Ada Betty Cuadros-Fernandez v. State ( 2013 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 5, 2013
    S    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-12-01073-CR
    ADA BETTY CUADROS-FERNANDEZ, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 380-80933-06
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Myers
    Opinion by Justice Francis
    Ada Betty Cuadros-Fernandez appeals her conviction for capital murder. After the jury
    found appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at life without parole. In three issues,
    appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction and the trial court erred by
    admitting certain evidence. We affirm.
    On October 13, 2005, McKinney firefighters and paramedics responded to a call about a
    sick infant at 1112 Woodhaven in McKinney. When they arrived, they found fourteen-month-
    old Kyle Lazarchik unconscious and unresponsive. They transported Kyle to the Medical Center
    of McKinney. Shortly thereafter, he was taken to Children’s Medical Center in Dallas where a
    CAT scan showed he had significant head injuries. Kyle died two days later. Appellant was
    arrested and charged with capital murder.
    In her first issue, appellant claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support her
    conviction. Appellant claims no evidence establishes she knowingly caused the injuries to Kyle
    that caused his death.
    In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979). The
    jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part
    of a witness’s testimony. Jones v. State, 
    984 S.W.2d 254
    , 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We do
    not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence but ensure the
    jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 238
    , 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
    A person commits capital murder if she knowingly causes the death of an individual
    under six years of age. Act of May 19, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 428, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
    428, amended by Act of May 28, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1209, § 1, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law
    Serv. 3235, 3235 (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.03(a)(8) (West 2011)). Direct
    evidence of the elements of the offense is not required. Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 14 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007). The identity of the person committing the offense may be proven by direct or
    circumstantial evidence. Earls v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 82
    , 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Juries are
    permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and circumstantial
    evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. 
    Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14
    –15. Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. 
    Id. at 15.
    If an adult defendant has sole access to a child when the child sustains an injury, the evidence is
    sufficient to support a conviction for injury to a child or murder if the child dies. Cuadros-
    Fernandez v. State, 
    316 S.W.3d 645
    , 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); Elledge v. State,
    
    890 S.W.2d 843
    , 846‒47 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref’d).
    –2–
    The indictment and jury charge in this case alleged appellant knowingly caused Kyle’s
    death by inflicting blunt force trauma on Kyle by striking his head against a cabinet door, a
    deadly weapon, or by means unknown.
    At trial, Rene Lazarchik testified she and her husband, Mike, had four children: Alyssa,
    twin boys Kyle and Ryan, and Malia. Alyssa was about sixteen months old when the twins were
    born in August 2004. The Lazarchiks decided to hire a nanny for their three small children
    instead of using outside day care when Rene went back to work. They interviewed appellant and
    liked her. She had a sweet personality and disposition as well as a good sense of humor. Her
    parents lived in Peru where her father was a pediatrician and her mother a veterinarian.
    Appellant was a live-in nanny; the Lazarchiks agreed to this arrangement although they had
    requested a nanny who came to the house daily. When they offered the job to appellant, the
    Lazarchiks asked her to commit to being with them for eighteen months; appellant accepted,
    telling them she “hoped for five years.” The Lazarchiks and appellant agreed that the Lazarchiks
    would not withhold funds from her paycheck, and appellant had the responsibility to report her
    income and pay income tax. Over time, the Lazarchiks thought of appellant as one of the family.
    Appellant had her own bedroom and bathroom at the house and ate meals with the family.
    According to appellant, she lived with her aunt and uncle on weekends.
    Rene admitted to being a cautious and thorough person. She spent two weeks with
    appellant and the children before returning to work after maternity leave. During this time, she
    made sure appellant knew where everything was in the house and how to care for the children.
    Rene and Mike attended classes at the hospital specifically for parents of newborns and twins,
    and Rene shared the information and knowledge she gained from those classes with appellant.
    She spent time explaining the special issues involved with twins, such as picking up only one
    child at a time and writing down medicine given to avoid giving one twin a double dose. Rene
    –3–
    also admitted she is a worrier and said safety, particularly that of her children, was important to
    her. She asked appellant to keep logs on the children so she would know what had happened
    during the day while she was at work. Before the twins were born, Alyssa attended a daycare,
    made several friends there, and Rene decided Alyssa needed to continue going to the daycare
    occasionally for socialization. This also gave appellant a break from caring for three young
    children.
    On Thursday, September 29, 2005, appellant told the Lazarchiks her aunt and uncle were
    going back to Peru, then moving to Germany, and that she would be going with them. Appellant
    indicated she had a lot to do to settle her relatives’ affairs before they moved at the end of
    October but said she would stay with the Lazarchiks until that time. Rene was surprised at
    hearing about the move, particularly since they had asked appellant for a minimum eighteen-
    month commitment. She also was concerned about whether appellant would take care of her
    income taxes which would be due the following April. The Lazarchiks usually paid appellant on
    Fridays; however, the day after appellant announced she was leaving, Rene told appellant she
    was not going to pay her until Monday because she wanted the weekend to “figure out what
    [their] liability was if any” with respect to the income tax issue.
    The following Monday, Mike arrived home from work early to find appellant had cleaned
    out her room and quit. Although he asked appellant about it, she would not talk to Mike and
    insisted on waiting until Rene got home. Once home, Rene asked appellant what was going on.
    Appellant said she thought Rene was not going to pay her again even though appellant had said
    she would work until the end of October. When Rene assured her this was not the case,
    appellant agreed to stay through the end of the month but spent each night her aunt and uncle’s
    house.
    –4–
    In preparation for appellant’s departure, Rene began interviewing other nannies. On
    October 12, she got an unexpected call about a candidate, and Rene agreed to an interview that
    evening. Rene asked appellant if she could spend the night and fix macaroni and cheese for the
    children, telling her Mike would pick up dinner for the three adults. Appellant agreed. When
    Mike and Rene got home, the children were fine. Kyle seemed completely normal; he was not
    fussy and had no marks on his body. Appellant did not say anything had happened to him during
    the day. Neither twin was yet walking so the Lazarchiks carried the boys to their playroom
    where they stayed during the interview. Afterwards, the Lazarchiks got the boys and rocked
    them while talking with appellant about the candidate. Appellant then went upstairs to bed.
    Later, the Lazarchiks put the boys in their cribs and likewise went to bed.
    On the morning of October 13, Kyle woke early and began crying. Despite having the
    start of a migraine headache, Rene got Kyle out of the crib and rocked him. He quickly stopped
    crying and fell back asleep. Mike took Kyle and continued to rock him while Rene went back to
    bed. Mike made breakfast and, with appellant’s help, got the children dressed. Mike left around
    8:30, dropping Alyssa at daycare on his way to work. Rene got up around 9:20 and got ready for
    work. She checked on the boys before leaving and kissed them goodbye. Both were fine and
    normal. Kyle was playing and smiling.
    Later that day, appellant called Rene. She said Kyle was not breathing and she had called
    911. Appellant told Rene she had fed the boys spaghetti, and after they were done, she put Kyle
    in the playroom. When she returned with Ryan, she noticed Kyle had thrown up. When Rene
    asked if there was anything Kyle could have gotten that would have caused choking, appellant
    repeatedly said no. Appellant did not say anything about Kyle hitting his head or that she hit his
    head. Rene called 911 to make sure they had the correct address and knew it was an infant in
    distress. She then rushed home, got Ryan and appellant, and met Mike at the McKinney
    –5–
    Hospital. They were told Kyle was being transferred to Children’s Hospital by helicopter. Rene
    left appellant with Ryan and went with Mike to Children’s where they saw Kyle. He had bruises
    all over his head, left arm, and left shoulder. A neurosurgeon met with Rene and Mike and told
    them Kyle had a severe brain injury and, although he would not survive surgery, time was of the
    essence and they had to do something to relieve the pressure on his brain.           After giving
    permission for a pseudo-surgical procedure, the Lazarchiks met with Dr. Matthew Cox, a board
    certified child abuse pediatrician. After talking to Cox, Rene became concerned about Ryan and
    asked a friend to get him. Over the next two days, Kyle did not improve. When the doctors
    confirmed Kyle was brain dead, the Lazarchiks removed him from life support.
    The morning after Kyle died, Rene’s sister showed the Lazarchiks a cabinet in the
    kitchen where the pasta strainers, pots and pans, and orange juice pitcher were kept. The cabinet,
    which was frequently used, had been damaged. Rene opened the cabinet and saw “tape all over
    it like layers of tape all over all around the hinge, all around where it was coming apart.” Rene
    said the cabinets were about four years old and that appellant had not mentioned one of them
    being damaged. She contacted the police to let them know about the cabinet.
    Mike Lazarchik likewise testified that, other than being a little congested, Kyle was fine
    the evening of October 12 and the morning of October 13. Mike got the children up and, after
    carrying Kyle downstairs, made breakfast. He used the cabinet where the pots and pans were
    kept. It was not damaged or broken that morning. Kyle ate and exhibited no unusual behavior.
    Mike kissed the boys goodbye when he left; Kyle did not have any bruises and seemed normal.
    Janet Wood was friends with the Lazarchiks. Rene called her from the hospital and asked
    her to check on appellant. According to Wood, appellant was sad and crying. Wood asked her
    what happened, and appellant told her Kyle just collapsed and fell down. Appellant said she
    performed CPR and it worked. She then told Wood that Kyle’s brain was not fully developed.
    –6–
    Wood thought it was strange that appellant did not ask how either Kyle or Rene was doing.
    After staying for about an hour, Wood left to pick up her son from school. When appellant
    called Wood and asked “what was going on,” Wood decided to return to the Lazarchik house.
    Appellant opened the door just as a police car drove by; she then fell to the floor and began
    wailing “no, no, no, no.” She told Wood she would never hurt Kyle. Shortly thereafter, two
    female police officers arrived to speak with appellant.
    McKinney Police officer Ida Wei Cover and Detective Kathy Hudson were sent to the
    Lazarchiks’ house to investigate how Kyle was injured. When they approached the house, the
    front door was slightly open, and they heard appellant crying and screaming. After appellant
    calmed down, the officers asked her what happened. She said Kyle was acting normal and ate
    his spaghetti, but after she tried to burp him, he threw up. Appellant said she first called 911,
    then tried to remove any food or vomit from his mouth, placed him on a pillow, and administered
    CPR. She said she might have scratched Kyle’s mouth when cleaning his mouth because he bled
    from the mouth. She told the officers she put Kyle on the pillow because “she didn’t want to
    hurt him anymore.” The story seemed inconsistent with Kyle’s injuries so the officers continued
    to question appellant. As the interview continued, appellant told them Kyle bumped his head on
    the door frame while walking into the playroom. Cover told appellant that Kyle’s injuries were
    not consistent with a minor head bump. Appellant then said Kyle was running when he hit the
    right side of his head on the door frame.
    Detective James Adams interviewed appellant after she was arrested. Appellant told
    Adams that, on October 12th, Kyle had been sitting on the cabinet when he reached for
    something and fell off the counter. He hit his head on the floor, and appellant put a cold pack on
    it for thirty to forty minutes. When Adams asked appellant if she told Kyle’s parents about his
    fall, she said she did not because Rene came home with a migraine and “wanted the lights out
    –7–
    and the house quiet, and Kyle seemed to be okay, had eaten and gotten sleepy.” He asked why
    she had not told the other officers about the fall, and appellant said she did not think they would
    believe her. Adams later went to the Lazarchiks’ house to look at the damaged cabinet door.
    The back of the cabinet door “had masking tape across the hinges down the split to hold it
    together, but it had split apart.”
    Dr. Cox said he briefly saw Kyle while in the Children’s emergency room but fully
    examined him when he was in the intensive care unit in critical condition on full life support.
    Cox described Kyle as nonresponsive with fresh bruises on both sides of his head, his right
    temple, along his right hairline, his left elbow, and his left shoulder. Cox said that, based on the
    initial neurologic exam and early appearance of swelling of Kyle’s brain, “it was quickly
    understood that his injury would be devastating and likely lethal just based on how he
    presented.” Although the full body x-rays showed a normal skeletal survey, his head CAT scan
    showed a subdural hematoma and a hemorrhage between the two halves of the brain. Cox said
    the hemorrhage was the result of trauma, causing blood vessels to leak blood around the surface
    of the brain. The CAT scan also showed Kyle’s brain was swelling and shifting down towards
    the spinal cord. Cox said the swelling could be the result of direct trauma to the brain or from
    lack of oxygen to the brain. Herniation, or brain shifting, resulted from the brain swelling; the
    brain structure moves because it has a limited cavity in which it can swell. Other symptoms of
    the brain shifting include slower breathing, slower heart rate, and dilated or “blown” pupils, all
    of which Kyle exhibited. The damage to Kyle’s eyes, including the degree of hemorrhage and
    retina folding, was another marker of severe trauma. Cox also observed two small round bruises
    on Kyle’s right temple.
    The medical team noted three different areas of impact to Kyle’s head with different
    areas of bruising; that both sides of the head and face area were impacted indicated more than
    –8–
    one forceful event occurred. A pressure measuring device was implanted to monitor Kyle’s
    intracranial pressure and, on October 14, the pressure was four to five times the normal limit.
    Cox noted Kyle’s injuries were new and saw no signs of prior or pre-existing injuries. In Cox’s
    opinion, the injuries were not caused by a household fall, bumping his head on a door frame, or
    falling off a counter and hitting the floor. Cox explained that when a child falls or bumps his
    head, he has an isolated impact injury. In contrast, Kyle had a diffuse brain injury causing a
    comatose state with no normal neurologic function. Cox said rotational type of force tends to
    cause diffuse brain injuries like Kyle’s, resulting from shaking or swinging a child’s head into a
    cabinet. Children with fatal head injuries suffer traumatic events, like falling from a bridge,
    being in a car accident, or being abused; accidental injuries such as falling from a counter or
    hitting a head on a door frame do not result in severe head injuries like Kyle’s. Rene and Mike
    said Kyle had eaten breakfast and been playing with blocks and crawling in a playhouse before
    they left for work. Cox said this activity was not consistent with someone who had a traumatic
    brain injury; in other words, Kyle would not have been able to do those things after suffering the
    head injuries he had. Cox also stated the edema Kyle had when he arrived at the hospital would
    not have been a result of a fall from a countertop the day before.
    Dr. Darshan Phatak at the Dallas County Medical Examiner’s office performed Kyle’s
    autopsy. He observed multiple contusions on Kyle’s head and Kyle’s brain was twice the size it
    should have been because of the swelling. He also saw two one-eighth inch punctate abrasions
    on the right side of the forehead and a contusion on his upper left arm. Phatak estimated the
    bruises occurred within 24 to 48 hours before Kyle’s death and were the result of at least three
    impacts to his head. Phatak confirmed the multiple subgaleal hemorrhages under Kyle’s scalp as
    well as hemorrhages in the soft tissue surrounding his eyes and within the optic nerve sheath
    were the result of blunt force trauma to Kyle’s head. Kyle also had subscalpular hemorrhages
    –9–
    located in the soft tissue overlying both sides of the skull. The trauma to Kyle’s head tore the
    dural veins which then resulted in bleeding. Phatak said the symptoms from the dural veins
    tearing would be immediate, “a collapse . . . no response to any stimuli, any voluntary movement
    would not be possible at that point.” As the blood collected, Kyle’s brain began to swell and was
    pushed downward, accentuating the brain damage. Phatak determined the cause of death to be
    blunt force injuries of the head; the injuries were inconsistent with just one fall or accident
    because of the “three areas of hemorrhage in different portions of the head.” Phatak measured
    the two punctate bruises on Kyle’s forehead and said they were consistent with the
    measurements of two of the nails located on the cabinet door taken from the Lazarchiks’ kitchen.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows Kyle
    was alive and unharmed on the morning of October 13. He ate the breakfast Mike made for him
    and was playing and smiling when Rene kissed him and left the house. Appellant was the only
    adult in the house with Kyle while Rene and Mike were gone. Appellant called Rene later to tell
    her Kyle was not breathing and she had called 911.          Kyle was nonresponsive when the
    paramedics arrived; he was taken to the hospital where doctors discovered he had extensive
    bruising and severe head trauma that resulted in his death. The medical experts at trial testified
    Kyle’s injuries were too severe to have been caused by falling from a counter to the floor or
    hitting his head on a door frame. They also testified the two punctate bruises on Kyle’s forehead
    were consistent with the location and measurement of two nails located in a kitchen cabinet door
    that was discovered badly damaged. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support
    appellant’s conviction for capital murder of a child under the age of six years. We overrule
    appellant’s first issue.
    In her second and third issues, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting
    evidence of two extraneous offenses.       Appellant complains of evidence that, on separate
    –10–
    occasions, she broke a salt shaker and dislocated Kyle’s elbow. The State offered the dislocated
    elbow incident to refute appellant’s testimony that the children had not been hurt while in her
    care and to show appellant did not immediately report the injury to Kyle’s parents. The broken
    salt shaker incident was offered to show the Lazarchiks did not get mad when appellant told
    them about it. Appellant claims this evidence was irrelevant and the prejudicial effect of its
    admission outweighed any probative value.
    Even if we assume the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, any error was harmless.
    Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) states an appellate court must disregard a non-
    constitutional error that does not affect a criminal defendant’s “substantial rights.” TEX. R. APP.
    P. 44.2(b). Under this rule, we may not reverse for non-constitutional error if, after examining
    the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not have a substantial and
    injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Gray v. State, 
    159 S.W.3d 95
    ,
    98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In assessing the likelihood that the jury’s decision was adversely
    affected by the error, we should consider everything in the record, including any testimony or
    physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the
    verdict, the character of the alleged error, and how the evidence might be considered in
    connection with other evidence in the case. Morales v. State, 
    32 S.W.3d 862
    , 867 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2000). We might also consider the jury instructions given by the trial judge, the State’s
    theory, any defensive theories, and closing arguments. 
    Id. The presence
    of overwhelming
    evidence of guilt plays a determinative role in this analysis. Neal v. State, 
    256 S.W.3d 264
    , 284
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Motilla v. State, 
    78 S.W.3d 352
    , 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
    Our review of the record shows the State briefly asked Rene about Kyle’s dislocated
    elbow and the broken salt shaker. Although the salt shaker was part of a set received as a
    wedding gift, Rene said she was disappointed but not upset with appellant. Rene believed the
    –11–
    elbow incident was an accident and used it as an opportunity to educate appellant. Although
    both parents were concerned about Kyle, they did not “react badly towards” appellant. Neither
    incident was essential to the State’s case. The evidence was not inflammatory, misleading, or
    likely to confuse the jury. Finally, the State did not emphasize the evidence or mention it in
    closing. In light of the other overwhelming evidence, we have the fair assurance that the error, if
    any, in admitting this evidence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
    determining the jury’s verdict. We overrule appellant’s second and third issues.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Molly Francis/
    MOLLY FRANCIS
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47
    121073F.U05
    –12–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    ADA BETTY CUADROS-FERNANDEZ,                       On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District
    Appellant                                          Court, Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 380-80933-06.
    No. 05-12-01073-CR        V.                       Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
    Justices FitzGerald and Myers participating.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 5th day of December, 2013.
    /Molly Francis/
    MOLLY FRANCIS
    JUSTICE
    –13–