Johnathan J. Darden v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-12-00038-CR
JOHNATHAN J. DARDEN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 115th District Court
Upshur County, Texas
Trial Court No. 16,004
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After his conviction by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, 1
Johnathan J. Darden was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count. 2 We affirm the
judgment of the trial court because (1) no error was preserved on the public-trial issue, (2) no
error was preserved regarding testimony that Darden invoked his right to counsel, (3) the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Darden a continuance, (4) failing to read the
enhancement allegation in the jury’s presence was harmless error, and (5) allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel were not proven.
(1) No Error Was Preserved on the Public-Trial Issue
Before jury selection, the State advised the trial court that Darden wanted to have his
mother present during jury selection, but that she was an intended witness for the State. In
response, the trial judge stated, “I can’t do it.” Defense counsel then indicated that he likewise
intended to call Darden’s mother as a witness. 3 The court was advised that Darden’s godfather
was also present and was asked whether he could be present during jury selection. The court
determined that family members who were not to be witnesses could be present during jury
selection. Defense counsel then asked the trial court if he could have a minute to advise Darden
that his mother could not be present in the courtroom during jury selection. No objection to her
exclusion was voiced.
1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West Supp. 2012).
2
The sentences are to run concurrently.
3
Although Darden’s mother was sworn as a witness, she was not called to testify by either party.
2
Darden now complains that his mother’s exclusion from the courtroom during jury
selection violated his right to a public trial. See Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused in a
criminal prosecution “the right to a . . . public trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a
public trial is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to be binding on the states. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). The right to a public trial also extends to the jury selection
process. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010) (per curiam) (citing
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)); see also Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 504–05. The
violation of a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial is structural error, and thus does not
require a showing of harm to warrant a reversal. Presley, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. at 725;
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997); Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 328
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Steadman, 360 S.W.3d at 510.
Here, Darden never objected to his mother’s exclusion from the courtroom during jury
selection. When the trial court advised that only nontestifying family members could be present
during jury selection, defense counsel asked merely if he could take a moment to advise Darden
that his mother could not be present during jury selection. 4
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Heigelmann v. State, 362 S.W.3d 763, 770 n.9 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d). A reviewing court will not consider errors not called to the trial
4
Darden did not file a motion for new trial complaining of the exclusion.
3
court’s attention. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Even
constitutional errors may be forfeited by failing to object at trial. See Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d
220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A defendant’s right to a public
trial has not been numbered among either the few “systemic requirements” that a trial court must
follow, regardless of the parties’ wishes, or established as a “waiveable” right only, which must
be implemented unless expressly waived. See Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004); see also Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), rev’d on
other grounds, 891 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Fletcher v. State, No. 14-96-01158-CR,
1998 WL 651616, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 24, 1998, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (right to public trial). By failing to object at the time the trial court
excluded his mother, a potential trial witness for both sides, Darden forfeited the right to present
this complaint on appeal, even if it was error. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 342; see also Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619–20 (1960) (closure of courtroom during grand jury hearing that
continued into contempt hearing did not violate defendant’s public-trial right absent request to
open court to preserve error for appeal); Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (complaint that hearing in chambers violated right to public trial not preserved for
review when trial objection addressed refusal of trial court to allow appellant to make bill of
exceptions in courtroom). Because Darden did not object to the exclusion of his mother from the
courtroom during jury selection, he has failed to preserve error, if any, resulting from such
exclusion. This point of error is overruled.
4
(2) No Error Was Preserved Regarding Testimony that Darden Invoked His Right to Counsel
Darden also contends that the State improperly placed before the jury the evidence that he
had invoked the right to counsel. During the State’s direct examination of Roxanne Warren, an
officer with the Gilmer Police Department, the following testimony was elicited:
Q. [The State] Did he indicate after you told him that allegation, did
he indicate he wanted to speak to you?
A. [Warren] No, he stated he had already requested an attorney.
Q. And did he think it was best that he spoke to an attorney before he
spoke to you?
A. Yes.
Q. So that interview was ended and ceased and never really began.
A. Correct.
Darden did not move to strike and request an instruction that the jury disregard Warren’s
testimony to the effect that he had requested an attorney at the time of the interview. Darden
further failed to object to the succeeding question, asking if Darden thought it best to speak to
any attorney before he spoke with Warren. Generally, in order to preserve a complaint for
appellate review, the record must show (1) that the complaint was made to the trial court by a
request, objection, or motion that was timely and sufficiently specific to make the trial court
aware of the grounds of the complaint and (2) that the trial court ruled adversely. Tucker v.
State, 990 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). If the objection is sustained, counsel must
then ask for an instruction to disregard. Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 701 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985); Schumacher v. State, 72 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d). If the
5
instruction is given, counsel must then move for a mistrial. Nethery, 692 S.W.2d at 701;
Schumacher, 72 S.W.3d at 47. If counsel does not pursue the objection to an adverse ruling,
error is not preserved. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). Error, if any, was not preserved for appellate review.
(3) The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Darden a Continuance
After trial commenced, Darden filed a written motion for continuance complaining that
the State failed to turn over all discovery material. Darden claimed surprise and the inability to
obtain a fair trial. 5 The State responded that it had, with the exception of some letters which
contained no exculpatory matter or evidence that would assist the State’s case, turned over all the
discovery. However, the State tendered the undisclosed letters to Darden in open court. The
motion for continuance was overruled. 6
On appeal, Darden contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion
for continuance because an expectation that trial counsel could adequately review forty to fifty
letters and upwards of 3,000 audio recordings provided shortly before trial is unreasonable. The
written motion for continuance filed and presented to the trial court is based on the assertion that
5
Darden also presented an oral motion for continuance after all witnesses were sworn, but before commencement of
testimony, contending the State provided him with discovery on the eve of trial, including over 3,000 recorded
telephone calls Darden made from jail. The discovery also included several letters written by Darden to an
individual the State intended to call as a witness. The State responded that it disclosed the discovery the day after it
became known. The State further indicated that it intended to introduce only one of those letters and one of the
audio recordings of a telephone call placed by Darden, both of which were specifically identified by the State. The
trial court overruled the oral motion for continuance. On appeal, Darden concedes that the oral motion for
continuance preserved nothing for appellate review. Anderson v. State, 301 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). The written motion for continuance was filed the following day.
6
The State responded that all discovery material was provided to Darden.
6
the State was in possession of discovery material which was not provided to Darden. 7 It does not
complain of the challenge of reviewing the just-produced data. An objection stating one legal
basis may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal. Taylor v. State, 20 S.W.3d
51, 56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). Here, however, a liberal reading of Darden’s
appellate point can be seen to fairly encompass the complaint made in the trial court. The record
indicates that “a stack of letters” was turned over to Darden in open court.
The decision on whether to grant a motion for continuance is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We, therefore,
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the trial court’s ruling. Id. To establish an
abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the defendant was actually prejudiced by the
denial of his or her motion. Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per
curiam) (citing Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Prejudice will
be found from the lack of a continuance “only if the record shows with considerable specificity
how the defendant was harmed by the absence of more preparation time than he actually had.”
Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Such a showing ordinarily
is made at a hearing on a motion for new trial, where, almost always, the defendant will “be able
to produce evidence as to what additional information, evidence or witnesses the defense would
have had available if the motion for delay had been granted.” Id. at 842. In addition to
establishing harm as a prerequisite to obtaining appellate relief, a defendant must also
demonstrate error in the denial of the motion for continuance:
7
Darden does not claim that the State failed to disclose Brady material. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7
In addition to this necessary showing of harm, an appellant must apparently also
show that the trial judge’s ruling on the motion was error. This most likely
requires a showing that the case made for delay was so convincing that no
reasonable trial judge could conclude that scheduling and other considerations as
well as fairness to the State outweighed the defendant’s interest in delay of the
trial.
Id. at 843.
Here, the trial court could reasonably have rejected Darden’s motion because all
undisclosed discovery, represented to be material which was not helpful to the State or to the
defense, was tendered to Darden in open court. We cannot say that the case made for delay was
so compelling that no reasonable trial judge could conclude the trial should not be delayed. 8
Moreover, Darden has not established “specific prejudice to his cause arising from the trial
court’s failure to continue the trial.” Heiselbetz, 906 S.W.2d at 511. A showing of specific
prejudice “can ordinarily be made only at a hearing on a motion for new trial . . . .” Gonzales,
304 S.W.3d at 842–43. In the instant case, Darden did not file a motion for new trial or otherwise
articulate what specific prejudice he suffered based on the denial of the motion for continuance.
We conclude Darden has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying the motion for
continuance and that the lack of a continuance harmed him. We overrule this point of error.
8
At trial, the State elicited testimony from Christy Thomas, the recipient of the letters, indicating Thomas met with
the investigator for the State Saturday, February 18, 2012, at which time the letters were turned over to the State.
The State contacted defense counsel the following day and provided counsel with the documents that were admitted
into evidence. These events took place before the time the jury was sworn.
8
(4) Failing to Read the Enhancement Allegation in the Jury’s Presence Was Harmless Error
After returning a guilty verdict on both counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, the
jury was returned to the jury room, at which time the State read the enhancement paragraph in
open court in Darden’s presence. 9 Darden pled true to the enhancement allegation.
Darden claims the trial court erred in failing to have the enhancement allegation read in
the presence of the jury in violation of Article 36.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provides, in relevant part:
The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by the attorney
prosecuting. When prior convictions are alleged for purposes of enhancement
only and are not jurisdictional, that portion of the indictment or information
reciting such convictions shall not be read until the hearing on punishment is held
as provided in Article 37.07.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(a)(1) (West 2007). Darden claims that, because the
enhancement allegation was never presented to the jury, the case should be reversed and a new
9
The State filed its notice of intention to seek enhancement of the range of punishment January, 9, 2012. The
enhancement paragraph, as read by the State, alleged, in part:
[T]he state of Texas . . . hereby gives notice to the defendant and his counsel of the state’s
intention to seek, prove and have submitted to the jury in the punishment phase of trial the issue of
whether the defendant had previously been convicted of the felony offense listed below.
Paragraph one, and it is further presented in and to said court that prior to the commission of the
offense in this cause, hereinafter called the primary offense, that on or about the 23rd day of
November, 2004, in Cause Number 7103503 in the 7th District Court of Smith County, Texas the
defendant was convicted of the felony offense of injury to a child, elderly, or disabled, a final
felony conviction and sentenced to seven years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Corrections. That should the jury find from the evidence and say so by their
verdict that the defendant is the same person previously convicted of the offense set forth in
paragraph one above, the range of punishment for this offense in this cause would be confinement
for life or for a term not to exceed 99 years nor less than fifteen years in the Institutional Division
of the Texas Department of Corrections if convicted under count one or count two of the
indictment. Additionally, a fine not to exceed $10,000 will be within the range of punishment
prescribed by law.
9
trial should be granted, or alternatively, he should receive a new punishment hearing. We
disagree.
Darden reasons that the decision in Turner v. State, 897 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995), controls. In that case, the trial court neither required the enhancement allegation to be
read nor received the defendant’s plea to the enhancement allegation. Turner found that the trial
court’s action was error and that the error was not subject to a harm analysis. Id. at 789. Darden
asks that we apply the same reasoning here.
Since Turner, however, the high criminal court has determined that all errors with the
exception of certain federal constitutional errors labeled “structural” are subject to a harmless-
error analysis. 10 See High v. State, 964 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam);
Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (overruling “any other decision
[that] conflicts with the present opinion”). Although Turner has never been explicitly overruled,
subsequent cases have held that a violation of Article 36.01 is subject to harmless error analysis.
See Mendez v. State, 212 S.W.3d 382, 388 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d); Hernandez v.
State, 190 S.W.3d 856, 868 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); Linton v. State,
15 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).
This Court has previously stated that entirely failing to read an indictment should be
classified as a structural error. Simmons v. State, 106 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003, no pet.). In this case, however, the enhancement allegation was read to Darden, after
10
Structural errors include the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, a judge who is not impartial, unlawful
exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury, the right to self-representation at trial, and the right
to a public trial. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
10
which he pled true. Darden complains only of the fact that the jury was not present at the time
the enhancement allegation was read. This was not tantamount to a complete failure to read the
enhancement allegations as required by the rule. Although it is error, it is not structural error and
should be reviewed to determine if it was harmful.
When reviewing nonconstitutional error under Rule 44.2(b), we determine whether the
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See Llamas v. State, 12 S.W.3d 469, 471 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In determining this, we must decide whether the error had a substantial
or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Id.; Hernandez, 190 S.W.3d at 868; Simmons, 106
S.W.3d at 760.
In Turner, the court expressed concern that a defendant could be misled into believing the
State has abandoned its intent to seek an enhanced sentence when the enhancement paragraphs
are not read and the defendant does not plead to them. See Turner, 897 S.W.2d at 789. If so
misled, “the defendant might take the stand and incriminate herself . . . for purposes other than to
subject herself to an enhanced sentence.” Id. Because of the inherent danger of self-
incrimination, strict compliance with Article 36.01 was required to ensure a fair and impartial
trial. Id.
Because Darden did not testify during the punishment phase of trial, there was no danger
of self-incrimination. Further, the enhancement allegation was read to Darden outside the
presence of the jury, and he pled true to that allegation. Therefore, Darden could not have been
misled into believing the State intended to abandon the enhancement allegation.
11
Turner also recognized that “a defendant’s right, under Article 36.01, to stand before the
jury and plead ‘untrue’ to the enhancement paragraphs is a valuable right.” Id. Because Darden
pled true to the enhancement allegation, the effect of the denial of such right is not an issue
here. 11
In addition, the primary offenses here were both first degree felonies, each carrying a
punishment range of life or for any term of not more than ninety-nine years or less than five
years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (West 2011). The effect of the enhancement was
to raise the minimum punishment from five years in prison to fifteen years in prison. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(1) (West Supp. 2012). The punishments assessed by the jury—life
imprisonment on each count—was the maximum Darden could receive, and both fell within the
unenhanced punishment range, which suggests this error was harmless.
Given these circumstances, we conclude the failure to read the enhancement allegation
and to receive Darden’s plea of true to that allegation in the presence of the jury was harmless.
We overrule this point of error.
(5) Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Were Not Proven
Darden contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution grants an accused the right to have the assistance of counsel for
his or her defense, a right that has been interpreted to require the effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
assistance of counsel is binding on the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
11
The jury was instructed that Darden pled true to the enhancement allegation.
12
McCoy v. Court of Appeals, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 435 (1988). A conviction resulting from
ineffective assistance of counsel is constitutionally infirm. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-part test formulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, requiring a showing of both deficient
performance and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Fox v. State, 175 S.W.3d 475, 485 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet.
ref’d). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel “are not built on retrospective speculation,”
but must be firmly rooted in the record, with the record itself affirmatively demonstrating the
alleged ineffectiveness. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
To prevail on this claim, Darden must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Tong v. State, 25
S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance and was motivated by
sound trial strategy. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). “If
counsel’s reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility
that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel’s decisions
and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.” Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d
79, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Rarely will a reviewing court be provided the opportunity to
make its determination on direct appeal with a record capable of providing an evaluation of the
merits of ineffective assistance claims. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. “In the majority of
13
instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect” the
reasoning of trial counsel. Id. at 813–14.
Darden claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he (a) failed to move to
quash the indictment, (b) advised the jury panel that Darden would not testify, (c) failed to object
to improper questions, (d) failed to redact a recorded interview viewed by the jury, (e) failed to
object to testimony informing the jury that Darden invoked his right to counsel before a second
interview, (f) failed to object to the introduction of letters from Darden to Thomas, (g) called
Ramona Lacy, the mother of the victim, to testify, (h) failed to object to the court’s charge,
(i) called Wade French as a witness during the punishment phase, and (j) failed to object to
comments made by the State during closing argument. He also claims these cumulative failings
demonstrate a pattern of ineffectiveness.
(a) Motion to Quash Indictment
In support of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to
quash the indictment, Darden asserts that the rather imprecise language utilized in the second
count of the indictment required correction. The second count recites that the victim’s sexual
organ was penetrated by “defendant’s organ.” 12 Darden admits, however, that the statute setting
out the offense allows for a crime to be committed by penetration “by any means.” 13 We do not
find the failure to file a motion to quash the indictment to be deficient representation.
12
Count one of the indictment alleges that the victim’s sexual organ was penetrated by “defendant’s sexual organ.”
13
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(1).
14
(b) Disclosure to Jury Panel that Darden Would Not Testify
Deficient performance is likewise not supported by the disclosure to the jury panel that
Darden would not testify at trial. Darden concedes that this matter, taken alone, does not
constitute ineffective assistance.
(c) Failure to Object to Improper Questions
Among other issues Darden claims reveal a pattern of ineffectiveness is the failure to
object to certain questioning of the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), 14 as well as certain
testimony offered by Thomas 15 and investigator Warren. 16 Trial counsel’s failure to object can
be presumed to be reasonable trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “The review of defense
counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes that counsel’s actions fell within a
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001). As is typically true, trial counsel’s reasons for not objecting do not appear in
the record. “If counsel’s reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least
the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to
counsel’s decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.” Ortiz,
93 S.W.3d at 88–89. Because trial counsel’s failure to object may have been based on trial
14
Susan Hinson, the SANE who interviewed the child victim, was asked if she has testified in other cases in which a
defendant was found guilty even though the victim did not want to disclose everything to the nurse during an
interview. The nurse responded affirmatively.
15
Thomas testified that she was engaged in a romantic relationship with Darden while Darden was living with the
victim’s mother. Thomas also testified about a certain letter she received from Darden which attempts to explain the
circumstances of the assault.
16
Warren testified that lying is common for those accused of a crime of this nature.
15
strategy, we are unable to conclude counsel’s actions fell outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.
(d) Failure to Redact Recorded Interview
Other complaints center on the substance of the interview between Warren and Darden.
Darden complains that the interview, which was published to the jury, should have been redacted
by deleting certain information, including a discussion regarding a physical altercation between
Darden and the child victim’s mother on the day before Darden’s arrest, a disclosure that Darden
was on parole at the time of the interview, and information indicating Darden was involved in a
romantic relationship with Thomas while he was living with the victim’s mother. Darden claims
that the referenced information is irrelevant and that, even if marginally relevant, it should have
been excluded. See TEX. R. EVID. 403.
It is not enough to show that, with the benefit of hindsight, counsel’s actions or omissions
during trial “were merely of questionable competence.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142–43
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Here, as in most direct appeals, the record is silent as to why trial
counsel did not object to the inclusion of the portions of the Warren/Darden interview of which
Darden complains. The record could have been supplemented through a hearing on a motion for
new trial, but such a motion was not filed. Darden has thus failed to meet his burden under the
first prong of Strickland.
(e) Failure to Object to Invocation-of-Counsel Testimony
Additionally, Darden complains of trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony informing
the jury that Darden invoked his right to counsel before a second interview with Warren. When
16
counsel is not provided an opportunity to explain his actions, this Court will not find deficient
performance unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Because the record is silent
as to why counsel failed to object, we employ the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct, in
possibly refusing to draw the jury’s attention to the invocation issue through an objection, could
be considered sound trial strategy.
(f) Failure to Object to Introduction of Letters
Darden further complains that trial counsel failed to object to testimony from Thomas
that she was engaged in a romantic relationship with Darden while Darden was living with the
victim’s mother. 17 In the same connection, certain letters were admitted into evidence through
Thomas, to which counsel did not object. While Darden fails to explain or to otherwise analyze
the damaging evidence in the letters, it is apparent that they were intended as an attempt by
Darden to explain the circumstances of his encounter with the victim in order to maintain his
relationship with Thomas. 18 The letters were properly authenticated by Thomas and were clearly
relevant to the issue of Darden’s guilt. See Simpson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App.—
17
As previously discussed, the record is silent as to why counsel did not object to testimony regarding the allegedly
romantic relationship between Darden and Thomas.
18
Both letters are incriminating. In the initial letter, Darden explained to Thomas:
I am sorry for lying in the begining [sic] . . . . I didn’t do this s[ ]t on purpose!! . . . . I had drinked
[sic] myself asleep and when I woke up [the victim] was in bed and it happen [sic], but I stope
[sic] myself when I realize what was going on she try to ge [sic] me to keep going I didn’t I made
her get out . . . . This only happen [sic] one time . . . and I’am [sic] not liying [sic] about that . . . .
Defense counsel stated that he had no objection to Exhibits 34 and 35 (a second letter from Darden to Thomas,
proclaiming, in part, that “I will NOT DO IT ANYMORE”).
17
Tyl. 2005, pet ref’d) (excerpt of letter appellant wrote to girlfriend while in jail was material
because it was declaration made by appellant regarding his guilt).
Even assuming the letters were inadmissible, the failure to object does not necessarily
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Greene v. State, 928 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Because the record is silent as to counsel’s possible strategies, we
decline to speculate why no objection was made. We may not “reverse a conviction on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds when counsel’s actions or omissions may have been
based on tactical decisions, but the record contains no specific explanation for counsel’s
decisions.” Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 830. Because the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that
this omission was attributable to ineffectiveness, the presumption of reasonable professional
assistance has not been defeated.
(g) Decision to Call Lacy as a Defense Witness
Darden further contends trial counsel was ineffective in calling the victim’s mother,
Lacy, to testify. Darden contends that damaging evidence was elicited from this witness
regarding an altercation between Darden and Lacy the day before Darden’s arrest. We cannot
conclude trial counsel was ineffective merely because he made the tactical decision to call Lacy
as a witness for the purpose of impugning her credibility. The decision to call a witness is
generally a matter of trial strategy. See, e.g., Rodd v. State, 886 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). Moreover, counsel was pursuing a strategically legitimate
line of questioning when Lacy volunteered that she and Darden became involved in an
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altercation. 19 Absent a record of the reason for counsel’s conduct, we must defer to counsel’s
decisions. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 830.
During Lacy’s cross-examination, further evidence of the altercation between Lacy and
Darden was elicited. Trial counsel objected to the introduction of photographs depicting injuries
to Lacy as a result of that altercation. After the trial court overruled the objection, further
information regarding the altercation came to light. Trial counsel may have made a decision, as
a matter of sound trial strategy, to draw no further attention to this matter by way of additional
objections, in light of the trial court’s ruling on the photographic evidence.
(h) Failure to Object to Court’s Charge
It is further claimed counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the court’s charge. The
sole argument made here is that the instruction regarding extraneous evidence appears to be
improper. We are not told why the instruction is improper or what objection should have been
made to this instruction. We thus overrule this issue as inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(h), (i) (brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to record). An inadequately briefed issue may be waived on appeal.
McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 49 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
(i) Decision to Call French as a Witness During Punishment Phase
Darden next complains counsel was ineffective in calling French as a witness in the
punishment phase of the trial. French had no opinion on whether Darden posed a danger to
society, so Darden complains the evidence had no value. As previously explained, we cannot
19
Lacy volunteered that, when Darden emerged from a locked room, “he immediately jumped on me.”
19
conclude that a tactical decision to call a witness amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g., Rodd, 886 S.W.2d at 384.
(j) Failure to Object to State’s Comments in Closing
Finally, Darden complains of counsel’s failure to object to suggestions he claims were
made by the State during closing argument that the jury should consider how parole applies in
this case, as such was forbidden by the court’s charge. The court’s charge included an extensive
discussion of how parole applies in this case 20 and advised the jury that the application of parole
law will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities. In closing, the State
informed the jury that Darden “will be entitled to parole at some point.” The State then clarified
that Darden will “get a chance at parole.”
The court’s charge specifically stated that “eligibility for parole does not guarantee that
parole will be granted.” When read in context, the complained-of argument did not suggest to
the jury that they should consider the possibility of parole in a manner forbidden by the court’s
charge.
20
The charge of the court indicated:
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned
might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good
conduct time earned equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, whichever is less,
without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. Eligibility for parole does not
guarantee that parole will be granted. It cannot be accurately predicted how the parole law and
good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole
authorities.
You may consider the existence of parole law and good conduct time. However, you are
not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this
particular defendant. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pardon and
Parole Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the governor of Texas.
20
(k) Pattern of Ineffectiveness
Darden maintains that the matters outlined above illustrate a pattern that establishes
ineffectiveness of counsel. Because the record before us does not support a conclusion that the
complained-of conduct by trial counsel fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms,
the alleged conduct cumulatively did not fall below that standard. See Rodriguez v. State, 336
S.W.3d 294, 303 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d) (because “appellant did not meet
her burden of establishing individual instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, we hold that
she cannot show an adverse cumulative effect from the actions of trial counsel”).
We overrule Darden’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: December 27, 2012
Date Decided: March 1, 2013
Do Not Publish
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