Baysystems North America LLC v. Rosebud-Lott Independent School District ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                                 IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-08-00260-CV
    BAYSYSTEMS NORTH AMERICA LLC,
    Appellant
    v.
    ROSEBUD-LOTT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
    Appellee
    From the 82nd District Court
    Falls County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CV-36,455T
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    After a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment against Appellant
    BaySystems North America LLC (BaySystems) and in favor of the plaintiff below,
    Appellee Rosebud-Lott Independent School District (the District), on the District’s
    negligent misrepresentation and DTPA claims. We will reverse and remand.
    Background
    The parties’ briefs and the record reflect the following undisputed factual
    background: In 1998, the District hired Sam Cohen to examine the roofs on some of its
    schools and to make recommendations for repairs. For the high school roof, which was
    a sprayed polyurethane roof (SPF) over a metal deck (or metal panels), Cohen noted
    and recommended:
    The large main roof of this facility has mildew over the entire area.
    There are a few coating blisters, some with water inside, and an area of
    wet foam. I recommend this roof level be power washed clean, repairs
    made to coating blisters and area of wet foam, then recoat with 15 to 20
    mils of new protective coating.
    The roof level around the old gym has some foam blisters and the
    entire roof has an extreme reversion of the base coating. These problems
    should be covered by the manufacturer’s warranty.
    Upon receiving Cohen’s recommendations, the District hired John Rogers, an
    engineer, to evaluate and implement Cohen’s recommendations. Rogers made bid
    specification documents to serve as the basis for bids, and his specifications included a
    list of products for the repair jobs on the several school buildings. One product was
    Eversil 580, a silicone roof coating sold by Everest Coatings, Inc., which was
    subsequently acquired by and known as BaySystems at the time of trial.
    The District selected the bid of Mainland Industrial Coatings, Inc. to perform the
    repair work. Mainland’s bid for the high school roof repair was $43,596. In accordance
    with Rogers’s specification, Mainland obtained the Eversil 580 roof coating from Everest
    Coatings and applied it to the high school roof in early 2000. The cost of the coating
    that Mainland purchased from Everest Coatings for the high school was approximately
    $25,000. Cohen was hired by Rogers to ensure that Mainland’s work complied with
    Rogers’s specifications, and Cohen confirmed that the work was in compliance.
    Mainland then requested the issuance of a warranty from Everest Coatings,
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                          Page 2
    which issued a ten-year “system” warranty that was dated March 1, 2000 and that was
    signed by the District, Mainland, and BaySystems. The express warranty’s pertinent
    terms include:
    EVEREST COATINGS, INC. warranties to the owner and applicator that
    the roof system will not leak for a period of (10) years due to deterioration
    caused by ordinary weathering conditions. Should the coating leak
    during this period due to such deterioration, Everest Coatings, Inc. will
    furnish at no charge, all materials, (coatings), equipment and labor
    necessary to repair such leaks.
    …
    THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT COVER:
    …
    2. Damage caused by structural movement, failure of the substrate over
    which coating is applied, faulty construction, or design (of the
    building).
    …
    THE FOREGOING SHALL CONSTITUTE EVEREST’S SOLE AND
    EXCLUSIVE LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OR
    USE OF THE SYSTEM. THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER
    WRITTEN OR ORAL, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND
    EVEREST   EXPRESSLY    DISCLAIMS  ANY     WARRANTY    OF
    MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE.
    Over the next few years and into 2006, the high school experienced roof leaks,
    and when notified of the leaks by the District, BaySystems, pursuant to the warranty,
    sent Brazos Urethane, Inc. to repair the leaks several times. BaySystems paid Brazos
    Urethane approximately $40,000 in labor and materials for the repairs to the high school
    roof. Dissatisfied with the repairs, the District’s attorney eventually demanded that
    BaySystems pay for an entire new roof for the high school (at a cost of around $300,000).
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                           Page 3
    This lawsuit followed.
    The    District     sued     BaySystems       for    breach      of   warranty,      negligent
    misrepresentation, DTPA violations, and fraud. The District also sued Rogers, who
    settled before trial. Each side’s experts agreed that the roof’s SPF foam coating had
    undergone reversion (it had reverted to its original “uncured,” “wet,” “tacky,” or
    “gummy” state), that the Eversil 580 roof coating was not properly adhering to the
    reverted foam and was the cause of the roof leaks, and that Rogers improperly specified
    the Eversil 580 roof coating for application on the reverted foam.1
    The jury was charged on breach of warranty, DTPA violations, fraud, and
    negligent misrepresentation and found for the District on all of the claims. The jury
    found actual damages of $390,000 (the cost to repair the roof) and $43,596 (the District’s
    economic loss), DTPA additional damages of $500,000 for conduct committed
    knowingly, exemplary damages of $500,000, and attorneys’ fees of $159,500.                          The
    District elected to recover on its DTPA and negligent misrepresentation claims, and the
    trial court signed a final judgment awarding the District $390,000 in damages on the
    DTPA claim, $43,596 in damages on the negligent misrepresentation claim, additional
    damages of $500,000 for knowing violations of the DTPA, exemplary damages of
    $200,000, and attorneys’ fees. BaySystems appeals, raising seventeen issues.
    1
    The experts did disagree on whether the roof’s substrate—for purposes of BaySystems’s
    warranty exclusion for “failure of the substrate over which coating is applied”—consisted of the reverted
    foam coating only (BaySystems’s view) or all of the roof’s various layers (the District’s view).
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                                      Page 4
    Negligent Misrepresentation
    In issue four, BaySystems contends that no evidence supports the jury finding on
    negligent misrepresentation. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if
    reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors
    could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 807, 822 (Tex. 2005). There is legally
    insufficient evidence or “no evidence” of a vital fact when (a) there is a complete
    absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence
    from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence
    offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence
    conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.      Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.
    Havner, 
    953 S.W.2d 706
    , 711 (Tex. 1997).
    The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are:
    1.     a defendant provides information in the course of his business, or in a
    transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest;
    2.     the information supplied is false;
    3     the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
    or communicating the information;
    4.     the plaintiff justifiably relies on the information; and
    5.     the plaintiff suffers damages proximately caused by the reliance.
    Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 
    188 S.W.3d 296
    , 302 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied); see
    Federal Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane, 
    825 S.W.2d 439
    , 442 (Tex. 1991).
    Specifically, BaySystems argues that there is no evidence that the District
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                         Page 5
    justifiably relied on any representation by BaySystems. We agree. The evidence shows
    that, before BaySystems had any interaction at all with the District, Rogers, the engineer
    hired by the District, specified the Eversil 580 coating and that the District’s contractor,
    Mainland, obtained it and applied it. BaySystems had nothing to do with Rogers’s
    specification of the Eversil 580 coating or Mainland’s application of it. The evidence
    thus conclusively shows that the District did not rely on any representation by
    BaySystems in the District’s purchase of the Eversil 580 coating; there were no
    representations.2 We sustain issue four.3
    DTPA
    The trial court submitted three DTPA claims to the jury:
    (1) DTPA breach of warranty (see TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2)
    (West 2011));
    (2) false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices (see 
    id. §§ 17.46(b),
    17.50(a)(1));
    and
    (3) unconscionable action or course of action (see 
    id. § 17.50(a)(3).
    In Question 1, the jury found that BaySystems failed to comply with the
    warranty and that its failure to comply was a producing cause of the District’s damages.
    In Question 7, the jury found BaySystems engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive
    act or practice that the District relied on to its detriment and that was a producing cause
    2
    The District argues that the warranty itself was a negligent misrepresentation, but the warranty
    was issued after the Eversil 580 coating was purchased and applied. Thus, the District could not have
    relied on any terms in the warranty in entering into the transaction.
    3
    Because there is no evidence of reliance, judgment could also not be entered on the jury’s fraud
    finding. Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 
    314 S.W.3d 913
    , 923 (Tex. 2010) (“Both fraud
    and negligent misrepresentation require that the plaintiff show actual and justifiable reliance.”).
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                                       Page 6
    of damages to the District.4 In Question 9, the jury found that BaySystems engaged in
    an unconscionable action or course of action that was a producing cause of damages to
    the District.
    In answer to Question 11, which was conditioned on a “yes” answer to any of the
    District’s three DTPA liability questions—Question 1 (breach of warranty), Question 7
    (“laundry list”), and Question 9 (unconscionability)—the jury found damages of
    $390,000, with the element of damages being the cost to repair the high school roof. The
    trial court entered judgment on the DTPA findings in the amount of $390,000.
    DTPA Breach of Warranty
    BaySystems argues that Question 1 presents a Casteel problem by including an
    invalid legal theory—breach of implied warranty—within the DTPA breach of warranty
    claim.5 See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 
    22 S.W.3d 378
    , 388-89 (Tex. 2000). We agree.
    The jury answered “yes” to Question 1:
    Was the failure, if any, of BaySystems to comply with the Warranty a
    producing cause of damage to Rosebud-Lott?
    1. “Producing cause” means an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause
    that, in a natural sequence, produced the damages, if any. There may
    4 “False, misleading, or deceptive act or practice” was defined in the charge as (1) representing
    that services or goods had or would have characteristics that they did not have; or (2) representing that
    services or goods are or will be of a particular quality if they were of another; or (3) representing that an
    agreement or warranty conferred or involved rights, remedies, or obligations that it did not have or
    involve; or (4) failing to disclose information about goods or services that was known at the time of the
    transaction with the intention to induce the District into a transaction it would otherwise not have
    entered into if the information had been disclosed.
    5
    The District contends that BaySystems did not object to the charge. BaySystems submitted an
    alternative submission of the DTPA warranty liability question (found on page 342 of the clerk’s record)
    that was in substantially correct form (omitting the implied-warranty theory), which the trial court
    rejected. This preserved its charge complaint for appeal. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Williams, 
    85 S.W.3d 162
    ,
    170-71 (Tex. 2002); Elbaor v. Smith, 
    845 S.W.2d 240
    , 244 (Tex. 1992).
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                                          Page 7
    be more than one producing cause.
    2. “Failure to comply with a warranty” means the following:
    a. Failing to furnish at no charge, all materials, coatings, equipment,
    and labor necessary to repair any leaks in the Rosebud-Lott High
    School’s roof system;
    b. Failing to perform repairs to the Rosebud-Lott High School roof
    system in a good and workmanlike manner.
    3. “Good and workmanlike manner” is that quality of work performed
    by one who has knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the
    successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner
    generally considered made [sic] by those capable of judging such work.
    4. An “express warranty” is an affirmation of fact or promise made by
    BaySystems that relates to Rosebud-Lott’s roof systems and becomes
    part of the basis of the bargain. It is not necessary that formal words
    such as “warrant” or “guarantee” be used or that there be a specific
    intent to make a warranty.
    Answer “Yes” or “No”: _____
    BaySystems sold goods (the Eversil 580 roof coating), and thus the UCC and its
    warranty provisions apply to BaySystems’s express warranty of its product. See PPG
    Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Limited Partnership, 
    146 S.W.3d 79
    , 83 &
    n.4 (Tex. 2004). BaySystems correctly complains that Question 1 erroneously contains
    an implied-warranty element: “Failing to perform repairs to the Rosebud-Lott High
    School roof system in a good and workmanlike manner.”
    The express warranty disclaims any implied warranties:
    THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL,
    EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES AND EVEREST EXPRESSLY
    DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
    FOR PURPOSE.
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                        Page 8
    See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (West 2009); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
    FDP Corp., 
    811 S.W.2d 572
    , 576-77 (Tex. 1991). BaySystems did not expressly warrant
    that it would perform the repairs, or would have the repairs performed, in a good and
    workmanlike manner; rather, it disclaimed any such implied warranty, and the District
    agreed to that disclaimer. The submission of Question 1 in this form was harmful error.
    See 
    Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 381
    , 388-89.
    DTPA Laundry-list Violations
    Also within issue seven, BaySystems asserts that, as with the negligent
    misrepresentation claim, there is no evidence of reliance to support the jury finding in
    Question 7 on DTPA laundry-list violations. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. §
    17.50(a)(1)(B) (providing that the “use or employment … of a false, misleading, or
    deceptive act or practice” must be “relied on by a consumer”); Henry Schein, Inc. v.
    Stromboe, 
    102 S.W.3d 675
    , 693 (Tex. 2002). We agree. As we held above, the evidence
    conclusively shows that the District did not rely on any representation by BaySystems
    in the District’s purchase of the Eversil 580 coating. Likewise, there is no evidence that
    BaySystems induced the District into the transaction to purchase the Eversil 580 coating.
    DTPA Unconscionability
    On similar reasoning, BaySystems further argues that, with regard to the jury’s
    unconscionability finding, there is no evidence that it took advantage of the District. An
    unconscionable act or practice is one that, to a consumer’s detriment, takes advantage of
    the consumer’s lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity to a grossly unfair
    degree. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (West 2011). The act or practice must
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                        Page 9
    have been committed in connection with the plaintiff’s transaction in goods. Amstadt v.
    U.S. Brass Corp., 
    919 S.W.2d 644
    , 650 (Tex. 1996). We repeat: The evidence conclusively
    shows that BaySystems had no involvement with Rogers’s specification of the Eversil
    580 coating or the District’s purchase of it in 2000, and BaySystems’s alleged conduct
    relating to the warranty repairs years later and into 2006 cannot have been committed in
    connection with the District’s transaction in 2000. See 
    id. at 650-51;
    Chastain v. Koonce,
    
    700 S.W.2d 579
    , 584 (Tex. 1985); Todd v. Perry Homes, 
    156 S.W.3d 919
    , 921-22 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
    We sustain in part BaySystems’s seventh issue. Based on our disposition of
    issues four and seven, we need not reach issues one and two, which assert that the
    economic-loss rule bars recovery on the negligent misrepresentation and tort-based
    DTPA claims.
    Breach of Warranty
    Issue three addresses whether judgment could be entered on the District’s
    separate non-DTPA breach of warranty claim. Sub-issue 3(a) contends that the jury’s
    breach of warranty finding presents the same Casteel problem as the DTPA breach of
    warranty finding. We agree.
    Charge Error
    A separate set of jury questions, nearly identical to the DTPA breach of warranty
    questions, was submitted to the jury on the breach of warranty claim. Question 14, like
    Question 1, improperly included an implied warranty to perform repairs in a good and
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                       Page 10
    workmanlike manner.6 The submission of Question 14 in this form, like Question 1,
    was harmful error. See 
    Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 381
    , 388-89. We sustain sub-issue 3(a).
    Warranty Exclusion
    Sub-issue 3(c) asserts that judgment cannot be entered on the breach of warranty
    finding because the District’s claim was expressly excluded by this exclusion in the
    warranty:
    THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT COVER:
    …
    2. Damage caused by structural movement, failure of the substrate over
    which coating is applied, faulty construction, or design (of the
    building).
    BaySystems first asserts that because the high school roof’s foam substrate
    failed—having undergone reversion—this unambiguous exclusion applies. Based on
    the record before us, we disagree that the exclusion is unambiguous in that respect. The
    experts disagreed on whether the roof’s substrate consisted of the reverted foam coating
    only (BaySystems’s view) or all of the roof’s various layers (the District’s view).
    BaySystems next argues that the exclusion applies because of “faulty design,”
    pointing to Rogers’s faulty engineering in his improper specification of the Eversil 580
    coating on the reverted foam roof. The exclusion is either ambiguous or inapplicable in
    that respect, as it excludes “faulty … design (of the building).” We thus overrule sub-
    issue 3(c).
    6
    To preserve this charge complaint, BaySystems submitted an alternative submission of the
    warranty liability question (found on page 337 of the clerk’s record) that was in substantially correct form
    (omitting the implied-warranty theory), which the trial court rejected.
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                                        Page 11
    Warranty Compliance
    Sub-issue 3(d) asserts that judgment could not be entered on the breach of
    warranty finding because BaySystems complied with the warranty. Several times in its
    brief BaySystems states that it had the leaks repaired every time that it was notified of
    them, but the brief does not contain argument on this sub-issue, nor does it identify the
    basis (e.g., legal insufficiency) on which we would sustain it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
    We overrule sub-issue 3(d) as inadequately briefed.
    Limitations
    In sub-issue 3(b) and issue 10, BaySystems asserts that all of the District’s claims
    are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations as a matter of law. Because of our
    above dispositions, we need only consider the District’s DTPA and non-DTPA breach of
    warranty claims.
    The statute of limitations for a DTPA breach of warranty claim is two years. TEX.
    BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (West 2011); McAdams v. Capitol Prod’s. Corp., 
    810 S.W.2d 290
    , 292 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, writ denied), overruled on other grounds by
    Lorentz v. Dunn, 
    171 S.W.3d 854
    (Tex. 2005). The statute of limitations for a breach of
    warranty claim is four years. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a), (b) (West 2009);
    see 
    PPG, 146 S.W.3d at 92-93
    .
    Because BaySystems had the burden of proof on its limitations defense, it must
    demonstrate that the evidence establishes conclusively, i.e., as a matter of law, all vital
    facts in support of the finding sought. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 
    46 S.W.3d 237
    , 241 (Tex.
    2001). In reviewing the jury’s verdict for the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                         Page 12
    consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
    “crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary
    evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    ,
    808 (Tex. 2005). Thus, we must credit favorable evidence for the District if reasonable
    jurors could, and disregard evidence contrary to the jury’s finding. Moreover, we must
    not substitute our opinion on witness credibility for that of the jury. 
    Id. at 816-17.
    The District filed suit on March 5, 2007. The trial court submitted two separate
    limitations questions for the DTPA breach of warranty claim and for the breach of
    warranty claim.        In the second set of questions, Question 3 (the DTPA breach of
    warranty claim) asked the jury to find the earliest date that the District knew or should
    have known that BaySystems would not repair the roof in accordance with the
    warranty. Question 16 (the breach of warranty claim) was identical. The jury answered
    October 4, 2006 for each question.7
    The District argues that, because its breach of warranty claim is that BaySystems
    breached its express warranty to repair the roof, the second question and the October 4,
    2006 date applies. We agree with the District, given the pleading of its breach of
    warranty claims in its Fourth Amended Petition. For its DTPA breach of warranty
    claim, the District pleaded that “after [the District] provided [BaySystems] with notice
    7 In the first set of questions, Questions 2 (DTPA breach of warranty) and 15 (breach of warranty)
    were identical. In Question 2 the jury found that July 21, 2006 was the earliest date that the District knew
    or should have known of enough leaks to indicate that the problem was not isolated. The jury was
    instructed that the required knowledge does not arise when the first leak is discovered, nor does it
    require that all leaks are known. See 
    PPG, 146 S.W.3d at 94
    (stating the applicable discovery rule ends
    when “an owner knows of enough leaks to indicate the problem is not isolated”). The jury answered July
    14, 2006 in answer to Question 15.
    We express no opinion on the propriety of the limitations questions and instructions.
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                                        Page 13
    of each such leaking roof systems, [BaySystems] has failed to repair such roof systems
    to make them watertight, therefore breaching its express warranty.” For its non-DTPA
    breach of warranty claim, the District pleaded that the “repair services provided by
    [BaySystems] in response to the notices of leaks did not comply with [Baysystems’s]
    written representation to repair [the District’s] roof systems so they would be
    watertight, which was a breach of [BaySystems’s] express warranty.”
    In a case for breach of an express warranty to repair, the breach occurs, and the
    statute of limitations begins to run, when further repairs are refused. See The Austin Co.
    v. Vaughn Building Corp., 
    643 S.W.2d 113
    , 115-16 (Tex. 1982); see also 
    PPG, 146 S.W.3d at 96
    .
    The evidence shows that there were reported leaks in 2002 and 2004 and that
    BaySystems had those leaks repaired. The evidence further shows that there were then
    more leaks, and in July 2006, Brazos Urethane was sent to attempt to repair the roof but
    did nothing because, as one of its employees stated, the roof was “hopeless.” The
    District then hired Brian Gardiner, a roofing expert, to inspect the roof, and he told the
    District that the roof had hundreds of holes. The District’s superintendent then sent
    BaySystems a letter dated October 4, 2006 informing BaySystems that the attempted
    repairs had failed and that BaySystems was not satisfying its obligations under the
    warranty.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the District, we cannot say
    that the evidence conclusively establishes that BaySystems’s alleged breach of warranty
    occurred, and the District’s breach of warranty claim accrued, more than two and four
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                       Page 14
    years before March 5, 2007, the date the District filed suit. We overrule sub-issue 3(b)
    and issue 10.
    Given our disposition, we need not address BaySystems’s remaining issues.
    Conclusion
    We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the District’s breach of
    warranty and DTPA breach of warranty claims for a new trial. See 
    Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 390
    .
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    (Chief Justice Gray concurs in the judgment remanding the case for a new trial.
    A separate opinion will not issue. He notes, however, that because the
    limitations issues were conditionally submitted based upon the jury’s answer to
    breach of warranty issues that we have determined to be defective, we need not,
    and should not, review the limitations questions. Because the limitations issues,
    based upon the facts, are intertwined with and dependent upon what the jury
    determines with regard to the warranty and its breach, if any, BaySystems
    should be allowed to retry those issues in the new trial of the breach of warranty
    claims.)
    Reversed and remanded
    Opinion delivered and filed December 21, 2011
    [CV06]
    BaySystems North America v. Rosebud-Lott ISD                                      Page 15