David Segovia v. State ( 2011 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-09-00325-CR
No. 10-09-00326-CR
DAVID SEGOVIA,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 85th District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 08-01596-CRF-85 and 08-02618-CRF-85
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After two indictments charged David Segovia with aggravated robbery, a jury
found him guilty on both charges and assessed punishment at forty years in prison and
a $2,500 fine in each case. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served
concurrently. Segovia appeals from both judgments, filing a joint brief that asserts five
issues. We will affirm.
On the evening of December 13, 2007, the apparently same person committed
back-to-back armed robberies of two Handi-Stop convenience stores in Bryan within an
hour of each other. Both robbery victims said that the robber “clicked” his gun and
pointed it at them in the robberies. About six months later, one of the stores’ cashiers
identified Segovia in a police photo line-up as the robber. At trial, the cashier identified
Segovia as the robber, and the manager of the other store testified that Segovia looked
like the robber, but she could not positively identify him. The robberies were recorded
by the stores’ security cameras, and two other witnesses who were familiar with
Segovia identified him in each robbery videotape.
In his first two issues, Segovia challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence on venue. He asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the offenses
occurred in Texas or that Brazos County is in Texas because no witness testified that
Brazos County is in Texas. The State first responds that Segovia’s venue complaint is
waived because the presumption that venue was proved applies. See TEX. R. APP. P.
44.2(c)(1); Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
Venue is not an element of the offense. Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d
771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); State v. Blankenship, 170
S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref’d); Henley v. State, 98
S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d). Thus, it need be
proved by only a preponderance of the evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 13.17 (Vernon 2005); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 604
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Fairfield, 610 S.W.2d at 779; Blankenship, 170 S.W.3d
at 681; Sudds v. State, 140 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, no pet.). An appellate court must presume that venue was proved
unless it was challenged in the trial court or the record affirmatively
shows the contrary. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); Hernandez v. State, 198
S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d); Blankenship, 170
S.W.3d at 681; Henley, 98 S.W.3d at 734.
Witt v. State, 237 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref’d).
Segovia did not dispute venue in the trial court. We next determine if it is
Segovia v. State Page 2
affirmatively shown in the record that the presumption of proper venue is inapplicable.
Lee v. State, 903 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, pet. ref’d). For the record
to affirmatively show that venue was improper, it must affirmatively negate whatever
proof was made by the State on venue. Holdridge v. State, 707 S.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); see also O’Hara v. State, 837 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992,
pet. ref’d).
The cashier testified that she lived and worked in Bryan and that both stores that
were robbed were in Brazos County. We take judicial notice that Bryan is in Brazos
County and that Brazos County is in Texas. See Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983). The record does not affirmatively show that venue was improper.
We therefore presume that venue was proved. Accordingly, Segovia’s sufficiency
complaints on venue are waived, and we overrule his first two issues.
In his third and fourth issues, Segovia complains that the prosecutor improperly
commented on Segovia’s failure to testify in the State’s rebuttal argument in the
punishment phase. The argument at issue is:
[PROSECUTOR]: Again, at one [sic] point does this man take
responsibility for anything he’s ever done? And before any change could
ever happen, there has to be an admission and responsibility. And it’s
required your verdict --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. … State is going
to defendant’s election not to testify. It’s clearly a violation of -- of his
right to not testify and not incriminate himself or make a statement. His
argument is clearly inappropriate and outside the scope.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I move for a mistrial.
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THE COURT: Denied.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ask the jury be instructed to disregard his
prior statement.
THE COURT: The jury is instructed that any argument that could
be interpreted as any comment upon the defendant’s failure to testify in
this case is improper, and you should disregard the last argument of the
prosecutor that was made that could have any such implication. The
defendant is free to not testify, and that circumstance cannot be taken or
used in any way in determining his punishment that should be assessed in
this case.
Issue three specifically asserts that the State’s improper argument so infected the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting punishment a denial of due process and
due course of law. Rule 33.1 applies to objections to jury argument. See Threadgill v.
State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). To preserve a
complaint for appellate review, the issue on appeal must comport with the objection
made at trial. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “[A]n objection
stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.”
Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g). Constitutional
claims are not preserved if not timely made in the trial court. See Broxton v. State, 909
S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Barker v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, 2011 WL
505236, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2011, no pet. h.) (holding that
alleged federal and state due-process violations were not preserved because they were
not asserted in trial court). The constitutional grounds being asserted in issue three
were not asserted in the trial court and thus are not preserved for appellate review.
Accordingly, issue three is overruled.
Segovia v. State Page 4
Issue four specifically asserts that the argument was calculated to deny Segovia a
fair and impartial trial. We construe this issue as a complaint that the trial court erred
in failing to grant a mistrial. Jury argument is limited to: (1) summations of the
evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) answers to argument of
opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “A comment on an accused’s failure to testify violates the
accused’s state and federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination.” Smith v.
State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 2005).
The State replies that the rebuttal argument at issue was invited by Segovia’s
counsel’s punishment-phase argument that Segovia may not be wholly responsible for
both robberies and that the argument was thus not improper. See, e.g., Long v. State, 823
S.W.2d 259, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We will assume without deciding that the
argument was uninvited and will proceed to a mistrial analysis.
The denial of a motion for mistrial, which is appropriate for “highly
prejudicial and incurable errors,” is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
(quoting Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); Ladd v.
State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
[T]he question of whether a mistrial should have been granted
involves most, if not all, of the same considerations that attend a
harm analysis. A mistrial is the trial court’s remedy for improper
conduct that is “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and
expense would be wasteful and futile.” In effect, the trial court
conducts an appellate function: determining whether improper
conduct is so harmful that the case must be redone. Of course, the
harm analysis is conducted in light of the trial court’s curative
Segovia v. State Page 5
instruction. Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is
incurable, will a mistrial be required.
Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, the
appropriate test for evaluating whether the trial court abused its
discretion in overruling a motion for mistrial is a tailored version of the
test originally set out in Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259-60 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998), a harm analysis case. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. The
Mosley factors that we consider in determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying a mistrial during the punishment phase
are: (1) the prejudicial effect, (2) curative measures, and (3) the likelihood
of the same punishment being assessed. Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77; see
Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.
Abbott v. State, 196 S.W.3d 334, 347 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d).
Considering the Mosley factors, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Any prejudicial effect was not incurable
because the State’s comment was indirect, was arguably invited, and was not flagrantly
improper. The trial court’s instruction to disregard was the proper curative measure in
this instance. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Finally, Segovia was facing a sentence of life or five to ninety-nine years in prison for
these aggravated robberies, which are first-degree felonies. In each robbery, Segovia
pointed a gun at the victim. Punishment evidence included Segovia’s prior state-jail
felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and evidence of two
loaded guns (a pistol and a shotgun) and drug-dealing paraphernalia found in his
bedroom. The likelihood of the same punishment being assessed without the State’s
comment is very high. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 85. Issue four is overruled.
Segovia’s fifth issue asserts that he was denied due process and due course of
law by the introduction of evidence of a flawed identification. Segovia complains that
Segovia v. State Page 6
the pretrial photo line-up that the cashier used to identify him was impermissibly
suggestive and tainted the cashier’s in-court identification of Segovia as the robber. The
cashier had told police that the robber had a teardrop tattoo, and Segovia complains
that his photo was the only one with a facial tattoo. He also complains that many of the
persons in the other photos “differ dramatically” from Segovia’s photo.
The State correctly argues that Segovia has failed to preserve this complaint for
appellate review because he did not obtain a pretrial ruling on the photo line-up, nor
did he object at trial to the cashier’s testimony or the introduction of the line-up into
evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re G.A.T., 16 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Perry v. State, 703 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986)). Accordingly, we overrule issue five.
Having overruled all of Segovia’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
REX D. DAVIS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed May 11, 2011
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