Belisario I. Lopez v. State , 565 S.W.3d 879 ( 2018 )


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  • Affirmed and Majority and Concurring and Dissenting Opinions filed
    December 20, 2018.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-17-00205-CR
    BELISARIO I. LOPEZ, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 176th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 1466251
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
    OPINION
    This case presents another challenge to the constitutionality of a court-cost
    statute. Though the legal arguments have grown familiar, the issue in dispute
    appears to be one of first impression.
    I agree with the majority that appellant’s first and second issues lack merit,
    and that this court should affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence. Though I stand
    by my dissenting opinion in Johnson v. State, the majority correctly determines that
    the Johnson precedent binds this panel to overrule appellant’s third issue, in which
    he asserts that the jury fee imposed in article 102.004(a) of the Texas Code of
    Criminal Procedure facially violates the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers
    clause.1 I part ways with the majority as to the analysis of the fourth issue, in which
    appellant asserts that the witness-summoning-fee statute — article 102.011(a)(3) of
    the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure — facially violates the Texas Constitution’s
    separation-of-powers clause. Though the majority holds otherwise, under binding
    precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals, to show that any court-cost statute
    on its face violates the separation-of-powers clause, a challenger need only show
    that neither the court-cost statute nor any interconnected statute directs that the funds
    collected under the court-cost statute be expended for something that is a legitimate
    criminal-justice purpose.
    In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the witness-summoning-fee statute
    facially violates the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers clause because the
    fee constitutes an impermissible tax collected by the judiciary, rather than a
    legitimate court cost. The parties have not cited and research has not revealed any
    binding precedent addressing this issue.2              Article 102.011(a)(3) imposes on a
    1
    See Johnson v. State, No. 14-16-00658-CR, 
    2018 WL 4925456
    , at *4–8, (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2018, no pet. h.) (majority opinion rejecting claim that the jury fee imposed
    in article 102.004(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure facially violates the Texas
    Constitution’s separation-of-powers provision); Johnson, 
    2018 WL 4925456
    , at *9–16 (Frost, C.J.
    dissenting).
    2
    The only appellate court that appears to have addressed whether article 102.011(a)(3) of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure facially violates the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers
    provision is the First Court of Appeals. In Allen v. State that court held that article 102.011(a)(3)
    does not facially violate the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers provision. See No. 01-16-
    00768-CR, 
    2018 WL 4138965
    , at *4–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, pet.
    granted).
    2
    defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor a $5 fee for each witness
    summoned by a peace officer in the case.3 Appellant’s argument amounts to a facial
    challenge to the statute’s constitutionality.             Appellant contends that article
    102.011(a)(3) violates the separation-of-powers clause because the statute does not
    direct that the funds collected be expended for something that is a legitimate
    criminal-justice purpose.
    Preservation-of-Error Analysis
    The trial court ordered in its judgment that appellant pay all court costs,
    though the trial court did not impose any court costs in open court, and the judgment
    does not contain an itemization of the court costs. In this context, appellant may
    challenge the constitutionality of article 102.011(a)(3) for the first time on appeal.4
    Facial-Challenge Analysis
    We review the constitutionality of a criminal statute de novo as a question of
    law.5 Because one making a facial challenge attacks the statute itself as opposed to
    a particular application, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
    exists under which the statute would be valid.6 Under the proper facial-challenge
    analysis, this court is to consider only applications in which the statute actually
    authorizes or prohibits conduct.7
    3
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
    4
    See Johnson v. State, 
    537 S.W.3d 929
    , 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam); London v. State,
    
    490 S.W.3d 503
    , 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
    5
    Ex parte Lo, 
    424 S.W.3d 10
    , 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    6
    Peraza v. State, 
    467 S.W.3d 508
    , 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
    7
    
    Id. 3 The
    Texas Constitution’s Separation-of-Powers Clause
    The Texas Constitution expressly guarantees the separation of powers among
    Texas’s three branches of government.8 Article II, section 1 states:
    The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided
    into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a
    separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one;
    those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to
    another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these
    departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the
    others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
    Tex. Const. art. II, § 1. In this section of the Texas Constitution the people of Texas
    provide that the powers granted to one governmental branch belong exclusively to
    that branch and the other branches may not exercise the power.9 When one branch
    assumes or is delegated a power more properly attached to another branch, that
    action violates the separation-of-powers clause.10 If a statute turns the courts into
    tax gatherers, then the statute delegates to the courts a power more properly attached
    to the executive branch.11
    The Court of Criminal Appeals’s Opinion in Peraza
    This court should look to the Court of Criminal Appeals’s precedent to
    determine the legal standard for analyzing appellant’s constitutional challenge. In
    Peraza v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed its 1942 opinion in Ex parte
    Carson, in which the high court found a $1 library fund court cost invalid as neither
    “necessary nor incidental to the trial of a criminal case.”12 Though the Carson case
    8
    Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; Salinas v. State, 
    523 S.W.3d 103
    , 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
    9
    Ex parte 
    Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 28
    .
    10
    
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –07.
    11
    
    Id. at 107.
    12
    Ex parte Carson, 
    159 S.W.2d 126
    , 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942); see 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 515
    –
    4
    did not involve an allegation that the court cost violated the Texas Constitution’s
    separation-of-powers clause, the intermediate court of appeals in Peraza relied upon
    the Carson precedent in determining that the statute in Peraza violated the Texas
    Constitution’s separation-of-powers provision.13 On review, the Court of Criminal
    Appeals concluded that “necessary and incidental to the trial of a criminal case”
    should not be the legal standard for determining whether court-cost statutes violate
    the separation-of-powers clause.14          The high court based this decision on its
    conclusion that the rejected standard would be “too limiting” and would “ignore the
    legitimacy of costs that, although not necessary to, or an incidental expense of, the
    actual trial of a criminal case, may nevertheless be directly related to the recoupment
    of costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the prosecution of
    criminal cases within our criminal justice system.”15
    The Peraza court held that, “if the statute under which court costs are assessed
    (or an interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be
    expended for legitimate criminal-justice purposes, then the statute allows for a
    constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of
    the separation of powers clause.”16 For the purposes of this legal standard, a
    criminal-justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of the criminal-
    justice system.17 According to the Peraza court, we are to determine the legitimacy
    17.
    13
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 512
    –13; Ex parte 
    Carson, 159 S.W.2d at 127
    –30.
    14
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 517
    .
    15
    
    Id. 16 Id.
    (footnote omitted).
    17
    
    Id. at 517–18.
    5
    of a purported criminal-justice purpose on a statute-by-statute, case-by-case basis.18
    The Peraza court emphasized that the challenger takes on the burden of establishing
    that the statute operates unconstitutionally in every possible circumstance.19 The
    Peraza court indicated that a party asserting a facial challenge to the constitutionality
    of a court-costs statute under the separation-of-powers clause must show that no
    circumstance exists under which the statute or an interconnected statute provides for
    an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal-justice
    purposes.20
    In Peraza, the challenged statute required collected court costs to be sent to
    the comptroller and that the comptroller deposit thirty-five percent of the funds into
    the state treasury to the credit of the state highway fund and sixty-five percent of the
    funds to the credit of the criminal-justice planning account in the general revenue
    fund.21 The Peraza court noted that article 102.056 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure requires that funds in the criminal-justice planning account be used to
    reimburse law-enforcement agencies for expenses incurred in collecting a DNA
    specimen from every person charged with certain crimes.22 Even if the court costs
    deposited into the criminal-justice planning account were used to fund criminal-
    justice projects unrelated to managing the statewide DNA database, the funds still
    would be used for legitimate criminal-justice purposes.23
    18
    
    Id. 19 See
    id. at 516.
    
    20
    See 
    id. at 517–19.
    21
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.020(e),(h) (West 2010); 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 519
    –
    21.
    22
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 518
    –19.
    23
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 519
    (concluding that “[t]he statutory scheme allocating these
    resources to the criminal-justice planning account are required, via interconnected statutory
    6
    As to the funds deposited into the state treasury to the credit of the state
    highway fund, Government Code section 411.145 requires that these funds be used
    to defray the cost of administering the part of the Government Code governing the
    collection and management of DNA samples, which the Peraza court deemed a
    legitimate criminal-justice purpose.24 The Peraza court held that the challenger had
    not shown that it was impossible for the court-cost statute to operate constitutionally
    under any circumstance.25 The court-cost statute challenged in Peraza did not
    involve the recoupment of costs necessary and incidental to the trial of a criminal
    case.26      Nonetheless, the Peraza court articulated a single legal standard for
    determining whether a challenger has shown that a court-cost statute facially violates
    the Texas Constitution’s separation-of-powers clause, and the high court did not
    state that this standard would vary according to the type of court-cost statute.27
    The Court of Criminal Appeals’s Opinion in Salinas
    In Salinas v. State, decided just two years after Peraza, the Court of Criminal
    Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring every convicted felon
    to pay $133 as a court cost.28 Though the statute expressly allocated the court costs
    among various accounts, the high court held that two of the accounts did not qualify
    as an allocation of funds to be expended for legitimate criminal-justice purposes and
    to that extent deemed the statute facially unconstitutional in violation of the
    provisions, to be expended for legitimate criminal-justice purposes”).
    24
    See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.145 (West 2010); 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 519
    –21.
    25
    
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 521
    .
    26
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.020; 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 518
    –21.
    27
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    28
    See 
    523 S.W.3d 103
    , 106–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
    7
    separation-of-powers clause.29
    In deciding the case, the Salinas court said that it was applying the legal
    standard from Peraza.30 As to the legal standard required to show that a court-cost
    statute facially violates the separation-of-powers clause, the teachings of Peraza
    mirror the teachings of Salinas.31 Yet, the Salinas court used different words to
    describe this legal standard.32 Though the Peraza court spoke in terms of statutes
    “provid[ing] for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for a legitimate
    criminal justice purpose,” the Salinas court stated that “Peraza requires that the
    relevant statutes direct that the funds be used for something that is a legitimate
    criminal justice purpose.”33 In finding the statute at issue unconstitutional in part,
    the Salinas court pointed to the failure of any statute to direct that the court costs be
    used for a legitimate criminal-justice purpose and found that this failure alone
    sufficed to show that the statute imposing the court cost facially violated the
    separation-of-powers clause:
    Because the constitutional infirmity in this case is the statute’s failure
    to direct the funds to be used in a manner that would make it a court
    cost (i.e., for something that is a [legitimate] criminal justice purpose),
    the statute operates unconstitutionally every time the fee is collected,
    making the statute unconstitutional on its face.34
    The Salinas court underscored that it found the statute facially
    29
    See 
    id. 30 See
    id. at 107 
    (reciting legal standard from Peraza); 
    id. at 109
    n. 26 (asserting that the State and
    the dissenting judges misunderstood Peraza and stating what the Salinas court concluded is
    required under Peraza).
    31
    See 
    id. at 106–10;
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    32
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10; 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    33
    Compare 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109
    n. 26, with 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 517
    .
    34
    
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 109
    n. 26 (emphasis in original).
    8
    unconstitutional because the statute failed to direct the funds to be used for a
    legitimate criminal-justice purpose.35 The high court stated that courts should base
    the determination of what constitutes a legitimate criminal-justice purpose on what
    the governing statute says about the intended use of the funds, not on whether the
    funds actually are used for a legitimate criminal-justice purpose.36
    The Salinas case did not involve a statute under which the court recoups costs
    that are necessary and incidental to the trial of a criminal case, nor did Salinas
    involve a statute that was silent as to the allocation of the court costs collected. 37
    The Salinas court used broad language and did not mention any exception for such
    statutes. See 
    id. Even presuming
    that appellant’s separation-of-powers challenge
    does not fall within the Salinas court’s holding, the high court’s statements constitute
    deliberate and unequivocal declarations of the law made after mature consideration
    and for future guidance of the bench and bar.38 These judicial dicta bind this court.39
    Thus, Salinas requires this court to apply the legal standard in that case to all facial,
    separation-of-powers challenges to court-cost statutes.40 In criminal appeals, this
    35
    See 
    id. at 109
    –10, nn. 26 & 36.
    36
    See 
    id. at 107
    .
    37
    See 
    id. at 106–10.
    38
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10; Murray v. State, 
    261 S.W.3d 255
    , 257 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2008), aff’d, 
    302 S.W.3d 874
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
    39
    See 
    Murray, 261 S.W.3d at 257
    ; see also Cervantes-Guervara v. State, 
    523 S.W.3d 827
    , 832
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (holding that when the Court of Criminal Appeals
    “has deliberately and unequivocally interpreted the law in a criminal matter, we must adhere to its
    interpretation”).
    40
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36; Hernandez v. State, No. 01-16-00755-CR,
    
    2017 WL 3429414
    , at 6–7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 10, 2017, no pet. h.) (applying
    Salinas legal standard to court-court statute that was silent as to the allocation of the court costs
    collected and that involved the recoupment of costs necessary and incidental to the trial of a
    criminal case).
    9
    court must follow precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals.41 We lack
    authority to overrule or circumvent Court of Criminal Appeals precedent.42
    Under the Salinas precedent, to show that a court-cost statute on its face
    violates the separation-of-powers clause, a challenger need only demonstrate that
    neither the court-cost statute nor any interconnected statute directs that the funds
    collected under the court-cost statute be expended for something that is a legitimate
    criminal-justice purpose.43
    The Salinas standard applies to appellant’s challenges to article 102.011(a)(3),
    even presuming that the statute involves recoupment of costs incurred by the county
    that are necessary and incidental to the trial of a criminal case, and even though the
    statute is silent as to the allocation of the court costs collected.44 Though the high
    court worded the Salinas legal standard somewhat differently than it worded the
    Peraza legal standard, the Salinas legal standard is not inconsistent with the result
    in Peraza because the Peraza court indicated that the court-cost statutes and
    interconnected statutes directed that the funds collected be expended for something
    that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose.45
    The Language of Article 102.011(a)(3)
    Article 102.011, entitled “Fees for services of Peace Officers,” provides:
    (a) A defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the
    following fees for services performed in the case by a peace officer:
    41
    See State of Texas ex rel. Vance v. Hatten, 
    508 S.W.2d 625
    , 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
    Gardner v. State, 
    478 S.W.3d 142
    , 147 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).
    42
    See 
    Hatten, 508 S.W.2d at 628
    ; 
    Gardner, 478 S.W.3d at 147
    .
    43
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36; Hernandez, 
    2017 WL 3429414
    , at 6–7.
    44
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36; Hernandez, 
    2017 WL 3429414
    , at *6–7.
    45
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    10
    ...
    (3) $5 for summoning a witness;
    ...
    (j) In this article, “conviction” has the meaning assigned by Section
    133.101, Local Government Code.46
    Article 102.011 does not allocate the witness-summoning fee to any specific fund,
    nor does the statute give any direction as to how the funds collected should be
    expended.47 Under article 102.011’s unambiguous language, the statute does not
    direct that the funds collected be expended for something that is a legitimate
    criminal-justice purpose.48
    The standard demands that statutes spell out the connections rather than leave
    others to connect the dots. In the simplest terms, that funds could be used for a
    legitimate criminal-justice purpose does not suffice.49 We must look to what article
    102.011 and any interconnected statute say about the intended use of the funds —
    not to the actual use of the funds.50 The Salinas court concluded that directing court
    costs to fund the “Comprehensive Rehabilitation” account — a general-revenue fund
    dedicated to providing rehabilitation services — violated the Texas Constitution’s
    separation-of-powers clause.51 In rejecting the argument that the account assists
    individuals with rehabilitation from injuries that easily could be caused by crime,
    the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the statute did not (1) describe the functions
    or services being funded, (2) impose a criminal-justice restriction on the use of the
    46
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011.
    47
    See 
    id. 48 See
    id.; 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36.
    49
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36; Hernandez, 
    2017 WL 3429414
    , at 6–7.
    50
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 106
    –10, nn. 26 & 36; Hernandez, 
    2017 WL 3429414
    , at 6–7.
    51
    See 
    Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 107
    –08.
    11
    funds, or (3) mention a criminal-justice purpose.52 Under Salinas’s separation-of-
    powers analysis, to pass constitutional muster, article 102.011 or an interconnected
    statute must direct that the funds collected be expended for something that is a
    legitimate criminal-justice purpose.53
    Like Local Government Code section 133.102, which the Court of Criminal
    Appeals found unconstitutional in Salinas, article 102.011 fails to limit the use of
    the funds collected to serving a criminal-justice purpose.54 Article 102.011 does not
    address how the funds collected should be expended or where they should be held.55
    Under article 102.011’s plain language, the statute does not direct that the funds
    collected be expended for something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose.56
    The State argues that nothing in the plain language of article 102.011 directs
    that the funds collected under article 102.011(a)(3) be paid into a general revenue
    fund or be expended for a purpose that is not a legitimate criminal-justice purpose.
    But, under the Salinas standard, none of that is required. A failure of any statute to
    direct that the funds collected under the court-cost statute be expended for a
    legitimate criminal-justice purpose suffices to show that the court-cost statute
    facially violates the separation-of-powers clause.57 Thus, under Salinas, article
    102.011’s silence as to whether the funds collected under article 102.011(a)(3)
    should be expended for something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose does
    52
    See 
    id. at 108.
    53
    See 
    id. at 106–10,
    nn. 26 & 36.
    54
    Compare Local Govt. Code Ann. § 133.102 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) with Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011.
    55
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011.
    56
    See Salinas at 106–10, nn. 26 & 36.
    57
    See 
    id. 12 not
    avoid a violation of the separation-of-powers clause.58
    The majority and the State contend article 102.011 directs that the funds
    collected under article 102.011(a)(3) be expended for the “reimbursement of the
    peace officer who performed the service of summoning a witness in this case.”59
    The majority also concludes that the witness-summoning fee “is an actual
    recoupment of the out of pocket expenses incurred for summoning witnesses.” 60
    In answering the legal question, we cannot change the legal standard. Nor can
    this court read saving language into the statutory text. The statute simply says that
    “[a] defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay the following fees
    for services performed in the case by a peace officer: . . . $5 for summoning a
    witness.”61 Under the unambiguous language of the statute the convicted defendant
    must pay a fee based on a peace officer’s services in summoning a witness.62 The
    statute does not provide that the witness-summoning fee is an actual recoupment of
    out-of-pocket expenses incurred for summoning witnesses.
    It is not our role to fix statutes. That power belongs to the Legislature. Our
    job is to say whether the statute as written meets the high court’s test.
    The statute does not state that the purpose of the fee is to reimburse the peace
    officer.63 Article 102.011 does not state that the funds collected under article
    58
    See 
    id. 59 See
    ante at 15.
    60
    See ante at 16.
    61
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011.
    62
    See 
    id. 63 See
    id.
    13
    102.011(a)(3) 
    should be expended for the reimbursement of any peace officer.64 The
    fact that a peace officer’s services in summoning a witness trigger this fee does not
    mean that the fee’s purpose is to reimburse the peace officer or the peace officer’s
    employer. Even if reimbursement of a peace officer or the peace officer’s employer
    would be a legitimate criminal-justice purpose, article 102.011 does not direct that
    the funds collected under article 102.011(a)(3) be expended for this purpose.65
    A divided panel of the First Court of Appeals recently issued the Allen case,
    concluding that article 102.011(a)(3) does not facially violate the separation-of-
    powers clause.66 The Allen court did not address whether article 102.011(a)(3)
    satisfies the Salinas standard but it suggested that the statute does not.67 Adding on
    to what the high court said, the Allen court concluded that the Salinas standard does
    not apply to court costs that are used to reimburse criminal-justice expenses incurred
    in connection with that criminal prosecution.68 According to the Allen court, the
    Peraza court held “that at least two types of fees assessed as court costs are
    constitutionally permissible: (1) court costs to reimburse criminal-justice expenses
    incurred in connection with that criminal prosecution and (2) court costs to be
    expended in the future to off-set future criminal-justice costs.”69 The Allen court
    reasoned that Peraza created one legal standard for court costs that reimburse
    expenses incurred in connection with that criminal prosecution and another legal
    64
    See 
    id. 65 See
    id.
    66
    See 
    Allen v. State, No. 01-16-00768-CR, 
    2018 WL 4138965
    , at *4–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, pet. granted).
    67
    See 
    id. at *8–9.
    68
    See 
    id. at *7–9.
    69
    
    Id. at *7.
    14
    standard for all other court costs.70 According to the Allen court, the Salinas court
    dealt with the second legal standard and did not change the first legal standard under
    Peraza.71 Applying an analysis similar to that used by the Allen court, the majority
    concludes that if a statute imposes court costs directly related to the recoupment of
    costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the prosecution of criminal
    cases, then under Peraza, the statute does not facially violate the Texas
    Constitution’s separation-of-powers provision, even if no statute directs the funds
    collected to be used for something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose.72
    But, the directing-the-use-of-funds component is the centerpiece of the
    Peraza/Salinas legal standard.           Eliminating it changes the standard — and
    potentially the outcome.
    The Allen court and the majority have misinterpreted Peraza and Salinas. The
    Peraza court articulated a single legal standard for deciding whether a party has
    shown that a court-cost statute facially violates the Texas Constitution’s separation-
    of-powers provision. The Peraza court did not say this standard would differ
    depending on the type of court-cost statute under scrutiny.73 The Salinas court re-
    stated this single legal standard in a similar way, using slightly different words. 74
    Applying the Salinas standard to appellant’s fourth issue, the failure of article
    102.011 or an interconnected statute to direct the funds collected to be used for
    something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose would mean article
    70
    See 
    id. 71 See
    id. at *8–9.
    
    72
    See ante at 16.
    73
    See 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    74
    See Salinas at 106–10; 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    15
    102.011(a)(3) facially violates article II, section I of the Texas Constitution.75
    This court should (1) conclude that under precedent from the Court of
    Criminal Appeals, to be constitutional article 102.011(a)(3) or an interconnected
    statute must direct the funds collected to be used for something that is a legitimate
    criminal-justice purpose; (2) hold that article 102.011(a)(3) does not direct the funds
    collected to be used for something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose; and
    (3) determine whether any interconnected statute directs that the funds collected be
    used for something that is a legitimate criminal-justice purpose. Because the court
    fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.
    /s/    Kem Thompson Frost
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Christopher and Jamison.
    (Jamison, J., majority).
    Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
    75
    See Salinas at 106–10; 
    Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 513
    –21.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-17-00205-CR

Citation Numbers: 565 S.W.3d 879

Filed Date: 12/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2018