in Re the State of Texas Ex Rel. Abelino Reyna, Relator v. Court of Appeals for the Tenth District ( 2015 )

WR-83,719-01
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 10/6/2015 2:36:27 PM
Accepted 10/6/2015 2:40:06 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
No. WR-83,719-01 CLERK
IN THE
TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS October 6, 2015
SITTING AT AUSTIN, TEXAS
_________________________________________________
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. ABELINO REYNA,
RELATOR
___________________________________________
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NINE TEXAS DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
ON MOTION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
CAUSE NO. 10-15-00235-CR
FROM THE 10TH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
WACO, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2015-1955-2
FROM THE 54TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
MCLENNAN COUNTY, TEXAS
____________________________________________
RENE M. PENA
District Attorney
81st Judicial District
State Bar No. 00792752
1327 Third St.
Floresville, Texas 78114
[Tel.] (830) 393-2200
[Fax] (830) 393-2205
[Email]
renepena@81stda.org
i
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Relator Abelino ‘Abel’ Reyna,
Criminal District Attorney
McLennan County, Texas
Real Party in Interest Hon. Matt Johnson,
Presiding Judge
54th Judicial District Court of
McLennan County, Texas
501 Washington Avenue, Suite 305
Waco, Texas 76701
Respondent Court of Appeals, Tenth District
501 Washington Avenue, Suite 415
Waco, Texas 76701
Real Party in Interest Matthew Alan Clendennen
Real Party in Interest’sTrial and
Appellate Attorney Mr. F. Clinton Broden
2600 State Street
Dallas, Texas 75204
State’s Trial Attorneys Mr. Mark Parker
Mr. Brandon Luce
Assistant Criminal District
Attorneys
219 North 6th Street, Suite 200
Waco, Texas 76701
State’s Attorneys on Appeal Abelino ‘Abel’ Reyna
Criminal District Attorney
ii
Sterling Harmon
Appellate Division Chief
219 North 6th Street, Suite 200
Waco, Texas 76701
iii
IDENTITY OF AMICUS CURIAE
Dustin Hugh “Dusty” Boyd Jo’Shea Ferguson-Worley
Coryell County District Attorney Terry County District Attorney
P.O. Box 919 500 West Main, Room 208E
Gatesville, Texas 76528 Brownfield, Texas 79316
(254) 865-5911, ext. 2267 (806) 637-4984
(254) 865-5147 (fax) (806) 637-4874 (fax)
Email: dusty.boyd@coryellcounty.org Email: jworley@terrycounty.org
SBN: 24050317 SBN: 24058993
Robert Thomas “Rob” Christian
Hood County District Attorney
1200 West Pearl Street
Granbury, Texas 76048
(817) 579-3245
(817) 579-3247 (fax)
Email: rchristian@co.hood.tx.us
SBN: 00798106
Laurie English
112 Judicial District Attorney M. Alan Nash
P.O. Box 1187 Erath County District Attorney
Ozona, Texas 76942 P.O. Box 30
(325) 392-2025 Stephenville, Texas 76401
(325) 392-8415 (fax) (254) 965-1462
Email: lke112da@gmail.com (254) 965-5543
SBN: 24025349 Email: da@co.erath.tx.us
SBN: 24027680
iv
Julie Renken
Washington and Burleson County District Attorney
100 South Park
Brenham, Texas 77833
(979) 277-6247
(979) 277-6237 (fax)
Email: jrenken@wacounty.com
SBN: 00794696
B.J. Shepherd
220th Judicial District Attorney
P.O. Box 368
Meridian, Texas 76665-0368
(254) 435-2994
(254) 435-2952 (fax)
Email: bjshepherd4@gmail.com
SBN: 18219500
v
DISCLOSURE REGARDING FEES
Pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel
for amicus curiae represents that no fee has been or will be paid to counsel
for preparation of this brief.
vi
Table of Contents
Identity of Parties and Counsel ......................................................................... ii
Identity of Amicus Curiae ………………………………………………….. iv
Disclosure Regarding Fees …………………………………………………. vi
Table of Contents .............................................................................................. vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... xi
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................. xi
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................... xi
Summary of Argument ...................................................................................... 1
Argument ............................................................................................................. 1
Does Davenport v. Garcia control criminal gag orders?................................ 1
Davenport fails to consider competing constitutional guarantees .............. 1
Davenport limits itself to considerations of Texas law ................................. 4
Findings Sufficient to Support a Gag Order................................................. 6
Least Restrictive Means .................................................................................. 9
Options Proposed by the Defense Bar .........................................................10
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................12
Prayer ..................................................................................................................12
Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................14
vii
Certificate of Service ..........................................................................................14
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United State Constitution
U.S. Const. amend. VI ……………………………………………………… 2, 4
State Constitution
Tex. Const. Art. I, §8 ……………………………………………………… 1, 2, 4
Tex. Const. Art. I, §10 .......................................................................................... 2
Federal Cases
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) .....................................3, 10
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ........................................3, 5
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ..........................................10
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) .............................. 5
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817(1974) ................................................................... 5
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) ............................... 5
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) .................................................. 3-4, 10
United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000) ....................................5, 10
United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2004) ................ 5
State Cases
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) ......................................... passim
In re Benton, 238 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) ........... 5
In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007) .......................... 5, 6, 7, 9
In re Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 64 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001) ........................................................................................................ 5
State v. Redus, 445 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ...................................11
Statutes
Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 44.01 ……………………………………………. 11
Tex. Penal Code, Ch. 37 ………………………………………………………. 2
ix
State Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 11(c) ............................................................................................ vi
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) ...........................................................................................13
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i) ............................................................................................13
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) .......................................................................................13
Tex. R. Evid. 105 ................................................................................................... 2
Tex. R. Evid. 402 ................................................................................................... 2
Tex. R. Evid. 403 ................................................................................................... 2
Tex. R. Evid. 404 ................................................................................................... 2
Tex. R. Evid. 802 ................................................................................................... 2
x
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
COMES NOW RENE M. PENA, District Attorney for the 81 st Judicial
District of Texas, and on behalf of eight Texas District Attorneys, and files
this Amicus Curiae Brief in Cause Number 83,719-01, In re State of Texas ex
rel. Abelino Reyna.
The purpose of this amicus curiae brief is to provide the Court with
the perspective of Texas prosecutors, particularly in regard to the proper
standards which should apply to gag orders in criminal cases, and why the
gag order in the case at bar should be upheld.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Counsel for amicus adopts the statement of the case presented in
Relator’s brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for amicus adopts the statement of facts presented in Relator’s
brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Court has designated the following issues to be briefed:
1. Is the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Davenport v. Garcia, 834
S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992), applicable to gag orders in criminal cases?
2. Are findings supporting the gag order in this case sufficiently
specific?
3. Is the Tenth Court of Appeals’ conditional grant of mandamus relief
supported by the law and facts of this case?
xi
Summary of Argument
1. The Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Davenport v. Garcia, 834
S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992), 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) is not applicable to gag
orders in criminal cases.
2. The findings supporting the gag order in this case are sufficiently
specific.
3. The Tenth Court of Appeals’ conditional grant of mandamus relief
is not supported by the law and facts of this case.
Argument
DOES DAVENPORT V. GARCIA CONTROL CRIMINAL GAG ORDERS?
The Court has raised the question whether the Texas Supreme Court’s
holding in Davenport, 834 S.W.2d 4 applies to criminal gag orders. Without
a definitive standard from this Court, the lower courts of this state have
used Davenport as a template for analyzing criminal gag orders, but the
integral shortcomings of Davenport make it inappropriate for criminal
cases.
DAVENPORT FAILS TO CONSIDER COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
The sole issue the Texas Supreme Court addressed in Davenport was
“whether the court’s gag orders violate the guarantee of free expression
contained in article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which provides in
pertinent part:
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege….”
1
Id. at 7.
As a civil decision, Davenport takes no account of issues that
differentiate civil cases from criminal cases. Davenport makes no attempt to
balance conflicts between free speech rights protected under article I,
section 8 and the trial rights of an accused recognized under the Sixth
Amendment and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
A courtroom is a forum for finding truth. To reach that goal, a
millennium of Anglo-American law has established proper manners and
means for getting at the truth. Those manners and means are explicitly
stated in the rules of evidence and procedure. Primarily, only relevant
evidence is to be admitted. Tex. R. Evid. 402. Even if relevant, evidence can
be excluded if it is overly prejudicial. Tex. R. Evid. 403. Certain evidence
may be admitted for only a limited purpose. Tex. R. Evid. 105. Some types
of relevant evidence may be kept out entirely. See, e.g. Tex. R. Evid. 404,
Tex. R. Evid. 802. When evidence is relevant and admissible, its sponsor is
subject to cross-examination and impeachment. If a witness provides false
testimony, they face criminal punishment. Tex. Penal Code, Ch. 37. Outside
the courtroom speech is free from constraint, regardless of its relevance,
prejudicial bias or truth. In short, justice requires that speech in the
courtroom be subject to certain limits and controls. Because the pursuit of
justice is paramount in a criminal trial court, the judges of those courts
have the duty not only of assuring that the rules are followed inside the
courtroom, but also the affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the
2
effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979).
None of these factors as they apply in a criminal context are taken into
account in the Davenport decision. Specifically, the trial rights of a criminal
accused are absent from the equation. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030 (1991), the United States Supreme Court recognized the
distinction between a restriction on the press and a restriction on the
litigants to a case:
We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer
and Sheppard v. Maxwell, rather plainly indicate that the speech of
lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under
a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the
press in Nebraska Press Assn. and the cases which preceded it. Lawyers
representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the
criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to
the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their
conduct.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991)(internal citations
omitted). Also, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Sheppard
that it is incumbent on the court to limit prejudicial outside interferences
from influencing the fairness of a criminal trial:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor
enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should
be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel
3
and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial
is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy
of disciplinary measures.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
DAVENPORT LIMITS ITSELF TO CONSIDERATIONS OF TEXAS LAW
In considering only the requirements of Texas law, the shortcomings of
Davenport become particularly glaring in the context of criminal cases.
Without even referencing Sixth Amendment requirements, Justice Hecht
was critical of the majority in not consulting federal precedent in reaching
its decision:
The second difficulty with the Court’s view that we should define
fundamental constitutional rights without interference from outside
the state is that it is premised on a one-dimensional view of those
rights which is rarely accurate. If relator were constitutionally entitled
to say whatever she pleased, this would be an easy case. But her right
to speak freely is not absolute, under either the First Amendment or
article I, section 8. In this case, relator’s right conflicts with the district
court’s interest in protecting minor litigants, and the issue is whether
the district court’s interest warrants the restriction imposed on
relator’s right. This tension among competing rights and interests
gives constitutional construction a multi-dimensional aspect. Thus,
the Court’s view that federal constitutional rights, which states cannot
diminish, are a “federal safety net” is overly simplistic. Federal
constitutional construction does not merely set minimum standards
for protected rights which the states are free to increase; it strikes a
balance among competing rights and interests that is itself of
constitutional significance. While states have more latitude in
adjusting this balance than they do in reducing guaranteed
protections, that latitude is not unlimited. State courts are not free
4
from federal constitutional considerations in determining fundamental
rights. The delicate balance among those rights and other interests
must also be maintained.
Davenport, 834 S.W.2d 4.
The briefs submitted in this case overwhelmingly rely on federal case
law to analyze the questions posed by the Court. The three Texas decisions
primarily cited are In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007); In
re Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 64 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001); and In re Benton, 238 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007). The Benton decision draws deeply from federal opinions in
analyzing the propriety of gag orders, citing primarily to United States v.
Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2004); United States v. Brown,
218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000); and Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054. The Houston
Chronicle decision also placed a strong emphasis on federal interpretation,
citing to Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); and Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974). While not directly reliant on federal interpretations, the
Graves decision takes pains to analyze and distinguish Houston Chronicle,
which did have a significant federal reliance.
There is a limited body of interpretive case law on Texas criminal gag
orders. The competing standards addressed in the briefs filed in this case
are all based on federal cases. It would be a practical impossibility for this
Court to attempt analysis of the question without reference to federal
5
interpretations, much less to possibly craft a new standard. This in itself is
a powerful reason to abandon Davenport and its progeny.
FINDINGS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A GAG ORDER
Because Davenport considered only free speech rights, violation of its
proscriptions has resulted in an all-or-nothing approach which is
dangerous in a criminal context. Presuming that the primary purpose of a
criminal gag order is to balance free speech rights against the constitutional
rights of the accused, as opposed to merely minimizing the effects of
pretrial publicity on a civil trial, the Davenport approach provides for no
middle ground range of reasonableness wherein this end may be
accomplished.
Davenport held that:
The first requirement of our standard advances from the prior
holdings of Texas courts that only an imminent, severe harm can
justify prior restraint, and in the context of gag orders, that harm must
be to the judicial process. (internal citations omitted) The mandate
that findings of irreparable harm be made is based on our state
constitutional preference for post-speech remedies. Only when no
such meaningful remedies exist will prior restraints be tolerated in this
context.
Davenport, 834 S.W.2d 4.
In Graves, the Waco Court of Appeals did not hold that the
circumstances of the case would not support the issuance of a gag order.
“Rather, we hold that (1) there is no evidence in the record supporting the
findings necessary for a gag order, (2) the limited record in this case does
6
not support Respondent’s decision to take judicial notice regarding pretrial
publicity, and (3) Respondent’s order does not contain sufficiently specific
findings for such an order.” Graves at 753. The result was that the gag
order was killed by the granting of mandamus. Justice Gray took
exception to this “no middle ground” approach, saying “I would expect a
delayed imposition of the holding to allow the trial court the opportunity
to meet the requirements of their opinion before a fair trial for Graves is
put in jeopardy. It is especially troubling that the majority would impose
so restrictive of a schedule without the opportunity to cure the perceived
problems when the right of the defendant to a fair trial is what weighs in
the balance.” Graves at 753-754 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
The Graves decision indicates that the problem with upholding the gag
order lay not so much in the lack of specific findings as the lack of the
record to support such findings. Justice Gray’s dissent certainly suggests a
belief on his part that the record did contain sufficient facts to support the
kind of findings required under Davenport. But since Davenport considered
only free speech rights and not the balance between competing
constitutional rights, the Graves court was compelled to kill the trial court’s
gag order.
It has been argued by Respondent and his amici that the trial court’s
findings in the instant case were insufficient to support a gag order. These
are the findings the court made on this point:
7
“This Court takes judicial notice of
1) the unusually emotional nature of the issues involved in this
case;
2) the extensive local and national media coverage this case has
already generated; and
3) the various and numerous media interviews with counsel for
the parties that have been published and broadcast by local
and national media.
The Court FINDS that counsels’ willingness to give interviews to
the media would only serve to increase the volume of pretrial
publicity.
The Court FURTHER FINDS that if counsel for the parties continue
to grant interviews to the media, the pre-trial publicity will interfere
with the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The Court FURTHER FINDS that no less restrictive alternative
means exists to treat the specific threat to the judicial process
generated by this pre-trial publicity.
The Court FURTHER FINDS that an order restricting extra-
judicial commentary by counsel for the parties is necessary to preserve
all venue options and a delay in the proceedings would not lessen the
publicity generated by this case.” Relator’s Appendix 4.
It is clear from these findings that the trial court perceived that the pre-
trial publicity and the public statements of the parties were highly
prejudicial and posed a threat to the proceedings. These matters are
apparent from the record. The State presented a news report quoting
Respondent’s counsel’s complaint that, “The Waco Police have repeatedly
8
given the public contradictory information about the events at Twin
Peaks.” Relator’s Appendix 3, Exhibit B. In addressing the court,
Respondent’s counsel complained that “the State has already poisoned the
well …. I couldn’t even count on two hands, the amount of press
conferences he gave purporting to describe what happened, calling them
biker gangs, when he knows they’re motorcycle clubs.” (RR I – 27). In
briefings and motions made in this case, Respondent and his amici have
continued to excoriate the State for making supposedly prejudicial
statements. Aside from the record, it is appropriate for a trial court to take
judicial notice of prejudicial press coverage, as the Waco Court of Appeals
acknowledged in Graves. Graves at 751.
It appears that the difficulty the Waco Court of Appeals has with the
gag order in the instant case is the same one it had in Graves, a lack of
formulaic “magical words” in the trial court’s findings. This is a result of
the draconian remedy required under Davenport, which looks only to free
speech rights and fails to take into consideration the threat posed to an
accused’s trial rights.
LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
The case at bar is about a shoot-out where nine people died. This
happened during the Sunday lunch hour in the heart of one of the state’s
major cities. One hundred seventy-seven people have been arrested.
Surrounding these events are reporting and editorial comment by
traditional and non-traditional news sources and social media, complete
9
with audio and visual content, available instantaneously to anyone in the
world who has a computer or a cell phone.
Balanced against these factors are the courts’ affirmative constitutional
duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Gannett Co.,
443 U.S. 368. This duty extends not only to Respondent, but to all 176 co-
defendants. Brown, 218 F.3d at 424. As the State has pointed out, a bare
minimum of 5,664 panelists would be required to conduct voir dire for the
one hundred seventy-seven potential trials in this case. Meeting this
challenge, while maintaining McLennan County as a venue option, will be
a daunting and costly task not only for the court system but for the entire
Waco area community.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that before a trial
court issues a gag order, it must first determine whether other
precautionary steps will suffice. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976). Possible alternative precautions, including change of venue, jury
sequestration, “searching” voir dire and “emphatic” jury instructions were
set out in Sheppard, 384 U.S. 333. Under the circumstances of Twin Peaks,
only the willfully blind cannot see why these lesser options are not
reasonable means to protect the trial rights of all one hundred seventy-
seven accused.
OPTIONS PROPOSED BY THE DEFENSE BAR
Throughout this case Respondent’s counsel has complained mightily
about public statements made by State agents. But rather than propose any
10
one of the less-restrictive means analyzed under Sheppard, the defense bar’s
solution is to allow all the parties to say whatever they want. Respondent’s
Brief, p. 4; Amicus Brief of Robert Callahan, p. 6; Amicus Brief of Texas Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association, p. 6. It is even proposed that defense counsel
has an affirmative duty under the Sixth Amendment to try a client’s case in
the court of public opinion. Amicus Brief of Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association, p. 3. Adding a further twist, Respondent has proposed that this
Court lift its stay of the gag order due to a perceived violation by the
Relator.
The solution proposed by the defense bar is no solution at all. In fact it
is the opposite. It proposes that when the trial court determines that
prejudicial pre-trial publicity threatens the rights of the parties and the
judicial process, that it do nothing, allow the problem to build, and
abdicate its constitutional responsibility to minimize the effects of the
prejudicial pretrial publicity.
The defense bar even advances the idea that the issuing of a gag order
should be dependent on the defense lawyer’s preferences. Amicus Brief of
Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, p. 5. Again, this idea asks a trial
court to abdicate its constitutional responsibilities. And not only that, it
ignores the State’s interest in a fair trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 44.01;
State v. Redus, 445 S.W.3d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
11
Conclusion
Gag orders in criminal cases, while rare, are appropriate measures that
trial courts may use to ensure a fair trial. In an atmosphere of
instantaneous media saturation, the threat of prejudicial pretrial publicity
in high-profile cases is real. It is in the interest of ensuring fair trials that
this Court establish workable standards for gag orders which takes into
account not only the rights of free speech and a free press, but also balances
those rights with the constitutionally guaranteed trial rights of the accused.
Prayer
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus prays that this Honorable Court
affirm the trial court’s issuance of the gag order in this case, issue a Writ of
Mandamus directing the Tenth Court of Appeals to vacate the conditional
Writ of Mandamus previously entered by that Court, and prays for such
other and further relief as may be provided by law.
Respectfully Submitted:
RENE M. PENA
/s/ Rene M. Pena
RENE M. PENA
District Attorney
81st Judicial District
1327 Third St.
Floresville, Texas 78114
[Tel.] (830) 393-2200
[Fax] (830) 393-2205
[Email]
12
renepena@81stda.org
State Bar No. 00792752
13
Certificate of Compliance
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R.
App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no
smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document
also complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if
applicable, because it contains 4,487 words, excluding any parts exempted
by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
Certificate of Service
I certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of this Petition
by electronic service or email or hand delivery on:
Relator, Abelino ‘Abel’ Reyna, McLennan County Criminal District Attorney at
abel.reyna@co.mclennan.tx.us.
Respondent, 10th Court of Appeals Waco, Texas by hand delivery per request of
Chief Justice Tom Gray
Attorney, F. Clint Broden, for Real Party in Interest, Matthew Clendennen at
clint@texascrimlaw.com
Real Party in Interest, Judge Matt Johnson, 54th District Court, McLennan County
Texas at matt.johnson@co.mclennan.tx.us
DATE: 10/6/15 /S/ RENE M. PENA
RENE M. PENA
14