in the Matter of X.J.T. ( 2014 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-13-00176-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF X.J.T.
    ----------
    FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
    ----------
    DISSENTING OPINION
    ----------
    I write separately in dissent because the State failed to prove X.J.T.’s
    statement was taken in compliance with Mississippi law.
    Texas law governs the admissibility of evidence, including confessions.
    The applicable family code statute provides that for an out-of-state custodial
    statement made by a child to law enforcement to be admissible, it must be
    (1) voluntary, (2) electronically recorded, and (3) in compliance with the laws of
    the state in which the statement was taken. 1
    1
    Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.095(b)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2013).
    The law of a sister state is presumed to be the same as Texas law unless
    the law of that state is proved or the trial court is asked to take judicial notice of
    the law. 2
    Effective March 1, 1998, the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence and Texas
    Rules of Civil Evidence were merged to form the Texas Rules of Evidence. 3
    Rule 202 of the rules of evidence provides that
    [a] court upon its own motion may, or upon the motion of a party
    shall, take judicial notice of the constitutions, public statutes, rules,
    regulations, ordinances, court decisions, and common law of every
    other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. A party
    requesting that judicial notice be taken of such matter shall furnish
    the court sufficient information to enable it properly to comply with
    the request, and shall give all parties such notice, if any, as the court
    may deem necessary, to enable all parties fairly to prepare to meet
    the request. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity
    to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor
    of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
    request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. Judicial
    notice of such matters may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.
    The court’s determination shall be subject to review as a ruling on a
    question of law. 4
    As this court has explained,
    Under rule of evidence 202, a party may compel a trial court to
    take judicial notice of another state’s law by filing a motion, giving
    notice to other parties, and furnishing the court with sufficient
    information to enable it to properly comply with the request. But
    when a party fails to request judicial notice of the law of another
    2
    Tex. R. Evid. 202.
    3
    See Smith v. State, 
    5 S.W.3d 673
    , 675 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
    4
    Tex. R. Evid. 202.
    2
    state as permitted under Rule 202, Texas courts will simply presume
    that the law of the other state is identical to Texas law. A preliminary
    motion is necessary to assure the application of the law of another
    jurisdiction, and absent a motion by a party, Texas law may be
    applied to a dispute. 5
    Clearly X.J.T.’s statement did not comply with Texas law mandated by
    sections 51 and 52 of the family code regarding treatment of juveniles and taking
    statements of juveniles. 6 Instead, the evidence shows that he was placed in a
    cell with adults and treated as an adult.       The question is whether anyone
    provided the trial court with Mississippi law and whether the trial court took
    judicial notice of that law.
    The burden was not on the juvenile to prove Mississippi law. 7 Although the
    trial court may take judicial notice of foreign law sua sponte, 8 nothing in the
    record reflects that the trial court did so in this case. Consequently, the burden
    was on the State, the proponent of the statement, to prove that it was taken in
    compliance with Mississippi law and perforce, to prove or ask the trial court to
    5
    Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gunderson, Inc., 
    235 S.W.3d 287
    ,
    290 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. withdrawn) (citations and internal marks
    omitted).
    6
    See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.01–.21, 52.01–.026 (West
    2008 & Supp. 2013).
    7
    See Tex. R. Evid. 202; Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 
    218 S.W.3d 671
    , 695 (Tex. 2006); 
    Gunderson, 235 S.W.3d at 290
    .
    8
    Tex. R. Evid. 202.
    3
    take judicial notice of applicable Mississippi law. 9 Because the State did not
    prove Mississippi law and because there is no evidence that the trial court took
    judicial notice of Mississippi law sua sponte, the presumption that Mississippi law
    is the same as Texas law prevails. And the State failed to prove that X.J.T.’s
    statement was taken in compliance with Texas law. Consequently, the statement
    was not admissible at trial, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it.
    Applying the appropriate standard of review, I would hold that due to the
    statement’s impact on the sufficiency of evidence, the statement’s improper
    admission requires reversal. 10
    Because the majority does not so hold, I respectfully dissent.
    /s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
    LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
    JUSTICE
    DELIVERED: February 27, 2014
    9
    See 
    id. 10 See
    Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); In re C.J.M., 
    167 S.W.3d 892
    , 895 (Tex.
    App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
    4