Allyn Shane Doyle A/K/A Shane Doyle v. State ( 2015 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-14-00340-CR
ALLYN SHANE DOYLE A/K/A SHANE DOYLE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 69th District Court
Dallam County, Texas
Trial Court No. 4361, Honorable Ron Enns, Presiding
October 15, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
This is an appeal from a bench trial in which appellant Allyn Shane Doyle was
convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a family member1 and
assessed punishment of 25 years in prison. Through one issue, appellant argues the
trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. We will affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.013 (West 2013); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2013).
Background
Evidence at trial showed that after an argument appellant accelerated his pickup
truck in reverse toward his father, tires spinning, and “rammed [his father] up in a pile of
junk.” His father jumped into the open bed of the truck but fell out in the street after
appellant quickly accelerated forward.
After the court found appellant guilty, the State announced it would be calling two
of appellant’s ex-girlfriends to testify during the punishment phase. Appellant and his
counsel informed the court appellant did not want to be in the courtroom during the
punishment phase. The court confirmed on the record appellant’s wish to be absent
from the courtroom during the testimony of “all of” the punishment witnesses.2
Appellant was escorted from the courtroom during testimony but was present when the
court announced his punishment.
One week after trial, appellant filed a motion for new trial, citing as grounds the
“verdict in this cause is contrary to the law and the evidence.” A little over a month later,
appellant filed a supplement to that motion with appellant’s father’s affidavit and
appellant’s affidavit appended. Appellant’s father appeared to complain of some
prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant’s affidavit asserted his counsel misunderstood him
at trial and while he did not want to be present during witness testimony, he did want to
testify at his punishment hearing. Appellant said he expressed this wish to counsel
2
The court questioned appellant about his choice. Appellant said he did not want to be present
because, among other reasons, the prosecutor had accused him of glaring at his ex-girlfriends during the
guilt-innocence phase of trial. He told the court he did not want the prosecutor to say he was “coercing a
witness, threatening a witness” so he did not want to be present. The court cautioned appellant to visit
further with his attorney and make certain of his decision. Appellant and his attorney conferred privately
and returned, telling the court appellant did not wish to be present for any of the punishment testimony.
2
“[a]fter [his] trial was complete back at the jail . . . .” The State objected in writing to
appellant’s supplemental motion for new trial when it was filed with the trial court. The
motions were overruled by operation of law.
Analysis
Through one appellate issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying
his supplemental motion for new trial. The State argues appellant’s supplemental
motion for new trial was an amended motion and was untimely because it was filed 42
days after appellant’s sentence was imposed. We agree.
The right to move for a new trial in a criminal case is purely statutory. State v.
Lewis, 151 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. ref'd) (citing Drew v. State,
743 S.W.2d 207, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). Rule 21 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure governs motions for new trial. TEX. R. APP. P. 21. The defendant must file a
motion “no later than thirty days after the date when the trial court imposes or suspends
sentence in open court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a). A defendant's motion may be
amended without leave any time within the thirty-day limit so long as the trial court has
not already ruled on the motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(b). Amendments outside of the
thirty-day time limit, even with leave of court, are barred so long as the State properly
objects. State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court
has limited jurisdiction when exercising its particular authority to rule on motions for new
trial. Lewis, 151 S.W.3d at 219. A late amended motion for new trial fails to vest the trial
court with jurisdiction over the issues included in the amended motion. Id.
3
Here, appellant timely filed his original motion for new trial. But, his supplemental
motion was filed outside the thirty-day time period and the State properly objected to the
trial court’s consideration of it. Also, the supplemental motion contained wholly new
grounds and thus was an amendment, not a supplement, to the original motion. Bailey
v. State, No. 12-06-00128-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3751, at *12 (Tex. App.—Tyler
May 16, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, we may
not consider appellant’s supplemental motion or the appended affidavits. 3 Only
appellant’s contention in his original motion for new trial is subject to our review. See
State v. Moore, 225 S.W.3d 556, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding if the State objects
to an untimely amended motion for new trial, the trial court and appellate court should
consider only the original motion and any timely amendment); Senegal v. State, No. 14-
01-00079-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2318, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
March 28, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar finding).
A trial judge's decision to grant a motion for new trial is reviewed only for an
abuse of discretion. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 593. We do not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial
court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable
view of the record could support the trial court's ruling. Id. Allegations that a verdict was
against the law and the evidence raise “a sufficiency challenge and only a sufficiency
challenge.” Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 594 (emphasis in original). The standard for
3
Filing affidavits in support of a motion for new trial more than thirty days after sentencing is
considered an untimely attempt to amend the motion. Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 455 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref'd).
4
reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The
evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
Appellant was charged with the felony offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon against a family member. “Family” includes individuals related by
consanguinity or affinity, including parents. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2013).
Section 22.02 of the penal code provides that a person commits aggravated assault if
the person commits assault as defined in section 22.01 and the person either causes
serious bodily injury to another or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the assault.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a). Section 22.01(a) provides a person commits assault
if the person intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a). Assault by threat requires only fear of imminent
bodily injury and does not require a finding of actual bodily injury. Dolkart v. State, 197
S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d). A culpable mental state is
generally proved by circumstantial evidence. Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95, 111
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). A jury may infer intent or knowledge
from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, conduct of
the accused, and the method of committing the crime. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
To support its allegations against appellant, the State presented the testimony of
four witnesses: appellant’s father, a police officer, a witness to the incident, and the
5
chief dispatcher at Dalhart county jail.4 Appellant’s father agreed his relationship with
appellant was a “rocky relationship” and appellant had a “really bad temper.” On the day
of the incident, he agreed he and appellant had a “very loud argument” over some
equipment and an unpaid debt appellant owed him. Appellant “took off in his truck
coming at me, you know, backwards and rammed me up in a pile of junk.” Appellant’s
father jumped in the bed of the truck to avoid being crushed and when appellant
accelerated forward, he rolled off the truck and into the street. He admitted he told
police appellant tried to kill him and that he included that in his written statement. From
this evidence, the trial court could have found appellant’s father was a family member
as defined in the Family Code, appellant used his truck in a manner that placed the
father in fear of imminent bodily injury, and that appellant had the requisite culpable
mental state at the time.
A responding police officer testified when he arrived at the scene, he asked the
father what had happened. He responded, “my son, Shane, just tried to run me over.”
The officer observed tire tracks that appeared to confirm the events. He also agreed
that a truck backing up into a person could be a deadly weapon because it is an
instrument that can cause serious bodily injury. The trial court could have found this
evidence sufficient to show the father was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury when
his son backed into him with a truck and the truck was used as a deadly weapon by the
manner of its use.
4
The Chief Dispatcher at Dalhart county jail testified to letters from appellant asking appellant’s
father not to prosecute and asking for his father to locate the witness and convince him not to testify in
appellant’s trial.
6
The testimony of a witness who saw the events provided additional proof of
appellant’s culpable mental state as well as proof that appellant used the truck as a
deadly weapon to threaten the father with imminent bodily injury. The witness testified
he heard the men arguing. As he watched, “[p]retty soon when the one guy run [sic]
and jumped in the pickup, he throwed [sic] the pickup in gear and backed over this other
man. The man fell over the pickup like that and backed him into a bunch of junk.” The
driver was “spinning the wheels of the truck.” The man “finally fell off the truck about the
middle of the street there.” The witness went over to the man he saw fall to “see if he
was still alive.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court
could have found each of the essential elements of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon against a family member as charged in the indictment. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing appellant’s original motion for new trial to
be overruled by operation of law.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
7