in the Estate of Ralph Lee Minton ( 2014 )

NUMBER 13-12-00026-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN THE ESTATE OF RALPH LEE MINTON, DECEASED
On appeal from the Probate Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
This appeal arises out of the probate court’s declaratory judgment ordering that
the funds in the accounts of the deceased Ralph Lee Minton (Minton) are the property of
his estate. By seven issues, appellant, Artemio E. Garza (Garza), appeals the judgment
in favor of appellees, Randall Lee Minton, individually and as Independent Administrator
of the Estate of Ralph Lee Minton, Glenda Marcelle Todd, Beverly Regina Alford, and
Wanda Lynn Smith (Beneficiaries). Garza argues that the trial court erred in its judgment
and denial of his motion for new trial because: (1) the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Ralph Lee Minton lacked legal capacity to
enter into contracts with First National Bank designating Garza as the beneficiary of his
accounts; (2) the trial court reversibly erred by admitting evidence that was irrelevant,
cumulative, and contained hearsay; (3) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction;
(4) a declaratory judgment was not an available remedy under the circumstances; (5)
Beneficiaries failed to request a jury question or provide evidence regarding whether
Minton disaffirmed the contracts; (6) Beneficiaries failed to plead rescission; and (7)
Beneficiaries failed to provide evidence that they lacked an adequate remedy at law. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On December 2, 2010, Minton passed away, intestate, leaving a checking account
and four Certificates of Deposit (C.D.(s)) totaling $432,968.73 at First National Bank (First
National). On March 25, prior to his death, Minton entered into payable on death (P.O.D.)
contracts with First National. The P.O.D. contracts designated Garza, a retired law
enforcement officer who had been friends with Minton since February 2007, as the
beneficiary of his account and three of his C.D.s at First National.1 On December 10,
2010, the estate filed an “Application for Independent Administration and Application to
Determine Heirship” concerning the account and C.D.s at First National. On December
16, 2010, Garza, relying on the P.O.D. designations, retrieved the funds from the bank
account and C.D.s at First National. On December 17, 2010, Beneficiaries filed an
1 There is a dispute over whether the P.O.D. contracts named Garza the beneficiary of the fourth
C.D. The jury did not resolve the controversy over the remaining C.D. because it found that Minton lacked
capacity to enter into any of the P.O.D. contracts, and we do not address that dispute because we affirm
their finding on capacity.
2
“Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order” in which they claimed
that Minton lacked capacity to enter into the P.O.D. contracts because he “was of unsound
mind” and “could be taken advantage of and easily manipulated.” Beneficiaries also
requested that First National be precluded from transferring any further estate assets to
the Beneficiaries of the P.O.D. contracts and that Garza be restrained from spending any
of Minton’s funds.
Garza made a verified plea arguing that the Beneficiaries lacked standing because
they had no justiciable interest in the claims asserted. Garza further filed a “counterclaim”
that the Beneficiaries had “neither capacity nor standing to bring the present action.”
On December 21, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on Beneficiaries’ application
for temporary injunction, and on January 12, 2011, the trial court issued a temporary
injunction enjoining Garza from spending or dissipating any funds he received from
Minton’s accounts.2 On August 1, 2011, the trial court granted partial summary judgment
in favor of Garza dismissing “the issue of undue influence and all references thereto.”
The trial court commenced a jury trial on Beneficiaries’ remaining causes of action on
August 2, 2011. On August 5, 2011, Beneficiaries filed their second supplemental
petition, asserting that the P.O.D. designations should be declared void because Minton
lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute them and praying that the trial court
declare that the funds were the property of Minton’s estate.
2 We affirmed the temporary injunction in In re Estate of Minton, No. 13-11-00062-CV, 2011 WL
2475394, at * 4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 23, 2011, no pet.) (mem. Op.).
.
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B. Evidence at Trial
At trial, Beneficiaries provided evidence of Minton’s mental incompetence from
January 2010 through May 2010. The evidence indicated that Minton stayed at McAllen
Nursing Center from January 23 to January 24, 2010. The nurse’s notes admitted into
evidence indicated that Minton was alert and able to follow directions, but also that he
was uncooperative and confused during his visit. On January 26, Minton was brought
back to the McAllen Nursing Center in an ambulance.
A few days later, Minton was sent to Legends Transitional Nursing Home
(Legends). The nursing home’s records indicated that Minton was alert, but forgetful and
demanding. An “Elopement Risk Assessment,” signed by the attending physician,
indicated that Minton was cognitively impaired with poor decision making skills, and his
“Fall Risk Assessment” indicated that he had “intermittent confusion.” The nurse’s notes
stated that Minton complained that he was having a heart attack and that he would know
because he claimed he was a heart surgeon.
On January 28, 2010, Minton was sent from Legends to McAllen Heart Hospital.
Heart Hospital’s admitting diagnosis stated that Minton had senility. The hospital’s
records stated that a psychiatric evaluation was performed by a doctor on February 3,
2010 which concluded, “At this time, the patient is capable to make decision [sic]
regarding his health. He might have poor judgment and wanted to go home without
proper assistance.” Sue Cook, case manager for McAllen Heart Hospital, testified that
she had contact with Minton around January or February 2010. She testified that Minton
was sick but refused nursing assistance.
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Minton was admitted to McAllen Nursing Home on February 5, 2010. The
admission notes indicated that Minton was alert but forgetful and confused. According to
the nurse’s notes, Minton was discharged on his own request from the nursing home the
next day, after being instructed on the risks of leaving.
In early February, Adult Protective Services (APS) was contacted with concerns
about Minton. Margot Barriero, a specialist for APS, testified at trial that she investigated
charges that Minton’s friend had exploited Minton and that Minton had neglected to care
for himself. APS found that the exploitation charges were unfounded. Barriero testified
that, during her home visit, Minton behaved irrationally and did not have good judgment,
but was capable of making some of his own decisions. She testified that he was verbally
abusive towards her and called the police to have her removed. She testified that
although he could not leave his bed, Minton did not want nursing care and wished to stay
by himself. She stated that she closed Minton’s case because he obtained twenty-four
hour nursing care. Additionally, Bernabe Balli testified that he assisted Minton by running
errands for him. He testified that on February 6, 2010, he called the police because he
did not believe Minton should be left alone.
John Tisdale, Minton’s long-time friend, testified that in January 2010, Minton had
problems thinking and making decisions, was easily agitated, and would not allow health
care workers to assist him. He testified that he often had employees run errands for
Minton, but that it was difficult to find help because Minton was rude to anyone who helped
him. Tisdale testified that Minton was bed-ridden and would stay for hours in his own
feces and urine, but would refuse to be cleaned and would request that the police be
called to have his healthcare workers removed. Tisdale testified that he informed Minton
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that he was not thinking right and needed help. Tisdale concluded that Minton lost his
mental capacity in January 2010 when Minton filed a restraining order against him.
Randall Lee Minton, Minton’s son and the independent administrator of his estate,
agreed that his father could be abusive and stated that he had not spoken with his father
since 2007. He admitted that Garza had more knowledge of Minton’s mental state than
he did. Additionally, Beverly Minton Alford, Minton’s daughter, testified that she had
stayed with Minton from February 20, 2010 through March 8, 2010, that their family had
a history of mental illness, that she witnessed Minton strike a medical provider, and that
Minton would become angry and yell obscenities. She further testified that Minton made
decisions that made no sense, and that she had to trick Minton into signing a check to
pay for his home health care, which she testified that he never would have signed had he
been mentally competent because he had always been very meticulous with his finances.
She stated that, earlier in his life, Minton was always up to date with all of his accounts
and C.D.s and that he once became angry at a bank employee because a date was
missing on a financial document.
Paul Lopez, a caretaker for Minton’s healthcare provider, testified that he cared for
Minton from February 22, 2010 to March 10, 2010. He stated that Minton was a horrible
man, that he was paranoid and would see and speak to people who were not in the room,
and that he would request food items that he saw on television and drink curdled milk that
was far past its expiration date. Lopez testified that Minton once punched him and broke
his glasses. He stated that on March 3, Minton told him he wanted to go for a drive in
Minton’s car that was parked outside even though Minton no longer owned a car. He
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further testified that Minton refused to take care of his personal hygiene, and that Minton
would often have his hands in his pants and get urine and feces under his fingernails.
Beneficiaries presented evidence that on March 26, 2010, the day after Minton
signed the P.O.D. contracts, he was admitted to the emergency room at McAllen Heart
Hospital. The hospital admission documents stated that Minton was unable to sign the
documents, and therefore Lopez had to sign the documents as a witness. The hospital
records also indicated that Minton had “adjustment disorder.”
Pedro Hugo Gonzalez, an APS specialist, contacted Minton in early May 2010. He
testified that he made several home visits to check on Minton. He stated that he believed
that Minton could not care for himself due to physical disabilities. Also, APS worker
Belinda Cantu conducted an investigation and generated a report on Minton in May of
2010. She testified that she investigated Minton because he had no one to care for him.
She stated that Minton refused to speak to her and accused her of trying to conspire
against him. She admitted that she is not qualified to make a medical diagnosis, but
testified that Minton was neglecting himself and made irrational decisions.
Furthermore, Francesco Jimenez, supervisor for APS, testified that he investigated
Minton’s case from May 10, 2010 to May 17, 2010. He stated that Minton could not accept
that he could not care for himself, that APS closed their case on Minton when he was
admitted into a nursing home, and that he ordered a psychological assessment of Minton.
Jimenez stated that the investigation determined that Minton would have been left at-risk
had he stayed at home because he was not making rational decisions. The intake sheet
from the investigation indicated that Minton had a mental illness. On cross-examination,
Jimenez explained that the mental illness listing on the report was not a medical diagnosis
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but that “mental illness” was listed on the document because the case investigators
determined that Minton was not making rational decisions.
Beneficiaries provided medical records indicating that on May 11, 2010, APS
referred Minton to Dr. Jose Alfonso Lopez who assessed Minton with senile dementia. At
trial, Dr. Lopez testified that he did not have an independent recollection of Minton, but
his records indicated that he had a reasonable basis for assessing him with senile
dementia. Dr. Lopez stated that, “Dementia is the loss of mental capacity, the lack of
judgment, and basically that’s what dementia is.” On cross-examination, he testified that
the records indicated that Minton had completed a “Patient Self Determination Record”
which meant that someone at the hospital had deemed that Minton was competent to
execute the document. He testified that Minton had also completed other hospital forms
which were similar in effect to legally binding contracts.
Further, Beneficiaries provided evidence that, on May 19, 2010, Dr. Iran Barrera
completed a mental health assessment of Minton, in which she concluded that Minton did
not have the mental or emotional capacity to care for himself. Additionally, Dr. David
Moron, the Beneficiaries’ retained expert, testified that after reviewing Minton’s records,
he determined that his conduct and symptoms were consistent with dementia. He further
explained that Minton did not have sound judgment or the ability to manage his financial
affairs in March of 2010. On cross-examination, Dr. Moron explained that dementia is not
an illness but a conglomeration of symptoms.
In support of Minton’s capacity to contract, Garza testified that Minton was mentally
alert and had good judgment at the time he signed the contracts. He explained that on
March 25, 2010, he dialed First National’s phone number and handed the phone to
8
Minton, who asked the bank to send representatives. Garza stated that he was present
when Minton signed the P.O.D documents. Further, Gail Cappadona, representative of
First National, and Brad Williams, First National Branch President, testified that they
brought the P.O.D. contracts to Minton’s house on March 25, 2010. They recounted that
Cappadona explained the P.O.D. contracts to Minton and that Minton understood what
he was doing when he executed them. Both believed that Minton was mentally competent
to enter into the contracts. Both also testified that they would not have allowed someone
who was not of sound mind to sign contracts.
Marilia Luz, a health care provider who cared for Minton from February 22, 2010
through March 27, 2010, testified that she had a good relationship with Minton. She
testified that Minton called to inquire about Luz after she sustained injuries in a car crash
and was unable to work for a few days. She stated that, on March 25, 2010, she visited
Minton to inform him that she was fine. She testified that, on March 25, 2010, she had
an intelligent discussion about the car accident with Minton, and that Minton was familiar
with the location of the car accident and asked whether the other driver involved in the
accident had liability insurance. She testified that on that date, Minton had a good grasp
on reality and was mentally competent.
Juan Martinez, a registered nurse at Briarcliff Nursing and Rehab Center
(Briarcliff), testified that he performed a mental competency assessment on Minton in
April 2010. He stated that based on his assessment, Minton was competent and oriented,
and that Minton was able to answer all of his questions. Martinez explained that after the
evaluation, he had a conversation with Minton that lasted between 45 minutes to an hour.
He stated that they discussed the cost breakdown of getting a room at Briarcliff and that
9
Minton was very aware of his finances. Furthermore, Dr. Jetta Marie Brown, Garza’s
retained expert medical witness, testified that Minton was not suffering from dementia,
and that there was no basis to believe that Minton was mentally incompetent on March
25, 2010 when he signed the P.O.D. contracts.
At the close of evidence, the jury rendered a finding that Minton lacked legal
capacity to enter into the P.O.D. contracts, and the trial court entered a final judgment on
November 2, 2011 ordering that the funds from Minton’s accounts and C.D.s were the
property of Minton’s estate. Garza filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that
there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding on
Minton’s capacity to contract and that the trial court erred by admitting medical records
and testimony concerning Minton’s mental capacity on dates other than March 25, 2010,
when he signed the P.O.D. contracts. The trial court denied his motion for new trial. This
appeal followed.
II. LEGAL AND FACTUAL INSUFFICIENCY
In his first issue, Garza contends that the evidence required impermissible
inferences by the jury and was therefore insufficient to support the jury’s finding that
Minton lacked capacity to contract when he signed the P.O.D. contracts on March 25,
2010. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the fact finding, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable persons
could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable persons could not. City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822, 827 (Tex. 2005). We may not sustain a legal
10
sufficiency or “no evidence” point unless the record demonstrates that: (1) there is a
complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by the rules of law or of evidence
from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence to
prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence established conclusively
the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810.
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence
presented by both parties, and will set aside the finding only if the evidence supporting
the finding is so weak or so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the
finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402,
406–07 (Tex. 1998). As the fact finder, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.
The burden of proof rests with the party seeking to set aside a contract for lack of
mental capacity. See Decker v. Decker, 192 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2006, no pet.). “The legal standards for determining the existence of mental capacity for
the purposes of executing a will or deed are substantially the same as the mental capacity
for executing a contract.” Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ).
To possess “mental capacity” to contract, Minton, at the time of contracting, must
have “appreciated the effect of what he was doing and understood the nature and
consequences of his acts and the business he was transacting.” See Mandell & Wright
v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1969); In re Estate of Robinson, 140 S.W.3d 782,
793 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). Mental capacity, or lack thereof, may
be shown by “circumstantial evidence, including: (1) a person's outward conduct,
11
manifesting an inward and causing condition; (2) any pre-existing external circumstances
tending to produce a special mental condition; and (3) the prior or subsequent existence
of a mental condition from which a person's mental capacity (or incapacity) at the time in
question may be inferred.” In re Estate of Robinson, 140 S.W.3d at 788 (quotations
omitted). As a general rule, the question of whether a person, at the time of contracting,
knows or understands the nature and consequences of her actions is a question of fact
for the jury. Id. at 793−94.
B. Trial Court’s Consideration of Evidence of Minton’s Mental Capacity Before
and After Execution of the Contracts
Garza first contends that the jury “was barred by law from giving weight” to
evidence of Minton’s mental competency prior to or after March 25, 2010, the date Minton
signed the P.O.D. contracts. Garza argues that even though the P.O.D. contracts were
not a will, the law from the Texas Supreme Court case Lee v. Lee, which related to a will
contest, is applicable. See Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. 1968). Given that the
legal standard for determining testamentary capacity and capacity to contract are
substantially the same, we agree that this law is applicable. See Bach, 596 S.W.2d at
675−76.
In Lee, the Texas Supreme Court determined that the proper inquiry in a will
contest on grounds of testamentary incapacity is the condition of the testator's mind on
the day the will was executed. Lee, 424 S.W.2d at 611. If there is no direct testimony of
acts, demeanor, or condition indicating that the testator lacked testamentary capacity on
the date of execution, “the testator's mental condition on that date may be determined
from lay opinion testimony based upon the witnesses’ observations of testator's conduct
either prior or subsequent to the execution.” Id. However, that evidence has probative
12
force only if some evidence exists demonstrating that the condition persisted and had
some probability of being the same condition that existed at the time the will was made.
Id.
Thus, to successfully challenge a testator's mental capacity with circumstantial
evidence from time periods other than the day on which the will was executed, the will
contestants must establish (1) that the evidence offered indicates a lack of testamentary
capacity; (2) that the evidence is probative of the testator's capacity (or lack thereof) on
the day the will was executed; and (3) that the evidence provided is of a satisfactory and
convincing character. See In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Horton v. Horton, 965 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1998, no pet.).
Garza argues that this case law indicates that the trial court was precluded from
considering evidence of Minton’s mental condition prior and subsequent to March 25,
2010 because Garza presented testimony that Minton was mentally competent at the time
the contracts were made. However, the cases cited by Garza explicitly state that
evidence form other dates can be considered if there is no evidence that the testator
lacked legal capacity to contract on the date it was executed. In fact in Lee, the court
determined that it could consider evidence, despite the fact that there was no evidence
of capacity from the date the will was executed. Lee, 424 S.W.2d at 611. Moreover, in
In re Estate of Graham, in which this Court followed Lee, we considered both evidence of
testamentary capacity on the date a will was signed and before and after that date. See
In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d at 606. Garza cites no case precluding the jury from
considering or giving weight to evidence under any circumstance, much less solely
13
because the party seeking to uphold the contract presents its own testimony of
competence. Accordingly, we hold that the jury was entitled to consider evidence of
Minton’s mental capacity prior and subsequent to the execution of the P.O.D. contracts if
the trial court could have considered it probative and relevant to his mental state on March
25, 2010. See id.; Lee, 424 S.W.2d at 611; Horton, 965 S.W.2d at 85. And as discussed
below, we determine that the jury could have found this evidence probative.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Garza argues that “even if the evidence of Minton’s pre and post March 25, 2010
execution conduct are considered, [Beneficiaries] failed to prove Minton’s lack of mental
capacity on March 25, 2010.” Beneficiaries presented evidence of Minton’s mental
incapacity showing that in the month of and the months before and after he signed the
P.O.D. contracts, Minton refused medical treatment even though he was bed-ridden and
needed it, that he spoke to people who were not there, that he sat for hours in his own
feces and urine, and that medical providers indicated that he was confused and senile.
They further provided evidence that on the day after he signed the P.O.D. contracts, he
was unable to sign himself into a hospital and that less than two months later he was
assessed with senile dementia. While this is evidence of Minton’s conduct and condition
prior and subsequent to March 25, the jury was entitled to infer that evidence of Minton’s
irrationality and dementia in the months preceding and following the signing of the
contract were probative of his capacity to contract on the date the contract was signed.
See In re Estate of Robinson, 140 S.W.3d at 788; In re Estate of Graham, 69 S.W.3d at
606. Beneficiaries also elicited testimony from their expert that Minton was mentally
incompetent in March 2010.
14
Moreover, while Garza elicited testimony from witnesses who claimed Minton was
competent on the date the contract was signed, it was the jury’s responsibility to judge
the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given their testimony. See
Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 406–07. Accordingly, we conclude that the
evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Minton lacked capacity to contract was not “so
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and
unjust,” see id., and the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
finding. See id.; Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Garza’s evidentiary sufficiency issue is
overruled.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Garza contends that the trial court erred by admitting Beneficiaries’ “Exhibit 1,”
which consisted of over 1,200 business records concerning Minton and his health. We
disagree.
A. Relevance and Materiality
At trial, when Beneficiaries sought to admit “Exhibit 1,” Garza’s attorney objected,
stating that Beneficiaries’ attorney was “correct that they have complied with [rule] 803
with the filing of the affidavit; however, simply because a record meets the hearsay
requirement of 803 does not make it automatically admissible. It still has to meet the
other requirements of admissibility, those being, among other things, relevancy and
materiality.” See TEX. R. EVID. 803. Garza’s attorney further explained that several of the
documents in the exhibit related to occurrences after March 25 that should not have been
admitted “because if there’s a medical record indicating that something was wrong with
Mr. Minton, for instance, in August of 2010 or July 2010 or October of 2010, that does not
15
in any way provide any indicia of what he was on March 25th of 2010.” He then argued
that under Lee, discussed above, this evidence was irrelevant because it did not concern
Minton’s mental state on the date he signed the contract. The trial court overruled Garza’s
objection and admitted “Exhibit 1.” Immediately after this, when Beneficiaries’ attorney
referred to the contents of the exhibit, Garza’s attorney stated generally, “Judge, I would
renew my objection on the basis of materiality, relevance and the records contain hearsay
statements, which should not be allowed.”
On appeal, Garza first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling
his relevance objection under Lee. See 424 S.W.2d at 611. However, we have explained
that Lee does not stand for the proposition that the jury is precluded from considering
mental incapacity evidence from dates prior or subsequent to the signing of a contract.
See id. And we have held that the evidence presented in this case relating to incidents
before and after March 25, were probative of Minton’s capacity to enter into the P.O.D.
contracts. Accordingly, Garza’s issue regarding his relevancy objection is overruled.
B. Hearsay, Cumulative Evidence, and Best Evidence Objections
Further, Garza argues, on appeal, that the trial court erred by admitting “Exhibit 1”
because its contents contained hearsay, were cumulative, and violated the best evidence
rule. In his brief, Garza refers to two other objections to “Exhibit 1” made later during trial,
one on hearsay grounds and the other on cumulative and best evidence grounds.
However, Garza’s objection that one of the documents admitted as part of “Exhibit
1” contained hearsay was not sufficient to preserve error for our review because the entire
exhibit had already been admitted without a specific hearsay objection from Garza’s
attorney. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Garza’s attorney’s statement directly after the exhibit
16
had been admitted that he was renewing his objection “on the basis of materiality,
relevance, and the records contain hearsay statements” did not specifically indicate which
statements in the over 1,200 business records in “exhibit 1” constituted hearsay and
therefore did not preserve the hearsay argument at the time the exhibit was admitted.
See id.
Turning to Garza’s best evidence and cumulative evidence objections, during
Garza’s testimony at trial, Beneficiaries’ attorney questioned him regarding medical
documents in “Exhibit 1” that indicated that Minton was mentally incompetent. Garza’s
attorney objected on the grounds that the testimony was cumulative and the “medical
records were the best evidence of what the medical records indicate.” On appeal, Garza
argues that it was error for the court to overrule his objection. However, Beneficiaries’
counsel referenced the medical records to impeach Garza on his testimony that Minton
was mentally competent, not to provide further evidence of the contents of the medical
records. See TEX. R. EVID. 1002 (“To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by law”). The testimony therefore was not cumulative and did
not violate the best evidence rule.
Moreover, on appeal, Garza makes the conclusory statement that the trial court’s
errors “resulted in prejudice to [Garza] and caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”
See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. The evidence subject to Garza’s hearsay objections related to
a record of a phone conversation received by one of Minton’s medical providers. On
appeal, Garza does not recount the contents of the record of the conversation, nor does
he explain how its admission caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See id.
17
38.1(i) (requiring an appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).
Additionally, Garza does not explain how, and we do not find that, Beneficiaries’ attorney’s
reference to the medical records during Garza’s testimony probably caused the rendition
of an improper judgment. See id. 44.1. We therefore conclude that any error resulting
from the admission of evidence that was hearsay, cumulative, or a violation of the best
evidence rule, was not harmful. See id.
C. Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Properly Examine “Exhibit 1”
Garza also alleges that “the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
[Beneficiaries ] to introduce over 1,200 documents . . . (1) without first hearing any
evidence concerning the contents of the records, or the [sic] how such records related to
the issues in the case; (2) without conducting any examination of the contents of the
records; (3) without determining whether there were any hearsay statements in the
records; and (4) simply relying on statements of counsel to answer the issues raised in 1,
2 and 3 above.” Garza, in his brief, however, cites no law requiring the trial court to follow
any of these procedures before admitting evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Moreover, Garza did not preserve this argument because he failed to object to the trial
court’s failure to follow the procedures Garza now claims were required before admitting
it. See id. 33.1.
For the foregoing reasons, Garza’s issue regarding the improper admission of
evidence is overruled.
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IV. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Garza argues that the trial court did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over
Beneficiaries’ claims and application for temporary injunction. Garza first argues that only
a representative of an estate has capacity to sue to recover estate property and that
therefore Randall Minton, as independent administrator, was the only party with capacity
to sue. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998). However, regardless
of whether the heirs had capacity to sue or were properly listed as plaintiffs, we cannot
reverse or alter the declaratory judgment on capacity grounds because Randall Minton,
as administrator of the estate, had capacity to sue for the declaratory relief, see id., and
the judgment specifically declared the funds to be the property of the estate. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.1(c).
Additionally, Garza’s claim regarding the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the
temporary injunction is not properly before us because Garza is not currently appealing
from the temporary injunction. Moreover, the temporary injunction enjoined Garza from
spending funds received from the P.O.D. accounts. Because the trial court has now
declared that the funds are part of Minton’s estate, any argument regarding error in the
injunction is now moot. City of Corpus Christi v. Cartwright, 281 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex.
Civ. App.—San Antonio 1955, no writ).
Garza also contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to declare the
P.O.D. contracts void because the contracts were nontestamentary transfers and were
therefore not subject to provisions of the probate code. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 441
(West Supp. 2011). We agree that the sections of the probate code, applicable at the
time Beneficiaries’ suit was filed, show that P.O.D. contracts are nontestamentary
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transfers and not subject to the provisions of the probate code. See id. However, Garza
has cited no authority supporting the proposition that because provisions of the probate
code do not apply, the probate court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(i). Moreover, here, the probate court was determining whether the funds were
part of the estate and therefore was deciding a matter “related to a probate proceeding,”
over which a probate court has jurisdiction. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4F (West Supp.
2011).
Accordingly, Garza’s subject-matter jurisdiction issue is overruled.
V. GARZA’S REMAINING ISSUES
Garza argues that the trial court erred because a declaratory judgment was an
improper remedy under these circumstances and because Beneficiaries failed to request
a jury question or provide evidence regarding whether Minton disaffirmed the contracts,
failed to plead rescission, and failed to provide evidence that they lacked an adequate
remedy at law. We disagree.3
Texas law authorizes courts to enter declaratory judgments to determine questions
of the construction and validity of a contract. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
37.004(a) (West 2008). This court has affirmed multiple judgments declaring that
contracts entered into by parties that subsequently passed away were void without
determining that the party seeking the judgment needed to plead rescission or provide
evidence that the contract was disaffirmed. See In re Estate of Robinson, 140 S.W.3d at
788; see also Korenek v. Korenek, No. 13-07-00111-CV, 2008 WL 2894906, at **4−5
3 Beneficiaries contend that Garza waived all of these arguments by not asserting them to the trial
court. It is undisputed that Garza failed to make any objection or argument regarding these issues to the
trial court. Rather, on appeal, Garza argues that he was not required to raise any of these issues to
preserve error. We assume without deciding that error is preserved for our review.
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(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 29, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Moreover, in Gober v.
Davis, the Waco Court of Appeals determined that the trial court was not required to enter
a finding that an annuity agreement was rescinded to hold that the beneficiary designation
on the agreement was void. No. 10-06-00043-CV, 2007 WL 1147353, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Waco Apr. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). We agree with the Waco Court of Appeals and
determine that Beneficiaries did not have to plead rescission to be entitled to a declaratory
judgment that the P.O.D. designations were void. See id. Because we have determined
that the trial court did not grant the equitable remedy of rescission, Garza’s argument that
Beneficiaries were required to establish that they had no adequate remedy at law also
fails.4 See Patterson v. Wizowaty, 505 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1974, no writ).
Garza also argues that Beneficiaries were required and failed to show that Minton
took active steps to disaffirm the contract. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brazil, 10 S.W.
403, 406 (1888) (determining that a voidable contract can be ratified if it is not
disaffirmed). Garza, however, directs us to no law requiring a party to show disaffirmance
to be entitled to the rescission of, or a declaratory judgment that, a P.O.D. contract
entered into by a party, now deceased, is void. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Moreover,
Garza cites no law indicating that, as Minton’s heirs, Beneficiaries could not disaffirm the
P.O.D. contract by filing a lawsuit to declare them void. See Breaux v. Allied Bank of
Texas, 699 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
4 Moreover, we are not persuaded by Garza’s argument that Beneficiaries had an adequate remedy
at law because they could have filed a suit for conversion. See Patterson v. Wizowaty, 505 S.W.2d 425,
428 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (reasoning that “a basic corollary to the equitable
right of rescission is the principle that rescission is not ordinarily available if an action for damages at law
provides an adequate remedy”). Specifically, Garza does not explain how Beneficiaries, without having the
P.O.D. designations declared void, could have alleged that a defendant wrongfully exercised dominion or
control over the estate’s property. See Green Int’l v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. 1997).
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(holding that temporary guardians disaffirmed a contract with an attorney when they filed
an “Opposition to Application For Attorney's Fees” with the court). Accordingly, we
conclude that Beneficiaries were not required to provide evidence or request a jury
question regarding whether Minton disaffirmed the contracts.
For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Garza’s remaining issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
____________________
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed the
30th day of January, 2014.
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