Christopher Ray Weatherspoon v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            ACCEPTED
    03-15-00237-CR
    7174853
    THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    9/30/2015 4:35:34 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    CLERK
    No. 03-15-00237-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS             FILED IN
    3rd COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF AUSTIN, TEXAS
    TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS      9/30/2015 4:35:34 PM
    JEFFREY D. KYLE
    Clerk
    ******
    CHRISTOPHER RAY WEATHERSPOON
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ******
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 264th DISTRICT COURT
    OF BELL COUNTY, TEXAS
    Cause No. 71839
    ******
    STATE’S BRIEF
    ******
    HENRY GARZA
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    BOB D. ODOM
    ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    P.O. Box 540
    Belton, Tx 76513
    (254) 933-5215
    FAX (254) 933-5704
    DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us
    SBA No. 15200000
    Oral Argument Not Requested
    1
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    ITEM                                                      PAGE
    Index of Authorities …………………………………………………………………              4
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument ………………………………………..         6
    Statement of the Case ………………………………………………………………              6
    Statement of Facts …………………………………………………………………..              7
    Evidence Supporting Plea of Guilty …………………………………     7
    Trial Court’s Judgment …………………………………………………..         9
    Summary of State’s Argument …………………………………………………            10
    Argument and Authorities ………………………………………………………             11
    First Issue on Appeal …………………………………………………….         11
    EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PLEA
    OF GUILITY UNDER ART. 1.15?
    Standard of Review ……………………………………………..         11
    Application and Analysis ……………………………………..      12
    Second Issue on Appeal ………………………………………………..         14
    EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT AT PUNISHMENT
    PHASE TO SUPPORT PLEA OF GUILTY
    UNDER ART. 1.15?
    Application and Analysis …………………………………….       14
    Third Issue on Appeal ………………………………………………….          16
    MUST JUDGMENT BE MODIFIED TO SHOW
    NO PLEA BARGAIN?
    Application and Analysis ……………………………………        16
    2
    Prayer ……………………………………………………………………………….                17
    Certificate of Compliance with Rule 9 …………………………………   17
    Certificate of Service ………………………………………………………….        18
    3
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES                                                           PAGE
    Brooks v. State, No. 03-13-00252-CR, ……………………………………..             13
    2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 6588 (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist.
    2014 no pet.), not designated for publication.
    Chindaphone v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 217
    ……………………………………             12-13
    (Tx. App. Ft. Worth 2nd Dist. 2007 rev. ref.)
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    (1979) …………………………………            
    11 Jones v
    . State, 
    373 S.W.3d 790
    ………………………………………………                13
    (Tx. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2012 no pet.)
    Jones v. State, 
    857 S.W.2d 108
    ………………………………………………                13
    (Tx. App. Corpus Christi 13th Dist. 1993 no pet.)
    Ex Parte Martin, 
    747 S.W.2d 789
    (Tx. Cr. App. 1988) ……………..       
    11 Taylor v
    . State, No. 03-14-0300-CR, 2014 Tex. App. ……………….        
    15 LEXIS 11324
    (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2014 rev. ref.),
    not designated for publication.
    Walker v. State, No. 03-03-00018-CR, 2003 Tex. App. ……………         
    14 LEXIS 5935
    (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2003 no pet.),
    not designated for publication.
    OTHER
    Texas Penal Code
    Section 31.03 ……………………………………………………………..                      12
    Section 31.03(a) …………………………………………………………                      12
    Section 31.03(b) …………………………………………………………                      12
    4
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    Article 1.15 ……………………………………………………………….. 7-8, 10-15
    5
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    The State does not request oral argument.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Christopher Ray Weatherspoon, was charged by indictment with
    the state jail felony offense of theft. In Count I the indictment alleged
    that he, acting individually and as a party with Kody Lee Braxton and
    Zachary David Castlow, did unlawfully appropriate, by acquiring and
    otherwise exercising control over, property, to-wit: metal castings of
    the value of $1,500.00 or more, but less than $20,000.00 from Kevin
    Canfield, the owner thereof, without the effective consent of the owner,
    and with intent to deprive the owner of said property. (CR-4).
    The Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged in
    Count I (RR-2-9) and the trial court, without objection, took judicial
    notice of the “plea papers” in the court’s file (CR-19), expressly
    including the judicial confession. (RR2-11). The trial court then found
    the evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilty and ordered a
    presentence investigation. (RR-7). There was no plea bargain with the
    State.(CR-19; RR2-10).     The court found the evidence sufficient to
    support a finding of guilty upon the plea of guilty. (RR2-11).
    6
    At the subsequent punishment hearing the court received and
    examined the presentence report (RR3-5) and heard testimony from the
    Appellant. The trial court assessed punishment at 2 years in State Jail
    (RR3-57).
    The Appellant gave timely notice of appeal (CR-36) and the trial
    court certified his right to do so. (CR-39).
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The Appellant raises two issues concerning the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support his plea of guilty under Article 1.15, Texas Code of
    Criminal Procedure, and the recitation in the trial court’s written
    judgment allegedly implying that there was a plea bargain with the
    State.
    Evidence Supporting the Plea of Guilty
    The Appellant executed a packet of “plea papers” in the case. (CR-
    19-28). Those papers included the following judicial confession:
    “Upon my oath, I swear my true name is Chris
    Weatherspoon and I am ___ years of age; I have read the
    indictment or information filed in this case and I committed
    each and every act alleged therein, except those waived by
    the State. All facts alleged in the indictment or information
    are true and correct. I am guilty of the instant offense as
    well as all lesser included offenses. All enhancement and
    habitual allegations set forth in the indictment or
    7
    information are true and correct except those waived by the
    State. All deadly weapon allegations are true and correct.
    All other affirmative findings to be made by the Court
    pursuant to this Written Plea Agreement are true and
    correct. I swear to the truth of all of the foregoing and
    further, that all the testimony I give in this case will be the
    truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help me
    God.” (CR-24)
    That judicial confession was signed by the Appellant. (CR-24).
    Furthermore, thereafter, the Appellant executed a declaration stating
    under penalty of perjury that all of the matters contained in the plea
    papers are true and correct. (CR-25).
    The Appellant’s trial counsel also signed an acknowledgment that
    expressly stated that he had explained everything, including the judicial
    confession, to him and that he had waived his rights and executed the
    documents    intelligently,   knowingly,   and   voluntarily.     Counsel
    specifically joined in the stipulations of evidence pursuant to Article
    1.15 and consented to the trial court taking judicial notice of the
    contents of the Written Plea Agreement. (CR-25).            The State also
    approved all of the contents of the plea papers. (CR-26).
    The trial court approved the plea papers in writing and stated that
    it was taking judicial notice of the matters contained therein. (CR-26).
    8
    During the hearing and after the Appellant entered his plea of
    guilty to the information, the State asked the court to “…take judicial
    notice of the contents of the court’s file including the plea papers which
    will contain the defendant’s judicial confession to count one..” The
    Appellant had no objection and the court did so. (RR2-11). Thereafter
    the court immediately found the evidence sufficient to support a finding
    of guilty. (RR2-11).
    At the sentencing phase of the trial, while attempting to minimize
    his culpability, the Appellant admitted helping Kody Broxton to take the
    metal casings (RR3-16) and taking the property to Houston for sale and
    sharing equally with Broxton in the profits. (RR3-37).
    Trial Court’s Judgment
    There was no plea bargain with the State in the case. (CR-19; RR2-
    10). In the trial court’s written judgment on the line denoted as “Terms
    of Plea Bargain” is found the phrase “SEE ATTACHED DISCLOSURE OF
    PLEA RECOMMENDATIONS”. (CR-31).            There is no such disclosure
    attached to the judgment and the “plea papers” also contained in the
    court’s file state that plea was “open” and thus recite no plea
    recommendations. (CR-19).
    9
    SUMMARY OF STATE’S ARGUMENT
    The trial court took judicial notice of judicial confession, signed by
    the Appellant and approved by the State, his counsel, and the court, as
    well as all of the “plea papers” in the case, without objection by the
    Appellant. That judicial confession stated that all of the allegations in
    the information were true and correct. The information contained all of
    the statutory elements of the offense charged.         The evidence was
    sufficient to support the Appellant’s plea of guilty and for the court to
    enter such a finding under Article 1.15.
    Although unnecessary, the evidence at the punishment hearing
    wherein the Appellant admitted participation in the theft as charged in
    the indictment may be properly considered and sufficiently supports
    the Appellant’s plea of guilty as well.
    The written judgment of the trial court does not specifically state
    that there was a plea bargain with the State and, in fact, there was not.
    It merely says see attached disclosure. That disclosure states that it was
    an open plea. The judgment does not, therefore, indicate that there was
    a plea bargain in the case. If, however, it could be so construed then the
    judgment should be modified to reflect that there was no plea bargain.
    10
    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
    First Issue on Appeal
    Was the evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilty
    pursuant to the Appellant’s plea of guilty as required by Article 1.15 of
    the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure?
    Standard of Review
    When the accused enters a plea of guilty the standard of review
    set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    (1979), as to sufficiency of the
    evidence are inapplicable. Ex Parte Martin, 
    747 S.W.2d 789
    , 792-93
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).      Instead the sufficiency of the evidence is
    governed by Article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
    Article 1.15 provides that in a non-capital felony case, where the
    defendant waives trial by jury and enters a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere, it is necessary for the State to “introduce evidence into the
    record” that shows the guilt of the defendant and that such evidence be
    accepted by the trial court as the basis for its judgment. See Martin at
    793. The appellate court will affirm the trial court’s judgment under
    Article 1.15 if the State introduced evidence that embraces every
    essential element of the offense charged that is sufficient to establish
    11
    the defendant’s guilt. A judicial confession stating that the defendant
    has read the charging instrument and that he committed each and every
    act alleged therein, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction
    upon a guilty plea under Article 1.15. Chindaphone v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 217
    , 219 (Tx. App. Ft. Worth 2nd Dist. 2007 rev. ref.).
    Application and Analysis
    The Appellant was charged with the offense of theft as set out in
    Section 31.03 of the Texas Penal Code. Section 31.03(a) states that a
    person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with
    the intent to deprive the owner of property. Section 31.03(b)(1) states
    that appropriation of property is unlawful if it is without the owner’s
    effective consent.
    Count I of the indictment in this case set out all of the elements of
    the offense under Section 31.03, alleging that the Appellant unlawfully
    appropriated property, to-wit: metal castings, from the owner and
    without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to
    deprive the owner of that property. (CR-4)
    The Appellant’s judicial confession stated that he had read the
    indictment and that everything alleged in it was true and correct and
    that he committed the offense as alleged. (CR-24).
    12
    A judicial confession stating that the defendant has read the
    charging instrument and that it is true and correct, where that charging
    instrument contains each and every element of the offense is sufficient
    to support a plea of guilty as required by Article 1.15. Chindaphone                 at
    219. See also Brooks v. State, No. 03-13-00252-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS
    6588 (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2014 no pet.), not designated for
    publication, following Chindaphone.1
    The Appellant would ignore his judicial confession because it was
    not formally offered into evidence nor sworn to before a notary or
    district clerk. That Appellant’s protestations to the contrary, however,
    the judicial confession may be judicially noticed by the trial court and, in
    that case, it need not be introduced formally into evidence. Chindaphone
    at 219; Jones v. State, 
    373 S.W.3d 790
    (Tx. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2012
    no pet.); Brooks op. at pg. 6.
    Likewise, a judicial confession that was signed by the accused,
    approved by his counsel, the State and the trial court and of which the
    court takes judicial knowledge need not be sworn. Jones v. State, 
    857 S.W.2d 108
    , 110 (Tx. App. Corpus Christi 13th Dist. 1993 no pet.);
    1
    Brooks also arose from the 264th District Court and involved essentially the same “plea
    papers” and judicial confession as the present case.
    
    13 Walker v
    . State, No. 03-03-00018-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 5935 (Tx.
    App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2003 no pet.) (“There is no requirement that the
    defendant swear to the waiver and stipulation before the clerk or
    anyone else” Op. at pg. 4).
    Here the Appellant signed the judicial confession and declared
    under penalty of perjury that it was true and correct. That judicial
    confession confirmed the truth of all of the allegations in the
    information. The information contained all of the statutory elements of
    the offense charged. The judicial confession was approved by defense
    counsel, the State and the trial court. The judicial confession and other
    “plea papers” were filed of record.      The trial court expressly took
    judicial notice of the papers, including the judicial confession, and based
    its judgment upon that instrument.          The evidence was certainly
    sufficient to support the Appellant’s plea under Article 1.15.
    Second Issue on Appeal
    Was the evidence at the sentencing phase of the plea proceeding
    sufficient to support the Appellant’s plea of guilty under Article 1.15?
    Application and Analysis
    It must first be observed that the evidence during the first phase
    of the plea proceeding was sufficient to support the plea and, therefore,
    14
    it is not necessary to rely upon the events during the punishment
    hearing. His contentions as to this issue are moot.
    While the Appellant did not go down the list of elements of the
    offense charged in his testimony at punishment one by one, he did tell
    the trial court that he and Broxton took the property, that he knew it
    was wrong and that he should have backed out (RR3-9, 17, 18), but that
    they did it at least twice. He also said that they took the metal castings
    to Houston on two occasions and sold it for a total of $9,000.00, which
    they split evenly. (RR3-37). This certainly, coupled with his plea of
    guilty and his judicial confession serves to satisfy the requirements of
    Article 1.15.
    A guilty plea is a unitary proceeding and Article 1.15 does not
    distinguish between evidence offered at guilt/innocence or the
    punishment phase.             The courts may consider evidence at the
    punishment phase in order to determine if the requirement of Article
    1.15 has been fulfilled. See Taylor v. State, No. 03-14-0300-CR, 2014
    Tex. App. LEXIS 11324 (Tx. App. Austin 3rd Dist. 2014 rev. ref.), not
    designated for publication2, and cases cited therein.
    2
    Taylor also arose in the same district court concerning a virtually identical fact situation
    as in this case and raising the same issues. Counsel for the Appellant also represented the
    defendant in that case.
    15
    Third Issue on Appeal
    Must the judgment of conviction be modified to reflect that the
    Appellant entered his plea of guilty without a plea bargain?
    Application and Analysis
    The Appellant entered his plea of guilty to the trial court without a
    plea bargain with the State. (RR2-10). The plea papers reflect that the
    plea was “open”. (CR-19). The judgment of conviction recites: “Terms
    of   Plea   Bargain:     SEE    ATTACHED       DISCLOSURE      OF    PLEA
    RECOMMENDATIONS. (CR-31). There is no apparent attachment to the
    judgment in the record. The only disclosure of plea bargain shows an
    open plea and therefore contains no plea recommendations (CR-19).
    The judgment does not actually state that there was a plea bargain
    in this case. There is no such attachment to the judgment and the
    court’s file, as well as the reporter’s record clearly show that there was
    no plea bargain. Thus there is really nothing in the judgment to reform.
    If, however, the Court interprets the statement to imply otherwise then
    the judgment should be reformed to delete that reference.
    16
    PRAYER
    The State of Texas respectfully prays that the judgment of
    conviction herein be, in all things, be affirmed.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    HENRY GARZA
    District Attorney
    /s/     Bob D. Odom
    BOB D. ODOM
    Assistant District Attorney
    P.O. Box 540
    Belton, Tx 76513
    (254) 933-5215
    FAX (254) 933-5704
    DistrictAttorney@co.bell.tx.us
    SBA No. 15200000
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9
    This is to certify that the State’s Brief is in compliance with Rule 9
    of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be
    included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 2,027 words.
    /s/     Bob D. Odom
    BOB D. ODOM
    Assistant District Attorney
    17
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    This is to certify that a true and correct copy of this brief has been
    served upon, John A. Kuchera, Counsel for Appellant, by electronic
    transfer via Email, addressed to him at johnkuchera@210law.com on
    this 30th day of September, 2015.
    /s/   Bob D. Odom
    BOB D. ODOM
    Assistant District Attorney
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-15-00237-CR

Filed Date: 9/30/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2016