Eugene D. Esters v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00219-CR
EUGENE D. ESTERS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1263515D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
In three issues, Appellant Eugene D. Esters appeals his conviction for
murder. We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Esters lived with his girlfriend, Jennifer, for about four or five years. He
moved out of their apartment about a month before her murder. Even after his
move, he was allowed to stay there when Jennifer and her two children were
gone and allowed to come by and see their two-year-old daughter, Sara,2 in the
morning before Jennifer’s mother, Della, took the children to school.
On December 5, 2011, Della arrived back at the apartment after taking the
children to school to discover that Jennifer and Esters had been involved in an
argument about the ownership of a set of jumper cables. Shortly thereafter,
Della, who was a secretary at Jennifer’s business, drove Jennifer to work and
later dropped her off at her apartment, noticing on the way to her own home that
Esters’s truck was heading toward the apartment. Puzzled over why Esters
would be returning to Jennifer’s apartment, Della called Jennifer, told her what
she had seen, and stayed on the line with her. Jennifer told Della that she saw
Esters enter the apartment garage, then get in his truck, park it, and wait there,
but she asked Della not to call the police. Della decided to return to the
apartment and stopped at a police substation on the way there but did not find
any officers present. After Della arrived back at the apartment, Jennifer and a
neighbor, Carrieta Cook, met Della at her car where Della could see Esters
2
We use a pseudonym for the child’s name. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
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sitting in his truck across the parking lot from Jennifer’s apartment. Esters next
pulled his truck up behind the three women and said “Della, I wanted to know
when I’ll be able to see Sara.” Della relayed the message to Jennifer, who was
close by and who responded, “Gene, we will work out something.” Without
saying anything else, Esters exited his truck, drew a gun from his pocket, and
shot Jennifer from several feet away; after she collapsed, Ester’s approached
Jennifer and shot her again. He then confronted Della and said, “[N]ow go put
that on Facebook,” and he shot her in the chest. Esters apparently then tried to
shoot himself under his chin, but when the gun did not fire, he said, “[D]amn, I
had a bullet for myself . . . . I killed the bitch, I told her I’d kill her.” He then yelled
for someone to call 911. Esters next told Della, “[S]it [your] stupid ass down
before [you] bleed to death,” and looking at Cook, he said “[B]itch, I ran out of
bullets.” Esters then put the gun in his truck, shouted “religious slurs,” and
stated, “I don’t have anything else to live for.” When the police arrived, he was
compliant, offered no resistance, and told the officer, “I’m not going to do
anything.”
A jury convicted Esters of murder and assessed his punishment at life in
prison. This appeal followed.
III. Sudden Passion
In his first issue, Esters asserts that the trial court committed fundamental
punishment charge error by denying his request for a sudden passion special
issue. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed that if “the Defendant
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has raised by a preponderance of the evidence the issue of sudden passion and
you so find then the punishment range for this offense is that of a second
degree,” which was 2 to 20 years plus a fine. He further requested that “sudden
passion” be defined as “passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation
by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion
arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former
provocation.” Esters argues that Jennifer’s response—“[W]e will work something
out”—to his inquiry about seeing Sara “could have amounted to sudden passion
which would require that the issue be submitted to the jury.” The State responds
that there is no evidence that the murder occurred under the immediate influence
of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.
A. Standard of Review
“[A]ll alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review
regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645,
649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In our review of a jury charge, we first determine
whether error occurred; if error did not occur, our analysis ends. Id.
B. Requirements for Submission
An accused who successfully argues that murder was committed under the
immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause reduces
the level of the offense from the first to the second degree, thereby reducing the
possible punishment range. Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013), Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The
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instruction given to the jury in this regard is required if some evidence raises the
issue, regardless of whether that evidence is contradicted, weak or impeached,
but is not required to be given if the evidence is so contested, weak, or incredible
such that it could not support a finding by a rational jury. Davis v. State, 268
S.W.3d 683, 693 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d). Further, if the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, fails to raise the
issue of sudden passion from adequate cause, the defendant is not entitled to an
instruction. See id. at 698.
Certain evidentiary requirements are necessary for sudden passion to be
submitted to the jury. Those are: (1) that the defendant in fact acted under the
immediate influence of a passion such as terror, anger, rage, or resentment;
(2) that his sudden passion was in fact induced by some provocation by the
deceased or another acting with him, which provocation would commonly
produce such a passion in a person of ordinary temper; (3) that he committed the
murder before regaining his capacity for cool reflection; and (4) that a causal
connection existed between the provocation, passion, and homicide. See
Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 605. Sudden passion is more than ordinary anger and
does not include a cause of the defendant’s own making. Hernandez v. State,
127 S.W.3d 206, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Nance v.
State, 807 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d).
Further, the sudden passion must have arisen from adequate cause, which
requires some evidence of the condition of the accused’s mind at the time of the
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offense. Mitchell v. State, 191 S.W.3d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005,
pet. ref’d); Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet.
ref’d).
C. Analysis
With this legal backdrop, we will examine the evidence and determine if
the submission of a sudden passion instruction was required. The only evidence
proffered by Esters was the previously recounted exchange:
[Esters to Della]–“Della, I wanted to know when I’ll be able to see
[Sara].”
[Della to Jennifer]–“Jennifer, Gene wants to know when he’ll be able
to see [Sara].”
[Jennifer to Esters]–“Gene, we will work out something.”
The second element under Wooten requires that the provocation “would
commonly produce such a passion in a person of ordinary temper.” See Wooten,
400 S.W.3d at 605. Jennifer’s response about working something out is not an
unreasonable response such as “you’ll never see your child again.” It cannot be
said that a person of ordinary temper would produce such sudden passion under
these circumstances, and Esters cannot meet his burden under this element.
Further, the fourth Wooten element requires that a causal connection exist
between the provocation, the passion, and the homicide. Id. Here, following the
murder, Esters attempted to shoot himself, and when this failed, he said “[D]amn,
I had a bullet for myself.” This clearly indicates that this act was planned and that
he set out to kill himself after killing Jennifer, thus negating his attempt to
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establish this fourth element of proof. Therefore, no error occurred in the
omission of a sudden passion special instruction, and Esters’s first issue is
overruled.
IV. A Prior Felony
In his second issue, Esters asserts that the trial court committed
fundamental charge error by submitting a special issue inquiring of a prior felony,
thereby enhancing punishment. Esters argues that a California conviction for
grand theft was not the equivalent of the type of felony required for punishment
enhancement in Texas. The State responds that the Texas Penal Code only
requires the State to prove that an out-of-state conviction was punishable in the
penitentiary of that State in order to meet the definition of “felony” for
enhancement purposes.
A. Analysis
Esters had been convicted of the offense of grand theft in California, which
he argued was similar to a Texas state jail felony of theft between $1500 and
$20,000, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(a)(4)(A), and that such state jail felonies
cannot be used for repeat offender enhancement purposes. See Ex Parte White,
211 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Punishment for a first degree felony offense can be enhanced to life
imprisonment if it is shown that “the defendant has previously been finally
convicted of a felony other than a state jail felony . . . .” Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 12.42(c) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014). The code further articulates that
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any conviction not obtained from a prosecution under this [Penal]
[C]ode shall be classified as follows: (1) ‘felony of the third degree’ if
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or
another penitentiary is affixed to the offense as a possible
punishment; (2) ‘Class B misdemeanor’ if the offense is not a felony
and confinement in a jail is affixed to the offense as a possible
punishment.
Id. § 12.41(1)–(2) (West 2011) (emphasis added). Referring to this section, our
Court of Criminal Appeals has told us that
[T]he Legislature enacted a statute to deal specifically with the
classification for enhancement purposes of convictions obtained
outside the Penal Code . . . . [T]here can be no doubt that the
Legislature intended to make convictions for felonies in federal
courts as well as courts of other states available for enhancement
purposes.
Ex Parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). These
convictions are contrasted with convictions whose punishment is confinement in
a jail. Specifically, “penitentiary” refers to facilities run by the Texas Department
of Corrections, that is, a facility run by the State of Texas, as opposed to a
“county jail run by the local sheriff.” Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (Clinton, J. concurring). The same state prison–versus–county
jail distinction is made in California. See People v. Lopez, 218 Cal. App. 4th
Supp. 6, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678, 681 (2013). Therefore, we must determine
whether Esters’s out-of-state conviction resulted in confinement in a California
penitentiary, which would be classified then as a felony for enhancement
purposes. An examination of Esters’s pen packet, contained in an exhibit
introduced by the State, indicates in the “Abstract Of Judgment” that he was the
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subject of a “commitment to state prison.” Therefore, this constitutes a “felony of
the third degree” for purposes of the penal code section 12.41(1), and no charge
error occurred. Esters’s second issue is overruled.
V. Autopsy Photos
Esters argues in his third issue that the trial court erred by admitting
autopsy photos that were gruesome and unduly prejudicial.
A. Standard of Review and Rule 403
The standard of review for a trial court’s admission of evidence is abuse of
discretion, and wide discretion is afforded to the trial judge. Green v. State, 934
S.W.2d 92, 101–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997);
Miller v. State, 196 S.W.3d 256, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d);
Hale v. State, 140 S.W.3d 381, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d).
The trial court’s decision should be reversed on appeal only if there is a showing
of abuse of discretion. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 101–02; Miller, 196 S.W.3d at 267.
Only if the court’s decision falls outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement”
has it abused its discretion. Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 718 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (op. on reh’g); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). This standard applies to the admission of
photographs. See Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 683.
Evidence may be excluded under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. But
this rule also favors the admission of relevant evidence, and such evidence is
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presumed to be more probative than prejudicial. See Shuffield v. State, 189
S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1056 (2006).
B. Analysis
We begin our review with an examination of the autopsy photos in
question. Those photos include: two close-ups of head wounds, a close-up of
bullet fragments and two of unfragmented bullets, four close-ups of arm wounds,
a side wound, what appears to be a leg wound, and the front view of the head
and shoulders of the victim. All of the wound photos are “clean” in that no blood
is depicted and no internal tissue is shown. Dr. Lloyd White, a pathologist and
deputy medical examiner for Tarrant County, took the photographs. He
examined and photographed six wounds in connection with the formation of his
opinion that death resulted from “penetrating handgun wounds of the chest” and
that the manner of death was a homicide. He testified that he typically takes
photographs during autopsies to help him explain the results of the autopsy if he
is called to trial, such as occurred in this case. A review of his testimony reveals
that he explained to the jury the six wounds in question including their location,
entry and exit, and possible internal damage caused thereby.
An examination of the case law in this area shows that much more graphic
autopsy results have been deemed admissible than the bullet wounds shown in
the subject photographs. We note that there is no depiction of dissection of the
body, removed organs, or exposed body cavities. For example, in Davis v. State,
313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), a cross section of the victims tongue
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was properly admitted when necessary to show an injury not otherwise visible.
In Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), depictions of
autopsy procedures, including removed organs, were properly admitted. Nothing
of this nature is contained in the autopsy photos in this case. Additionally,
[a] court may consider many factors in determining whether the
probative value of photographs is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, including: the number of exhibits offered,
their gruesomeness,[3] their detail, their size, whether they are in
color or black-and-white, whether they are close up, whether the
body depicted is clothed or naked, the availability of other means of
proof, and other circumstances unique to the individual case.
See Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 331.
Turning to the above listed factors, only eleven autopsy photographs out of
over 140 State’s exhibits were introduced. Under the commonsense
understanding of the word they cannot be said to be “gruesome”; they are
detailed only to the extent that they are well-photographed pictures of clean
wounds that depict nothing under the surface of the skin and are blown-up
pictures on boards for purposes of explanation by the assistant medical
examiner. The record does not indicate whether the photos were color or black-
and-white. All but one are close ups depicting no more of the body than
necessary; the photographs of the arm and leg suggest that the body is
uncovered but this is not shown in the photographs. Lastly, it would theoretically
3
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “gruesome” as “inspiring
horror or repulsion.”
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be possible, but more difficult, for the assistant medical examiner to testify about
the location and description of the wounds without the photographs.
Considering the foregoing factors, the previously discussed case law
concerning the admission of autopsy photographs, and the importance of the fact
that these autopsy photos are simply not “gruesome,” we hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting these photographs in connection with the
testimony of the assistant medical examiner in explaining the wounds and their
connection to the cause of death. Esters’s third issue is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
Having overruled Esters’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and MEIER, J.
LIVINGSTON, C.J., concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 30, 2014
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