Jauney Darcila Wheeler v. State ( 2008 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 1, 2008

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 1, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-07-00763-CR

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JAUNEY DARCILA WHEELER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1072791

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant, Jauney Darcila Wheeler, appeals her conviction for aggravated robbery, contending that the trial erred by denying her motion to suppress involuntary custodial statements.  We affirm.

Background

On June 11, 2006, Christopher Washington was found dead on a porch, having been shot several times.   Officer Todd Miller, investigating the crime, recovered Washington=s cell phone and contacted appellant, the last person with whom Washington had spoken on that cell phone.

On June 12, 2006, appellant voluntarily came to the Houston police homicide division and spoke to Officer Miller in an interrogation room.  She drove her own vehicle.  Appellant was informed by Officer Miller that she was free to leave and that she was not under arrest. Appellant was not frisked and she was not handcuffed. Officer Miller conducted the interview in plain clothing and wore no firearm.

Appellant told Officer Miller what had transpired the previous evening, but Officer Miller did not believe her because there were inconsistencies in her story.  When confronted with these inconsistencies, appellant began to cry.  At about 5:30 p.m., Officer Miller read appellant her Miranda rights for the first time.^[1]  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Appellant then told Officer Miller that she had driven a man named Clay to Washington=s residence with the intent to rob Washington.^[2]  Appellant told Officer Miller that Clay shot and killed Washington.  She consented to having her statement recorded, and her Miranda rights were read to her again. She then took Officer Miller to Clay=s residence and to the scene of the shooting.  She later was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Washington.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress and it was considered at a hearing before the trial court over three days, December 4-6, 2006.  After denying appellant=s motion to suppress, and accepting appellant=s guilty plea on April 27, 2007, the trial court sentenced appellant to 20 years in prison.^[3]

Standard of Review

 An involuntary plea must be set aside.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon 2007); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, (1969).  Before the prosecution can introduce a defendant=s incriminating statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, the trial court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived her Miranda rights.^[4] See Mitchel v. State, C S.W.3d C, No. 01-06-00369-CR, 2008 WL 339696, at *3 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2008, no pet.).  The trial court is the sole trier of fact at a suppression hearing and is entitled to almost complete deference.  Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).  When there is conflicting evidence about whether a confession was voluntary, the trial court is the sole judge of facts at the suppression hearing, and an appellate court may not disturb any finding supported by the evidence.  Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) abrogated by Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856  (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  

AThe determination of whether a statement is voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., an application of law to a fact question.@  Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  If the record supports the trial court=s findings, those findings will not be disturbed.  Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  We will only consider whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts.  Id.

The burden of proof at a suppression hearing is on the prosecution, which must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant=s statement was given voluntarily.  Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).  AThe test is whether the defendant=s will was >overborne= by police coercion.@ Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 257 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref=d) (citing Guardiola v. State, 20 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d)).  The voluntariness of a statement is subject to a totality of the circumstances test.  Id. Among the factors that mitigate against the voluntariness of a statement are police falsehoods.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). Likewise, mental capacity is always a factor in assessing the voluntariness of a statement.  See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1978); Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) (AWhen persons of markedly limited mental ability . . . are questioned without the aid of counsel, issues of >suggestibility and possible overreaching are raised= . . . and must be factored into a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.@ (citing Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 938 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Analysis

Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because appellant, at age 21 and having only gone through the eleventh grade, did not voluntarily give her statement to Officer Miller because she felt intimidated and did not understand the Miranda warnings given to her. 

Appellant testified that Officer Miller yelled at her, intimidating her into confessing, and that she felt she was not free to leave the interrogation room once brought there.   Appellant testified that she believed she would get to go home if she cooperated. Appellant also testified that she believed that she would spend the rest of her life in prison if she did not tell Officer Miller what had happened on June 11, 2006, and that she would get to go home if she did so.  She claims that, by the time she gave her recorded statement, she was just telling Officer Miller what she felt he wanted to hear so she could go home.

Officer Miller and Officer Tyler also testified at the suppression hearing.  They testified as to their recollection of events surrounding appellant=s confession.  Their testimony indicated that appellant was informed, from the inception, that she was not under arrest and free to go at any time.  She came in her own car, bringing a friend and the friend=s children; was offered a beverage; and was allowed to use the restroom during the interview.  Officer Miller testified that he did not intimidate appellant in any way, and that appellant=s testimony was given freely and of her own accord.  Officer Miller testified that appellant was read her Miranda rights on two occasions: when appellant first began to tell inconsistent versions of what had transpired on the day in question, and then again on tape before she voluntarily gave a recorded statement to Officer Miller.  Officer Miller testified that she appeared lucid and seemed to understand the Miranda warnings.

The trial court also heard testimony concerning appellant=s education and work history.  Appellant testified that she dropped out of high school in the eleventh grade to attain work, but had done well in her classes.  Appellant testified that her work history included cashiering, food production, and caring for children.  The trial court noted that appellant appeared to be Aan intelligent woman for her age.@  No evidence of a low intelligence quotient or mental illness was presented.

The trial court filed findings of fact based upon the testimony at the suppression hearing.  Among these were findings that appellant was sober, uninjured, alert and cooperative throughout the process; that she had been told explicitly that she was free to leave at any time; that Officer Miller read appellant her Miranda rights in compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.22; that appellant made inconsistent statements to Officer Miller; that appellant told Officer Miller of her plan to rob Washington; that appellant agreed to make a statement and have it recorded; that the recording was done in compliance with section 2 of article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Miranda; that appellant=s recorded testimony included a recital that she understood her rights and intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived those rights before giving her testimony; that at no time did the police threaten, coerce, abuse, intimidate or mistreat appellant or offer any promises or inducements to gain a confession; and that in participating in each interview, appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily gave up and waived the rights set out in section 2 of article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The trial court=s findings of fact clearly accepted the testimony of Officers Miller and Tyler and disregarded the testimony of the appellant concerning the conduct of the interview and eventual confession.  See Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 902; Dunn, 721 S.W.2d at 336.  Based upon its findings of fact, the trial court concluded: AAll statements made by the defendant to police officers were made in full compliance with the United States Constitution and laws as well as the Constitution and statutes of the State of Texas and are therefore admissible in evidence against the defendant at any trial on the merits of this case.@

The ruling of the trial court in denying appellant=s motion to suppress the statements made to police is supported by sufficient evidence in the record, and will not be disturbed.  Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 650. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/        William J. Boyce

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 1, 2008.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Anderson and Boyce.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]           While no definitive time is established in the record, the officers contend that appellant came to the police station in the early afternoon.

^[2]           The State=s brief interchangeably uses ACory@ and AChris@ to refer to the victim and ACory@ to discuss appellant=s alleged accomplice.  AClay@ is the name of the alleged accomplice in the record and Chris is the abbreviated name of the victim, Christopher Washington.  We have found no ACory@ in the record.

^[3]           The trial court=s certification stated that there was no plea bargain in this case and that the appellant had the right to appeal.  In an apparent contradiction, the trial court also checked the box indicating that appellant had waived her right to an appeal.  The State, however, concedes appellant=s right to appeal.

^[4]           The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to admonish a defendant, either orally or in writing, before accepting a guilty plea in a felony case.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art 26.13(a) (Vernon 2007).  While the guilty plea was not recorded, the record does contain the admonishments made by the court, and as such there is a prima facie showing that the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly.  Grays v. State, 888 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.CDallas 1994, no pet.)