Donny Joe Curry v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
06-14-00140-cr
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
3/16/2015 3:12:21 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
In the
Court of Appeals for the
Sixth District of Texas at Texarkana FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
Donny Joe Curry, § 3/16/2015 3:12:21 PM
Appellant § DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
§
v. § Nos. 06-14-00140-CR
§ 06-14-00141-CR
The State of Texas, § 06-14-00142-CR
Appellee §
Trial Number CR1301628, CR1301627, and CR1301625 in the
The County Court at Law No. 1 of Hunt County
The Honorable F. Duncan Thomas, Judge Presiding
STATE’S BRIEF
Greg Willis
County Attorney Pro Tem
Hunt County, Texas
Oral argument is requested if Claire D. Miranda
Appellant also requests argument Special Prosecutor
2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200
McKinney, TX 75071
(972) 548-4323
FAX (214) 491-4860
State Bar No. 24037121
cmiranda@co.collin.tx.us
Table of Contents
Index of Authorities ................................................................................. iii
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................... 1
Statement of the Case ...............................................................................1
Statement of Facts..................................................................................... 1
Summary of the State’s Arguments .......................................................... 6
Argument & Authorities ...........................................................................7
Issue One ( Sufficiency of the Evidence; Failure to Identify ) ................7
The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's
conviction for failure to identify. Appellant was
lawfully detained by the police and refused to
give his name after the peace officer asked for
that information.
I. Standard of Review ...............................................................................7
II. The State proved that Appellant was guilty of Failure to
Identify. ................................................................................................ 8
A. Appellant was lawfully detained ........................................ 8
B. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name ............ 10
Issues Two, Three and Four (Punishment outside the applicable
range) .......................................................................................................13
Appellant was properly sentanced within the
applicable range of punishment.
I. Standard of review .............................................................................. 13
i
II. Appellant was sentanced properly within the applicable
range of punishment on all Class C offenses ........................... 13
Prayer ...................................................................................................... 16
Certificate of Service ............................................................................... 17
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................ 17
ii
Index of Authorities
Statutes, Codes, and Rules
Tex. Penal Code
§ 6.03(a) ............................................................................................. 10
§ 38.02(a)............................................................................................. 8
§ 38.02(c)(1) ......................................................................................... 8
§12.23 ................................................................................................ 13
Tex. R. App. P. 23 ................................................................................ 14
U.S. Const. amend. IV ........................................................................... 8
Cases
Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323 (2009) ............................................................................. 9
Asberry v. State,
813 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 1991) ....................................... 14
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............................................. 7
Ex parte Rich,
194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........................................... 13
Hemphill v. State,
505 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App 1974) ............................................ 10
iii
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979) ............................................................................. 7
Mizell v. State,
119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ........................................... 13
Montgomery v. State,
369 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ......................................... 7, 8
Navarette v. California,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) .......................................................................... 9
Overshown v. State,
329 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) ................... 9
Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996) ............................................................................. 9
iv
Statement Regarding Oral Argument
The State does not believe oral argument will assist the Court
in resolving the issues in this case. However, if oral argument is
granted to Appellant, the State requests the opportunity to respond.
Statement of the Case
Appellant pleaded not guilty before the Court and the Court returned
the following verdicts:
Offense Cause No. Class Verdict Punishment
Fail to ID CR13001628 C Guilty $250 fine
FMFR CR1301625 C Guilty $250 fine
No Inspection CR1301627 C Guilty $250 fine
Statement of Facts
On August 26, 2013, Officer Samantha Manrique of the
Commerce police department was on routine patrol on Highway 24 in
Commerce, Hunt County, Texas 9 RR 63. At approximately 4:00 pm.,
Officer Manrique observed Appellant’s car swerve to the left, nearly
striking the median and causing an accident, before heading through
an intersection. 9 RR 63. Appellant’s car had a broken taillight and
a homemade paper license plate. 9 RR 63. Due to these traffic
violations, Officer Manrique signaled for Appellant to pull over by
1
activating the overhead lights on her patrol car, and she performed a
traffic stop of Appellant’s car. 9 RR 64.
When she approached the driver side window, Officer Manrique
noted Appellant also had a handmade registration sticker and
handmade paper inspection sticker that matched his “license plate”.
9 RR 67; 12 RR 39-40. Officer Manrique asked for Appellant’s
driver’s license. 9 RR 64-65 Appellant stated he had no driver license
and no insurance. 9 RR 64-65 During her detention of Appellant,
Officer Manrique asked Appellant’s name. 9 RR 64-65 Appellant
responded that his first name was “Donny” and stated he did not wish
to give his last name as it was a family name. 9 RR 64-65. Appellant
refused to give any further identifiers. 9 RR 70-71. After speaking
with him further, Appellant handed Officer Manrique paperwork
purporting to explain why he did not need to have a driver license,
insurance, or license plate. 9 RR 66. The paperwork did not provide
any identifying information. 9 RR 70-71. Appellant told Officer
Manrique he was a sovereign citizen. 9 RR 66. Due to a concern
about sovereign citizens’ proclivity toward violent behavior, Officer
Manrique called her lieutenant for backup. 9 RR 66, 122-123.
2
Officer Manrique had to give dispatch a full description of the
vehicle, as she could not identify the driver from his own statements
or his “license plate”. 9 RR 66 Lieutenant Mike Pehl and Sergeant
Steve Scott arrived on scene as backup. 9 RR 68. Manrique told
Lieutenant Pehl that Appellant identified himself as a sovereign
citizen. 9 RR 125-126. Lieutenant Pehl was aware through training
and experience that sovereign citizens believe in a totally different
form of government that derives from the law of man and the law of
the land, rather than from the constitution. 9 RR 124-125.
Lieutenant Pehl and Sargent Scott, both wearing police identification
on their clothing, approached Appellant’s car and Lieutenant Pehl
asked Appellant to identify himself. 9 RR 127. Lieutenant Pehl
identified himself as a peace officer to Appellant. 9 RR 128. He
informed Appellant that Appellant had to identify himself to a peace
officer or he was in violation of the law. 9 RR 127-128. Appellant
refused to identify himself but told Lieutenant Pehl he wanted to
show him something. 9 RR 127-129 Appellant then reached into the
top of his briefcase. 9 RR 128-129. Due to his fear about sovereign
citizens’ potential for violent behavior, Lieutenant Pehl drew his
3
weapon from his holster and told Appellant to show him his hands. 9
RR 128. Appellant pulled his hands from the briefcase, Lieutenant
Pehl holstered his weapon and grabbed Appellant’s arm to pull
Appellant from the car. 9 RR 128. Lieutenant Pehl pulled on
Appellant’s arm several times but was not able to pull Appellant from
the car. 9 RR 128-129. Lieutenant Pehl asked Officer Manrique for
her Taser, which Manrique handed to him, and told Appellant he
would tase him if he did not step out of the vehicle. 9 RR 129.
Appellant continued to refuse. 9 RR 129. Lieutenant Pehl then tased
Appellant. 9 RR 129.
Lieutenant Pehl continued trying to get Appellant out of the
car, this time from the passenger’s side, but Appellant locked his
arms on the steering wheel in resistance. 9 RR 97. Lieutenant Pehl
tased Appellant a second time, this time in his side, to try and get
Appellant compliant and was ultimately successful in pulling
Appellant bodily from the car. Once outside, Appellant continued to
flail about screaming. 9 RR 69-70, 129-130. Lieutenant Pehl held
onto Appellant’s torso area and was able to secure one handcuff. 9
RR 69-70, 129-170. Sergeant Scott had to secure the other handcuff
4
on Appellant. 9 RR 69-70. Appellant was placed into custody at that
time. 9 RR 69-70. Lieutenant Pehl located identifying paperwork in
Appellant’s car after the arrest. 9 RR 82.
5
Summary of the State’s Arguments
State’s Reply to Issue One
The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for
failure to identify. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name
while he was lawfully detained and after officers requested that
information.
State’s Reply to Issues Two, Three, and Four
Appellant was sentenced properly within the range of
punishment for all Class C convictions.
6
Argument & Authorities
Issue One
(Sufficiency: Failure to Identify)
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the
conviction.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for
failure to identify. Appellant was lawfully detained by the police and
refused to give his name after Officer Manrique and Lieutenant Pehl
requested that information.
I. Standard of review
In a sufficiency review, the appellate court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether
any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(plurality & concurring opinions). The jury is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimonies, and the reviewing court must not usurp this role by
substituting its own judgment for that of the jury. Montgomery v.
7
State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The duty of the
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the evidence presented
supports the jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally
sufficient case of the offense charged. Id. When the reviewing court
is faced with contradicting inferences, the court must presume that
the jury resolved any such conflicts in favor of the verdict, even if not
explicitly stated in the record. Id.
II. The State proved that Appellant was guilty of Failure to
Identify.
Appellant was convicted of refusing to give his name to a peace
officer while being lawfully detained. The offense of failure to
identify is defined as follows: “A person commits an offense if he
intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of
birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and
requested the information.” Tex. Penal Code § 38.02(a). An offense
under this section is a Class C misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code §
38.02(c)(1).
A. Appellant was lawfully detained
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects individuals from unreasonable seizures. U.S. CONST. amend.
8
IV. When police officers signal that a driver should stop a moving
vehicle and, in response, the driver actually stops the vehicle, the
driver has been seized under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g.,
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009). The seizure continues
for the duration of the traffic stop and terminates when the police tell
the driver he is free to leave. Id. A traffic stop is reasonable when
there is reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic violation has
occurred. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). A
traffic stop results in a “detention” of all individuals in the vehicle.
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327.
Appellant does not argue that the detention was unreasonable,
but merely that there was no detention. App. Br. 11. Officer
Manrique observed Appellant commit traffic violations and she
stopped the vehicle he was driving. 9 RR 64. Because Officer
Manrique had an objectively reasonable basis for making the traffic
stop, Appellant was lawfully detained at the inception of the stop.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); Overshown
v. State, 329 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010)
(finding that “lawful detention” in the context of a failure to identify
9
case extends to vehicle passengers). Appellant gave his initial refusal
to identify at the beginning of the stop and thus, the stop was not
unreasonably extended. Appellant remained detained while backup
officers arrived and again refused to give his name when questioned
by Lieutenant Pehl.
There is sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant was lawfully detained when he refused to give Officer
Manrique his name.
B. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name
“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tex.
Penal Code §6.03(a). It is well settled that intent is a question of fact
to be determined by the trier of facts from all facts and circumstances
in evidence. Hemphill v. State, 505 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. Crim. App
1974).
Officer Manrique asked for Appellant’s name when she first
spoke with Appellant after the traffic stop. Appellant gave his first
name only. Appellant explained he was a sovereign citizen and
10
stated he would not give his last name as it was a family name. 9 RR
64-65. Further, Appellant would not provide the officer with any
identification. Rather, Appellant gave Officer Manrique paperwork
that explained why he was exempt from the laws of the State of
Texas. Appellant further refused to give his name to backup officers
Lieutenant Pehl and Sergeant Scott, even after being informed that
by failing to do so he was in violation of the law. 9 RR 127. During
the course of their interaction with Appellant, Officer Manrique,
Lieutenant Pehl, and Sergeant Scott were never actually able to
ascertain Appellant’s full name. The officers identified Appellant
only after discovering identifying paperwork in Appellant’s vehicle
post-arrest. 9 RR 82.
Appellant placed a homemade license plate on his car and made
it impossible for police to identify him. Appellant created fake vehicle
registration tags, further hiding his identity from authorities.
Appellant refused to give a full name to Officer Manrique and refused
to carry identification. Appellant refused to give Lieutenant Pehl and
Sergeant Scott his name when asked during their interaction with
him. Appellant stated he was a sovereign citizen and carried
11
paperwork stating he was not subject to the law. Appellant was
wholly uncooperative with any state investigation. Appellant’s
identification as a sovereign citizen and related actions speak to his
purpose in obfuscating his identity and obstructing state laws.
The totality of the circumstances support the Court’s finding
beyond a reasonable that refusal to give his name was intentional.
This issue should be overruled.
12
Issues Two, Three and Four
(Punishment outside the applicable range)
Appellant was properly sentanced within the
applicable range of punishment.
I. Standard of review
A sentence that is outside the maximum or minimum range of
punishment is unauthorized by law and therefore illegal. Mizell v.
State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant may
obtain relief from an unauthorized sentence on direct appeal. Id.
Nothing in Texas law prevents a court with jurisdiction over a
criminal case from noticing and correcting an illegal sentence, “no
matter when or how the relief was sought”. Ex parte Rich, 194
S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
II. Appellant was properly sentenced on all Class C
convictions
Appellant was convicted of the Class C misdemeanors of Failure
to Identify, Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility, and No
Inspection. “An individual adjudged guilty of a Class C misdemeanor
shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500.” Tex. Penal Code
13
§12.23. Appellant was sentenced to a $250 fine in each case and
given credit for the fine. 11 RR 7-8. Appellant acknowledges that he
was properly sentenced on the record, but complains that the Court
entered a handwritten sentence for jail time, in error, after the fact.
App. Br. 14.
The failure of the trial court to properly record what is reflected
in the judgment is an error of a clerical nature. See Asberry v. State,
813 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 1991). Where a judgment
and sentence improperly reflects the findings of the court, the proper
remedy is reformation of the judgment. Id. at 529. Appellate courts
can reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a
judgment nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the
judgment appears in the record and may act sua sponte in doing so.
Id. at 529-530; Tex. R. App. P. 23. Appellate courts have frequently
reformed judgments to correct improper recitations or omissions
relating to punishment by deleting the finding. Id. at 530.
As Appellant was properly sentenced but subject to a clerical
error outside the record, Appellant’s issues two, three, and four
14
should be remedied by reforming the trial court’s judgment to reflect
the proper punishment assessed by the court.
15
Prayer
The State prays that this Court will affirm Appellant’s
conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
Greg Willis
County Attorney Pro Tem
Hunt County, Texas
/s/ Claire D. Miranda
Claire D. Miranda
Special Prosecutor
Asst. Criminal District Attorney
2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200
McKinney, TX 75071
State Bar No. 24037121
(972) 548-4331
FAX (214) 491-4860
cmiranda@co.collin.tx.us
16
Certificate of Service
The State has e-served counsel for Appellant, the Honorable
Jason Duff, through the eFileTexas.gov filing system and sent a
courtesy copy by e-mail to jasonaduff@gmail.com on this, the 16th day of
March 2015.
/s/ Claire D. Miranda
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Certificate of Compliance
This brief complies with the word limitations in Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2). In reliance on the word count of the
computer program used to prepare this brief, the undersigned attorney
certifies that this brief contains 2,157 words, exclusive of the sections
of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Claire D. Miranda
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
17