Gregory B. Baten Trust, Intervenor v. Branch Banking and Trust Company and Richard W. Heath ( 2015 )


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  • AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed February 10, 2015.
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-14-00133-CV
    GREGORY B. BATEN TRUST, Appellant
    V.
    BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY AND RICHARD W. HEATH, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-08390
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
    Opinion by Justice Stoddart
    Gregory B. Baten Trust (Trust) filed a petition in intervention in a garnishment action.
    The trial court subsequently granted an order striking Trust’s intervention. In eight issues, Trust
    appeals the trial court’s order striking its intervention and the trial court’s final judgment. We
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) filed an application for a post-judgment
    writ of garnishment. In its application, BB&T alleged it had a final judgment against Britannia
    Construction, LLC. BB&T claimed Richard Heath, the garnishee, had effects belonging to
    Britannia, and BB&T sought a writ of garnishment against Heath to satisfy BB&T’s existing
    judgment. BB&T asserted that Mark Godson was Britannia’s registered agent. In his answer,
    Heath acknowledged he was indebted to Godson in the amount of $178,000.
    Trust sought to intervene in BB&T’s garnishment action. In its amended petition in
    intervention, Trust alleged Godson agreed to sell his house to Heath, and, as part of the sale of
    the house, Godson and Heath executed an ancillary “Chattel Contract.” Pursuant to the Chattel
    Contract, Heath was to pay Godson $200,000 (later reduced to $178,000) for certain furnishings,
    antiques, and other chattel associated with the house.
    Trust further alleged “Godson and/or Britannia” owed Trust approximately $185,000. To
    secure the debt, Trust previously had a lien on the house Godson sold to Heath. Prior to closing
    on the sale of the house, the title company required a release of lien from Trust, and Trust
    released its lien on the house. In exchange, Trust alleged, “Godson and/or Britannia had an
    agreement with Trust to pay Trust $100,000 of the Chattel Contract proceeds at closing.” Trust
    asserts it never received payment, and claims it is entitled to proceeds from the Chattel
    Contract—the same money BB&T sought to garnish. In its petition in intervention, Trust
    alleged:
    Trust is entitled to file this petition because Trust had a valid lien on the House
    which Trust was improperly induced to release, and Trust has a claim relative to
    the Chattel Contract and its proceeds; there are existing unresolved claims before
    the Court relative to the proceeds of that Chattel Contract as well as the propriety
    of Trust’s release of lien on the House. It is reasonably believed that the $178,000
    admitted to by Heath in his answer, are the proceeds of the Chattel Contract.
    Those funds have not, to Trust’s knowledge, been delivered to BB&T and are not
    otherwise in the possession or control of BB&T – it is reasonably believed that
    Heath is still in possession of those funds. . . . Accordingly, right of ownership
    and/or possession of the Chattel Contract proceeds is still in dispute and before
    the Court; Trust claims an interest in those same funds as well as well as [sic]
    independent claims against the parties relative to the House and Chattel Contract.
    Trust also filed a motion to deposit garnished funds into the registry of the court and,
    alternatively, to dissolve or modify the writ of garnishment for the purpose of placing garnished
    funds into the registry of the court. Trust attached the affidavit of Gregory B. Baten to the
    motion. In the affidavit, Baten averred that Godson owed Trust $181,400, Trust released its lien
    on the house, Trust believed it would receive $100,000 from the proceeds of the Chattel
    –2–
    Contract, Trust was not paid, and Trust believed the money it was owed was part of the funds
    held by Heath. Baten’s affidavit states that before the sale of the house, “Godson and I had an
    agreement and contract that Godson would pay the Trust $100,000 of the Chattel Contract
    proceeds, as payment against the $181,400 that Godson owes the Trust. . .Trust would not have
    released its lien on the House but for the representations and agreement of all parties to the
    House closing, [sic] that Trust would receive $100,000 of the Chattel Contract proceeds and that
    said $100,000 would be paid and delivered to Trust.”
    BB&T filed a motion to strike Trust’s petition in intervention. Heath joined BB&T’s
    motion. The trial court granted the motion to strike. Subsequently, the trial court entered a final
    agreed judgment on the garnishment action, ordering BB&T recover funds from Heath. This
    appeal by Trust followed.
    In its fourth issue, Trust argues the trial court abused its discretion by striking its petition
    in intervention. Trust asserts the Baten affidavit proves its ownership of or interest in the
    garnished funds. Trust asserts it could have brought suit against Heath in its own right and as the
    sole plaintiff because it was due $100,000 of the funds held by Heath, but belonging to Godson.
    We review the ruling on a motion to strike a plea in intervention for an abuse of
    discretion. See Brauss v. Triple M Holding GmbH, 
    411 S.W.3d 614
    , 630 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2013, pet. denied) (citing Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    ,
    657 (Tex. 1990)); Dibon Solutions, Inc. v. Martinair Holland N.V., No. 05-11-01586-CV, 
    2013 WL 6671503
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2003, pet. denied) (“Because a trial court has
    broad discretion in determining whether to strike an intervention. . .”). A trial court abuses its
    discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or acts in an arbitrary
    and unreasonable fashion. 
    Brauss, 411 S.W.3d at 630
    (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,
    Inc., 
    701 S.W.2d 238
    , 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).
    –3–
    Once a motion to strike is filed, the intervenor has the burden to show a justiciable
    interest in the pending suit. In re Union Carbide Corp., 
    273 S.W.3d 152
    , 155 (Tex. 2008) (per
    curiam). “To constitute a justiciable interest, the intervenor’s interest must be such that if the
    original action had never been commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole plaintiff, he
    would have been entitled to recover in his own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief
    sought in the original suit. In other words, a party may intervene if the intervenor could have
    brought the pending action, or any part thereof, in his own name.” 
    Id. (internal quotations
    and
    citations omitted). A person also can intervene “if the action had been brought against him he
    would be able to defeat recovery, or some part thereof.” Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe
    Operating Co., 
    793 S.W.2d 652
    , 657 (Tex. 1990). The intervening party must also show the
    intervention will not complicate the case by an excessive multiplication of issues and the
    intervention is almost essential to protect the intervenor’s interest. 
    Id. The interest
    asserted by
    the intervenor may be legal or equitable. 
    Id. A person
    who claims ownership of the garnished
    property may intervene and prove it owns the property. Exterior Bldg. Supply, Inc., 
    270 S.W.3d 769
    , 771-72 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (intervenor claiming ownership properly asserted
    it was a distinct entity from judgment debtor, owned the garnished funds, and was not indebted
    to creditor).
    Trust bore the burden to show it had a justiciable interest in the garnishment action; it
    was required to show it could have brought the garnishment action in its own name or it could
    have defeated all or part of the recovery had the action been brought against it. 1 Trust’s asserted
    1
    The civil practice and remedies code also outlines when a writ of garnishment is available:
    A writ of garnishment is available if:
    (1) an original attachment has been issued;
    (2) a plaintiff sues for a debt and makes an affidavit stating that:
    (A) the debt is just, due, and unpaid;
    (B) within the plaintiff’s knowledge, the defendant does not possess property within Texas subject to execution
    sufficient to satisfy the debt; and
    (C) the garnishment is not sought to injure the defendant or the garnishee; or
    –4–
    interest in the garnishment is its claim that Godson agreed he would pay Trust $100,000 of the
    Chattel Contract proceeds and, without that promise from Godson, Trust would not have released
    its lien on Godson’s house. Trust does not claim it is a party to the Chattel Contract or a third
    party beneficiary of the Chattel Contract; Trust does not claim an original attachment has been
    issued; Trust does not claim it has sued Godson for failure to pay the money as promised or that
    it has a valid, subsisting judgment against Godson; and Trust does not claim its agreement with
    Godson created a secured interest in the proceeds of the Chattel Contract.                                                  While Trust’s
    assertions may support a legal action by Trust against Godson to recover on the alleged debt, the
    trial court did not act outside its broad discretion by determining Trust’s claims are insufficient
    to show ownership of or an equitable interest in the money held by Heath such that Trust was
    entitled to intervene in the garnishment action.
    Under these facts, the trial court could have concluded that Trust could not have brought
    the pending garnishment action, or any part thereof, in its own name, and could not have
    defeated an action against it. See In re Union Carbide 
    Corp., 273 S.W.3d at 155
    ; Guar. Fed.
    Sav. 
    Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657
    . Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion by determining
    Trust failed to meet its burden to show it has a justiciable interest in the garnishment and Trust
    was not a proper intervenor. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
    BB&T’s motion to strike Trust’s intervention.
    We overrule Trust’s fourth issue.
    Each of Trust’s remaining seven issues make arguments about BB&T’s application for
    the writ of garnishment, Heath’s answer, Heath’s joinder motion, and the trial court’s ruling on
    evidentiary objections made by Trust. We need not address any of these remaining issues. An
    (3) a plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment and makes an affidavit stating that, within the plaintiff’s knowledge,
    the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 63.001.
    –5–
    order striking an intervention completely disposes of the intervenor’s interest in the suit and
    dismisses the intervenor from the suit such that the intervenor cannot appeal other complaints
    about the judgment. Once Trust was stricken from the suit, it was no longer a party to the suit
    and it no longer had an interest in the suit. Because Trust is not a party to this suit, it cannot
    appeal its remaining complaints about the trial court proceedings.          See, generally, In re
    Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
    184 S.W.3d 718
    , 723 (Tex. 2006) (“Generally, only parties of
    record may appeal a trial court’s judgment.”); Lapiner v. Maimon, 
    429 S.W.3d 816
    , 820 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed); Johnson v. Crook, 
    93 S.W.3d 263
    , 268-69 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (“[A]n intervenor is a party for purposes of
    appeal only if (1) she timely files a pleading, and (2) the trial court does not strike the pleading
    before the entry of a final judgment.”)).
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Craig Stoddart/
    CRAIG STODDART
    JUSTICE
    140133F.P05
    –6–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    GREGORY B. BATEN TRUST, Appellant                    On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District
    Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-14-00133-CV         V.                        Trial Court Cause No. DC-13-08390.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart.
    BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST                             Justices Francis and Evans participating.
    COMPANY AND RICHARD W. HEATH,
    Appellees
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellees Branch Banking and Trust Company and Richard W.
    Heath recover their costs of this appeal from appellant Gregory B. Baten Trust.
    Judgment entered this 10th day of February, 2015.
    –7–