Armstrong, Ex Parte Rodarrion D. ( 2015 )

PD-0479-15
PD-0479-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 4/30/2015 12:40:21 PM
Accepted 5/1/2015 10:29:59 AM
NO. _________________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
______________________
EX PARTE
RODARRIAN D. ARMSTRONG
______________________
On appeal from the Ninth Judicial District
Court of Appeals, Beaumont, Texas
Appellate Cause No. 09-14-00522-CR
and
st
The 1 Judicial District Court of Jasper County, Texas
Cause No. 12,170JD
______________________
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
______________________
Dennis D. Horn
SBN: 24034489
Attorney At Law
1075 CR 619
Kirbyville, Texas 75956
(409) 420-0771
(409) 420-0772 fax
horden@hotmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
May 1, 2015
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED
UNLESS A STATE REQUEST FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT IS GRANTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court's appealable order as well as the
names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.
PARTIES
Appellee: The State of Texas
Appellee Counsel: Steve Hollis
District Attorney
121 N. Austin, Room 121
Jasper, Texas 75951
Appellant: Rodarrian D. Armstrong
101 Burch Street
Jasper, Texas 75951
Appellant Counsel: Dennis D. Horn
Attorney At Law
1075 CR 619
Kirbyville, Texas 75956
Trial Court: The Honorable Craig M. Mixson
District Judge
121 N. Austin, Room 205
Jasper, Texas 75951
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.............................................................................. 4
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT...........................................................5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY................................................ 5
GROUND FOR REVIEW- EXCESSIVE BOND............................................. 6
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5
PRAYER.............................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY........................................................................ 9
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................. 9
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................10
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Ex parte Davis, 574 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) ...........................................6
Ex parte Prelow, 929 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1996, no pet.) ....................6
Trammel v. State, 529 S.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975) ...................................6
TEXAS CODES:
Tex. Code of Crim. Proc., Art. 1.09 .....................................................................................6
Tex. Code of Crim. Proc., Art. 17.01 ...................................................................................6
Tex. Code of Crim. Proc., Art. 17.15 ...............................................................................6,7
TEXAS CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Sections 11, 13 ....................................................................................................6
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
8th Amendment ....................................................................................................................6
4
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
The issue in this matter is straightforward, unambiguous, and can be effectively addressed
in written briefs without oral argument. Oral argument is therefore waived unless the State is
granted oral argument. If the State is granted oral argument, Appellant request oral argument to
respond to the State’s oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 28, 2014, Jasper city police responded to a shooting call to find Obrien Parks (victim)
suffering from a gunshot wound. Interviews with witnesses alleged that Appellant, an eighteen
year old male, and the victim had words earlier in the day. Appellant later returned to confront
the victim at his residence, at which time the victim displayed a firearm at Appellant. Appellant
left but returned to the victim’s residence to see him pointing the same firearm out the window at
Appellant. Appellant retrieved a shotgun from a vehicle and shot one time at the victim striking
him in the face and chest. The victim was later pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant is currently a prisoner held in the Jasper County jail after being arrested on May
28, 2014, and charged with murder. Defendant’s original bond was set at $1,000,000.00. On
October 6, 2014, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Reasonable Bail. A hearing was held on
October 10, 2014, and the Court set Appellant’s bond at $800,000.00. On November 7, 2014,
Appellant filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus Motion to Set Reasonable Bail. (CR1,p.28-32). After
hearing Appellant’s Application on November 20, 2014, the trial court continued Appellant’s
bond at $800,000.00 (CR, p.58). On December 3, 2014, Appellant filed his Notice Of Appeal.
(CR, p.53). On April 1, 2015, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed the bail decision of the trial
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court.
GROUND FOR REVIEW
(1) The trial erred in setting Appellant’s bond at $800,000.00. The amount of bond set in this
case is in direct conflict with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Texas Constitution,
U.S. Constitution, and current case law.
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (TCCP) Article 1.09, excessive bail shall not be
required. “Article 1.09 ... proscribes excessive bail. The primary purpose of an appearance bond
is to secure the presence of the defendant in court for the trial of the offense charged. Bail should
be set sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the defendant will appear at trial, but it
should not be used as an instrument of oppression.” Ex parte Prelow, 929 S.W.2d 54, 55
(Tex.App.–San Antonio 1996, no pet.) Additionally, Article 17.01 of the TCCP states that “bail
is the security given by the accused that he will appear and answer before the proper court the
accusation brought against him, and includes a bail bond or a person bond.” The general rule
favors the allowance of bail. Thus, presumptions are not to be indulged against the applicant, and
the power to deny or require bail will not be used as an instrument of oppression. Ex parte Davis,
574 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) The purpose of bail is to secure the presence of an
accused upon trial of an accusation against him. It is not a revenue measure intended to be a
substitution for a fine, but is intended to secure the trial of the alleged offender rather than turn
his securities or those of his bondsman into a penalty. Trammel v. State, 529 S.W.2d 528, 529-30
(Tex.Crim.App. 1975) “The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an
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instrument of oppression.” Article 17.15(2) TCCP. Under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 11 and 13 of the Texas Constitution, all prisoners
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties and excessive bail shall not be required.
Appellant was arrested on May 28, 2014, and charged with murder. Appellant was arraigned on the
charge and bond was set at $1,000,000.00, but was subsequently reduced to $800,000.00.
Appellant filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus Motion for Reasonable Bail and a hearing was held on
November 20, 2014. At this hearing Appellant testified that he had lived in Jasper all his life, his
father also lives in Jasper, and that if he were to make bond, he would stay at an aunt’s house in
Jasper. Appellant stated that his family nor anyone else has the ability to get a loan or anything
else to obtain funds for a bond, he did not have any way to secure a loan or any other means to
make a $800,000.00 bond.
Article 17.15 of the TCCP states the rules for fixing the amount of bail. Under subsection (1), bail shall
be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance the defendant will appear, however subsection
(2) states that bail is not to be so used an instrument of oppression. Additionally, pursuant to
subsection (3), the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are
to be considered, and subsection (4) states the ability to make bail is to be regarded. Finally,
under subsection (5), the future safety of the victim and the community shall be considered.
Appellant’s bond is currently set at eight hundred thousand dollars for a first degree felony. Although
murder is a very serious charge, there appear to be extenuating circumstances in this case, and no
evidence was presented of any prior criminal history on Appellant or that he might be a flight
risk. He does not have any money and his ability to secure funds to make any form of bond are
severely limited. Additionally, the State did not raise any concerns about the future safety of the
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community for this appears to be an isolated incident with no reference to prior acts of violence
by Appellant. As stated in the U.S. Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and the TCCP the
purpose of bond is: to secure the appearance of the defendant in court. Appellant stated that he
nor any of his family members had the ability to make a bond of that amount. Appellant has
resided in this city all his life with family members in the community and would reside with an
aunt if he made bond. These close ties with the county favor a reasonable bond in conformance
with amounts set in similar first degree felony cases.
The amount of bond set in this case is in direct conflict with the above listed code sections, articles, and case
law. To set bond at $800,000.00 on a first degree felony on a defendant with no prior criminal
history or evidence of a flight risk is using bond as a form of oppression and is totally out of line
with other bonds set in this county for this degree of felony.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that his petition for discretionary review be granted and that, on hearing, the
judgment of the Ninth Court of Appeals by reversed and vacated and the cause remanded to the
trial court with instructions to release Appellant on a personal bond or set bail in an amount
which this Court determines Appellant can clearly afford.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Dennis D. Horn
Attorney For Appellant
SBN: 24034489
1075 CR 619
Kirbyville, Texas 75956
Tel:(409) 420-0771
Fax: (409) 420-0772
8
horden@hotmail.com
Certificate of Delivery
This is to certify that, on this date, the undersigned served this Petition for Discretionary
Review on Steven M. Hollis, District Attorney, by hand delivery of same to the office of the
Criminal District Attorney for Jasper County, Texas, at 121 N. Austin, Room 101, Jasper, TX
75951.
Signed this 30th day of April, 2015.
/s/_________________________
Dennis D. Horn
Attorney For Appellant
RULE 9.4 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Using the WordPerfect X7 word count utility, I have determined that this document contains 790 words, not
including the “caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table
of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement
of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service certification,
certificate of compliance, and appendix.” TRAP 9.4.
/s/___________________________
Dennis D. Horn
APPENDIX
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Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the opinion of the Ninth Court of Appeals.
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-14-00522-CR
____________________
EX PARTE RODARRION D. ARMSTRONG
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 1A Judicial District Court
Jasper County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 12170JD
________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Rodarrion D. Armstrong (appellant or Armstrong) appeals the
denial of his pretrial habeas corpus application requesting bail reduction. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to appellant’s brief,1 Jasper City Police responded to a call about
a shooting, where they found the victim, Obrien Parks (Obrien), suffering from a
1
This matter involves a pretrial issue and therefore, solely for purposes of
our review on this matter, any references to the underlying facts of the alleged
1
gunshot wound. Witnesses allege that Armstrong, an eighteen-year-old male, and
Obrien had a disagreement earlier that day, and Armstrong confronted Obrien at
Obrien’s residence. Obrien allegedly displayed a firearm at Armstrong, and
Armstrong left. Later, Armstrong returned to the victim’s residence, where Obrien
pointed the firearm out the window at Armstrong. Armstrong then retrieved a
shotgun from a vehicle and fired one shot at Obrien, striking Obrien in the face and
chest. Obrien was later pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Armstrong was
arrested and indicted for first-degree felony murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§19.02(b), (c) (West 2011).
The trial court originally set bail at one million dollars. Armstrong filed a
Motion to Set Reasonable Bail. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court
reduced Armstrong’s bond to eight hundred thousand dollars. Armstrong then filed
an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Seeking a Reasonable Bond.
At the habeas hearing, Armstrong testified that he was incarcerated in the
Jasper County Jail and that he had no means to secure an $800,000 bond or a loan.
He testified that his family members do not have any money, they have not visited
him in jail, and he is not going to get any help from his family. According to
Armstrong’s testimony, he has lived in Jasper all his life, and if he were to make
_________________________
offense as stated in this Memorandum Opinion will be taken from Armstrong’s
brief on appeal.
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bond, the only place he could go would be his aunt’s home in Jasper. However,
Armstrong also testified that his mother lives in Harris County. The trial court gave
the State “a little latitude” in cross-examining Armstrong regarding the facts of the
offense and instructed the State, “Don’t get too much into the facts of the case.”
Nevertheless, the parties agreed on the record that Armstrong was under
indictment for murder. The trial court denied Armstrong’s request to reduce bail.
The trial court continued Armstrong’s bond at eight hundred thousand dollars. On
appeal, Armstrong argues the bail is excessive under the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure and the United States and Texas Constitutions. 2
REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT’S SETTING OF BAIL
We review a trial court’s ruling on the setting of bail under an abuse of
discretion standard of review. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (West
2005) (affording a trial court discretion to set bail); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d
848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). The defendant has the burden to
show the bail set by the trial court is excessive. Ex parte Rodriguez. 595 S.W.2d
549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The trial court’s ruling will not be
disturbed if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Clemons v. State, 220
2
The record includes limited information regarding the circumstances under
which the alleged offense occurred, and there is no evidence in the record before us
as to whether Armstrong had a prior criminal record, whether he had a prior work
history, or if there were any previous and outstanding bail amounts.
3
S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)). The United States
and Texas Constitutions prohibit excessive bail. U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV;
Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11, 13. Additionally, the Code of Criminal Procedure sets
forth rules for the trial court in setting bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
17.15. Other factors that may be considered in determining the amount of bail
include family and community ties, length of residency, aggravating factors
involved in the offense, the defendant’s work history, the defendant’s prior
criminal record, and previous and outstanding bail. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at
849.
An appearance bond secures the presence of a defendant in court for trial. Ex
parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550. The trial court should set bail sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance the defendant will appear at trial, but not so high as
to be oppressive. Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The
right to a reasonable bail is protected by the United States and Texas Constitutions.
Ex parte Sabur-Smith, 73 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
no pet.). Bail is excessive if it is “set in an amount greater than [what] is
reasonably necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate interests.” Ex parte
Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing United
4
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753-54 (1987)). When setting the amount of bail,
the trial court weighs the State’s interest in assuring the defendant's appearance at
trial against the defendant’s presumption of innocence. Id. The amount of bail may
be deemed oppressive when the trial court sets the bail at an amount “for the
express purpose of forcing [a defendant] to remain incarcerated.” Ex parte Harris,
733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider the
rules found in article 17.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the
factors set out in Rubac. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15; Ex parte
Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849. The habeas applicant has the burden to establish that
the bail is excessive. Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 592-93 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
The primary purpose of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of the
accused at trial on the offense charged. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d at 550.
The amount of bail must be high enough to give reasonable assurance that the
accused will appear, but the power to require bail should not be used as an
instrument of oppression. Id.; Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d at 99; Ex parte Harris,
733 S.W.2d at 714. According to the record before us, Armstrong did not present
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any evidence at the habeas hearing that the trial court set bail in his case for the
express purpose of forcing him to remain incarcerated. Furthermore, Armstrong
presented no evidence about any discussions with bail bondsmen or any evidence
about how much Armstrong believes the bail should be or what amount he could
satisfy. Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 595. The trial court could have believed or
disbelieved all or part of Armstrong’s testimony, and could accord that testimony
with the weight the trial court thought the testimony warranted. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (West 2009), art. 38.04 (West 1979); Ex parte
Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
The nature of the offense and the circumstances surrounding the offense are
primary factors in determining what constitutes reasonable bail. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(3). In considering the nature of the offense, it is proper to
consider the possible punishment. Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479-80
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977). When the nature of the offense is serious, a lengthy prison
sentence following a conviction is probable. Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 760
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Therefore, the pretrial bail must be
set sufficiently high to secure the presence of the accused at trial because the
prospect of a lengthy sentence might decrease the chance that the accused will
appear. See id. at 761.
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The record reflects that the State indicted Armstrong for intentionally or
knowingly causing the death of Obrien by shooting him with a gun, a first-degree
felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b), (c). According to Armstrong’s brief,
he shot Obrien once, striking him in the face and chest. As a first-degree felony,
the offense carries a sentence of five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment, and
a fine not to exceed $10,000. Id. § 12.32 (West 2011). Thus, the record reflects that
the nature of the offense is very serious and it carries a possible life sentence.
The ability of an accused to post bail is a factor to be considered, but the
inability to make the bail set by the trial court does not automatically render the
bail excessive. See Ex parte Vance, 608 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980); Golden v. State, 288 S.W.3d 516, 519 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, pet. ref’d). This is true even if the accused is determined to be indigent. Ex
parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
Armstrong presented some evidence that he could not afford to post bail.
Although the record reflects that the trial court appointed Armstrong counsel based
on his indigence, Armstrong did not present any evidence regarding his attempts to
secure bond or his work history. The accused’s inability to make bail, even to the
point of indigence, does not control over the other factors because if the ability to
make bail controlled, then the role of the trial court would be completely
7
eliminated, and the accused would be in the position of determining his own bail.
See Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d);
Ex parte Parker, 26 S.W.3d 711, 712 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.).
As noted previously, a trial court may also consider the defendant’s work
history, prior criminal record, his family and community ties, length of residency,
aggravating factors in the offense, and previous and outstanding bail. Ex parte
Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849. Armstrong presented no evidence regarding his work
history or his prior criminal record, or lack thereof.3 Although he testified he has
lived in Jasper all his life and the only place he could go if released on bond would
be his aunt’s home in Jasper, Armstrong admitted that none of his family members
had visited him while in prison. Therefore, the Rubac factors do not weigh in favor
of a reduction of his bail.
CONCLUSION
Armstrong bears the burden of demonstrating that the amount of the bond is
excessive. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Ex parte Rodriguez, 595
S.W.2d at 550. Armstrong failed to meet his burden. We cannot say the trial
court’s denial of Armstrong’s application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bail
3
We note that appellant asserts in his brief that he has no prior criminal
history, however such evidence was not presented at the hearing.
8
reduction was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on March 18, 2015
Opinion Delivered April 1, 2015
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
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