Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cody Littlepage ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00194-CV
3879773
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/23/2015 1:51:49 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
FILED IN
No. 03-14-00194-CV 3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
1/23/2015 1:51:49 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
In the Court of Appeals
Third District of Texas — Austin
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellant
V.
CODY LITTLEPAGE,
Appellee
Appealed from County Court at Law Number 2, Williamson
County, Texas; Before the Honorable Timothy Wright
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Amber D. Farrelly
Texas Bar No. 24069671
BAIRD☆FARRELLY CRIMINAL DEFENSE, PLLC
2312 Western Trails Blvd Ste. 102-A
Austin, TX 78745
Tel. 512-804-5911
adfelaw@gmail.com
Attorney for Appellee, Cody Littlepage
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
1
No. 03-14-00194-CV
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellant
V.
CODY LITTLEPAGE,
Appellee
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellee, Cody Littlepage, believes that oral argument might benefit the Court
in this case and respectfully requests that it be granted.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT……………………………………………....2
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………..…3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………….……4
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………...……5
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT………………………………….…………6
APPELLEE’S BRIEF………………………………………………………….……..7
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………..………….8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT…………………………………………..…….9
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...…23
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………….…23
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE……………………………………………..…24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE…………………………………………………...…25
INDEX OF APPENDICES…………………………………………………….……26
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
U.S. CONST. Amend. V, VI, XIV
Tex. Const. art. I, §10 and 19
STATUTES
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12101
TEX. TRANS. CODE § 724.015
TEX. TRANS. CODE § 724.032
TEX. TRANS. CODE § 724.042
CASES
Erdman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)……………………..16
Ex parte Ard, No. AP-75,704, slip op. at 2,
(Tex.Crim.App. March 11, 2009)(opinion not designated for publication)….…....10
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)………………..…….…9
Landin v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 475 S.W.2d 594
(Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ)………………………………………….....19
Lane v. State, 951 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.)……………...18
Nebes v. State, 743 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.App. 1988)…………………………………..16
Raesner v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 982 S.W.2d. 131, 132
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. Denied)…………………………...…….9
4
State v. Amaya, 221 S.W.3d 797
(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. Ref’d)……………………………………….….19
TX DPS v. Jauregui, 176 S.W.3d 846, 848-849 (Tex.App. 2005)………13, 16, 18, 19
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
ASL American Sign Language
ALJ Administrative Law Judge
ALR Administrative Law Review
5
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court should grant oral argument for the following reasons:
a. The issues presented have not previously been authoritatively decided.
See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(b).
b. Oral argument will give the Court a more complete understanding of
the facts presented in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(c).
c. Oral argument will allow the Court to better analyze the complicated
legal issues presented in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(c).
d. Oral argument will significantly aid the Court in deciding this case.
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), 39.1(d).
6
No. 03-14-00197-CV
_____________________________________
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
APPELLANT
V.
CODY LITTLEPAGE,
APPELLEE
_____________________________________________________
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Cody Littlepage, appellee, respectfully submits his brief in response to
appellant’s appeal.
For clarity and brevity, the appellee, Cody Littlepage, will maintain references
as established by the Texas Department of Public Safety. Citations to Appellant’s
brief will be AB at [page number].
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Deputy Reynaldo Ramirez arrested Cody Littlepage for driving while
intoxicated and was responsible for providing the DIC-24 and requesting a breath or
blood specimen. The evidence shows Littlepage is deaf1 and communicates via
American Sign Language (ASL).2 Littlepage requested an ASL interpreter by
referring to the “deaf law.”3 Nevertheless, Deputy Ramirez, who does not speak
ASL, did not request an interpreter.4
After an extensive and difficult struggle with communication via written
word,5 often times where it seemed Littlepage did not understand,6 Deputy Ramirez
arrested Littlepage. Deputy Ramirez placed Littlepage’s hands behind his back,
handcuffed him and placed him in the patrol vehicle.7 Deputy Ramirez testified that
he showed Littlepage the DIC-24 and orally requested a specimen.8 Deputy Ramirez
did not tell Littlepage what the DIC-24 was or its purpose.9 Littlepage glanced at the
DIC-2410 before Deputy Ramirez stated that Littlepage’s non-response would be
1
CR 54, 58-59, 76
2
CR 70
3
CR 55, 74
4
CR 63
5
CR 55
6
CR 64, 71, 79
7
CR 77
8
CR 77
9
CR 74
10
CR 77
8
considered a refusal.11 Due to his deafness, Littlepage was unable to hear anything
requested or stated by Deputy Ramirez. Further, Littlepage was physically unable to
respond via sign language due to being handcuffed with his hands behind his back.
Despite the Department’s position, the evidence shows that Littlepage did not
refuse to provide a breath or blood specimen,12 and given the unique circumstances
of this situation, does not authorize a license suspension.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Littlepage was “properly
asked to submit a specimen of breath,”13 and that he refused.14 Littlepage appealed to
Williamson County Court Two, contending Littlepage was not properly asked to
submit a specimen, and there was no showing that Littlepage refused to provide a
specimen. Judge Tim Wright agreed and reversed the decision of the ALJ. Judge
Wright was not required to accept or defer to findings not supported by the record
and was authorized to make contrary findings. Ex parte Ard, No. AP-75,704, slip op.
at 2, (Tex.Crim.App. March 11, 2009)(opinion not designated for publication), citing
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 727.
11
CR 77-78
12
CR 78
13
ALJ Decision dated October 3, 2013
14
Id.
9
II. REFUSAL
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Littlepage knowingly and
intelligently refused to provide a breath sample. Transportation Code § 724.032(a)
notes two ways a person can refuse:
If a person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, whether
expressly or because of an intentional failure of the person to give
the specimen.
Just as it is the State’s burden to show voluntary submission of a breath test, it
is the State’s burden to show a refusal. Texas Transportation Code §724.042 states
that the issues at a hearing are (1) reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to
stop or arrest the person; (2) probable cause existed to believe that the person was
operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated; (3) the person was
placed under arrest by the officer and was requested to submit to the taking of a
specimen; and (4) the person refused to submit to the taking of a specimen on request
of the officer. (emphasis added).
The Department concedes that Transportation Code 724.01515 provides that
when a driver is arrested for driving while intoxicated, he must be warned of the
15
§ 724.015. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OFFICER BEFORE REQUESTING SPECIMEN.
Before requesting a person to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer shall inform the person
orally and in writing that:
(1) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, that refusal may be
admissible in a subsequent prosecution;
(2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person's license to
operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently
prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;
10
statutory consequences of refusal to provide a breath or blood specimen.16 The issue
in this case is whether Deputy Ramirez properly provided the warnings to Littlepage,
a deaf person, and whether Littlepage refused to submit to the taking of a blood or
breath test. Littlepage contends that because of his deafness, Deputy Ramirez never
made a proper request for a specimen and Littlepage did not refuse, either expressly
or by intentional failure, to provide a specimen.
A. Littlepage Understood Written English
The Department asserts that Littlepage understood English to a degree in
which he was able to read the statutory warnings on the DIC-24, and then
intentionally refused to answer Deputy Ramirez’s request for a breath specimen.
Deputy Ramirez testified that “this [was] the most difficult test [he had] ever done”
because Littlepage is deaf.17 Deputy Ramirez testified that he and Littlepage
communicated via “the written word,”18 noting that Littlepage would answer by
circling ‘yes’ or ‘no.’19
The Department maintains that Littlepage appeared to understand English,20
and that “given the fact that Littlepage is deaf, the presentation of the warnings in
16
AB 7
17
CR 70
18
CR 55
19
CR 55
20
AB 7
11
written English constituted substantial compliance.”21 In support of this argument,
the Department relies on TX DPS v. Jauregui 176 S.W.3d 846, but Jauregui is easily
distinguishable because, the defendant acknowledged that he understood the statutory
warnings whereas Littlepage did not.22
Here, the record does not contain any affirmative remarks regarding
understanding the warnings or the DIC-24. Instead, Deputy Ramirez testified that
there were times when Littlepage seemed to not understand23 and when Littlepage’s
written responses did not make sense in the English language.24
Deputy Ramirez acknowledged that ASL and English were not the same
language.25 After questions regarding the fact that Littlepage is deaf, Deputy
Ramirez admitted that it was probable that there was a communication barrier,26 and
that it was possible that Littlepage did not understand what Deputy Ramirez was
writing.27
The record is unclear as to whether Deputy Ramirez asked Littlepage via
writing if he would read the DIC-24. Deputy Ramirez testified that after Littlepage
21
AB 7
22
TX DPS v. Jauregui, 176 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex.App. 2005), “When [the officer] provided
Jauregui a set of written warnings at the jail, Jauregui stated, ‘I understood this, I don’t need to read
it.’ Jauregui then refused for a second time to provide a breath specimen.”
23
CR 64
24
CR 64
25
CR 69
26
CR 71
27
CR 79
12
was arrested, Deputy Ramirez “held [the DIC-24] up to him,”28 and Littlepage
“glanced at it.”29 The record shows that Deputy Ramirez did not tell Littlepage what
the DIC-24 was or point out the heading to Littlepage.30 However, Deputy Ramirez
testified that he did state, “Here’s the Statutory Warnings, yes or no?”31
When asked if he wrote or said that statement, Deputy Ramirez testified that
he said it but did not recall if he wrote it.32 There is no evidence that this statement
was written to Littlepage. However, even if the statement was written, Deputy
Ramirez testified that “[Littlepage] didn’t circle yes or not [sic] that he would read it
or wouldn’t,”33 thereby not providing a refusal.
In regards to the question as to whether Deputy Ramirez requested that
Littlepage read the warnings, the evidence does not support this. There is no
evidence of this written question and it was physically impossible for Littlepage to
have responded -- once Littlepage was placed under arrest, all communication
between he and Deputy Ramirez ceased because he was physically unable to
respond. He could not respond to the DIC-24 to either refuse or consent because he
was handcuffed with his hands behind his back.
28
CR 77
29
CR 77
30
CR 74
31
CR 77
32
CR 77
33
CR 55
13
B. Informed Decision
The Department properly states that “a peace officer is directed to provide
certain warnings before requesting a driver’s consent to an alcohol concentration test,
so the driver has the opportunity to make an informed decision about taking or
refusing the test.”34
“The purpose behind section 724.015 is ‘to ensure that a person who refuses to
give a requested specimen does so with a full understanding of the consequences.’
Nebes v. State, 743 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.).”
TX DPS v. Jauregui, 176 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex.App. 2005)
In order for an informed decision to be made, one must understand the options
or the questions being posed to him. Littlepage did not understand and therefore
never had the opportunity to make an informed decision.
“It is implicit in Article 6701 l-5, §2, that a suspect’s decision to submit to a
breath test must truly be her own, made freely and with the correct understanding of
the actual statutory consequences of refusal.” Erdman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 890, 893
(Tex.Crim.App. 1993)
Further, the Department asserts that Littlepage “deliberately ignored the
warnings Deputy Ramirez presented and refused to answer the deputy’s request for a
breath specimen.” However, Ramirez acknowledged that speaking or reading the
34
AB 9
14
DIC-24 aloud to Littlepage would be ineffective because he could not hear.35
Ramirez testified that he stated orally, “Here’s the Statutory Warnings, yes or no?”36
And that he then stated, “Then I will consider this a refusal?” He replied, “Yes,
ma’am.”37
The evidence shows that Littlepage was never given the warnings in a way that
he was able to have a full understanding of what was being asked of him or the
consequences. Littlepage was never provided the warnings in a language he could
understand, ASL. Therefore no intelligent waiver or refusal could be made by
Littlepage.
C. No Refusal
The Department contends that Littlepage “refused to answer the deputy’s
request for a breath specimen.”38 However, the evidence plainly shows that
Littlepage did not refuse:
Littlepage did not understand the DIC-24 or its purpose; Deputy Ramirez
testified he did not recall if he told Littlepage what the DIC-24 was or its purpose.39
35
CR 76
36
CR 77
37
CR 78
38
AB 4
39
CR 74
15
Ramirez acknowledged that Littlepage may not have known what the DIC-24 was.40
Q: Did he know—do you know if he knew what it was?
A: No, ma’am.
Littlepage’s silence was not a refusal but rather was due to his inability to
physically hear Deputy Ramirez and should not have been taken as a refusal. When
asked if he received his refusal on the form, Deputy Ramirez answered that “He
didn’t answer so he didn’t refuse…he wouldn’t say yes or no.”41 Ramirez further
testified that Littlepage did not expressly tell him that he would not give a
specimen.42
Q: Did he expressly tell you that he would not give a specimen?
A: No.
In Jauregui, there was “no evidence that the appellant did not understand the
warnings or that this failure to receive the warnings in writing had any impact on his
decision to take the breath test.” Jauregui, 176 S.W.3d at 849-850 (Tex.App. 2005)
citing Lane v. State, 951 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.).
The Department assumes that Littlepage understood the warnings. However,
the evidence shows the contrary. During the entire DWI investigation, Deputy
Ramirez and Littlepage communicated via writing and circling of “yes” or “no.” The
evidence also shows that there were communication difficulties throughout, when
40
CR 77
41
CR 56 (emphasis added)
42
CR 78 (emphasis added)
16
Deputy Ramirez could not understand Littlepage and vice versa.43 When Deputy
Ramirez presented Littlepage with the statutory warnings, he did so orally, without
writing and Littlepage gave no response.
In Jauregui, where “the evidence demonstrated that the purpose of section
724.015 had been fulfilled: Jauregui had been informed of the consequences of his
failing to provide a breath specimen, and he had indicated that he understood those
consequences.” 176 S.W.3d at 850. In the instant case, all the evidence points to the
fact that Littlepage was not able to give a response because he neither understood the
warnings nor heard the request for a specimen, therefore the purpose of section
724.015 was not fulfilled.
III. LITTLEPAGE DISTINGUISHED
The Department points to the cases of State v. Amaya44 and Landin v. Tex.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety45 to argue that Deputy Ramirez substantially complied with the
statute to provide warnings to Littlepage. The Department maintains that Littlepage
understood those warnings and subsequently refused. However, this is the proverbial
comparison of apples and oranges.
In both Amaya and Landin, the defendants spoke Spanish. These cases cannot
43
44
CR 71
State v. Amaya, 221 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, pet. Ref’d).—gave defendant
45
warnings in two languages, English and Spanish.
Landin v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 475 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ)
17
control the instant case because they dealt with individuals who were able-bodied
and could communicate with the officers. Those cases focused on being given the
warnings in either English or Spanish.
In the case at bar, Littlepage is completely and totally deaf. He has no ability
to hear spoken language. Consequently, he was unable to hear what Deputy Ramirez
said or asked. Further, Littlepage could not speak to Deputy Ramirez or reply to
requests. Although Littlepage utilizes another language, ASL, the central issue is
that he is a disabled person who cannot communicate or express himself to Deputy
Ramirez.
The Department concedes that they have the burden in the current case to
show that Littlepage sufficiently understood the warnings to give an informed
waiver. They did not meet that burden. While the Department at most argues that
Littlepage appears to understand English enough to answer yes or no to field sobriety
tests, there is no evidence that the communication regarding the statutory warnings
was understood. Deputy Ramirez did not emphasize what the warnings were or
receive a response from Littlepage that the acknowledged or understood the DIC-24.
This is substantiated by the fact that all communication, however limited, ceased
when Littlepage was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and put in the patrol
car.
Strict compliance is not required when the warnings can be given either orally
18
and/or in writing. Here, this is not an option for a deaf person: (1) there is no way to
provide the warnings orally without the aid of an ASL interpreter; and, (2) since
there is no written form of ASL, providing the warnings in writing is impossible.
Clearly Amaya and Landin are spoken language cases and do not apply to the
case at bar. It is clear that Littlepage is unique and distinct. The evidence shows that
Littlepage is deaf, and he physically is unable to hear; that he communicates in ASL;
that Deputy Ramirez does not understand ASL; that deafness is a recognized
disability under the ADA; that no interpreter or accommodations were made for
Littlepage; ASL has no written language; that Littlepage was arrested and handcuffed
behind his back; Littlepage had no ability to communicate after handcuffed; Deputy
Ramirez read the warnings in English; Littlepage was not able to hear that reading
and was not able to read them on his own; that he was not told what DIC-24 was for;
that Littlepage was not expressly asked by Deputy Ramirez to provide a sample; that
he was verbally told to respond but could not do so because he could not hear the
request; that he was verbally told that a no answer will be taken as a refusal; that he
did not hear this request; and that he never expressly or intentionally refused to
provide a breath or blood sample.
Deputy Ramirez knew Littlepage was deaf.
Q: And you noted that he was deaf?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did he tell you he was deaf?
19
A: Yes, ma’am.46
Deputy Ramirez testified that he attempted to secure an interpreter. However,
when asked on cross-examination about an interpreter, Deputy Ramirez testified that
he did not know if there was an interpreter available or not because he did not know
if one was even called.47 Although the Department argues that Littlepage
understood everything that was communicated and asked of him, Deputy Ramirez
stated there were times when Littlepage seemed to not understand.48 Deputy
Ramirez replied, “yes, ma’am” and that “[Littlepage’s] English grammar didn’t make
sense.”49 Deputy Ramirez acknowledged that there was a communication barrier
between himself and Littlepage.50
Section 724.015 requires that the officer “shall inform the person orally and
in writing” regarding the consequences of refusing to submit a specimen. That was
not done in this case. The evidence shows that Littlepage communicated via sign
language and Deputy Ramirez was unable to understand him.51
IV. DUE PROCESS
Both the Department and Deputy Ramirez acknowledge that Littlepage’s
46
CR 58-59
47
CR 63
48
CR 64
49
CR 64
50
CR 71
51
CR 70
20
deafness is a recognized disability under the ADA.52 Because of this, the issue
extends beyond a single spoken language comparison. It encompasses equal
protection under the due process clause. Although the Department asserts that
Littlepage did not raise the issue of due process, the evidence shows that the issue
was raised with the trial court.53
When the Constitution has been interpreted to require language access, the
issue is typically framed in terms of the Sixth Amendment. Likewise, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses have been employed to justify the
right to interpreters within the courtroom and access to the justice system. Due
process requires more than just the appearance of equality within the courtroom. Due
process requires proceedings a person can understand both inside the courtroom and
while interacting with law enforcement during the investigatory phase.
Disabled persons are afforded extra protection to ensure justice and due
process. Deputy Ramirez was aware that Littlepage was disabled. When asked,
Q: Okay. Would you agree that hearing impairment is a
disability?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: As recognized by the Americans with Disabilities Act?
A: That’s why I recognize it, yes, ma’am.54
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires state and
52
CR 61
53
RR 14-15
54
CR 61
21
local governments to make their programs, services, and activities accessible to
individuals with disabilities, including individuals who are deaf or hard of
hearing. Specifically, under 28 CFR §35.160 General—Communications, states:
(a) (1) a public entity shall take appropriate steps to
ensure that communications with applicants, participants,
members of the public, and companions of disabilities are
as effective as communication with others.
(b) (2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary
to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance
with the method of communication used by the individual;
the nature, length, and complexity of the communication
involved; and the context in which the communication is
taking place. In determining what types of auxiliary aids and
services are necessary, a public entity shall give primary
consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities.
In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be
provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in
such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of
the individual with a disability.
The regulations also specify that in determining what type of aid or
service is necessary, the public entity shall give ‘primary consideration” to the
requests of the individual, and shall “honor” that choice unless it can demonstrate
“that another effective means of communication exists.” 55
Likewise, Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973 29 USC Section 794(a)
states
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
55
Title II of ADA 28 CFR 35.130(B)(2)
22
subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service."
Law enforcement is included in those entities which are governed by the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. It is rational to associate equal protection and
due process guarantees that are required in the courtroom to apply throughout the
criminal justice system. Because Deputy Ramirez recognized that Littlepage was
deaf and was protected under the ADA. Deputy Ramirez failed to accommodate
for Littlepage’s disability and therefore violated his due process rights as a citizen.
CONCLUSION
The evidence shows Littlepage is deaf and communicates through ASL.
Consequently, this case involves an unspoken/visual language and a disability.
When viewed in this light, the evidence shows that Littlepage did not understand the
statutory warnings and Deputy Ramirez incorrectly assumed Littlepage’s non-
response was a refusal. Littlepage neither understood nor expressly refused to
provide a specimen. Given the unique circumstances of this case, the ALJ erred and
this case does not provide for a license suspension.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee respectfully requests that the judgment
23
of Williamson County Court Two be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
CODY LITTLEPAGE
Amber Farrelly
Texas Bar No. 24069671
BAIRD☆FARRELLY CRIMINAL DEFENSE
2312 Western Trails Blvd Ste. 102-A
Austin, TX 78745
Tel. 512-804-5911
Fax. 512-804-5919
adfelaw@gmail.com
By: __________________________
Amber D. Farrelly
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the computer program used to prepare this document reported
that there are 4,331 words in the pertinent parts of the document, per TRAP
9.4(i)(2).
By: __________________________
Amber D. Farrelly
24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 23, 2015, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant’s Brief was served on the following counsel of record by
the means indicated:
Via e-file
Kevin M. Givens
Supervising Attorney,
ALR Appellate Section
SBN 00796633
P.O. Box 15327
Austin, Texas 78761-5327
Tel: (512) 424-5193
Fax: (512) 424-5221
Kevin.Givens@dps.texas.gov
By: __________________________
Amber D. Farrelly
25
No. 03-14-00194-CV
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellant,
V.
CODY LITTLEPAGE,
Appellee
APPELLEE’S APPENDIX
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Tab A ...................................................... Texas Constitution art. I, §10 and 19
26
TAB
“A”
27
Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 10:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself,
and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted
by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a
violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have
the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and
laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the
punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of
impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger.
Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 19:
No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or
immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of
the land.
28