Brayan Josue Oliva-Arita v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                    U1-1b-UU140-.r.;
    FIRST COURT OF APPE,
    HOUSTON, TEX
    3/11/2015 4:10:51 F
    CHRISTOPHER PF
    CLEF
    NO. 01-15-00140-CR
    FILED IN
    IN THE                      st
    1 COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TX
    COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 11, 2015
    CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE,
    CLERK
    FOR THE
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    BRAYAN JOSUE OLIVA-ARITA, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law #1
    Galveston County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. MD-0342858
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
    Salvador Faus
    Torres and Faus Law Filin
    1009 44th Street
    Galveston, Texas 77550
    (409) 763-2978
    (409) 763-3424 (fax)
    salfaus@gma.il.com
    SBN: 00785854
    ATtORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    The Appellant waives oral argument.
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Parties and counsel in this case are as follows:
    I. BRAYAN JOSUE OLIVA-ARITA, appellant, represented at trial by Salvador
    Faus, 1009 44th Street, Galveston, Texas 77550 and represented on appeal by
    Salvador Faus, I 009 44th Street, Galveston, Texas 77550.
    2. The State of Texas, appellee, represented at trial by Lindsay Ricbatds1
    Assistant District Attorney, and on appeal by Rebecca Klaren, Criminal
    District Attorney for Galveston County, Texas, 600 59th Street, Galveston,
    Texas 77551.
    i
    CITATION TO THE RECORD
    Clerk's Record       .......................................... C.R. (page)
    Reporter's Record .......................................... R.R. (page)
    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Index of Authorities ........................................................................ ..      iv-v
    S1:a.tement of the Case······························~···········~········.................           1
    Issues Presented. ...........•...........•......•...................•...•...•..•.........•...... -.   1-2
    St:a.tement ofFaru ·····························-:··················· . ·······............. ...      2-4
    Summary of Argument for Issue Number One..........................                                    5
    Argument in Support of Appellant's Issue Number One...................                                5-7
    Summary of Argument for Issue Number Two..........................                                    7
    Argument in Support of Appellant's Issue Number Two................                                   8-11
    Conclusion and Pra.yer ................................................................. ..           11
    Certificate of Service········:·················································-:···········         14
    iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES                                                                                                                                                                                                                  PAGE
    Contraras v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 168
    (Tex.App.- Amarillo 2010, pet. ref' d) .....•...........................                                                                                                                                               6, 10
    Crawford v.d§tate, 
    355 S.W.3d 193
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref' d) .......................... .                                                                                                                                          9
    Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240,287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) ..... .                                                                                                                                                        5
    Fordv. State, 158 S.W.3d 488,492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ........... ..                                                                                                                                                 8
    Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 
    306 S.W.3d 893
    (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2010, pet. ref' d) ................................... .                                                                                                                                            6, 10
    Johnson y. State, 2012 WL 698894(Tex. App.Houston [ t4tl:t Dist.]
    Nos. 14-10-00941-CR, 14-10-00942-CR, March 6, 2012) (Unpublished)... 6
    Klare v. State, 
    76 S.W.3d 68
    , 72 (Tex.App.Houston [141h Dist.]
    2002, pet:. ·ref d) •. ••I   I   I   1 I   I. I   I   I   I   I   I   I   I- •   •   •   •   •.• I   •   •   •   I   I   It I   I   I   I   II I   I   I   I I I. I I   •   •   •   •   •   •   •   'I I   I   I   I   s
    State y, Sheppard, 
    271 S.W.3d 281
    ,287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)......                                                                                                                                                       5
    Short v. State, 
    2011 WL 3505611
    (Tex. App.Beaumont
    No. 09-1 0-00489-CR, August l 0, 20 1 J) (Unpublished). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                                                                                                              8~   9
    State v. Daniel, 
    446 S.W.3d 809
    (Tex.App.-San Antonio
    2014, no pet.) ............................................. !l.............................                                                                                                                           10
    iv
    CASES                                                                             PAGE
    Tellez v. State, 
    2011 WL 3925627
    (Tex. App. Beaumont No.
    09-10•00348-CR, August 24, 2011) (Unpublished) .................... .             9
    STATUTES
    Texas Transportation Code Section 601.053 (a) (1-7) ................ ..           3
    TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §601.061 (Vernon 1999).................. .                 6
    CONSTITUTIONS
    Fourth Amendment- United States Constitution ....................... .            2
    Article l §9 of the Texas Constitution ...................................... .   2
    v
    NO. 01·15·0014()-CR
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    CO:MES NOW, BRAYAN JOSUE OLIVA-ARITA, hereinafter referred to as
    "Appellant,'' and submits this brief pursuant to the provisions of the Texas Rules of
    APPella:te Procedure and would respectfully show as follows:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant was charged by information and complaint with the offense of
    Driving While Intoxicated (C.R. 7, 8)
    On December 29, 2014, a hearing on a motion to suppress was held which was
    denied. (R..R. 1,39). On January 2, 2015, Appellant pleaded Nolo Contendere to the
    charge and a plea bargain was reached where appellanfs punishment was assessed at
    three (3) days County Jail and a $500.00 fine. (C.R., 53-54). The trial court certified
    Appellant's right to appeal the denial ofthe motion to suppress. (C.R. 52).
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress
    the evidence as follows:
    1
    1) The State of Texas failed to prove that the insurance database is a
    reliable informant in providing police officers with information
    regarding whether a vehicle has insurance; and
    2) A notice of "unconfmned" insurance, with no other specific
    information, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or
    probable cause for search and seizure under the 4th Amendment of
    the United States Constitution and Article 1 §9 of the Texas
    Constitution.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Appellant was charged by infonnation and complaint for the offense of
    Driving While Intoxicated alleged to have been committed on February 16, 2014
    (C.R., 2, 3).     Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress any and all evidence of
    intoxication based on the illegality of the initial traffic stop for unconfirmed
    insurance. The State of Texas stipulated that this case involves a warrantless arrest.
    (R.R. 5). Therefore, the burden is on the State to prove a legal basis for the stop of
    Appellant. Officer Jose Lobo, with the Friendswood Police Department, was on
    patrol on the night of February 16. 2014 when he performed a routine license plate
    check on a silver two-door Honda. (R.R. 7) Officer Lobo testified that the license
    plate check showed Appellant's vehicle to have unconfmned insuta:nce. (R.R. 8, 13)
    2
    Officer Lobo testified that this "typically" means that the vehicle has no insurance.
    (R.R. 8)~ Officer Lobo testified that the appellant advised that he had no insurance
    because he recently purchased the vehicle (R.R. 11, 12, 13).       At that point, Officer
    Lobo conducted a Driving While Intoxicated investigation (R.R 13). The DWI
    investigation culminated in Appellant's arrest for Driving While Intoxicated.
    Officer Lobo testified that he does not know who administers the insurance
    database. (RR. 14, 15) He does not know for what legislative purpose the insurance
    database was established. (RR. 15) Officer Lobo does not know the rate of false
    positive information the insurance database generates; wherein the database relays
    information to a patro] officer that the subject vehicle has unconfirmed insurance,
    when in fact the vehicle is insured. (R.R. 16) Officer Lobo acknowledged that the
    inso.rance database is not always accurate. (R.R. 20) Officer Lobo estimated from
    his personal experience that the database revealing unconfirmed insurance was
    correct around 75 percent ofthe time. (R.R. 16, 17)
    Officer Lobo testified he is not aware how long it takes the database to update
    a recent purchase of insurance. (R.R. 17, 22) Officer Lobo testified that he was not
    aware of the legal alternative means of obtaining motor vehicle insurance pursuant to
    Texas Transportation Code Section 601.053 (a) (1-7), such as a surety bond
    certificate, certificate of deposit with the comptro11er, certificate of deposit with the
    3
    appropriate county judge, or a certificate of self-insurance. (R.R. 18-20) Officer
    Lobo testified he does not know if these alternative means of establishing motor
    vehicle insurance are input into the insurance database. (R.R. 19)
    Officer Lobo testified that the when he checks a vehicle for insurance he
    receives one of three responses: I. Confirmed; 2. Unconfinned with accompanying
    information such as when the insurance expired, who was the insurance provider, and
    whether it has been expired more than 45 days; or 3. Unconfirmed. (R.R. 21, 22)
    After hearing the evidence and argument the trial court denied     Appellant~ s
    Motion to Suppress.
    4
    SUMMARY OF AR~UMENT FOR ISSUE NUMBER ONE
    I.       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION                      IN DENYING
    APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE.
    Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to Driving While Intoxicated. The judge
    assessed appellant's punishment at assessed at three (3) days County Jail and a
    $500.00 fine. (C.R., 53-54) The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to
    suppress the initial traffic stop of the appellant on the basis of unconfirmed insurance
    because there is no proof of the operating history and reliability of the insurance
    database.
    ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S ISSUE NUMBER ON~
    Law enforcement personnel may briefly detain and investigate a person
    whey they have a reasonable suspicion that the person in involved in crimina]
    activity. State v. Sheppard, 
    271 S.W.3d 281
    , 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). The
    officer must be able to point to something that would 1ead a reasonable person to
    believe that the person, being detained was engaged in, had engaged in, or was
    about to engage in a criminal act.             Klare v. State, 
    16 S.W.3d 68
    , 72
    (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. rerd).         Those articulable facts must
    amount to more than a mete hunch or suspicion. /)gvis v._State, 94 
    7 S.W.2d 240
    ,
    287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).
    5
    In the instant case, Officer Lobo stopped Appellant's vehicle on the basis
    that a check of his license plate through the insurance database came back
    unconfirmed. Drivers are required to maintain proof of financial responsibility to
    lawfully drive on public roads.      See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §60l.061
    (Vernon 1999).      Ofc. Lobo, based solely on his personal experience, testified that
    the insurance database is correct around 75% ofthe time. (R.R. 16, 17) Therefore,
    based on Officer Lobo's personal experience the database is incorrect around 25%
    of the time.     Officer Lobo's testimony reveals he knows very little of the inner
    workings of the insurance database.        In the case of Johnson v: State, 2012 WL
    698894(Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] Nos. 14-10-00941-CR, 14-10-00942-CR,
    March 6, 2012) (Unpublished), although decided on other grounds; reveals another
    instance where a police officer received a false positive on infonnation regarding
    unconfirmed insurance.
    The State did not present any evidence developing the source of the
    information comprising the database, illustrating the accuracy of the       databa~e,
    establishing the timeliness of the information within the database, depicting how
    often those using the database were told that insurance was unconfmned,            or
    proving that the program through which the database was accessed was even
    operating at the time.     Ganzafez..Gilando v. State, 
    306 S.W.3d 893
    (Tex.App.-
    Amarillo 2010, pet. ref' d). Other than Officer Lobo's anecdotal evidence, the State
    did not present any evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of police reliance
    on the information in the insurance database, also known as the Financial
    Responsibility Verification Program.             Contraras v. State, 
    309 S.W.3d 168
    (Tex.App.- Amarillo 2010, pet. refd).
    Without the State presenting evidence that the insurance database is credible
    and reliable, the insurance database is the equivalent of an anonymous informant,
    which, without corroborating information, cannot be the sole basis of an
    investigative detention. Therefore, the trial court abused its' discretion in denying
    appellant's motion to suppress.
    SUMMARY OF ARGIJN(ENT FOR ISSVE NUMBER TWO
    2.      THE 1RIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
    APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE.
    The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the initial traffic
    stop of the appellant on the basis of a response from the insurance database of
    "unconfirmed" insurance, without any accompanying corroborating information.
    This response does not provide sufficient specific, articulable facts to suppon
    reasonable suspicion or probable cause for an investigative detention.
    7
    ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S ISSUE NUMBER TWO
    A response of ''unconfirtned" insurance alone is not sufficient to create
    reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative detention of Appellant.     A police
    officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has reasonable suspicion to
    believe that an individual is violating the law. Ford v. State, I 
    58 S.W.3d 488
    , 492
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). It is uncontroverted that Officer Lobo based his stop of
    Appellant's vehicle upon a response of unconfirmed insurance from the insurance
    database.
    Officer Lobo's testimony reveals that he receives three possible responses
    when checking a vehicle for insurance:        1. Confinned; 2. Unconfirmed with
    accompanying information such as when the insurance expired, who was the
    insurance provider, and whether it has been expired more than 45 days; or 3.
    Unconfirmed. (R.R. 21, 22) Similarly, in Short v. State, 20I I WL 3505611 (Tex.
    App. Beaumont       No. 09-1 0-00489-CR, August 10, 2011) (Unpublished), the
    officer in that case testified that these three responses are common from the
    insurance database. In contrast to this case, the arresting officer in the Short case,
    received information that Mr. Short was driving a vehicle that showed insura.rtce
    coverage was ''unconfirmed for 45 days or more and      expired.·~   IQ. The arresting
    officer further testified that a report of unconfittned with no information listed
    8
    "typically mean_s that Department of Insurance is unable to confirm one way or the
    other, and they don't have any information to support that finding." 
    Id. The arresting
    officer in Short further testified that he does not stop a vehicle whose
    return states unconfirmed with no information listed.     Similarly, in Crawford y.
    State, 
    355 S.W.3d 193
    (Tex.App.-Houston [lstDist.] 2011, pet. ref'd), this Court of
    Appeals found that when the respon_se from the insurance database yields specific
    information, such as the last insurance company, the policy number, and that the
    policy had expired more than 45 days before, that this is sufficient, specific,
    articulable information to justify reasonable suspicion and a subsequent
    investigative detention. Id at 197, 198. Lastly, Tellez v. State, 
    2011 WL 3925627
    (Tex. App. Beaumont No. 09-1 0-00348-CR, August 24, 2011) (Unpublished) also
    supports a stop when a check of a vehicle through the insurance database reveals
    unconfmned insurance with accompanying information to show that the insurance
    was expired.
    In contrast, to the specific articulable information seen in the Short,
    Crawford, and Tellez cases, in this case, the only evidence Officer Lobo received is
    that the insurance was unconfirmed on Appellant's vehicle, with no accompanying
    information.   A response of unconfirmed insurance, with nothing more, is not
    sufficiently specific, articulable information to support reasonable suspicion to
    9
    justify an investigative detention.
    In State v. Daniel, 
    446 S.W.3d 809
    (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.),
    the sole basis of the stop was based on a database response that the insurance was
    unconfirmed. Id at 814. The San Antonio appellate Court in State v. Daniel found
    that this response alone is not sufficiently detailed and reliable evidence to support
    reasonable suspicion. Id at 815.
    Similarly, a response from the insurance database that the information
    regarding         a   vehicle's    insurance is "not available"      or the   status was
    "undocumented" is not sufficient to prove that the stop was based on either
    reasonable suspicion or probable cause.            Gonzalez~Gikmdo   v. State, 
    306 S.W.3d 893
    (Tex.App.-Amarillo 201 0, pet. rer d); Contraras v. $_tate, 
    309 S.W.3d 168
    (Tex.App.- Amarillo 2010, pet. ref'd).
    The distinction in the case law precedent is very clear: A response from the
    insurance database of unconfirmed accompanied with specific information
    corroborating the response, supports reasonable suspicion.           A response from the
    insurance database of unconfirmed with nothing more, as in the case at hand, is not
    enough to support reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop and detain.
    A response from the insurance database that insurance on a vehicle is
    "unconfirmed,n with no other accompanying information is not sufficiently
    10
    ----'-------'~   --   -   ~-   ---   -~-       - - - -----   ---~     -------        -------~
    detailed and reliable evidence to support reasonable .suspicion. After all, every
    citizen in the United States is walking around unconfirmed, that we may or may
    not have an arrest warrant, until the government stops you to confll111 your identity.
    To justify the intrusion ofthe State upon an individual's liberty solely on the basis
    of a vague, nebulous response from an unproven computer database is to venture
    into a dangerous world.        The trial Court abused its' discretion in denying
    appellant's motion to suppress by fmding that a response of "unconfirmed"
    insurance a1one, with no specific infonnation accompanying the response, is
    sufficient articulable and specific facts to justify reasonable suspicion to stop and
    detain.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully asks that
    the judgment of the trial court be reversed and that a judgment of acquittal be entered
    and for such other and further relief to which Appellant may be justly entitled.
    11
    ~~?
    SALVADORFAUS
    TORRES and FAUS LAW FIRM
    1009 44th Street
    Galveston, Texas 77550
    (409) 763-2978
    (409) 763-3424 (fax)
    salfaus@gmail.com
    SBN: 00785854
    Attorney for Appellant
    CERTiFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I certifY that the foregoing brief was prepared in Microsoft Word using 14
    point font for text, and that the brief contains 2,064 words.
    ~~~
    Salvador Fall!)
    CERTiFICATE OF SERYICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Brief for Appellant was hand-
    delivered to Ms. Rebecca Klaren, Assistant District Attorney of Galveston County,
    Texas, 600 591h Street, Galveston, Texas 77551 and hand-delivered and/or mailed to
    Appellant in compliance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on this the
    11th day of March, 2015.
    Salvador Faus
    12