Reymundo Hamelton Garcia v. State ( 2018 )

Opinion issued August 30, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-16-00541-CR
———————————
REYMUNDO HAMELTON GARCIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 179th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1442404
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Reymundo Hamelton Garcia, guilty of the felony
offense of murder1 and assessed his punishment at confinement for twenty years. In
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b), (c) (Vernon 2011).
two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence and excluding the testimony of his expert witness during the guilt
phase of trial.
We affirm.
Background
Adan Lopez Paz testified that in November 2013, he lived in an “apartment”
in a warehouse, while the complainant, Ernest Ybarra, lived at the same property in
a trailer. On the night of November 5, 2013, Paz, while sleeping, was awakened by
a “bang,” a “loud” “hard bang.” At the same time, he heard his car alarm sound, and
he thought that someone, who was “drunk,” had “hit [his] car.” Paz then heard the
complainant yelling and loudly screaming for about twenty minutes. “[S]cared,”
Paz stayed inside his apartment and telephoned the owner of the property, Abel
Trevino, to tell him that “there was somebody that was crazy” outside of his
apartment. When the screaming stopped, Paz opened his apartment door and saw
the complainant on the ground. Thinking that the complainant was “drunk,” Paz
walked passed him, went to look at his car, and moved it to another location on the
property.
After Paz moved his car, Trevino arrived at the property and asked Paz what
had happened. Trevino and Paz then went to “check[] . . . out” the complainant.
When Trevino touched the complainant to “see if he was okay,” he discovered that
2
the complainant had been shot and was dead. As Trevino and Paz walked out of the
area where the complainant was located, they saw appellant, who was “c[oming] out
of []his trailer” with a firearm, a “large” revolver, “.38, .357 [caliber].” Appellant
had a conversation with Trevino, which Paz did not hear. And Trevino called for
emergency assistance.
The next day, Paz notified a law enforcement officer who was at the property
that he had found a bullet in the taillight of his car. He, at the officer’s request, then
moved his car back to the location where it had been the previous night when his car
alarm had sounded.
Paz explained that although he had “[n]ever had any issues” with the
complainant, he had stayed away from the complainant because he had “heard that
he was a bully” and “liked to pick on people for no reason.” Paz noted, however,
that he had never actually seen the complainant drunk or “picking on people.” And
he had never seen the complainant “walking around with two big knives.”
Trevino testified that he owns approximately ten properties, including a
warehouse with “a couple of apartments” inside. He also has several trailers on the
warehouse property that he rents to homeless individuals. Trevino explained that
the complainant had rented a trailer at the warehouse property for more than a year.
Although the complainant would play music loudly outside of his trailer, Trevino
had never received any complaints about the music.
3
On the night of November 5, 2013, Trevino, who was not at the warehouse
property, received a telephone call from Paz. Trevino arrived at the property within
ten minutes of the telephone call and found Paz, who had just moved his car. Trevino
then went to appellant’s trailer, and appellant “walked out” holding “a gun in his
hand.” Because Trevino “did not like guns on [his] property” and appellant had only
been living in his trailer for one day, he told appellant to leave. At the time, appellant
appeared “[n]ormal” and did not tell Trevino about the shooting or that he had felt
threatened. According to Trevino, the firearm that he saw in appellant’s hand was a
“big gun,” a revolver, “like a .357 [caliber].”
After Trevino told appellant to leave the property, appellant went back into
his trailer and came out with a box. Trevino did not see appellant’s firearm, but he
believed that it was inside the box. After appellant left the property, Trevino then
began looking for the complainant because “the door of his trailer was open” and he
was “missing.” Trevino found the complainant in a hallway in a fetal position.
Thinking that the complainant was “drunk,” he “pushed him,” but the complainant
did not move. Trevino ran outside, retrieved his cellular telephone from his truck,
and called for emergency assistance, telling the operator that appellant was “getting
away.”
Trevino explained that at the time he asked appellant to the leave the property,
he “didn’t know what had happened.” He noted that he did not see any firearms,
4
knives, or weapons near the complainant. In fact, Trevino did not see any firearm
that night, other than the one that appellant was carrying. And he denied telling the
other tenants at the property that the complainant was “trouble.”
Houston Police Department (“HPD”) Sergeant C. Howard testified that on the
night of November 5, 2013, he and his partner, HPD Officer R. Lujan, responded to
a call regarding “a homicide scene.” Howard noted that appellant had been living
in “a little shed,” or trailer, on the warehouse property. After law enforcement
officers obtained a warrant to search the trailer in which appellant had been living,
they found, outside of the trailer, various items. And inside of the trailer, the officers
found “a .38 caliber cartridge casing.”
Sergeant Howard further explained that he found the complainant, who also
resided in a trailer on the warehouse property, in “a fetal position” and “crouched
down” in the back of a building on the property. The complainant did not have a
firearm in his possession, and law enforcement officers did not find any weapons or
firearms in his trailer. However, the complainant did have utensils and knives in the
kitchen of his trailer.
After obtaining an arrest warrant for appellant, Sergeant Howard and Officer
Lujan met him at a restaurant, where he told them that he was not armed and had
“got[ten] rid of the gun.” Later, at an HPD station, appellant gave a statement to
5
Howard.2 Appellant stated that during the night of the shooting, “it was dark” and
the complainant had been playing music loudly. After appellant, who was standing
in the doorway of his trailer, asked the complainant to turn down the music, the
complainant threw down his bag, put his hand in his pocket, and came toward
appellant. Appellant then shot the complainant, but “in self-defense.” Appellant did
not tell Howard that the complainant had a firearm or a weapon that night.
According to Sergeant Howard, the complainant was shot on his “front side.”
And both Trevino and Paz identified appellant as the person that they had seen at the
warehouse property with a firearm on the night of November 5, 2013. Howard noted
that a firearm is a deadly weapon and capable of causing serious bodily injury.
Officer Lujan testified that on the night of November 5, 2013, he and Sergeant
Howard arrived at the homicide scene, where he interviewed several witnesses,
including Trevino and Paz. While at the scene, he and Howard determined that
appellant had recently “moved into . . . a small shack-type structure” or trailer on the
warehouse property. And Lujan obtained a search warrant for appellant’s trailer,
which Howard and HPD Officer J. Oliphant then searched.
On November 6, 2013, Officer Lujan returned to the homicide scene, where
he found “some live rounds” outside of appellant’s trailer. Specifically, Lujan
2
The trial court admitted into evidence the videotape recording of appellant’s
statement to Sergeant Howard.
6
found, in a “green and white shoebox,” “a box of Monarch brand . . . .38 caliber
ammunition” and, in a black suitcase, a “small plastic bag” with “six rounds” of
“.357 [caliber] . . . bullets.” While Lujan was at the scene, Paz alerted him to “a
bullet fragment” that he had found in the taillight of his car. Lujan then asked Paz
to move his car back to the location where it had been the previous night. As part of
his investigation, Lujan determined that a bullet “went through” the complainant and
struck Paz’s car.
In regard to appellant’s statement to Sergeant Howard, Officer Lujan
explained that appellant had stated that he had been warned that the complainant was
“trouble,” appellant had asked the complainant to turn down his music, and when
the complainant came toward appellant, he shot him once. Lujan further noted that
appellant had told law enforcement officers that he had thrown away his firearm,
which the officers were not able to locate the firearm.
Dr. Dwayne Wolf, deputy chief medical examiner at the Harris County
Institute of Forensic Sciences, testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of
the complainant, who died at the scene on November 5, 2013. Wolf explained that
the complainant had suffered a gunshot wound to the front left side of his chest. The
bullet had traveled from the left side of the complainant’s body to the right side, and
from the front of his body to the back, before exiting. Wolf opined that the
complainant had been shot by an individual standing more than two and a half feet
7
away from him. And as a result of being shot, he had suffered serious bodily injury
that was clearly dangerous to human life.3 His cause of death was a “[g]unshot
wound to the chest.” And the manner of death was homicide.
Suppression of Evidence
In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence because the arrest and search warrants obtained by law
enforcement officers “contained conflicting information” and, thus, “it [was]
obvious that the information [contained in the warrants] was fabricated”; the arrest
and search warrants “lacked the requisite language needed for proper execution”;
and the arrest and search warrants “d[id] not give rise to probable cause.”
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion
and the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We generally
consider only the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing unless the parties
consensually re-litigate the issue at trial. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole and exclusive
trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and it may choose to believe or
3
During his testimony, Dr. Wolf described in detail the complainant’s internal
injuries caused by the gunshot wound.
8
disbelieve all or any part of the witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d
278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000). When, as here, a trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we
review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Walter v.
State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We give almost total deference
to a trial court’s implied findings, especially those based on an evaluation of witness
credibility or demeanor. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the
record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. at 447–48.
Prior to trial, appellant generally moved to suppress “[t]he fruits” of his “arrest
and detention” without specifying any particular evidence to be suppressed. At the
hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, appellant again generally moved for the
court “to suppress any evidence . . . seized in connection with either the arrest
[warrant] or the search warrant” without specifying any particular evidence that he
sought to be suppressed. On appeal, appellant again generally complains that the
trial court “should have suppressed all evidence obtained as a result” of the arrest
and search warrants. However, he also specifically asserts that the trial court
erroneously allowed “a gun that was the fruit of [law enforcement] officer[s’] illegal
search” to be admitted into evidence.
9
In deciding whether to address the merits of an appeal from the denial of a
motion to suppress, we must first identify the “fruits” that the trial court declined to
suppress. Gonzales v. State, 966 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Miller v. State, 312 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2010, no pet.); Brennan v. State, 140 S.W.3d 779, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Second, an appellate court must determine whether
the “fruits” were “somehow” used by the State. Gonzales, 966 S.W.2d at 524
(internal quotations omitted). If it is not clear from the testimony and exhibits what
the “fruits” are, then an appellate court need not address the merits of the defendant’s
claim. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Miller, 312 S.W.3d at 166;
Brennan, 140 S.W.3d at 781. “Likewise, if the fruits have not somehow been used
by the State,” then the appellate court again need not address the merits of the
defendant’s claim. Gonzales, 966 S.W.2d at 524 (internal quotations omitted).
To the extent that appellant complains generally that the trial court erred in
not suppressing “all evidence obtained as a result” of the arrest and search warrants,
we note that such a generalized argument fails to identify specific items of evidence
or categories of evidence that appellant sought to exclude by challenging his arrest
warrant and the warrant to search his trailer. Thus, he presents nothing for our
review. See Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Miller,
312 S.W.3d at 166 (defendant presented nothing for review where his motion sought
10
to suppress “any evidence obtained pursuant to the warrants” and brief stated he
“sought to suppress all evidence seized” (internal quotations omitted); Brennan, 140
S.W.3d at 781 (global request to suppress “all evidence seized or obtained” from
alleged illegal searches and failure “to identify what, if any, evidence was ruled upon
by the denial” of suppression motion, presented nothing for appellate review
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996).
In regard to appellant’s specific complaint on appeal that the trial court
erroneously allowed “a gun that was the fruit of [law enforcement] officer[s’] illegal
search” to be admitted into evidence, we note that appellant’s firearm was not
admitted into evidence at trial.4 And he has not identified any other evidence related
to his firearm that was discovered as a result of the challenged warrants.
Accordingly, we need not address the merits of appellant’s firs issue. Gonzales, 966
S.W.2d at 524 (court need not address merits of defendant’s complaint where “the
fruits have not somehow been used by the State” (internal quotations omitted)).
Exclusion of Expert Testimony
In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in excluding,
during the guilt phase of trial, the testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Darrel Turner,
4
Sergeant Howard and Officer Lujan both testified that law enforcement officers
were not able to locate the firearm used in the offense and appellant told law
enforcement officers that he had thrown his firearm away.
11
regarding post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) because Turner’s testimony
“showed [a]ppellant’s mental status at the time of the offense” and “in all
prosecutions for murder, . . . [a] defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as
to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing . . . together with all
relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the
accused at the time of the offense.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a)
(Vernon 2018). Appellant further argues that he was harmed by the exclusion of
Turner’s testimony about PTSD because “[b]y [the trial court] preventing . . . Turner
from testifying,” he was “denied the right to put on his defense.” See U.S. CONST.
amends. VI, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of mental illness for an
abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 574–75 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); see also Nickerson v. State, 478 S.W.3d 744, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, no pet.). We will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it falls outside
the zone of reasonable disagreement. Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). If the trial court’s ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to the
case, then we will uphold the judgment. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56; Nickerson, 478
S.W.3d at 757.
12
Appellant argues that because Dr. Turner’s testimony about PTSD negates the
required mens rea for the offense of murder, it was admissible under Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure article 38.36(a) and Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008).
Generally, relevant evidence5 that negates the mens rea element of an offense,
including evidence of a defendant’s history of mental illness, may be presented to a
jury. Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574 (defendant convicted of offense of murder); see
also Lizcano v. State, No. AP-75,879, 2010 WL 1817772, at *19 (Tex. Crim. App.
May 5, 2010) (not designated for publication) (defendant convicted of offense of
capital murder); Quick v. State, No. 01-09-01127-CR, 2011 WL 286155, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (defendant convicted of offense of murder). And in a prosecution for
murder, “the [S]tate or the defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing . . . together with all
relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the
accused at the time of the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a); see
Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574 (quoting article 38.36(a) in discussion of admissibility
of mental-illness evidence in prosecution for murder).
5
See TEX. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence).
13
However, mental-illness evidence, including that which is admissible in a
murder prosecution under 38.36(a), must still meet the general requirements for
admission under the Texas Rules of Evidence,6 and it may be excluded if it does not
actually negate the required mens rea of the offense. Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368,
381–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (trial court not required to admit expert testimony
concerning defendant’s mental illness during guilt stage of trial where “it d[oes] not
directly rebut his culpable mens rea”); Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574–75 (trial court
has discretion to exclude mental-illness evidence, including evidence admissible
under article 38.36(a), which does not negate element of mens rea); see also Lizcano,
2010 WL 1817772, at *19 (mental-illness evidence must meet general applicable
requirements for admission of evidence and “may be excluded if it does not truly
negate the mens rea” for offense); Ward v. State, No. AP-75750, 2010 WL 454980,
at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (not designated for publication); Nikmanesh
v. State, No. 05-16-00363-CR, 2017 WL 2774445, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June
27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Brown v. State, No.
04-12-00813-CR, 2014 WL 3747234, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 30,
2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Quick, 2011 WL 286155,
6
See, e.g., id. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”).
14
at *4–5 (mental-illness evidence, including that admissible under article 38.36(a),
may be exclude where it does not truly negate requisite intent for offense of murder).
The mens rea for the offense of murder is intentionally or knowingly causing
the death of an individual or intending to cause serious bodily injury and committing
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2011); see also id. § 6.03(a), (b)
(Vernon 2011) (defining when person acts intentionally, or with intent, and
knowingly, or with knowledge); Braughton v. State, 522 S.W.3d 714, 727 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. granted). Thus, the excluded testimony in this
case must negate the culpable mental state or show that appellant’s mental illness
prevented him from forming (a) the intent to cause the death of the complainant or
(b) the intent to cause the complainant serious bodily injury where his act caused the
death of the complainant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). In other
words, appellant’s mental-illness evidence must do more than provide an excuse or
justification for appellant forming the requisite intent; it must show that appellant
was prevented from forming the intent to commit the offense of murder. See Mays,
318 S.W.3d at 381 (mental-illness evidence did not rebut culpable mental element
of either capital murder or murder; mental-illness evidence only showed why
defendant intentionally and knowingly killed law enforcement officer); see also
Ward, 2010 WL 454980, at *4 (forensic psychologist’s testimony “presented only
15
an excuse for the crime: that [defendant] intentionally killed [the complainant]
because he was so paranoid that he thought [the complainant] . . . was out to get
him”); Nikmanesh, 2017 WL 2774445, at *3–4 (expert testimony concerning
defendant’s “major depressive disorder or obsessive-compulsive personality
disorder could only offer an explanation or motive for [his] actions but could not
negate intent” for offense of murder).
Here, Dr. Turner, outside the presence of the jury, testified that he is a clinical
psychologist who has experience with patients suffering from PTSD. In March
2016, he conducted a psychological evaluation of appellant. After his examination,
Turner concluded that appellant was competent and sane at the time of the offense.
However, Turner diagnosed appellant as having major depressive disorder, recurrent
and severe PTSD, and severe alcohol use disorder that was in “full remission.”
Dr. Turner explained that appellant’s PTSD was “more on the severe end,”
although it was not “the most severe” that he had seen. It “stem[med] from his
service in the United States Army in Vietnam between 1967 and 1971.” Appellant
had received “some treatment for [his] PTSD” and “disability through the United
States government.” And Turner opined that on November 5, 2013, appellant had
PTSD.
In regard to PTSD generally, Dr. Turner noted that a person with PTSD could
“re[-]experienc[e] . . . th[e] event [that caused the PTSD] through nightmares,
16
through intrusive memories, [and] sometimes flashbacks.” A person with PTSD
could also demonstrate “avoidant behavior,” i.e., “going out of one’s way to avoid
situations, things, smells, sounds that remind [him] of th[e] event, a negative
emotional state,” “a flat affect,” irritability, and “other negative emotional criteria.”
A “hallmark of PTSD” is also hypervigilance, i.e., a person is “very aware of [his]
surroundings,” “perceive[s] danger, oftentimes in places where someone without
PTSD would not,” and is “more apt to . . . see[] [certain behavior] as a threat.” A
person with PTSD could also react to a perceived threat at a quicker rate.
Related to appellant’s PTSD, Dr. Turner opined generally that when appellant
is placed “in a situation where he perceive[s] himself to be in danger,” his
“experience [of] fear and an increase in [his] nervous system activity” are
“exacerbated greatly.” And because appellant’s PTSD is “of a military nature and
[a] combat nature,” his “response cycle is to defend himself,” i.e., appellant is “more
prone to stand and defend himself as opposed to getting away from the area.”
However, Turner clarified that appellant’s PTSD did not “cause[] his actions” on
November 5, 2013, and appellant was not experiencing a “break with reality” or a
“delusional state” at the time of the offense. Further, appellant’s PTSD did not cause
“diminished capacity or . . . insanity.”
Dr. Turner further noted that appellant, in regard to the night of November 5,
2013, had reported to him that he had felt threatened by the complainant. The
17
complainant had approached him, appeared to be “reaching for a weapon,” and
“verbalized a threat to kill [him].” Appellant then shot the complainant, who left the
area. Appellant “contemplated following the [complainant] to see if he was okay or
what had happened with him[,] but . . . he didn’t know why the [complainant] was
accosting him[,] . . . if the [complainant’s] intention was to rob him[,] or if [the
complainant] had friends hanging around.” Accordingly, appellant decided not to
follow the complainant “for his own safety.” Appellant told Turner that “he didn’t
think [that] he had done anything wrong because he believed he had acted in
self[-]defense.” Turner noted that appellant’s story had remained consistent “over
time.”
Notably, Dr. Turner’s testimony does not address appellant’s inability to form
the intent to kill the complainant or his capacity to act with knowledge of his conduct
and its consequences; rather, the testimony provides an explanation or excuse as to
why appellant shot the complainant. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 381–82 (“All of
[defendant]’s mental-illness evidence showed why he intentionally and knowingly
killed” law enforcement officer; defendant’s evidence did not “suggest that he did
not intend to shoot a person.”); Quick, 2011 WL 286155, at *4–5 (trial court did not
err in excluding mental-illness evidence in murder case where evidence “fail[ed] to
show that [defendant] did not act intentionally or knowingly”); see also Lizcano,
2010 WL 1817772, at *19–21 (trial court did not err in excluding testimony from
18
defense experts about defendant’s “limitations in cognitive ability, intoxication at
the time of the offense, and general [mental] deficits” where evidence did not negate
mens rea element for capital murder and “no evidence show[ed] a connection
between [defendant’s] generally low level of mental functioning and his knowledge
during the commission of the [capital murder] offense”); Ward, 2010 WL 454980,
at *4 (trial court did not err in excluding forensic psychologist’s report and testimony
where evidence “presented only an excuse for the crime: that [defendant]
intentionally killed [the complainant] because he was so paranoid that he thought
[the complainant] . . . was out to get him”); Nikmanesh, 2017 WL 2774445, at *3–4
(trial court did not err in excluding “psychiatric evidence” where expert testimony
concerning defendant’s “major depressive disorder or obsessive-compulsive
personality disorder could only offer an explanation or motive for [his] actions but
could not negate intent” for offense of murder); Palmer v. State, No.
05-14-00671-CR, 2015 WL 6859783, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 9, 2015, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court did not err in excluding
expert’s testimony about defendant’s history of mental issues and current stressors
because evidence did not suggest defendant did not “form[] the intent to kill his
in-laws, or any other person”); Brown, 2014 WL 3747234, at *3–5 (trial court did
not err in excluding psychiatrist’s testimony regarding mental illness where
testimony did not negate mens rea for offense of murder; psychiatrist did not state
19
defendant incapable of forming intent to kill or incapable of acting with knowledge
of her conduct and its consequences); Smith v. State, 314 S.W.3d 576, 589–91 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of
defendant’s mental-health history where evidence did not show, “due to her mental
condition, [defendant] was either unable to form a conscious objective or desire or
to engage in conduct causing [the complainant’s] death, or could not be aware [that]
her actions were reasonably certain to cause [the complainant’s] death”).
In other words, the mental-illness evidence proffered by appellant in this case
does not negate the requisite mens rea for the offense of murder. Mays, 318 S.W.3d
at 380–82 (although mental-illness testimony “may be relevant for mitigation
purposes during the punishment phase [of trial], . . . expert testimony that does not
directly rebut the culpable mental state usually may be excluded at the guilt stage”);
Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574–75 (trial court has discretion to exclude mental-illness
evidence which does not negate element of mens rea); see also Nikmanesh, 2017
WL 2774445, at *3–4; Quick, 2011 WL 286155, at *4–5.
Further, we note that the trial court could have also excluded Dr. Turner’s
testimony, which did not relate to appellant’s ability to form the requisite intent at
the time he shot the complainant, as overly confusing or misleading to the jury. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
20
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”);
Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574–75 (relevant mental-illness evidence admissible under
article 38.36(a) “may [still] be excluded under Rule 403 if the probative value of the
evidence ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence’” (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 403)); see also Smith
v. State, No. 05-16-00102-CR, 2017 WL 462349, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1,
2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court could have
excluded evidence of defendant’s mental illness where such evidence did “not
relate[] to his ability to form the requisite intent at the time of the murder” and “could
confuse or mislead the jury” (citing TEX. R. EVID. 403)); Gassaway v. State, No.
05-07-00922-CR, 2009 WL 1547756, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2009, pet.
ref’d) (not designated for publication) (mental-illness evidence which did not negate
mens rea for offense of murder could mislead jury on factual issues).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Turner’s
testimony during the guilt phase of trial. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 381–82; Jackson,
160 S.W.3d at 574.
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Caughey.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
22