Randle Wayne Portis v. State ( 2011 )


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  •                                   IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-09-00343-CR
    RANDLE WAYNE PORTIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 54th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2008-749-C2
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    After his motion to suppress was denied, Appellant Randle Wayne Portis
    pleaded guilty to possession of more than four but less than 200 grams of cocaine and
    was assessed a 25-year prison sentence. Portis appeals, asserting in one issue that the
    trial court erred in denying the motion.
    We apply the familiar bifurcated standard of review for a trial court’s
    suppression ruling. Davis v. State, 
    74 S.W.3d 90
    , 94-95 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
    In the suppression hearing, Waco police officer Chester Long testified that he was on
    patrol and checking license plate numbers on his patrol car’s computer for stolen
    vehicles. Long ran the plate number on the car Portis was driving, and the computer
    check indicated that the registration had expired several months earlier. Long stopped
    Portis, who immediately advised Long that the registration was current and showed
    him a receipt with the current sticker. Portis had just renewed it, and Long said that the
    computer had not updated the renewal.
    During the stop, Long smelled marijuana odor coming from the car and asked
    Portis if there was anything in it. Portis told Long that he did not have probable cause
    to search the car. Long took Portis’s driver’s license for his partner to run on the
    computer, and he had Portis get out of the car. Long then learned from his partner that
    Portis’s driver’s license had been suspended for failure to take drug education classes.
    Long then searched the car and found cocaine and marijuana.
    Portis’s sole issue asserts that, because the information relied on to make the stop
    was incorrect, there was no basis for the stop and that no good-faith exception to the
    Texas exclusionary rule (article 38.23) is applicable. Assuming without deciding that
    Portis raised this argument in the trial court (which the State contends did not occur),
    we disagree with his contention.
    Portis’s argument is that Long could rely on his computer’s information only to
    the extent it was accurate, and because it was inaccurate, the initial detention was
    unlawful. He cites as support Colston v. State, 
    511 S.W.2d 10
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), but
    that case is highly distinguishable because it involved the lack of probable cause to
    make a warrantless arrest, while this case involves the validity of the initial traffic stop.
    Portis v. State                                                                         Page 2
    Article 38.23(a) provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
    Constitution or laws of Texas or the United States. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    38.23(a) (West 2005). It operates to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment. Garcia v. State, 
    829 S.W.2d 796
    , 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (plurality op.).
    The distinct issue is whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.
    Daugherty v. State, 
    931 S.W.2d 268
    , 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
    A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist who
    commits a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 
    827 S.W.2d 937
    , 944 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1992). In general, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
    when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
    occurred. Walter v. State, 
    28 S.W.3d 538
    , 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Wolf
    v. State, 
    137 S.W.3d 797
    , 801 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see also
    Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810, 
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1772, 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (1996).
    …
    Because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative
    detention than a custodial arrest, such stops are analyzed as Terry stops.
    Berkemer v. McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 439, 
    104 S. Ct. 3138
    , 3150, 
    82 L. Ed. 2d 318
             (1984); 
    Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506
    . An investigative detention—either as a
    part of, or apart from, a traffic stop—is also a seizure for Fourth
    Amendment purposes. See 
    Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178
    ; Powell v. State, 
    5 S.W.3d 369
    , 375 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d). Therefore, a
    traffic stop and any concomitant investigative detention must be
    reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S.
    CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Fourth Amendment
    protects against only unreasonable searches and seizures. 
    Terry, 392 U.S. at 20
    , 88 S.Ct. at 1879; 
    Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 540
    (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 
    525 U.S. 83
    , 88, 
    119 S. Ct. 469
    , 473, 
    142 L. Ed. 2d 373
    (1998)).
    Haas v. State, 
    172 S.W.3d 42
    , 49-50 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d).
    An investigatory detention or an arrest is not invalid merely
    because an officer relies upon reasonably trustworthy information that
    later proves to be erroneous. Dancy v. State, 
    728 S.W.2d 772
    , 783 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1987); Brown v. State, 
    986 S.W.2d 50
    , 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    1999, no pet.) (concluding that although there was no evidence that the
    Portis v. State                                                                            Page 3
    vehicle was actually stolen, the officers had probable cause for the
    warrantless arrest based on the stolen vehicle information on the “hot
    sheet,” thus the contraband found as a result was admissible); Kelly v.
    State, 
    721 S.W.2d 586
    , 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)
    (finding that stop of defendant because officer believed the vehicle was
    stolen provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to detain defendant
    regardless of whether the information was shown to be inaccurate or
    false).
    Mount v. State, 
    217 S.W.3d 716
    , 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
    We agree with the State’s argument that because it is reasonable for an officer to
    rely in good faith on information provided by his mobile computer, there is no violation
    of the law that requires suppression under article 38.23. See, e.g., Duronslett v. State, No.
    14-96-00562, 
    1997 WL 576373
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 18, 1997, no
    pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating that trial court could have found officer
    acted reasonably in traffic stop for expired plates, according to computer check,
    regardless of whether such information later proved to be correct); see also 
    Mount, 271 S.W.3d at 728-30
    . The trial court implicitly found that the officer acted reasonably and
    did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
    We overrule Portis’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed October 26, 2011
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    Portis v. State                                                                        Page 4