Randle Wayne Portis v. State ( 2011 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-09-00343-CR
RANDLE WAYNE PORTIS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2008-749-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After his motion to suppress was denied, Appellant Randle Wayne Portis
pleaded guilty to possession of more than four but less than 200 grams of cocaine and
was assessed a 25-year prison sentence. Portis appeals, asserting in one issue that the
trial court erred in denying the motion.
We apply the familiar bifurcated standard of review for a trial court’s
suppression ruling. Davis v. State, 74 S.W.3d 90, 94-95 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
In the suppression hearing, Waco police officer Chester Long testified that he was on
patrol and checking license plate numbers on his patrol car’s computer for stolen
vehicles. Long ran the plate number on the car Portis was driving, and the computer
check indicated that the registration had expired several months earlier. Long stopped
Portis, who immediately advised Long that the registration was current and showed
him a receipt with the current sticker. Portis had just renewed it, and Long said that the
computer had not updated the renewal.
During the stop, Long smelled marijuana odor coming from the car and asked
Portis if there was anything in it. Portis told Long that he did not have probable cause
to search the car. Long took Portis’s driver’s license for his partner to run on the
computer, and he had Portis get out of the car. Long then learned from his partner that
Portis’s driver’s license had been suspended for failure to take drug education classes.
Long then searched the car and found cocaine and marijuana.
Portis’s sole issue asserts that, because the information relied on to make the stop
was incorrect, there was no basis for the stop and that no good-faith exception to the
Texas exclusionary rule (article 38.23) is applicable. Assuming without deciding that
Portis raised this argument in the trial court (which the State contends did not occur),
we disagree with his contention.
Portis’s argument is that Long could rely on his computer’s information only to
the extent it was accurate, and because it was inaccurate, the initial detention was
unlawful. He cites as support Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), but
that case is highly distinguishable because it involved the lack of probable cause to
make a warrantless arrest, while this case involves the validity of the initial traffic stop.
Portis v. State Page 2
Article 38.23(a) provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
Constitution or laws of Texas or the United States. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.23(a) (West 2005). It operates to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (plurality op.).
The distinct issue is whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred.
Daugherty v. State, 931 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop a motorist who
commits a traffic violation. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). In general, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
when an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred. Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Wolf
v. State, 137 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see also
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d
89 (1996).
…
Because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative
detention than a custodial arrest, such stops are analyzed as Terry stops.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d 318
(1984); Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506. An investigative detention—either as a
part of, or apart from, a traffic stop—is also a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. See Francis, 922 S.W.2d at 178; Powell v. State, 5
S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d). Therefore, a
traffic stop and any concomitant investigative detention must be
reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Fourth Amendment
protects against only unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry, 392 U.S. at
20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 540 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 473, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998)).
Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 49-50 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d).
An investigatory detention or an arrest is not invalid merely
because an officer relies upon reasonably trustworthy information that
later proves to be erroneous. Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 783 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987); Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1999, no pet.) (concluding that although there was no evidence that the
Portis v. State Page 3
vehicle was actually stolen, the officers had probable cause for the
warrantless arrest based on the stolen vehicle information on the “hot
sheet,” thus the contraband found as a result was admissible); Kelly v.
State, 721 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)
(finding that stop of defendant because officer believed the vehicle was
stolen provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to detain defendant
regardless of whether the information was shown to be inaccurate or
false).
Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
We agree with the State’s argument that because it is reasonable for an officer to
rely in good faith on information provided by his mobile computer, there is no violation
of the law that requires suppression under article 38.23. See, e.g., Duronslett v. State, No.
14-96-00562, 1997 WL 576373, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 18, 1997, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (stating that trial court could have found officer
acted reasonably in traffic stop for expired plates, according to computer check,
regardless of whether such information later proved to be correct); see also Mount, 271
S.W.3d at 728-30. The trial court implicitly found that the officer acted reasonably and
did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
We overrule Portis’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed October 26, 2011
Do not publish
[CR25]
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