City of New Braunfels, Texas v. Tourist Associated Businesses of Comal County Union River LLC D/B/A Landa River Trips Chuck's Tubes Waterpark Management, Inc. Tri-City Distributors, LP Stone Randall Williams And W. W. GAF, Inc. D/B/A Rockin \"R\" River Rides ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00198-CV
4437853
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
3/10/2015 12:18:32 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-14-00198-CV
In the Third Court of Appeals
Austin, Texas RECEIVED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS, TEXAS - 3/10/2015 12:18:32 PM
Appellant
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
v.
STOP THE ORDINANCES PLEASE, W.W. GAF, INC., D/B/A ROCKIN “R”
RIVER RIDES, TEXAS TUBES, TOURIST ASSOCIATED BUSINESSES OF
COMAL COUNTY; UNION RIVER LLC D/B/A LANDA RIVER TRIPS;
CHUCK’S TUBES; WATERPARK MANAGEMENT, INC.; TRI-CITY
DISTRIBUTORS, LP AND STONE RANDALL WILLIAMS - Appellees
Appeal from the 207th Judicial District Court, Comal County, Texas
Cause No. C2007-387B
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CITY OF AUSTIN, THE TEXAS MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, AND THE TEXAS CITY ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT, CITY OF NEW BRAUNFELS, TEXAS
KAREN M. KENNARD, City Attorney
MEGHAN L. RILEY, Chief, Litigation Division
MEITRA FARHADI, Assistant City Attorney
State Bar No. 24036547
City of Austin Law Department
P. O. Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767-1546
Telephone: (512) 974-2310
Facsimile: (512) 974-1311
meitra.farhadi@austintexas.gov
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, AND TEXAS CITY ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................... iii, iv
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................................1
SUPPLEMENTAL LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ......................................2
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................3
I. Municipal Ordinances are Presumed Valid...........................................3
II. The Solid Waste Disposal Act Does Not Preempt Municipal
Ordinances Regulating Disposable Containers. ....................................6
A. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Disposable Containers are
a Valid Exercise of Police Power. ..............................................6
B. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Disposable Containers are
Consistent with State Law. .........................................................7
C. Section 361.0961 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act Lacks the
Unmistakable Clarity Required to Preempt a Municipal
Ordinance. ...................................................................................8
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 11, 12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................13
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn Jones,
878 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1994) ..................................................................................4
City of Brookside Village v. Comeau,
633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982) ..................................................................................3
City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) ..................................................................................7
City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas,
794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................6, 8
Dallas Merchant’s and Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas,
852 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1993) ..................................................................... 3, 5, 8, 9
Gonzalez v. Gainan’s Chevrolet City, Inc.,
690 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1985) ..................................................................................7
Johnson v. City of Fort Worth,
774 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1989) ..................................................................................4
Jones v. Fowler,
969 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1998) ..................................................................................4
Lombardo v. City of Dallas,
73 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1934) ................................................................................6, 7
Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos,
523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975) ..................................................................................5
Meno v. Kitchens,
873 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App. – Austin 1994, writ denied) ......................................4
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) ...............................................................................................6
iii
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) ...............................................................................................6
RCI Entm't, Inc. v. City of San Antonio,
373 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2012, no pet.) ...............................3, 8
In re Sanchez,
81 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) .............................3, 9
Sorokolit v. Rhodes,
889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994) ..................................................................................4
State v. Chacon,
273 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2008, no pet.) ....................................3
Thompson v. City of Palestine,
510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974) .................................................................................. 3
Waxahachie v. Watkins,
275 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1955) ...................................................................................3
Statutes
TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5 .............................................................................................3
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.022(a) .........................................................7, 8
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.022(b) .............................................................8
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.0961 ................................... ii, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 54.004 ...............................................................................6
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §551.002 ..............................................................................7
iv
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The City of Austin (“Austin”), a home-rule municipality in the State of
Texas like the Appellant, has a substantial interest in the outcome of this case.
Austin believes that the issues before this Court are of great significance to all
Texas cities which have authority to enact and enforce ordinances pursuant to their
police power. The specific issues presented in this case are of critical interest to
the City of Austin because Austin enacted an ordinance regulating the distribution
of single-use carryout bags in 2012, and to other municipalities throughout the
state because it directly effects their ability to enact ordinances regulating
containers. The Texas Municipal League (TML) is a non-profit association of over
1,100 incorporated cities. TML provides legislative, legal, and educational
services to its members. The Texas City Attorneys Association (TCAA), an
affiliate of TML, is an organization of over 400 attorneys who represent Texas
cities and city officials in the performance of their duties. TML and TCAA, along
with the City of Austin (collectively “Amici”), have a strong interest in opposing
the erosion of municipal authority.
The author of this brief is a salaried assistant city attorney for the City of
Austin. Other than normal salary, no fee has been paid or will be paid for the
preparation of this brief.
1
SUPPLEMENTAL LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
AMICI CURIAE: COUNSEL:
City of Austin Meitra Farhadi
Assistant City Attorney
Texas Municipal League State Bar No. 24036547
City of Austin-Law Department
Texas City Attorneys Association Post Office Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767-1546
Telephone: (512) 974-2310
Facsimile: (512) 974-1311
meitra.farhadi@austintexas.gov
ISSUES PRESENTED
Amici strongly support the legal arguments and explanation of public policy
presented by Appellant City of New Braunfels.
Amici raise the following points:
1. The Solid Waste Disposal Act Does Not Preempt Municipalities from
Regulating the Distribution or Use of Certain Containers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici respectfully submit this amicus curiae brief pursuant to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 11 in support of Appellant, City of New Braunfels, Texas
(“New Braunfels”), and urges this Court to reverse the trial court’s order denying
New Braunfels’ summary judgment, granting Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment, and issuance of an injunction preventing New Braunfels from enforcing
two valid ordinances (the “Ordinances”).
2
ARGUMENT
I. Municipal Ordinances are Presumed Valid.
When reviewing the validity of a municipal ordinance, we begin with the
presumption that the ordinance is valid. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633
S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982); RCI Entm't, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 373 S.W.3d
589, 595 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2012, no pet.). Home-rule cities, such as New
Braunfels, have full power of self-government and authority to do anything the
Legislature could have authorized them to do. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
Therefore, courts now determine whether the Legislature has limited the power of
a home-rule city, not whether it has made specific grants of authority. In re
Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see also
Dallas Merchant's & Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489,
490–91 (Tex. 1993); State v. Chacon, 273 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. App. – San
Antonio 2008, no pet.); RCI Entm't, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 373 S.W.3d 589,
595 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2012, no pet.). The party challenging the ordinance
bears the “extraordinary burden” of establishing that the municipality abused its
discretion in enacting the ordinance. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d at 792–93 (citing
Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974); Waxahachie v. Watkins, 275 S.W.2d 477
(Tex. 1955)).
3
This dispute – which centers on the question of whether the City of New
Braunfels Ordinances violate the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Chapter 361 of the
Texas Health & Safety Code) – is one of statutory construction. Matters of
statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide, and the rules of
statutory construction are well settled. Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d
653, 656 (Tex. 1989). First and foremost, courts must follow the plain meaning of
the statute. Meno v. Kitchens, 873 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App. – Austin 1994,
writ denied). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then courts must infer
the legislative intent from the plain meaning of the terms and words used in the
statute. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. 1994). In examining the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words and terms used in the statute, courts may
not enlarge the meaning of any word or term beyond its common or ordinary
meaning. Id. at 241. However, language should be reviewed in context, not in
isolation. Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998); see also
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn Jones, 878 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994)
(“Only in the context of the remainder of the statute can the true meaning of a
single provision be made clear.”). Thus, when attempting to ascertain legislative
intent, a court may consider the objective of the law, its history, and the
consequences of a particular construction. Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 432.
4
At least one additional rule of statutory construction applies in this case.
Courts construing state statutes that are allegedly in conflict with municipal
ordinances passed by home-rule cities should attempt to reconcile the state statute
and the ordinance if any fair and reasonable construction of the apparently
conflicting enactments exists. Dallas Merchant’s and Concessionaire’s Ass’n v.
City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1993). Thus, unless there is a clear
conflict between the statute and the municipal ordinance in question, the court
interpreting the two laws should endeavor to leave them both intact.
In this case, Appellees contend that the Ordinances conflict with section
361.0961 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. There are no cases that directly
interpret the language of section 361.0961. Thus, the meaning of the statute must
be determined based on its plain language, context, and the other applicable rules
of statutory construction. Going back to first principle, the Texas Constitution
grants home rule municipalities the “full power of self-government, that is full
authority to do anything the legislature could therefore have authorized them to
do.” Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.
1975). Therefore courts must look to the acts of the legislature “not for grants of
power to such cities but only for limitations on their powers.” Id. Consequently,
unless the Ordinances directly conflict with the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the
Ordinances should remain intact.
5
II. The Solid Waste Disposal Act Does Not Preempt Municipal Ordinances
Regulating Disposable Containers.
“[T]he mere fact that the legislature has enacted a law addressing a subject
does not mean that the subject matter is completely preempted.” City of
Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas, 794 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1990).
A. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Disposable Containers are a
Valid Exercise of Police Power.
A city may enact reasonable regulations to promote the health, safety and
general welfare of its citizens as a valid exercise of its police power. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE § 54.004. Courts generally uphold governmental action that
promotes health, safety, morals or general welfare even if such action were to
destroy or adversely affect recognized real property interests. See Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (As a general rule, the
government is not required to pay for the incidental effects of its laws and
regulations); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
(“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.”); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1934) (“All property
is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power; nor are regulations
unconstitutional merely because they operate as a restraint upon private rights of
person or property or will result in loss to individuals.”). This presumption favors
6
the reasonableness and validity of a city ordinance, and an “extraordinary burden”
rests on one attacking a city ordinance. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984).
Police powers extend so far as is reasonably necessary to achieve the
objectives of the regulation. Lombardo, 73 S.W.2d at 479. Regulating disposable
containers on certain waterways within New Braunfels is a proper exercise of
police powers because it is substantially related to New Braunfels’ goal to protect
the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of New Braunfels, and to minimize
interference with the public’s enjoyment of parks, waterways and public spaces,
and to preserve the pristine nature of the waterways. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
§551.002; CR:541-543, 551-554.
B. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Disposable Containers are
Consistent with State Law.
Courts are tasked with construing laws “in a manner that comports with
legislative intent and furthers the purposes of the statute.” Gonzalez v. Gainan’s
Chevrolet City, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. 1985) (internal quotations
omitted). Since its adoption, the Solid Waste Disposal Act (“Act”) has reflected
legislative intent to reduce municipal waste as its top priority. The Act provides
that “. . . it is the state’s goal, through source reduction, to eliminate the generation
of municipal solid waste . . . to the maximum extent . . . feasible.” TEX. HEALTH
7
& SAFETY CODE § 361.022(a). To accomplish the state’s goal, the Act prioritizes
the methods of eliminating municipal solid waste in the following order:
For municipal solid waste . . . the following methods are preferred, in
the order listed:
(1) source reduction and waste minimization;
(2) reuse or recycling of waste;
(3) treatment to destroy or reprocess waste to recover energy . . . ;
or
(4) land disposal.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.022(b). Municipal ordinances that regulate
the distribution or use of disposable containers, therefore, clearly do not conflict
with the legislature’s stated objectives in the regulation of solid waste. To the
contrary, such ordinances serve the state’s first priority – source reduction.
C. Section 361.0961 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act Lacks the
Unmistakable Clarity Required to Preempt a Municipal
Ordinance.
When there is no conflict between a state law and a city ordinance, the
ordinance is not void. Responsible Dog Owners, 794 S.W.2d at 19; RCI Entm't,
Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 373 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2012,
no pet.). However, an ordinance that attempts to regulate a subject matter
preempted by a state statute is unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with a state
statute. Dallas Merchant's, 852 S.W.2d at 490–91 (emphasis added); RCI Entm't,
373 S.W.3d at 595. Nevertheless, if the Legislature decides to preempt a subject
matter normally within a home-rule city's broad powers, it must do so with
8
“unmistakable clarity.” In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 794, 796 (Tex. 2002); citing
Dallas Merchant's, 852 S.W.2d at 491.
The Legislature did not preempt the regulation of disposable containers by
municipalities with the required unmistakable clarity when it enacted section
361.0961 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Because the legislation is located in the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, and because throughout the Act “container” is referred
to as a vessel of some sort intended to hold waste – it is a reasonable interpretation
that the regulation of containers not intended for waste is not covered by the Act.
However, even if the Court were to agree with appellees, and find that the Act
preempts a municipality from regulating any container with the goal of source
reduction or waste minimization, the Court still must endeavor to leave the
Ordinances intact so long as there is any possible way to do so. Dallas
Merchant’s, 852 S.W.2d at 491 (“A general law and a city ordinance will not be
held repugnant to each other if any other reasonable construction leaving both in
effect can be reached.”); In re Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d at 796 (Courts will not hold an
ordinance and a state statute “repugnant to each other if they can reach a
reasonable construction leaving both in effect.”). Because the Act is not clear as to
what is prohibited or intended in regard to the term “container”, and because there
are multiple fair and reasonable constructions that would leave both the Ordinances
and the Act in effect, the Ordinances are not preempted by the Act.
9
PRAYER
For these reasons, the City of Austin respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the trial court’s order, and render judgment on behalf of appellant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
KAREN M. KENNARD, CITY ATTORNEY
MEGHAN L. RILEY, CHIEF, LITIGATION
/s/ Meitra Farhadi
MEITRA FARHADI
Assistant City Attorney
State Bar No. 24036547
City of Austin-Law Department
Post Office Box 1546
Austin, Texas 78767-1546
Telephone: (512) 974-2310
Facsimile: (512) 974-1311
meitra.farhadi@austintexas.gov
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
CITY OF AUSTIN
TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE
TEXAS CITY ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing on all parties, or
their attorneys of record, in compliance with the Appellate Rules of Civil
Procedure, on this 10th day of March, 2015, as follows:
Via the CM/ECF System to:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Jim Ewbank
State Bar No. 06343030
Cokinos, Bosien & Young
1210 Nueces Street
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 476-1080
Facsimile: (512) 476-7770
jewbank@cbylaw.com
Jonathan Hull
State Bar No. 00798950
Reagan Burrus, PLLC
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Telephone: (830) 358-7499
Facsimile: (830) 625-4433
jhull@reaganburrus.com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
William M. McKamie
State Bar No. 13686800
Adolfo Ruiz
State Bar No. 17385600
McKamie Krueger, LLP
941 Proton Road
San Antonio, Texas 78258
Telephone : (210) 546-2122
Facsimile : (210) 546-2130
mick@mckamiekrueger.com
adolfo@mckamiekrueger.com
11
Bradford E. Bullock
State Bar No. 00793423
Knight & Partners
223 W. Anderson Lane, Suite A-105
Austin, Texas 78752
Telephone : (512) 323-5778
Facsimile : (512) 323-5773
bradford@cityattorneytexas.com
Valerie M. Acevedo, City Attorney
State Bar No. 00798020
J. Frank Onion III, Assistant City Attorney
State Bar No. 15289500
City of New Braunfels
P.O. Box 31747
New Braunfels, Texas 78131
Telephone: (830) 221-4280
Facsimile: (830) 626-5578
vacevedo@nbtexas.org
fonion@nbtexas.org
/s/ Meitra Farhadi
MEITRA FARHADI
12
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(i)(2)(B) because this brief contains 2079 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Meitra Farhadi
MEITRA FARHADI
13