Roland Christopher Reed v. State ( 2018 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-17-00199-CR
___________________________
ROLAND CHRISTOPHER REED, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 355th District Court
Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR13698
Before Bassel, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Kerr, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Roland Christopher Reed pleaded guilty to the offense of possession
of methamphetamine of four grams or more, but less than 200 grams, with intent to
deliver, and the trial court accepted his plea. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 481.112(a), (d) (West 2017). After the trial court instructed the jury to find Reed
guilty based on his plea, the jury found Reed guilty and assessed his punishment at
forty-five years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine, and the trial court sentenced him in
accordance with the jury’s recommendation.
Reed’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738,
744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified
Reed of the motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him of
his right to file a pro se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek
discretionary review should this court hold that the appeal is frivolous, and took
concrete measures to facilitate Reed’s review of the appellate record. 436 S.W.3d 313,
319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded Reed the opportunity to file a
response on his own behalf, but he did not do so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
2
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct.
346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the record. Our independent
review of the record revealed that the bill of costs includes a capias warrant fee of
$100. The statute governing fees for services of peace officers provides that a
defendant convicted of a felony shall pay $5 when a peace officer arrests him without
a warrant and $50 for executing or processing an issued arrest warrant or capias. See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011(a)(1), (2) (West 2018). Reed’s initial arrest
was made following the discovery of drugs during a traffic stop—not pursuant to an
arrest warrant—and only one capias appears in the record.1 Applying the statute
governing fees for services of peace officers to these facts, Reed should have been
assessed a $5 fee for when he was initially arrested without a warrant and a $50 fee for
when officers executed the capias. We therefore modify the judgment to delete $45
from the total costs assessed, leaving total costs of $464. See Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d
725, 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see also Barefield v. State, No. 02-14-
00336-CR, 2016 WL 551890, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 11, 2016, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (deleting from judgment a $50 arrest fee
Our clerk’s office contacted the district clerk regarding the costs, and she
1
stated that the $100 capias fee reflected the assessment of a $50 fee for the initial
arrest and a $50 fee for the capias.
3
that was not supported by record). We likewise modify the bill of costs and the order
to withdraw funds to delete $45 of the total costs and fines assessed, reducing the
total costs and fines to $10,464. Cf. Bone v. State, No. 02-15-00452-CR, 2016 WL
7240603, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (modifying bill of costs and order to withdraw funds to
delete fees not supported by record).
Except for the errors corrected by the modifications described above, we agree
with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
the record that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm as modified the trial court’s judgment and order to withdraw funds
incorporated into the judgment.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 31, 2018
4