-
2CnFE8 27 r-il |:0o './ ' •'- .1 (^ J • i ♦ - s. / Mukm uk v.Com m jssijnerofDept.ofCo2aect±>nalServ±:es, 529 F 2d 272 0-976) End ofDooBii Qit ^ 2017 Than son Ralters.N o ahin to orjgjialU S .G ovemra eitW odes. WESTLAW '''' 2017 Thorn don Reuteis.No cliin to oiXTiiftiw- S .Govenun ent:W oaks. siJOi Mukm iTk v.Com m issiDnerofDept.of CorrectiDnalServires, 529 F 2d 272 0-976) There are types ofd^riyat±>n of r^ts whidi may be reoognized as unoonsdtutional for puipo^ of federal dsdl rghts statute onwhen they are jadinhTly sd dedated; however, there ate instances of giD®abu® to hum an d^ity sd diockingto ODnsdenceasto requiieno pdicdalpiDnounoem aitfortheirgeneralreoognitfon. 42U SC A .§1983;U SC A ConSLAmQid.8. C affis that cdte this headnote D-l] C ivilR ^hts G ovemm entA gaiciesand O ffriers Pubic officermay inflictharm whiii is a violation ofa oonstilutionalprohfoifion withoutoonsdousplan or iltcitpuipose; however,teStof liability oughtnotignoreentir^ the mores of the tin es oreventhepartioilar moresofprison guards, tmtxained in the lawyers'view of life. 1C a ^ that dte this headnote AttDm^andLaw Firms *273 DavilJ. File, New York City (Elizabeth M . Fidier,DaviiRosaiberg, and Paul, Wei9S,Riflciid,W hazton & G a3adsDn,N ew Y oik C ity, ofcounsd), forappdlant. David L.Birch,D^utyAffit:.Atty.Gai.of theStateofNe«r Yoik (LouisJ,Leflcowitz,Atty.G0i.,and SamuelA . H irdiow itz, F irstA ast.A tty.G en., ofooun^, forappdlees. BeforeFEINBERG ,GURFE3N andVAN GRAAFEILAND ,CiroiitJudges. 0 pimon G U R FE IN , C ircuitJudge: TheplaintiflE,M asiaM ukm uk,isaB lade MusQin leaderwho ^ait15 years iiNew Yoikstateprisons.^ From hisown albgatfonsin hisci^ilrghtsaomplaint,hewasanactivistii prison.Onecannothet)butieadb^eai the lines *274 thatdiehasbeoi a thorn ii thesideofprison officdalsduringmostofhisprison life.Such activisn tmdstc elicdtareactdve usa ofpower. To persons in authority in the prison seme thatpow eris readifyavailable.The arbus questfonraissd is whethertheboundaresofperm febtesanctionsby the correctionsofBDerswere cro^d and theoonst±ut±>nalrightsof MukmukundertheEi^th,FoiuiBaithandFirstAm endmoitsviohted. ^ HewasTe1f3a3?d onpaipb ii January, 1975. This is a s 1983 action which has long endured upon the docketof the D istidctC ourt for the Southern D istrictofN sv Yoik with but iTtt-v* movem ait:. The actfon was begun xi A ugust: 1970. The compfeintwas twice am ended. Ih 0 ctober 1973,amotion forsummaiy jadgmaitwasmadeby thedefeidants,who aretheComm isabnerof theD ^artmaitof Correctbnal Services; J. Edw ii LaVaHee, Superdntendait of the ClintDn Correctdonal Facility; Viicent R . M anaisi, SuperhtEndentoftheAtticaCorrectionaIFacility;andJbhnL .ZeIker,SuperintaidaatoftheG reaiH avaiCorrectbnal Fadlty.^ 2 Eartierdefeiaem otfonsto disn issforlade ofprosacutfon were detiied.Varbusotherprooeduialm ovesaaEdesa±ted ii the opxiionbebw .M ukmukv.CcmmiasbnerofD^tofCorEectdonalServicEs,369FSupp.245 (SD N .Y J.974).A prayerfor iEStorat±>n of good tin e oedils was dian tsbpH as h the nature of a pettbn for habeas ooipus wilhout exhaustbn of state ranedies.SeePredaerv.Rodriguez,411U S.475,93 SjCt.l827,36L Ed2d439 a.973).W eagiee. WESTIAVV Epps v.CortEse, 326 F Supp .127 0-971) *130 g.NeifliertheR^teviiW MiBondActnortheni]ese}^iEa^setfiDrththattiieSherifiE,puraaanttDtliewritwifti bond,m ay fouibfybiBak and enterorthathem ay notbreak oraitEr. 10. ]n none ofthe 'rnH-Kniii iai m.eiaa did. the SheadfE biBak and enterinto the piHti ofp]ajitiffe. 11. Neither the SheadfE nor hasagents have any dascti^don an deteam iiing the under^dng tiansactaon gasdng rte to the r^fevii wMl bondactian.TheyaaenotasquaiBd orpeam Msdto hear ordetEon iie any aasues ofthe adghtsof eMierof theparties to the paraperty ii questian. 12.The ShedfE, orhasagents,after ssiziig and takingposssssbn of the paraperty nam ed in the wril:, musthoid it ii his oistDdy fiara peadod of ssventyHwo houis,duringwhich tan e thedefendantnam edon thewadtm ay legaii poaaessbn of theproperty by filing a counter-bond in the sam e am ountas the oraginalbond. 13. The fiaam of the writ requiced by Paara^lvania Rules of CiviL Procedure, Rule 1354, contaiis no notdce to the defeidantthathem ay reoovertheproperty by posting a counterbond, nordoes ites^reffi^prohiaitthisnoldae. 14 .Ifthedefendanton thewritfeilstD fDethe counterbond withii thesevaitybtf o hourperbd,theSherifE,orhisagai.ts, isrequired to delivertheproperty ffiized to theplaintdtTon thewiit^sjbipcttD Rule1079 dealing withan poundiig. 15.TheplaiitdfE, Epps,and thedefaidant:,G ovemm entEm playeesExchangeC oaporatbn, aasthepartiestao a contract aitdtfed RetaiLBistallneatContracfe- SecuiityAga3eemait'whichprovades,interalia,thefi3]]owing; You r.ya<3=rijng diaUretaii HfVa to said merrhandase;I wiUbe as^nsble fiarits loss ordam age; I wilLnotran ove or encum bersam e; if I defeuMin any paymentorbreach any oovaaantheceii, the aitdre babnce diallbe in mediatefy' due and payable and you orassigns may retakethe merchandi^, ^D.the sam e and hold me fiDr any deficaaicy, or afEiim the saife and hold me Ihbte fiarthe unpaM babnce * * * n otioe by buyer: 1. Do not sign this contractbefiare you read itor if itcontains any bbnk ^aces.' 16.Thepropertynam edii thewrittD be r^leviedfiram plaiitifEEppsconsistBdofoneG E .stereo, twowedding rhgs, a diamond watch and band and a T .V .roofantama. 17. PlaiitifEEpps, atthe tin eof the institutian ofthe r^levii actian, earned Mexcessof$10,000 peryear. 18.0 n Fdaruary 1,1969, the pfeintdflE, PaulParham , and the defeidant. Sears, Ro^uck and Co., altered iitD a sin ilar nataii fTPrf"rr^n^Tar"a•lcr> piDviding that the seBer raaii t-it-lp ii the goods sold and thatupon defeult the ^Ilerm ay at hisoption i^xDi^s3thegoods.Thep!kintifiE,EIlai Paiham ,wasnotaparty to theoontract. 19.A HaimonyHousetableandfiaurstiaolsandadiyanbedweredelis/erBdtDthep]aintifiE,PaulPaiham ,and posssssbn wasraainedbyhin iihishomeuntdLthegoodswereri^leviedbytheSheriffofPhilade^hiaCounty. 9n TVinsand PrisDners'R jghts, K rantz. Oc)M anual&rPrisDn Law Li)iaries,W emer. (1)M odemFedeialPiact±eD dgest,Vo]Limesl6-18A ,26,26A ,39,and42. tn ) M anualforCourtsM artKl,U S .G ovemm aitPrhtmg O fiSoe. WdusdoeandtheM iiilaiy, Pubic Law Education liistiliite (Dutofpiait- ke^ curreitcopdes). b) R j^tsofthe 3m prisoned, Siiger. *611 4)) PracticeM anualon Miliaiy DisdiaigeU pgiadiig. Am edcan CdvilL ±>ertdesU nion. <5) Prisoners'AssistanoeD irBctDiy,TheN at±)nalPrison Pio^ct. W C rfai iialPiDaeduiE in aN utdieD, Tfnaeland LaFave. AILCitatijns 790 F 2d 589 KiKi cfr •:5;aufi eit;. ' 2017 Thc-.'P. frm R eare-:rs.l\ o ciaii to crgrialU S .0 oveinrn entW otIlp. WESTLAW 201 / Thoir: soxi K c^iueis.No • itii; id cihiialU 5 .C ovemm oiicW oikt CaliweILv.Milter,790 F2d 589 tt986) them ail ]^w Ibiary.CaHw^doesnotaigue thathdsaocesBtD the basic Ihmry is iiadequate ii tEon s ofthe mom berof visits he isalbwed ortheam ountof tin ehem ay isn ain. in.the Ibraiy atany one tin e. 25] 26] CeiiiwelLclainsthatthebasiciaw ]ibiaiiescannot:seaveasasL±)StitutEfc)rdir!ectaoaesBtD them ain bw Ubiaiy. WedonotiagiBe.Thebasfcbw ]ibiaries,ifth^cDntaiithematEim]s]istBdinthe^poidixitDtheafiEidavitfDadiisupport ofM xlbrfemotiDn for summary judgment (c^Boduoed in Appaidixto thisopini)n),a2EadequatEtopiDviaeCa]dweIL with the dtatfonshe needs to requeStica^kw matBciaJs and to com pJete his reseairh. Rpsi-rirtbns on ditBCtaooess tp bgalmatsdabmaybe justdfisd in Ightof bgitin atEsecurilyoonaideiatfons. Cam pb^ at 226-29;^a]sD Procunferv. Martinez,416U 5.396,420,94 SCt. 1800,1814-15,
40 L Ed 2d 224a974).AswenotBdattheoutffit,M arbnpiE^ts unijue discplhaiy and fflourity oonsideratiDns. This is true whetherone isdea]iig with generalpopubtdon mm atss or with those in theContcolU nit-Becau^we find thatthedisct-aooasrestrfotfonsdo notraiderCaidwelLSaoaestD the courts,asa gaietalm atter, unm eaningfiil,and thatthe® restdctbnsaresupportedby iegitinate teourityconsideaatfons, wewilLdefertn the judgm aitofM arfon oflEfciaisin adoptiig theprooeduiESth^have. Procunier, 416U 5.at420,94 SCt.atl884;BeILv.W o]fai,441U S.at555,99SChat1882;Campbell,at226. 27] This, however, does not foiV di^offi of Caidw aonessdain . CaidweHwas initial^ convicted and aaitiaioed under,and jD istrictofColrmbia law iiorderto pursuepostKonvictfon ran edies.H earguesthat the d-iciT-if-t- *607 courterred in assum ing that the rsinstatan aitof the "Shawnee PIan" would, withoutm ore, ran edy the lack ofD istcictof Colim bia caselaw in them ain law library.U nderthe Shawnee Plan,prisoneisneeding catebw matadalsnotavailable in them ail law iforarymay reguest, by exactcite, the materials fiom theShawneeLaw Library, and photocopies of these matEozals would be provided them . Caldw ell dain s, therefore, that sum mary judgm aitwas inproperon thebaaisoftheafBdavitsubm iltedbyM i]]er,and thatthereran aiigaiuine issuesofmatedalfoctin regard tohisaccesdain . Weagreewilh CaHwdlto theextaitthatfectualisaiesrHnaii asto the availabilityof District of Columbia casdaw matsadals,and as to whether there are suffkdait referaice and research matsrials available to hin to obtah cites to the casebw matetdals he neads." If the exact-cite s/^sa is supplan entsd by adequatereferaicematedals in thebasic law Ibrary, thai theuseof a bw IbraryoutsrieM arion to proviieaccessto DistrictofColambb caffimatedabis const±utbnalVperm issibb. If, however, the basic bw Iforary^stan has notbeai in plan aitsd, or if the IbTarips do notcontain the materbb they have beai r^resitsd to contain, then the conSdtutdonalityof the legal-accessprogram is pbcad hto qu^tbn. Ih eithercase, CaHweHwould be abb to pursue thatpartofhis accesscbin on ran and .Thus, we hold that the distdctcourterred ii granting M illerfem otion for sum mary judgm aiton thatpartofCaldwdlfe cbin regardiig the adequacy ofhbacoess to DistrrtofColunbbcasebw .21 addition,iftheconditfonswehavenotBdabove asto th<=» ibhiiTtynfadeqi iat¥> TF'fi=»w=nnpm aterbb ii thebasicbw IbTariesaTPnotsatisfied, then Caldwdim aypursue hbgeneralchallenge to the adequacy ofM arfonSlegal-acoeteprogram . rhCotgaiiv.M ilfer,708 F 2d 1241 f7thC3rl.983),weheld
40 L Ed 2d 224dT a974); Jchnson v. Avsry, 393 U S. 483,486-87, 89 set. 747, 749-50, 21 L Ed2d 718 (1969).We ffad that M iilerb aiguin ait fells squareV withh the Supran e C ourtbcaveat, O-O] The sofeeviiaiae offered by MiHerin regard to CaHwellS fise-exetcise chin was DavisS afSdavit. Theas is no iidioation thatiD paTalpgal.cpprhlTei-jpnffpcg"anydegrBeofes^erti^cistDin atters ofprison ffiCurity.N ordoes he stats thathe h rs^nsble form aking the type ofdisaetbnaiy decisbn at issuehere. See St. Chire v. Cuyler, 634 F2dl09,115 (3idCirJ.980).M jlfersubmittsdno fiirtherafiEiJavitBinis^nsetDRevearndLambfeafBdavit-Itistrue Davis averred that, folbw ing the lockdown, a Bureau tadc foroe recom mended a numberof changes in the operation of M arbn. H e did not stats, however, nor do we fhd any oonclisiye mention efewhere in the reoord of, the natuis of those changes,whetherM arbn officialshad adopted than , or what pacific ^curity oroperationalconsiderations supportthan .D avis did noteven iidiatEwhelhera ban on group relgiousactdvitieswasrsoom mended by theBureau tadc foiDs,orwhetheritgr0w outof the tadc forces otherreoom meidatdons. 3h addition, M iDerdid notappend a copy ofthe tadc fonoeS fhdings, recom mendations, orr^ortto hism otion forsum maiy judgm ait:. Ih diort,D avisSaffidavit ofersno insight into why group religious ssrvioesthreatm the seairityoropetation ofMarbn. The evidaioe,whatlittilethere may be, offered by M fTW-tn supportthe ban on group religious activities is defectove for anotherfundam aitalreason :D avisSafEidavitxslatsd onV to theperiod in mediatsV foUow ing the lockdow n atM arbn. M ilter makes no attempt to substantiate whether the conditions that in his judgmait neoeffidtatsd the lockdown had persistBdtD thetdn eoftheoialargum enton hismotion forsummaiy judgm ait,som eninem onthslater. ItisundoubtabV fwsripr to justify resbdctbns on group religious activities during the period in mediatsfy followiig a declared stats of an ergaicy, see,eg.,W alkerv.M intses, 771 F 2d 920,930-31 (6thCir2985);RogerBV.Scuir, 676F 2d 1211,1216 (8th Cira982),butitisyetanotherquest±>nwhetherfflcurityconaemswarxantapemianaitban.W alter,771F 2dat930- WESTLAW 201'/ Tl-K.-rn so:: 1< . H• Ca]dwe]lv.MiIfer,790 F2d 589 tt986) It 33fer finm c]aarwhatfoi33e Cooper drauB be gdyan ii a cannotiivol/iig the ddaadn iiatniy treatm entofmembersof apa3tiou]arfeih.W e alaa cJedded Cocperw ilhout the benefit of mudi of the Supran e Cou3h jirifprudence ii the area of inmatBrrhts,mostnotabV Cruz v.Beto, 405 O S.319, 92 SCt. 1079, 31 L £ld2d 263 (1972);Pi!Dcun3erv.M artiiez, 416U S,396,94SCt.l800,40LEd2d224 a974);Pe]lv. Procunder, 417 U S.817, 94 SJCt.2827,41 L £d2d 495 a974); W olfifv.M cDanneIl,418U S.539,94SJCt.2963,41L Ed2d935 a974);Jcnesv.NorthCarolhaPrd!=nnpm'Undcn,433U S. 119, 97SCt.2532,53LEd2d629 a977);BeILv. W odfidl, 441 U S. 520, 99 SCt. 1861, 60 L Ed2d 447 a979). In Cruz, &r example, the SupianeCouJhheld that an hmatsmay notbe "dmded a reaaaiable qgportunity of pumiAig hds fadth comparable to tihe opportunity afforded foTbw prdsDnecs who adhere to aanvaitdonalreligdous preo^ts." C ruz, 405 U S. at331,92 SjCt:.atl081 bnphasisadded).Thus,wedonotread Cocperasrequdrdhg thatweeppend a "Teaat:restxdctdye alematdve" qualdfer to the standard set foidi ii M acfyunv. Fianzai, 704 F 2d 954 C7th C dr.), osrt. denied, 464 U S. 996, 104 SCt.493,78 L Ed2d 687 0-983), thatregufetbnsaffortiigan iim atEfefise-exercifge rightbe "reasDnaby adapted" to achieving an in portantpaio]ogialob;^ctdye. We aocord, as we must:, prisDn ofEicals wiie-rangiig defeamce in adopt±ig policies that are needed to presesrve intEtnalOlder and fficuidty, Hewittv. H eln s, 459 U S. 460,474,103 S jC t:. 864,872-73,
74 L Ed 2d 6750-983);Bellv. Wo]fai,441U S.at547-48, 99 S£:t.atl878;PeIl417 U S.at827, 94 S£:t.at2806,andwewi]lnotsubst±utBOur juidgm ait for theirs "ii the abaaioe of substantialevidaiae in the isoDid to iidicatE that the officials have exaggeaated thPTT-Ti3cpongp>tn thpgannnjandpn-at-inng." PeIl,417U S .at827,94 S JCt.at2806;SeeBlockV.Rutherford,468U S.576,104 Sjct.3227,82 LEd2d438 a984);H ewitt,459 U S.at467,470,103 SChat869-70;BeILv.W olfidi,441U S.at547- 48,554-55,562-63,99 S C t. at1878-79,1882-83,1886-87.Thisdoesnotm ean, how ever, thatitisappropriatB forus to defercom pl^feV to prdsDn adm inistratDis. Madyun, 704 F 2d at959 .By requiring thata prisDnregulation orpolicy be reasonab!^ adaptryl tjo an ioi portantoonsctfonalgoal, we protectthe Tegitdn ate jiterestof *597 prisonersii adhering to thtairTiaiTjTm1 yafa and giveguidanceto prison adm inistrators ii adopting policiesthatcom p!^ with oonddtutdonal standards,whileatthe am etin ec^propriat^deferring to theirjadgm entii mattersiabtBd to iislntiitionalsRainty.ld. ThAdictTTri-rniirtdT
66 L Ed 2d 163,qad nfPaTdwTtfaTiaiTgY^ngh«aiTPfe p wipnsnd Lamb also Stated that "the distrbution ofHoVCommunbn WESTLAW 2017 Thornson Reufois.h o chin to oii}iialU 5 .G oveinin entw oiks. '• ^ eHV.M r,790 F2d 589 a986) ri^tunderA rticdellltD havepioceediigsji theircausesoonductedbeforeadistrictjudgeafloppoaed to am agistiatE.and to <=ngiYiari-iami«annfein ii-farifyof g i«4i a i-ta-ni an^w^ri^ ri^«a jidiHai doesnoCwozk tz3 daiyhin theexetoseofthatright:. CaHweH ccntEnds that the district court fclbwed in proper procedure ii giantiig sum m aiy jidgm ent by hoUhg an evid£nt±cty hearhg xi ordertD detBun he whethergenuhe issues o£m aterial&ctesdstBd as to hiscJain s. Ih ourqphion this haccuTateV characterizes the proceedhgsbelow. Ttis true that the firsthearhg was desgnated a "bench tral' by the court reporter, butonV the A ssistantU S .A thorny and CaJdweHw ere preiBit, and no witneasswere sworn or testin ony taken. Rather, them agistrateadced CaldweHtD outihe his clain s so as to " an idea on them otion." Thetiansccptcorapriffld onytw gity-eightpages.Thesecondproceedxigw asdesgnatsd an "evidenthiyhearhg." Onceagaii,nowAne£ffiswere sworn ortestin ony taken. R efryrhg to the first proceedhg, them agistrate stated to CaldwelLthat'VepreviousV heard argum ents h thiscase," and hfiomedhin thatan affidavitof ReveraidW esl:; one of the chaphhs atM arbn,hadbeai subm ittwd to the aourt-H e then said to CaHwelb "Ithirk that we have covered everythhg on them otdon.W e covered eveiythxig at the lastm otion hearhg, didn twe?" The m agistrats then took the m othn ftjr sum m aiy judgm entunderadvisn ait. The aitire second proceedhg com prised four pagesoftranscrjpt. Caldw eRw as proceedhg pro se and his com plaht oontahed at best crHidiaoiy fectualaHegations. M oreover, Caldw eD. had giVim it+r^ n^TriiPr-affH»\r!rs»rin-ra -ffi oppneririnn tn M iDerSm Othn forsumm azy judgmait.Them agistzatBwas gidng Caldw elLthe opportxinity to hdrats what sort of evidaice he would reV on diouh the cause go to triaL Such a procedure is aitdreV consonant wilh the practhe of not holdhg pro s litigants to the m ore strhgait standards applied to fom alV toahed attorn^. See, eg., H ughesv.Rowe, 449 U S. 5,9-10,101S jC1.173,175-76, a980) t>ercuriam );H ainesv.Kemer,404U S.519,520-21,92 SjCt.594,595-96,30 L Ed2d 652 0.972).To feuJtthemannerh which the districtcourtconducted thepzDceedhgsherewou]dundu^hhhita salitarypraclhe.Thus,wew£llaonsiderthe proceedhgsbehw asoralargum anton M iHerSm othn for sum m aiy jadgm ait. CahwelLwasorighaTly COnvictBdh theP -is^rH-nfr n1iim h-fa.H needsannpflpitr> D jcfrH-nfr;nlim hh raapTaw . n 3] Befoietumhgto tJiesubstantiyeiaaiesiai^byCaHwellonappeail^wem ustaddreEsaprpcBduralm atdsr.CaHweH fi]adh3scDmp;biittjndertliefedeaalmandamusacts,28U SC .§§ 1361 and 1651 .Thed3stdctcDurtODnstEuedCaliwe]l& complaiitasonesaekiig dtiherawritofhabeas ODipusorawritofm andam usunderthesssbaliitES.ThecDurtheGd that neitherthem andam us statutesnorthe habeas statute provided a statntpry baFds for federal j.iTT3iict±)noverCaJdweJls com pMitL® The dist2±toourt:, however, aflbsr *595 condidiig that it had no jimiictbn, decided the merits of CaJdweHh ciain sby gianthg summaiy jidgmaitforM iLer.On ^peal, CaHwelL argues that the district court had 3jb;pct-m atterjLudsdictbn pursuantto 28 U S jC. § 1331. Q Weexpressno cphion ccoicemhg thereasonsgivai by thedistnctcourtforholdhg thatithad no jorisdiction overC aJdwells oom phhtpursuant to e±her28 U S C . § 2254 orthe m csndamusprovisions. It is welLsettiied thatpro se iitigants are notheid to the stiiigaitstandards applied t30 form alfy-trained m an bets of the legalprofessfan, and that, aoaoidingV, we construe pro $ com plaints liberally. See, eg., H ughes v. Rowe, 449 U S. 5, 9-10,101 SjCt. 173,175-76,
66 L Ed 2d 163a980) ^erouriam );H ainesv.Kemer,404 U S. 519,520-21,92 SCt. 594, 595-96,
30 L Ed 2d 652a972);BatESV. J ^ , 745 F 2d 1146,1150 C7thC ira984);Chi]dsv.Duckworth,705 F 2d 915,922 C7th C irJ.983). Itisalso w^settled thatFed R C ivP. 8 fe.) d) doesnotrequire a plaintifftn setfcrth the statutory basis for the districtcourts ajb;pct-m atter jirisdictfan ii orderfor the courtto assum e jurisdiction, so long as he alleges focts sufiBdentto brhg the ca®w ithin the courts jorisdihbn. v. S tateB card ofTax Ccm m isEaoneis,763 F 2d 272,278 C7thCirJ.985);Rohlerv.TRW , Inc.,576 F 2d 1260,1264 (7th CirJ.978);ffiealsoLossv.Blankaridrp, 673 F 2d 942,950 C7th C irJ.982) ("In perfections in pleading style w iHnotdivesta federalCDurtof judsdictbn where the complaht as a whole reveals a properbasis for jirisdiction."). It is dear ftom the fece of Caldw eTiScom plaht that he has alleged a num ber of constitutionalviolatiDns, arishg out of the lockdown atM aTHnn^ g1fFirHpr"tn gk/ta Hie^rW-n^nrh jiTTaiTrrinri nndpr^S TT S JC .§ 1331. See BivaiSV. Six WESTLAW 201'/ 1 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,500 U.S. 614(1991)
111 S.Ct. 2077,
114 L.Ed.2d 660, 59 USLW4574 District Court, and we apply the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. SeeBolting v.Shaipe,
347 U.S. 497,
74 S.Ct. 693,
98 L.Ed. 884(1954). I Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, claiming that a Leesville employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment. **2081 Edmonson invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. During voirdte, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Citing our decision in Bats3nv.Kaitucky,
476 U.S. 79,
106 S.Ct. 1712,
90 L.Ed.2d 69(1986), Edmonson, who is *617 himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors. The District Court denied the request on the ground that Batsondoes not apply in civil proceedings. As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000. It also attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence, however, and awarded him the sum of $18,000. Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that our opinion in Bataai applies to a private attorney representing a private Utigant and that peremptory challenges may not be used in a civil trial for the purpose of excluding jurors on the basis of race.
860 F.2d 1308(1989). The Court of Appeals panel held that private parties become state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges and that to limit Batsonto criminal cases "would betray Batsai's fundamental principle [that] the state's use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race violates the equal protection clause."
id., at 1314. The panel remanded to the trial court to consider whether Edmonson had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batssn. The full court then ordered rehearing en banc. A divided en banc panel affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications.
895 F.2d 218(1990). The court concluded that the use of peremptories by private Utigants does not constitute state action and, as a result, does not implicate constitutional guarantees. The dissent reiterated the arguments of the vacated panel opinion. The Courts ofAppeals have divided on the issue. See Dunham v. Frank feN uisery &Crafbs, lhc.,
919 F.2d 1281(CA7 1990)(private litigant may not use peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons on account of race); *618 Flidd v. Dykes,
863 F.2d 822(CAll 1989) (same). Cf. D asv. Sky Chefe, Ohc.,
919 F.2d 1370(CA9 1990) (corporation may not raise a BatHan-type objection in a civil trial); United StatEsv.De Grose,
913 F.2d 1417(CA9 1990)(government may raise a Batscn-type objection in a criminal case), rehearing en banc granted,
930 F.2d 695(1991); R^moldsv.LittfeRock,
893 F.2d 1004(CA8 1990) (when government is involved in civil litigation, it may not use its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner). We granted certiorari,
498 U.S. 809,
111 S.Ct. 41,
112 L.Ed.2d 18(1990), and now reverse the Court of Appeals. II In Poweisv.Ohr>,
499 U.S. 400,
111 S.Ct. 1364,
113 L.Ed.2d 411(1991), we held that a criminal defendant, regardless of his or her race, may object to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion of persons from the petit jury. Our conclusion rested on a two-part analysis. First, following our opinions in Batscnand in CartEcv.Juiy CommigaianofG regieCC3unty,396 U.S. WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Governnient Works llu/. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,
500 U.S. 614(1991)
111 S.Ct. 2077,
114 L.Ed.2d 660,
59 USLW 4574based upon a civil verdict may be preclusive of issues in a later case, even where some of the partiesdiffer. See Alfen v. McCuny,
449 U.S. 90,101 S.Ct.411, 66L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). And in alljurisdictions a true verdict will beincorporated in a judgment enforceable by the court. These are traditional functions of government, not of a select, private group beyond the reach of the Constitution. Ifa government confers on a private body thepower to choose thegovernment's employees or officials, theprivate body will be bound by theconstitutionalmandate of raceneutrality. Cf.Ta2kaii^,488 U.S., at 192-193,109 S.Ct.,at 462-463; RenderL-fiakerv.Kdhn,
457 U.S. 830,
102 S.Ct. 2764, 73L.Ed.2d418(1982). At least a plurality of the Court recognized this principle in Teayv.Adams,
345 U.S. 461,
73 S.Ct. 809,
97 L.Ed. 1152(1953).There we found state action in a scheme in whicha privateorganization known as the Jaybird DemocraticAssociation conducted whites-only elections to select candidates to run in the Democratic primary elections in Ford Bend County, Texas. The Jaybird candidate was certain to win the Democratic primary and the Democratic candidate was certain to win the general election. Justice Clark's concurring opinion drew from Smihv.A]lv2±^t,
321 U.S. 649,664,
64 S.Ct. 757,765,
88 L.Ed. 987(1944), the principle that "any 'part of the machinery for choosing officials'becomes subject to the Constitution's constraints." Terry,
supra,
345 U.S., at 481,
73 S.Ct., at 819. The concurring opinion concluded: **2086 *626 "[W]hena state structures its electoral apparatus in a form whichdevolvesupon a politicalorganization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play."
345 U.S., at 484,
73 S.Ct., at 821. The principle that the selection of state officials, other than through election by all qualified voters, may constitute state action applies with even greater force in the context of jury selection through the use of peremptory challenges.Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body. Were it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no question that the entire process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes state action. The fact that the government delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised. The delegation of authority that in Teny occurred without the aid of legislation occurs here through explicit statutory authorization. We find respondent's reliance on Polk Countyv.Dodsoiii,
454 U.S. 312,
102 S.Ct. 445,
70 L.Ed.2d 509(1981), unavailing. In that case, we held that a public defender is not a state actor in his general representation of a criminal defendant, even though he may be in his performance of other official duties. See ii.,at 325, 102 S.Ct., at 453-54; BrantLv.FinkeX
445 U.S. 507, 519,
100 S.Ct. 1287,1295,
63 L.Ed.2d 574(1980). While recognizing the employment relation between the public defender and the government, we noted that the relation is otherwise adversarial in nature.
454 U.S., at 323, n. 13, 102 S.Ct., at 452, n. 13. "[A] defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards ofcompetence and integrity as a private lawyer,... a public defender works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client." ia.,at 321,102 S.Ct., at 451. *627 In the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party, an adversarial relation does not exist between the government and a private litigant. In the jury-selection process, the government and private litigants work for the same end. Just as a government employee was deemed a private actor because of his purpose and functions in DodsDn,so here a private entity becomes a government actor for the limited purpose of using peremptories during jury selection. The selection of jurors represents a unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race. Our decision in w estv.Atkiis,
487 U.S. 42,
108 S.Ct. 2250,
101 L.Ed.2d 40(1988), provides a further illustration. We held there that a private physician who contracted with a state prison to attend to the inmates' medical needs was a state actor. He was not on a regular state payroll, but we held his "function[s] within the state system, not the precise terms WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No ciaim to origuial U.S. Government Work.s. 9 Edmonson v, Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,
500 U.S. 614(1991)
111 S.Ct. 2077,
114 L.Ed.2d 660, 59 USLW4574 There can be no question that the first part of the Lugar inquiry is satisfied here. By their very nature, peremptory challenges have no significance outside a court of law.Their sole purpose is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartialtrier of fact. While wehaverecognized the valueof peremptory challenges in this regard, particularly in the criminal context, see Bat33n,
476 U.S., at 98-99,
106 S.Ct., at 1723-1724, there is no constitutional obligation to allow them. Roa3v.Okfeho(na,
487 U.S. 81, 88,
108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278,
101 L.Ed.2d 80(1988); Stilsonv. United States,
250 U.S. 583, 586,
40 S.Ct. 28, 29-30,
63 L.Ed. 1154(1919). Peremptory challenges are permitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to excludea given number of personswho otherwisewould satisfy the requirementsfor service on the petit jury. *621 Legislative authorizations, as well as limitations, for the use of peremptory challenges date as far back as the founding of the Republic; and the common-law origins of peremptories predate that. See Holfend v. nihois,
493 U.S. 474,481,
110 S.Ct. 803, 808,
107 L.Ed.2d 905(1990); Swain,380 U.S., at 212-217, 85 S.Ct., at 831-834. Today in most jurisdictions, statutes or rules make a limited number of peremptory challenges available to parties in both civil and criminal proceedings. In the casebefore us,thechallenges were exercised undera federal statute that provides, intEralia: "In civil cases, eachparty shallbeentitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additionalperemptory challengesand permit them to be exercised separately or jointly."
28 U.S.C. § 1870. Without this authorization, granted by an Act of Congress itself, Leesville would not have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts. [3] Given that the statutory authorization for the challenges exercised in this case is clear, the remainder of our state- action analysis centers aroundthe second part of the Lugartest, whether a private litigant in allfairness mustbedeemed a government actor in the useof peremptory challenges. Although we haverecognized that this aspect of the analysis is oftena factbound inquiry,seeLugar, supra,
457 U.S., at 939,102S.Ct.,at 2754-55, our cases disclose certainprinciples of general application.Our precedents establishthat, in determining whethera particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following: the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tu]saPrDfessionalCoIlect±nServries,nhc.v.Pcpe,
485 U.S. 478, 108S.Ct. 1340,
99 L.Ed.2d 565(1988); Burtmv.W ihi ±ig1mPaikiigAutihorily,
365 U.S. 715,
81 S.Ct. 856,
6 L.Ed.2d 45(1961); whetherthe actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Teny v.Adam s,345U.S. 461, 73S.Ct.809,97L.Ed. 1152 (1953); M ardiv.A]abama,
326 U.S. 501,
66 S.Ct. 276,
90 L.Ed. 265(1946); cf. SanFranciscDArts& AtliMis,nhc.v.UnitelStatES Ofympt *622 Comm .,
483 U.S. 522, 544-545,107 S.Ct.2971,2985-2986,
97 L.Ed.2d 427(1987); and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a uniquewayby the incidents of governmental authority, seeSheBe/v.Kraan ei:,
334 U.S. 1,
68 S.Ct. 836,
92 L.Ed. 1161(1948). Based on our application of these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that theexercise of peremptorychallenges by the defendantin the District Court waspursuant to a courseof state action. [4] (5) Although private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not rise, by itself, to the level of state action, **2084 Tudsa PrDfe9six]al,
485 U.S., at 485, 108 S.Ct., at 1345, our cases have found state action when private parties make extensive use of state procedures with "the overt, significant assistance of state officials." 3d, at 486, 108 S.Ct., at 1345;see Lugarv.EdmcandsDnOilCo.,
457 U.S. 922,
102 S.Ct. 2744,
73 L.Ed.2d 482(1982); Srmdach V. Fam Finance Coip. of Bay view,
395 U.S. 337,
89 S.Ct. 1820,
23 L.Ed.2d 349(1969). It cannot be disputed that, without the overt, significantparticipation of the government,the peremptory challengesystem, as wellas thejury trial system of which it is a part, simply could not exist. As discussed above, peremptory challenges have no utility outside the jury system, a system which the government alone administers. In the federal system. Congress has established the qualifications for jury service, see
28 U.S.C. § 1865, and has outlined the procedures by which jurors are selected. To this end, each district court in the federal system must adopt a plan for locating and summoning to the court eligible prospectivejurors.
28 U.S.C. § 1863; see, eg..Jury Plan for the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (on file with Administrative Office of United States Courts). This plan, as with all other trial court procedures, must implement statutory policies of random juror selection from a fair cross section of the community, 28 U.S.C. § VVESTLAVV © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original tJ.S. Government Works. 7 53 SKt o F O H E V £ K 1 ms A - 'i } -i:-' a M . i-H \ V. 1 'IM' S-r * • r • : 'fi \
Document Info
Docket Number： 04-17-00023-CR
Filed Date： 3/2/2017
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/8/2017