Gary Carson v. State ( 2019 )


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  •                                    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-15-00170-CR
    GARY CARSON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
    Bowie County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 14F0102-102
    Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Moseley,* JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion on Remand by Justice Moseley
    ________________________
    *Bailey C. Moseley, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
    MEMORANDUM ON REMAND
    Gary Carson was convicted on open guilty pleas in the 102nd Judicial District Court of
    Bowie County, Texas, of three counts 1 of assault on public servants who were performing public
    servant duties, 2 the penalties being enhanced by previous convictions, 3 and three counts of bail
    jumping. 4 Carson v. State, 
    515 S.W.3d 372
    , 374 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d, Nos. PD-
    0205-17, PD-0206-17, PD-0207-17, PD-0208-17, 
    2018 WL 4472228
    , at *5 (Tex. Crim. App.
    Sept. 19, 2018). Carson executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, and after a trial on
    punishment, the trial court sentenced him to fifty years’ imprisonment in each of the assault cases
    and ten years’ imprisonment in each of the bail jumping cases. 5 
    Id. This Court
    reversed and
    remanded the case for a new trial on punishment, having found that Carson’s appellate waiver of
    appeal was invalid and that fundamental error was committed at sentencing. 
    Id. at 385–86.
    The
    Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that Carson’s waiver was valid, reversed our judgment,
    and remanded the case to this Court for consideration of Carson’s heretofore unaddressed
    1
    The charges were made through four separate indictments. Carson has filed a single brief raising the same issues in
    all four cases. We reach the same result in the other three cases, released today in separate opinions numbered 06-15-
    00171-CR, 06-15-00172-CR, and 06-15-00173-CR.
    2
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1) (West Supp. 2018).
    3
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.425 (West Supp. 2018).
    4
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10 (West 2016).
    5
    The assault charges were enhanced by two prior felony convictions, to which Carson pled true. The fifty-year
    sentences were to run concurrently to each other, and the ten-year sentences were to run concurrently to each other,
    but consecutively to the fifty-year sentences.
    2
    alternative argument that he may still appeal his conviction under the Young exception. 6 Carson,
    
    2018 WL 4472228
    , at *5.
    Under what is known as the Helms rule, a nonnegotiated guilty plea that is voluntarily and
    understandingly executed results in the implied waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects, including
    deprivations of due process, occurring before the entry of the plea. Helms v. State, 
    484 S.W.2d 925
    , 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). The Helms rule was later expanded to apply to jurisdictional
    defects as well. Griffin v. State, 
    145 S.W.3d 645
    , 648–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However, in
    Young v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals largely abrogated the Helms rule by holding
    that a nonnegotiated guilty plea impliedly waived or forfeited the right to appeal a claim of error
    only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of and not supported by the error.
    Young v. State, 
    8 S.W.3d 656
    , 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Rankin v. State, 
    46 S.W.3d 899
    , 901–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
    Carson entered a nonnegotiated guilty plea and executed an explicit waiver of appeal, but
    argues that he can appeal his conviction under the Young exception in spite of the waiver under
    Helms. However, the Helms rule and the Young exception apply only to implied waiver. See
    
    Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901
    –02; 
    Young, 8 S.W.3d at 667
    . Here, Carson executed an explicit waiver
    of appeal. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the Young exception does not apply to provide
    Carson’s requested relief. Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.
    6
    Because the underlying facts of the case have been discussed in detail in our prior opinion in this case, we address
    only those facts relevant to the point of error presented on remand.
    3
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Bailey C. Moseley
    Justice
    Date Submitted:      October 25, 2018
    Date Decided:        January 9, 2019
    Do Not Publish
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15-00170-CR

Filed Date: 1/9/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/9/2019