=E 'rC--=3-
il
=
;
l:lj -
i
F i s 3 l;l' i
g c ii3333:e
€PFPP9€
c :ii'Flil' o o
;; ;; ;;5
3I9:9:
!; i;;: -
+ ltl;
- l:ll
s lllP
55!q5$A
c@ € 6 6. @
D
;
l5t '..1=l=l FxEE g
a
l;l :=
t't tr
c c
lrl'
tl t=l
tltl
tl
5
tl il I
;l 6t
,sI I
I
6
'lll' rt o
il I
tl
tltl
t
tl
tl o
3
Bi:E€ 5,
ll os:J9550 -*XA
3?:ll,l 363i3i llIt '/oO
oc006!1:>
ooSootc
-r +
0
llr
tl E
tl
tlll
lt
a
zx
3
lt . tl
j{tl
5 lleE
: I lu
i
n
ill.l ill iltl
tlt-l
7
z
_t3l *l >l
i 3l*l
ilg= 5 :hiJ' o _q ;bls d
o
5
o
1 ;2
a
c
:::
:>
-2
3S
-i
Feu!!Frs
3<;<<33;
ryN**
-avFl{6s- 9F:tf+??
q g f'
:::t.2.::! *eF$ast
etSeeei
33>>xl*
u0drorrrd
;'F; ;r; ;.;- > ;
o
=:=i
s o 6
F 3
;;YVie-e-e-i 3
F
I
I x::::::::
656556U5 8*S*E8r in{{3iii* -n
3
a5a5b$a5
3888SSS
3
::ii5-::
t888ii3e
t
ct
ssEsstgs
FilNPDP!P
E6FOOAOO
@FF*99@
85[5;dd -.@es
iiirdE:;
0
t 5
@eb65
\
ri
N
E8 E
(a
2t a
zI
D
z
!O{s ONUPODO , , s, oooo
38988888 8888888 3S3s8888 o
7
I fi
o
t -O >
z
r5 T
8 Sr
3!
,b
5
:.
I
:E 3
3-i'€ zi
c3 EFz
8
:: a?a
rii o
D
o
I
CL
s. o
6
a
5
H
131?55
NOTICE OF CONFIDEN'I.IALITY RIGHTS: IF YOU ARE A NATURAL PERSON,
YOU
MAY REMO\,'E OR STRIKE AI\{Y OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING IIiTORIUATION o
FROM ANY INSTRUMENT TIIAT TRANSFERS AN I}iTERESI'IN REAL PROPERTY F.
BEI'ORE lr IS FILED FoR RECORD rN Ttrn puBLIC RECORDS: youR socrAl
R
SECURITY NUMBER OR YOUR DRII'ER'S LICENSE NiU]VIBER.
WARRANTY DEED WITII VE\-DOR'S LIIN
l*t
Dccember IU 2008 <7
Grantor: ROBERT tv{ll,LER and wifu, ARDAN MILLER 7
Crantor's Mriling Address (including county):
6 10 P:rk St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches County, TX 7596 I
t-t
Grantee: FRL,DERjCK D. CR\HAM t-_l
l_t
Grantee's FIailing Address (including county);
3704 Raguet St., Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches Couag. T}-j5965
Consideration:
TEN AND Noi 100 Doi.r.ARS 1s 10.00) ancl orhervaruabre consideration,
ancl a nore
of evcn date rhat is in the principal alnourr of IrORTy-FOUR THotJiAND
and
Noi 100 DOLLARS (s44,000.00) and is execured by cranree, payabre to rhe
order
of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TEXAS, -ihe n.te is secured ty a vendor,s
lien
relained in tavor of FIRST BANK & TRUST EAST TFXAS in rhis dee
Notc:
].
l)aie: Oecemter-ffi-, zoof
Anrount: forty-Four llsg-saud urd Noi i00 Dollars 1$44,0{}t}.Qti)
\{ake..: Frolhcr cxceptions 10 conve,vnnce *nd warrailtf,
urd
3. iicnr ilrtj proreeds of tb.e:.ole, pay, in tiris urdvr;
a. exlens€s o f iirreclOsure, rnciud hg a commisSiOn tO TruStee cf 5% Of tlrC bid;
b. 1o Bcnciiciary, tlie full amo'unt of prurcipui, intcrest, etk)mcv's ltes, and o'Jra
oliargcs due and unpaiti;
c. sny all)ounts required b)'law to bc palii beforc payment to Cruntor; arrd
d. to Crsnlor, anv ba'lancre.
$cnEr'a-l Provisions
l. Ii'Lny of thc propcily is sold undcr this ded oltrust, Cranior 5h3l] irrrngdisl6b
sun€ndcr posscssion to the purchascr. If Cranlor t'ails to do so, Grantor shall bccorncl$r;lS#a I
suffemncr of t-he purchaser, subject to an 8cliotr fc'r forcible detaincr.
2. Recitals in arry'I'nrstee's deed convcying the properfy will bc presumed to bc truc, (]
3. Procecding uadcr rhis dccd of trust, 6liag suit for forcclosure, or pursuing any othcr
rrrnedy will not cottslirule an clection of rernedics. |.-
4. This lien shali remain supcdor to licns later crcated even if the lime of paynxxit of tr
all or part ofthe rrote .is extendcd or part ofthe properry is released'
5. If any portion of the note cennot be lawfully secured by this dced of trust, payrnents
shali be applied first to d:schargc that portion.
6. Grzurtor assigrs to Bcneficiary all sruls payable to or received by Crarrtor from r-r
condcmnatios of sll or part of the pmpqty, tom private salc in lisu of cpndcrnnation, anci frorn 2
damages caused by public works qr consrmction on or ncar thc property. After deducting aly
{?
cxpenses i:rcured ilcluding artornels fces, Bvneficiary mayreleane aly rernaining sufils to Gmntor
or apply such sums to r€duce tlre note. Bcneii<;ir:.ry shall not be iiable for fsilurs lo collect cr to
r:xercise diligcnce in coliccting any such sutirs.
7. Grantor assigns to Btneficiary absolutcly not oniy as colialeral, all present asd future
rent and other incomc and receipts frolrr tho propsrty. LeBsEs urt not assigtred. Grantor warrants the
volidiry and vnlbrd:rta:rtt:Lnia
AXERICA)
E0elgtA 8SlaEf).FXSq'NlT&r} s$Aif ts3 ofi jdldsn,i€r!
lia r ia-Te re sa Lopez
Bclbrc rr.c,rbr*uxdaurynefisnkbify, e NutaridL l)r [.icer of thc i,'nited Starcs ot
Arnerica residcnt in Singa;rorc, duly comrnissionevi and qualificd, ol this day pa-sonaily npocareC
FREDERICK D. Cl{A}lAMr k*{}*9-re{ffi or proven to rn€ 10 be the person who* nunc i:
suhscribed lo tic foregolrg iasr.:$rurrt and ackrowlcdgcd to me lliat l''e cxecuted the same ior rhc
purpos€s and consrccrajon therein cxpresscd.
Civo: undermy hand aod seai of ofice tlris 5tjr day of Decenbe r 2008
lide:=--,\_"13t-i""i 9tjic,er . -,ofrleUnirecO
rl
O Ea
gs
1t1 t
+'nOoJZ ? c('
ih
u.l
E'
S'i
/-
o|'n
v,
;cl-cul 6r-
Es (u
Cl OJ
x(u
scn bs b
i'-.= i E l! - a o-
o
E
>. z.
.": )l.-\
) 59.
-c! s-iH.HE-kEf ttl T'
E
,;(J
-
z 2<
u
trvr
oo
?
atz
Cr!
&
u
tE. o-
(E
t>
q,)>
(./)
r
u
<
(n
F c
z
tlJ
=
Q
o- C)
U
- LJ
z
3
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 37
t: (oi
:;i
j \r
;-:t
(tUM
-
*
a!
t
(f) <
()F l
€ q :
!- qf
@
c6
O
{.r\ a) al
f-i
C al
c*
c
*J
a.{ w .nl
*---I
R
I -1 I
r-{ t
zv
3
tr {
cE
LN
€
-+* tlli
tl*
r-
$0 rfl
N N cf
Ft -z
-t-\ 5l c]
\ct LR
-g T 3
s
}O
J
.l
Ic.
CII
rfl
CH
.f,
oc
cf
$* $
:il tra
ra
F
A
-x.lJ
tt)
(.Jl
' -r{6 e
tL) al
r
(o
-rl l{ -
=
.F
J
E r.i a,fr
KH I 5 d z
r"- c3
E xF i o rg
a tr"U z ru
.t
R
-i
v(J
I
fr rl.l 3
E6 c)t I ,.|
G d8 -(..,-; rh
ul 3(9
o
is
+) 11
-,ga tsl r{
!-f
5* SE
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 3B-A
(\
r:
*
{
= E
O f.r F =x
vr-H 5X
I
t
I lI)
lrH zB -
ft1
i { F cf
, fr F
g {i ii"lU nt rg
f'L,
I F:EIU
Itr 5R R rt.t
r-.l
gl
a 3s
lu-o 8A x; 1 rfi
{
,{
s1 aa
t) ttE?
E arZ b€
/t{ E F-f
.o -
F<
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 38-c
c.l
Y
cl
ro g $i'
t{l
eF
,
q
N
!r.
I 1
...l
g
srl
B 6 €
c
.',-
a E --
d.{
€
t
2
7.
;r{
a
-
w dj
Etr cc
ttt n-
l_ c-
FI
CI
3
i-
ra z
:)
cl ai
LN ri
Ir
ro !f,
rfi &
rI
(f cr)
?a
Eg ar
-? v
Z
IF ts,E
f.Fl t
-
[f
ffiu a rg
l't, q
R
U
ru
(l)l { ;iJ
sI .JO
'1q
r-i
QIc,
a,
>'9
x; rfl
r-
.-
la
'-
r-
Bg fi5 -
c-
'a
I I
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 38-d
C O=
rn -
[:
iti
,lt- ,E:
Y-n c''
@
I
l€
rf
n-
Ni
I ln
aJ- !*
c
{_t
(t{
(R l;.' I
x{
Ft'.
i
I
I
i
\E;
-1\;
I
\
4 it
",i 1
Sl-
r.{
I
I
i
I
I
ii\- I t
6 "\'|
I
{l uJl
€lvl 7!
I
I
cr
€
lJ-l
c0 t\-
Ti
I ln
qi
s
(L
AI
\-/l li
ll IO
N"{
ft
.-J
->l
q tr *dc]
I'
-/l 2:,
Fl-
i 'y'l
u u 4dt
--.1
-t\
T=
i_ rlJ
JV.l
LYI
'l 7i FSI F
d b'i 4zzlx,\J
i
{
,i
I
a J
E P-l{ d, =-H
ftJ ,Efi 3s J;
fl 2l T
:4
g snE flEE rt S.i
-='-i"ri -cr
Z
,,iiU C*,,ti H
a-
-lC{ tr
Hlljnn,;
Yzf,frui
e u,
O
ft
sqotrE at I
,TR ,i:! nr
--
E
frtrfi18 ol di rn 'f
-<(,:rn(,
dt=4Q -o
ctrOC? >1:
Eo-{t
fiE i
rNl r
*\l a
s 1-' €
c"
c-
i!
::c.
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 3B-e
- ca
:
:f
co 5l
:- rf
IF
E
ili
g
.{ I
t €I .i3
ts
C.l
c/l
fr
N Sr
t
H
oo
F
g
- lr
;L
?
\- ao
€
, .(r
ul
E il
q z.
tr z
F &
t
! s
tr s
al
cd
ctr
LN
f'*
b ac
a-
rn at
s r,
FS cl
t4 f -z
LN
a cl €
ss- :x
rJl
a
cg
?
-S
d-
g
{
€
a{
- 7.
*r* F a.l
>x t-
cO
r{
E.;
g;i \- 7
ffE >tr *
=!
EE$
ef +x
C)-Y
KH
RX
z8
It
-?
-
cl
AIJ
\l
Iu
V
:E{ tr iiu x'v
e,2 6
rt.r
B
&
ri
;H3Hfi
gqgF rLJ
;
s
E -a vo
o
Ot
o
xt rfi
r{
n
sl-
€,
t
q)
FaaEg {u EI
o 'i(6
o-
tFufiC
\r
-i
\r* RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 3B.f
a.l
(-I
ili :
f\
c.l
:
J a.-
i
II r-
lx I
di
TT l'-
s
-{
q 2
ll
s
-l
z
o
o 6
r€a t)
c{
a
oc
s& LN
c\-
fft
cr.
hsfi cf
Qiu
.j
r{ z-
cf
$s$ I-rt
g €
rL .f
F r|| cc
$ t\
>x {- c.r
g{ r{
t= g,H., >t
EX ll
HBf
=
cc
(5
C'
(J
qX
76
qu
-
c0
? z
a-
dfr
o cl 5+<
ru
vYZ J
I
O(E o
I
rl-l
'{
EF C"
GC
lrl lI, rfl
o
lrl 3
ST 4 ,,:
G o -t ,n
rH :E
IL :i ll
,F T
,r RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 38-g
/--
\*
-F C!= zut va.l
a-
$=
O;
?-s ?
s
l.\I-
gl
ili
€
E
q
\-l
tr
C
'.;
cd
I
:
It \Id sl-
a
--t,, h
€ vl (a)
I
f\t" /
il
q
f r')
aq ri
;
I
id
A
rt
$ o\lt ir
& z
s L
\-
3
a
r
r)
r')
E fi od
x
Eo s oc
&
c\
A
n,l TL
rrfi
c! 6
N
-.
il
: { 7.
cJ'
c{ F co
tn rJl o
r:
.$ g t; s
s F
ru co
[!
\) trl rx
ts
r -
Cl
?
+*
ai
a'l
r. fit tt7
x
rr 7 X5
lriO.9
f!
"{
:t
J
\n
B z
il
f{F{ 7 Iii o za a.
=HF ir€ x5
7 €
a.
n
(l
$9'
R
rLJ
r|.t 2.
@ ,- 3
d
iHEH -\tsE
>h
\i
;.b E rn
{
t a
&
A
V
'tr
HtrE= sq(i f!
a rl
I&3 I ,i 'aig
-\) s
o s
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 38,h
,1re-uso-tg3s
i_
'.+-_.-l:--:-:-.*'-..
ji Fnfocnrcx o- cfiaHln
lnEDrntct o. cnrr{lc r 187
r!.ilaxrE7
lrD0GGr6. n r:rs *glul
ii &ff** .*:'!l 'r ir, ,I tar $,iilryi'":.j
,6
i
i ':ltlll l80tt! l18lr.5EtOll?tSt .I
i
Eranch0 Oate0F04-2010 Acoount00103374g Amount 108.07
Sorisl I 183 TR I 131 22S04 InsuD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr D franCoOe
Branch0 Dtt606-03-2010 Account5OrO3374g Anount75.00
gcrirt 1t07 TR tr3jt28o4
Dis{r&utionCode 21
TransmitAccount0 Soqusnccg0l?g6g526
O
..lnrtt0 EmpiO
- 0 otb, O
Trancode 0 O
TrancmitTR 113122804 FxceptionCode0 piyNopay DietributionCods 21
Tran3rntiAccount O Squrndfr I SzSeeqo
CgrrtclcdAccount 0 Tnan*mitTR 113124804 ExtxptionCoda O
p"VUopaV
CorcdodAccount 0
r;l ll t I 160r,r: t l85rr50 toll?[5|.
8r.o€h0 D.te 0$.05-2010 Account SOlO33Z4g Amount56.52 Brsncfi 0 oat! 0&11-a0io Accounr so10g3745 A;"t 3000--.00
Scnd 1185 TR 11312ZA(X InetlD 0 EmptD 0 DbCr O TnnCode 0 0 TB tr0101Og IngtlD 0 Emptp
DbtributlonCode 2'l TrangrnitAccount0 Sbqrrsnca g0t26&+72n
Ea/ial
Ot|trblltigncodc 1
0 Dtcr'C rrendojJiO:
TrsnsmitAccount 0' Soq{r€ncc l+OSSStSeO
Tr€trrflrtTR 113122e0,4 ExceptionCodo 0 payNopey TranrrnitTR 0 ExcsptionCodo 0 payNopa] CorreaeOacmunt
?vFbdAccount 0 O
I
I
1
I tt rre:r on&r.r
FfiBEmCr rL
,r6ffi:t,tIr'|:t
Hl{r--Fr.^re tdp }ry'trr
* .F5;o"
s
t*c. t+w+ea h+ eAtr,.ttYr FUE . _ wr* 6 Ea
_
IggIgSH ieii&-'ri'F ,,j!^;
ffi| 1 I
@I ll^ I
r: laoqr: t loqrSo tgtt?L 5r -
a
_-_=.&&e_
r{J,r0060o
t?5oo/
Eonctr 0 Dsb Fl&.?0i0 Account SO103374f Arnount 175
Eranch 0 Dat. 05.05.2010 Account 501033745 Arnount 4i.00 0t
s6nrl 1189 rR i 13122904 rnsttD 0 ErnprD o Drcr o rrancode
Ssr6i 1184 TR 113122804 tnsrlD0 EmptD0 ObCrD TrFncod60 0
D8ffiutionCode 21 TruNmrtAccount 0 Siqrrancc eOr3{ S6E6
Drctrbstioncodc 2J TrenemitAccount0 Seqtnncr g0i2ggTl0o TranernitTR 1131246&t Excaptioncod. O payXopay
TnrnernrlTR 113122804 ExcaptinnCodcO pryHopay
ConcddAccount 0
Co.rodedAccouni 0
[$so.cs
Finr Brnk
&Trurt l*
stutrnGrt6,
.lll : l80rrr: t lglt 50 tO 31?\9 ll | | ?gol.ri I tg0r 50 I0tl ?\ s
t: I
Brardr 0 DatsH1-?010 Accounl 5010&3745 Arnount 190.0O Brench 0 Dais 06-2$2010 Acrour( 50i03374i Arnount tO0,0.00
S€risl 1188 TR 1 131228&4 InrUD 0 ErnplD 0 DbCr D TranGode 0 S..i.t 119O TR l t3tZZAO/r Inr$D 0 ErrplD 0 Db0 D f"crCorfc
OiatbdbnCodc 21 TrgnmriAount 0 Sqrnnce 9O132OS6E2 Di*hlbutiooCodc ?1 T*rsrnitAccourx 0 Siqirf,€ g0f g50S610
O
TroarynitfR 113122804 Excapboncodc0 payxopey TrrnunitTR 1131228&t E'erptonCodc 0 p'fli{JpL-
Cor€dsdAcc.ount 0 Cono*dAcslntO -
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 38-i
DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPI
\A(. ()(IDO(:HF,S (,FN'] R^I- ,^,PPR DiST
I lb w H(.);cPIt'At- Sl"
\.4c( )(;fx-)( -iJ l-..q. .t x j Jqr; I
q l6,,5 bij" J 4+7
This is a rcceipt. I)o not pay.
fJ* ner ID: R 18218
-f
{IRNER 1r4,.\RIORIE l.{NE.
8OI I,,AI;RE],I,,C,NE
\At ocl)ocHEs. IX 75964_65 Ii
Par;e{ ld/{)rrnerSec 28016 / l Atrsr/Subd jv CIAI{TIIR Sliltr N
,{ccDunr Nr)rrlhcr: I ll-
I i1)-:6ti0-0 ll{tO{) Blocl i.or l-t)t:2 Ac rcs (lat ('r,dr /.1
{ )rvncr lntcr:sr I oix) i-egais t- I' l2 CARTER
Pri'D Address 80 I l_At,rRF.t. LN
PnrpCrrviS1./Zip NA(:.)Gt)O(.ili:S.IX-7596.t
l-il'i: LrSl'A I i;
Llon:r.sierd L i,ilc
l car Jurisdiction l'nr Tsr Post
Rr te Tsr -l'otnl
Vrlur Codr DistltrnlOther Amounl lhlr l'{)sted
:109 :lA[ txiDOC]t lF.s c.r,){ iN"iY 0 4_i4100 s3+.6 90 t, 5i01 9l s0 00 !10"!97 t)l,lq,'2()i()
2r)09 \AC(-)CD(,\CltFS isD v&() l. t7f)0cfl $l9.6 90 sjjT
P 07 s0 00 slil ,17
ll09 :\./\t.( )(iu(-X.ll.ltiS 1SD t&S 0 200000 $39.690 P $?9 18 50 00 $?9 l3
'.ta)q CIT\',(lt- t\A( a)c{)()cHi:s 0 550000 54.6 C0
s P !.)00.I ir Si) 0{) !;-100.lta)
20ag i.*, tn,ri. s!122.22 50 t)u 5822 t2
Parrel Totrls: t8l2 2.. SC 00 5822 2-l
Dl'l Ycrrillonth: lfl I 0i) I paymeni Ref Totrls:
s822.22 s0.00 $822-:2
(llcrk: n:ra PTid lt.v: i.RLDERICK D GRAHAM Pavmcnt-type: Checl Prr ment Ref No: l:)2!,/
Crand Totals: 582 2.21 s0.00 s822.r2
a| [^
1y '.- I - ,'-l
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 39-a
DUPLICATE TAX RUCEIPT
:i,{L.f)CI)OCI{I: S (.,
LIJTRAL APPR D]S1'
I t., w itosPIT.\l- s-i
\,,\(l()C;l)()Ct l I i,S. ]-X 7-_s 96 1
't-i 6- J60-.14:l l
This is a receipt. Do not pav.
()tl'69r lp, R I8218
iI ]RNER VlAR.IORIE JANE
.30] LAURT'"L LANI,
N.4('0GDOC}rF_S,'fx 7_(96.1_65 I l
i'arcel id,'{)rmrr Str-l 18024 i I
At-.st,'Subdiv CAR'THl \u[: N
Ac,roirnl )lurnbcr l8- j ii)---q600-0l1o0r) ftiock Lrrt
a,)\!Ier ltitercst
i 0l 12 -\crcs Lat Code AI
L O)1t L.egals: l,l l2 C,\RTLR
l'rrp .;1i1,1,.r, tiO I L.\tjp.EL LN
i ;,',,p ( ih,;sr,7.p NACOC;DOC,I.rirS.t x_75e64
I IFL ESTATE
ill)mestead Codd: I]
'frr p()!t
Yerr .furirriiction IllKate 'l 'l
i'rlue (ode ar Drs,'Pen,'Othrr otel Amounr Dsrr posted
iril C' i!A( r.lUDO(. itES ISD
\t&O I I70000 $i9,6.16 A S 168.-s,1 S0 Oil $1685.1 0l l,i2fill
lrll0 N,\COCiIX)L'I{LS ISD I&S 0.200000 519.690 A S i9.{rE r.lil
50 s.19 6E
2r)10 \Ac(.)Gix.)Cili:s (-oi,)i]'y t 4-j410{j 5-]4,6q0 A s5: 49 $0 0{l s.s2 49
tiJlo /.-il Y OF NA(:OCjI)O(.HES 0.561167 s54,690 A s 15-5 70 sft 0{) s is-5 ?0
f,O10 Yerr 't otsls 5J 6 .10
1 $0 1r0 s4la 40
Ps rr:cl Tota ls: 5416.40 s0 0() s4t640
I)['l Ytgr'rtl(]nth; l.)l l{il f 'l.otels:
I'a.v-mcnt Re s+t6..r0 s0.fr0 141 6..10
(.lerk: Grace Paid By: I)E\A TI,RNER Payment.Iype: Check l'rymcnt Ref \o: II l2
Crpnd Totrls: S'l l6.JlJ St)-00 s,r t6.J0
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 39-b
Page I rf I
DUPLICATE TAX RECEIPT
N.Aalo(iDOC}iES CiiNTR;\t. AppR DIST
]I6WftOSPITALST
\ACOGD()c-rtrs, "i-x 7.596 I
t)36-56A-1.147
This is B receipt. Do not pay.
f)wner ID; R 18218
Ti,rI{NNR MAi{JOIiII: IA\J:
801 l.AtjRiir. t-ANI
\ACI)CDOCI IES. t'X ?i964-65 l3
Parcel kl/l.iwner Sert: l8(il6 , AbstiSuhdrv CAIt'itR \[rt.
1
A,iccun'Number N
l8-llfr,-s6!lrJ-0ll(){}(l Block
( )\vner Inlcre\t
l_or Acre ! ( ill ( odc rr. l
| 0()A
Lcgals LT l2 CARTER
i'rop Addrcss. 80 1 i,Al_ REL L\
I'rip Cilv,Sti Zrp NACr.i(tDCICHLS.TX_7_596.1
LIFF ESTATE
[Jrrnrestead L'odc : l:i
Ycar ,lurisdiction rnx Rrlr It: Posi -ln
r Stut Code r D i r./l'c ni {) th c r f0lrl Amount Drtc postod
:OIO NACO(iDOCIi€S ['OITNTY 0 "134100 $1t,690 P $.s2'18 !r E7 .16i1 t j 06 01t2i)i
:U1(r CIIY OF NAC(XjD(}('HF,S {} 56q..i61
i
s54.6gc P sr55 69 !t3.1,-\ $ l?g i)4
l0l0 \^1CO(iD0Cffirs iSD M&O I I 70t)00 s19.690 r) $l6E 5{ sl.s.j8 ll91
r0li.| \A{-O(lD(_)C'HI-tS jSD t&S
82
t) t00000 sj9,69i) P $.19.70 5s 96 5.1_5 65
loio r;.-r :f"i"i. 5.r ti'r t s62 ,16
$ f7t 8t
Pr rcel Totr ls: 54i6 4l $62.,t6 s.178 8r
DPI l'e*r;)lonlh: 2(.tl j06 prvmen( Ref l.otals:
S{ I 6.,t I 5 62.16 s478.87
{llcrk: mes;hclJc I Paid By: Dt:\A TLiRNijit Pa,!mrnt Tvpe: {.-heck l'almcot R{f loi tili)
Gre nd Trilals: 5{16.{l \6:.,16 td? tt.8r
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 39-c
[.19..19t,\
DIJPLICATE TAX RECf II'T
\A( (_i{;iXX'llF.S { fNlRAL AppR I)tS'I
": t.' w iti)sPIl ,Ai_ s-r
\AC.-)CD{JL litS f X 7i:)6 I
9I6-<61-'i- 1..i,1r'
This is s receipt. Do not pay,
On'ncr IIJ: R t8318
'l l,lRNl:R
\4AR.l0RlF ir\Nt:
8tl LAI.jRI-.l.l.ANF
NA( O(in()clJLS. t'X 75961-65 t I
Seq.
i'arce! ld/()wncr 28()25 | i AbstiSubdrv CAR If:R \u t1t N
Ae corrnr \umber I 8- I l0-,:h0ii-1t12(100 Block Lor LOT I2
(,)!1r1er lnlerest.
4.ci es C at (lodr: z\ i
I 000 l-egalsr LT 12 C'ARI ER
Ilrrrp Address 801 l."Ai.JRf i. LN
Prup Crr.v,'Stlzip NAC(X;IX)CHLS.TX-?-5964
LIFE I:S'f:\TI;
lilimcs(ead (.odc
frv
I rar .lurisdiction L\ Ratr .',-:
I'o.ct
'flx 'I-otrl Amounr
! ttuc (lodc DistPen 0ther l)ltt Poite(t
).(:l I NAilax y
'l).)Cl'.lL-,S Cu'r}:t () 134$A 514,690 s75.16 s0 00 575.,16 0i,ll:il12
]i)] i )iA(.](X;JXX]}.ILS ISD V&O L I7(l0tr0 s_r9.6t0 \{} 00 s2l2 t3
2(11 I f.'ff\' a)F N.{L-a)(ji)(x i:lFs .) 569000 s,\,{,690 s15566 50 01j
.iiii NA(:(t(itx)( ltEs r!t) I&s !. )l {,b
0100(100 S.19.690 5.19 ir) Stl r'0 sl, i0
l0l l Year Totrls t5f):) 00 50. iio s5{J1.00
P$rrfl 'l 0tsls: $50i 00 50 00 55('3 00
l)Pl I eariUonrh: l0l2f)l paymcnr Rtf I otrls: ss0J.00 s0.00 s50J.00
( lerk: rncschellc I l'rid fly: FRLI)LTRICK D (iRAHA\{ Palment I ype: (lheck Pa1'.ment Rcf No: I lS I
Grrnd Torcls: :is0J.00 5-S03.00
RESPONDENT'S
EXHIBIT 39-d
DUPLICATT, TAX RECEIPT
?'l,r.f |,1.;1rtn,t tt:S C tlJl RAl,. ,.\ppR DIST
: l5 t!' t"10st)lT,\1. st'
i!.{(-O.;l)OC l lirS, TX j i96 l
q3 6,-( 1r !)- j ".1.1I
This is a receipt. Do not pav.
Owner ID: R 18218
iirftr;P-Y1 \1n RJQftlii JANF.
8()l l.r\l RI-L t-ANlr
l"l:\( (-xil)O(.lJrS. I X 75()(i4-r.5 l l
i'ai'ce) Iditlqnei Set: }Jit:6 , I
.t,bst-rSubdiv CAR'l irR 'iil tt
r\dcc{rni Nutlber I li- I I l-iit)i)-it Bicrcl
I 2(;0tt l.or I OT l2 ,\ercs , .rl ( \i
l)'^nrr lnlfrcrl I rli){) {)Ll(
i cg:ls i- i' I I C,\1{ l Llt
l)n)p.1,jdr.ss 8{)i 1..\tiR[1.1].,
j)rop Cjt;'/S1.ZtI \.1( ()(;D{,X. if ES.l X-;
:
c
6-2 t
:' (/t
F
;a
D
z z 2 2
m
z h r z z z z zr z z z z z iri z z z 8H A
x
z z ftz z r-z 2 z z 2 z z z
I
o
z 2
{
f
z 2 z
{ q I I
z -z r
z -z zn
F
tt
z rz -z z. z { q*
3X
ts
l g I i i
o
i
r 4 i i i i I { I j q I I
n
i F .pX;
g;
F
z
o o o o o
t
z 2 z z t z z z z z z z 2 z z z z z z z 2 z z z z
3()
q> P
o -dz 2
o r v v F r r n 6 g
!
2,ns
- >
! ! !
f,F
l'oG
5o ;>
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 s 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 O'l
3 d=:
3P d; :5 :E
lftt 1> ;t *€
3P
i
>
v\
t i i I
F
I vt. vl
{ OY
;lfrt Im >I oB s.x
qt
g.x e.x
o5 Af a 5l d Yl OY
ls. x I
{ ^l
{I !4
n I r Ift - I 1 t{ I
i
?; le 31, 1>
1> 1>
-! 3 3 3 3 3
d
3 3 ot
sg 3H "5 0l6t 5g
m
3
PI
;i
EI 3
I
F
ni 3; BE h;
;ro ;' ni, I#
1F
t
z z
{ { -
t
z z z
{ n a =l z z fi
EI 1 +2
-;9 ;E t4 J dl z{ z !l z z
m
3 l !
> tl >l I I ;l 5 =l = 9l
I
I 9tr
o=
ilet
nl 3
m
z
!t
P o
i z € I 4666555U8o
t
t zlr1l
3 € 3
D
v
o@@!o6baaiJ*
L 6a!
gi F
{{F
r 1
3
2 x m
7 d
o=
pt
so zd gR
||"-i
t; uYE F
4
6l ;- v :< lF o
o i
z j
1
I
a
n
I
I &i
8< i 9
7 oI
6 z z i 2=
-{o
E,
r
5
3Z
I
c!
d .>
- 3 (r3
e 3 o
6 5 N
3
6' t{ -5
8J".o,999-6-s-o
zI 2i
!{{
o E$EggEggS o n):
(rn
3 z
- {
lf T€
?3
d
3 T
(t
3
o fr
n
o ilqe
qaa
{o o
c rod sfi
1 ah'v
3
o r x 6
i66
z;:
x7
n :5! E 7
va
I E9.s -{ F,
t'o IF9E t { hJJ
o
--t :l
b{ x
6
/e
l!B=
t5 lo
-o
<{
o
d
C
= m
gEg I
c! ix x g9 z
-l
:. 38
dt; z
do
(,0
o
g
€8
l7 Es=
BT: 2 !
.iO
!l
O
f
I Dos HI
3 E
Iz ;3* 5€ou J
6
2 F
;as oz 6
3
d
zI
, FEE 3 F
(o TTE
aof;
F'
3 o>z
t
,
o
(1
EE
c, II
a!
:r!tq8 s parricr income
loconrg source
le&' I Checrcn
ti{J'i ptRSior{ pAyAEtt AT THf IST
OF EVtRy MO,rH r*To r't.tionrr wesffrrnFtlr
bink A/c r.0084681 FROM THT 5TART OF ,4PRII
t4:rn'hly sour!e Chryion letter dated 28th February 2014 2Or4
Net
Year pension
!
5W6
ended Taratlon receiyed splil as
April Annual D€ducted to be Monthly net per UX
ilg:r:$i't' 2At4 Pension at Source sbared pension divorce
4,465 27.31 1 2,275.99 13655.7
M! Tontl'!t/ sha.e In,,i.frng p"riis r
1 I J7.97
i.4Eti
ffi t.6.813
1.6-i 12015 t
,dr per Maf wire 5r.€
1855.1jt 1..63120157 cop! rn Ste
erpenses estimates
5 .rrm uf, Io tw !
*hich has no !or! cod€ only rculing
1{mber 50 pound5 rterling multiphed
)y dollere exahrngc Gte
7
.rE!rr r!rt |,r,r'rr8y !lvtil8 t4 I rsm5
MCho!t air cCndition,hE. Csn not
ranage tii5 iummer due to 96r health
150
;as h6ting not used jurt tor heatrng wate.
OL
,,ty water and Earbage coll(tion
5{
)r'operfy laxes currentlV detinou€nt
s0c
ry to e he.s. Nacodochcs
a'u being
and ciou6t;.. I'exas.
l,ol N0.
uctl,g r,t)r r\(). z2 oI
rjf ttte ltcplat rll
the Kcptat ol'Lgt 2_\-Ll. (.it),tllock
l.ot 2-s-L:. (.itr,[]lock 67-
67 aS
as ShOwn rr* l)lat
shrrw,n Otr i^
*r-.rr,r,,,r in
r)r,rr r.ei{:)rclerj
v.lLrnrc 9. I'}agc 2-5 o1'rhe r'rai Rcc'rtis, Nacirgcr,,c'r,;r-g6l;;i.l..rr..
f{
sr(;NrD thir$eL&.zotz
JFremy'S. 'v\rillis
209 Hughes Slreer
Nacogdoches. TX 75961
(936) 56e-7e4J
AC'KNOWLEDONIF,NI
S]-,\TE OF'I'EXAS
CO{ AiT}, OF NACOCI)OC}JES
llLt;C)Rlr fufl-. drr: uirdercigncd Notar,r, lrul-rlic- on thi.s da; personall-v- appearcd
\\'illis. knorvn to rne lo bc thc pcri,rn Jerenry S.
whosc-narrre is subscribcd to thc fbrcrroirrg instrumcnt lrici
acknon'ledged ttr me titat lhe sarne has trr:cn cxccutctJ lbr thc purpos{Js
and con.sirlcratitirr therein
cxprcsscd.
(;lVl..N trnder mv irand anf'olllcc tfris I
Lban. {gfeenent Setween: Datod: 22d June 20,13
Frederick D. Graham purclpot oftherb$owingprop€rty in the city of
Nacogdoches, Nacogdoches county, Texrx and belng-Lotlsc, cnvblock 6?, as
shsqm on Plat recorded in volume 9, paae 25 of the {ecords of Nacogdoches
courqr,
Texss-
L€xdipe pat' leine Robert a-nd Mccatty, (JJC citizms) residing
atflalficre,-Ellingtorr,Erja4,T,aploq$t$een
Buckinghamshirc, Si,6 iigA gngla1j
t - - -
,
The puqrose of the loan to enable lvk Frederick Grahan to repay
the outstanding
PlVment tn full due tq First Bag& and Trust p.aqt Texas. ThE paymenr in-fufr,
ytl fsutt the relinquisbmerit in &e lien curently held by First Bard