Sam Houston Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Joe D. Berry ( 2017 )


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  •                                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    _________________
    NO. 09-16-00346-CV
    _________________
    SAM HOUSTON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL Appellants
    V.
    JOE D. BERRY, ET AL, Appellees
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
    Liberty County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. CV-15-10279
    ________________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    In this accelerated, interlocutory appeal, Sam Houston Electric Cooperative,
    Inc. and several individual members of the cooperative’s management and current
    and former directors (collectively referred to herein as “SHEC”) challenge the trial
    court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of purported class action
    claims and request to stay those proceedings pending arbitration. We reverse the trial
    court’s order and remand the cause with instructions to enter an order compelling
    arbitration and staying the putative class proceedings pending arbitration.
    1
    I.     Background
    SHEC is a member-owned, not-for-profit electric cooperative organized under
    the Texas Electric Cooperative Corporation Act (“ECCA”) to provide electricity to
    its members in rural areas. See Tex. Util. Code Ann. § 161.001–.254 (West 2007).
    Formed in 1939, the cooperative’s original Articles of Incorporation (the “Articles”)
    provided that its directors would manage its affairs, and, as permitted by the ECCA,
    that its bylaws could “be altered, amended or repealed by not less than the
    affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Board of Directors at any regular or
    special meeting.” See Tex. Util. Code Ann. § 161.064(a). The cooperative’s 2012
    Bylaws1 restate that authority, and also provide that “[t]he business and affairs of the
    Cooperative shall be managed and governed by the Board, . . . [which] shall exercise
    all of the powers of the Cooperative except such as by Law or the Articles are
    conferred upon or reserved to the Members.” SHEC’s Board of Directors is
    comprised exclusively of qualified members elected by other members.
    The record indicates that, as permitted by the ECCA and the original Articles,
    SHEC amended its Bylaws periodically over time. See Tex. Util. Code Ann. §
    1
    Unless otherwise stated, any reference to “the Bylaws” herein is to the 2012
    Bylaws, the earliest version contained in the record on appeal.
    2
    161.064(b). In 2012, the Board of Directors adopted amendments to SHEC’s Bylaws
    to include the following arbitration agreement:
    Section 2.09. Dispute Resolution. A Member may submit a claim or
    dispute between the Member and the Cooperative regarding the
    Governing Documents or Electric Service to the Board for resolution.
    The Board may establish a policy establishing a procedure for
    submitting a claim or dispute to the Board. If the Board is unable to
    resolve the dispute[,] then the Cooperative and the Member shall
    cooperate to select one or more mediators to help resolve the dispute.
    If no resolution of the dispute occurs through mediation[,] any party
    may demand binding arbitration as provided under the laws of the State
    of Texas.
    Lester Berry applied for membership with the cooperative in 1991, and he
    maintained his membership until the time of his death in late 2015. In early 2016,
    Lester Berry’s son, Joe D. Berry, who was not himself a member, filed suit against
    the cooperative on behalf of Lester Berry’s estate and his surviving heirs.2 Berry’s
    suit initially asserted wrongful death and survival causes of action, alleging that
    Lester Berry, who was elderly, in poor health, and required an oxygen concentrator,
    died after the cooperative terminated electricity service to his home due to an unpaid
    electric bill. Berry later amended his pleadings to add the individual defendants and
    to assert several putative class action claims relating to SHEC’s management of its
    2
    For the sake of clarity in light of the shared surname, we will use “Berry” to
    refer to Joe D. Berry in his various capacities as a party to this suit. Any reference
    to Lester Berry, deceased, will be by use of his full name.
    3
    finances, such as claims that SHEC excessively compensated Directors and failed to
    return unused revenues to members. Citing the arbitration clause contained in its
    Bylaws, SHEC filed a motion to compel arbitration of the putative class claims only
    and to stay the proceedings as to those claims pending arbitration. After SHEC filed
    its motion to compel arbitration, but before the motion was decided, Berry amended
    his pleadings again to add Guillermo Cano, a member of the cooperative, to the suit
    as an additional representative of the putative class.
    Berry and Cano opposed SHEC’s motion to compel, arguing that the
    arbitration clause was not valid and enforceable because: (1) the arbitration
    provision was added to the Bylaws after Lester Berry became a member and was not
    signed by Lester Berry; (2) the agreement is illusory because SHEC maintains a
    unilateral right to amend or remove the provision by amending its Bylaws; (3) the
    agreement is procedurally unconscionable because members of the cooperative have
    little or no choice of electrical service providers; and (4) the claims are not arbitrable
    because the agreement does not expressly permit class arbitration.
    Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied SHEC’s motion to
    compel arbitration and to stay the class proceedings pending arbitration. SHEC
    thereafter filed a motion for the court to reconsider the motion to compel arbitration
    and, alternatively, to stay the proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. After a
    4
    second hearing, the trial court denied SHEC’s motion to reconsider as well as its
    motion to stay the proceedings. SHEC timely filed this interlocutory appeal, and this
    Court granted SHEC’s emergency motion to stay the trial court proceedings pending
    this appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098 (West 2011); Tex. R.
    App. P. 29.3.
    II.   Standard of Review
    This case is governed by the Texas Arbitration Act (the “TAA”),3 which
    provides that “[a] written agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable if the
    agreement is to arbitrate a controversy that: (1) exists at the time of the agreement;
    or (2) arises between the parties after the date of the agreement.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &
    Rem. Code Ann. § 171.001(a) (West 2011). A party seeking to compel arbitration
    under the TAA must first establish, as a threshold matter, that there exists a valid
    arbitration agreement and that the claims in dispute fall within the scope of that
    agreement. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 
    166 S.W.3d 732
    , 737 (Tex. 2005);
    3
    In its brief on appeal, SHEC asserts that the TAA applies. Although the
    Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”) preempts the TAA in certain cases, the burden
    of proof on that issue rests on the party asserting preemption. See Ellis v. Schlimmer,
    
    337 S.W.3d 860
    , 862 (Tex. 2011). As no party has asserted preemption in this case,
    our analysis will proceed under the TAA. Nonetheless, we cite cases decided under
    both acts, as they share the same core substantive principles. See Forest Oil Corp. v.
    McAllen, 
    268 S.W.3d 51
    , 56 n.10 (Tex. 2008) (noting similarities between FAA and
    the Texas General Arbitration Act, the predecessor to TAA).
    5
    J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 
    128 S.W.3d 223
    , 227 (Tex. 2003). If the party
    seeking arbitration establishes the existence of a valid agreement, the burden shifts
    to the party resisting arbitration to raise an affirmative defense to enforcement. J.M.
    Davidson, 
    Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227
    .
    “When reviewing a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, we defer to the
    trial court’s factual determinations that are supported by evidence but review the
    trial court’s legal determinations de novo.” Rachal v. Reitz, 
    403 S.W.3d 840
    , 843
    (Tex. 2013). Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the claims in
    dispute fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement are legal questions subject
    to de novo review. In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 
    279 S.W.3d 640
    , 643 (Tex.
    2009); Henry v. Gonzalez, 
    18 S.W.3d 684
    , 691 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet.
    dism’d).
    III.   Analysis
    The trial court signed a general order denying SHEC’s motion to compel
    arbitration, and did not issue written findings of fact or conclusions of law.4
    Therefore we address each objection to arbitration raised by Berry and Cano in the
    4
    The court’s oral ruling and statements made during the two hearings on the
    issue indicate that its denial was based on a finding that the agreement was an
    adhesion contract and illusory; however, oral comments from the bench do not
    constitute findings of facts or conclusions of law. See Seasha Pools, Inc. v.
    Hardister, 
    391 S.W.3d 635
    , 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.).
    6
    trial court and affirm the court’s judgment “if it can be upheld on any legal theory
    that finds support in the evidence.” Worford v. Stamper, 
    801 S.W.2d 108
    , 109 (Tex.
    1990); Double Eagle Resorts, Inc. v. Mott, 
    216 S.W.3d 890
    , 893 (Tex. App.—
    Beaumont 2007, no pet.).
    A.    Existence of Agreement
    Berry and Cano argue that the arbitration provision contained in the 2012
    Bylaws is not enforceable against members who joined the cooperative prior to 2012
    because the provision lacks mutual assent as to those individuals. Although a party
    will generally not be bound to an arbitration agreement that he has not signed,
    nothing in the TAA or in Texas law requires that an arbitration agreement be signed
    as long as it is in writing and agreed to by the parties. Amateur Athletic Union of the
    U.S., Inc. v. Bray, 
    499 S.W.3d 96
    , 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). An
    obligation to arbitrate may bind a non-signatory under state law principles governing
    the formation of contracts. In re Rubiola, 
    334 S.W.3d 220
    , 224 (Tex. 2011). One
    theory under which the Texas Supreme Court has found a non-signatory can be
    compelled to arbitrate is the equitable doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel.” 
    Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 845
    –46.
    “Under ‘direct benefits estoppel,’ a non-signatory plaintiff seeking the
    benefits of a contract is estopped from simultaneously attempting to avoid the
    7
    contract’s burdens, such as the obligation to arbitrate disputes.” Kellogg Brown &
    
    Root, 166 S.W.3d at 739
    . A non-signatory that engages the litigation process to bring
    claims based on certain terms of a contract cannot avoid an arbitration provision
    within that same contract. See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 
    52 S.W.3d 749
    , 755–56
    (Tex. 2001) (holding that non-signatory parties’ suit on the contract manifested their
    assent to the contract’s terms, including the arbitration provision contained therein).
    Rather, such a non-signatory should be compelled to arbitrate if he or she seeks, by
    his claims, “to derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration
    provision.” Kellogg Brown & 
    Root, 166 S.W.3d at 741
    . A claim seeks a direct benefit
    from a contract if liability on the claim “arises solely from the contract or must be
    determined by reference to it.” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 
    180 S.W.3d 127
    , 132
    (Tex. 2005). This determination “turns on the substance of the claim, not artful
    pleading.” 
    Id. at 131–32.
    Thus, we look to the substance of Berry and Cano’s
    pleadings to determine whether their putative class claims seek a direct benefit from
    the Bylaws that contain the arbitration provision, or whether, as Berry and Cano
    argue, the claims merely “touch upon” the Bylaws.
    8
    Berry and Cano attached the 2012 Bylaws as an exhibit to their third amended
    petition,5 and cited extensively to those Bylaws throughout the pleading. They
    affirmatively assert that the 2012 Bylaws, which contain the arbitration clause, form
    a contract between SHEC and its members.6 In fact, they explicitly seek relief in the
    form of a judicial declaration that “[t]he Bylaws and Articles constitute a binding
    and enforceable contract between SHEC and SHEC’s Board on the one hand and the
    SHEC members and certain non-members (i.e., patrons) on the other[,]” along with
    other declaratory relief relating to SHEC’s purported obligations under the 2012
    Bylaws. They assert a claim for breach of contract, averring that SHEC “breached
    its contractual obligations under the Bylaws and Articles,” that “[t]he Bylaws, by
    their explicit terms, constitute a valid, enforceable contract” and that Berry and Cano
    “as members and patrons of SHEC, are parties to the contract evidenced by the
    Bylaws and Articles and thus have standing to sue for its breach.” They seek actual,
    compensatory damages for “the injury caused by the breaches of the Bylaws and
    5
    The third amended petition was the live pleading at the time the trial court
    denied SHEC’s motion to compel arbitration. Their second amended petition, the
    live pleading at the time SHEC initially filed its motion to compel arbitration, had
    the cooperative’s 2014 Bylaws attached. The 2014 Bylaws contain the same
    arbitration provision as the 2012 Bylaws.
    6
    The petition states that, to the extent that the Bylaws conflict with the
    Articles of Incorporation or the ECCA, the Bylaws are void and unenforceable;
    however, at no point have they alleged that the arbitration provision conflicts with
    the Articles or the ECCA.
    9
    Articles[.]” Further, Berry and Cano allege a cause of action for conversion relating
    to capital accounts that SHEC maintains for each member. These accounts are
    created and maintained pursuant to the Bylaws, which establish the procedure for
    allocation of capital credits and losses and set forth the manner in which the capital
    credits are to be retired. Finally, Berry and Cano assert that SHEC owes the
    cooperative’s members a fiduciary duty created, inter alia, “[b]y the Bylaws and
    Articles as a matter of contract.” They specifically aver that “[b]y virtue of the
    contractual relationship created by the Bylaws, SHEC holds [excess revenues] in
    trust for the benefit of the patrons. Under this arrangement, SHEC and the officers
    and directors of SHEC are trustees of that trust.”
    Each of these claims asserted by Berry and Cano arise from or in relation to,
    and therefore seek a direct benefit from, the 2012 Bylaws; they do not merely “touch
    upon” them. A suit seeking damages for breach of specific contractual obligations
    necessarily arises from the contract, and a suit for judicial declaration of rights under
    a specific instrument cannot be determined without reference to that instrument.
    Accordingly, by seeking to enforce and benefit from the 2012 Bylaws as a valid and
    enforceable contract, Berry and Cano have manifested their assent to that contract,
    and are thereby bound to its provisions. See FirstMerit 
    Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 755
    –56.
    10
    In other words, Berry and Cano “cannot both have [their] contract and defeat it too.”
    Weekley Homes, 
    L.P., 180 S.W.3d at 135
    .
    Berry and Cano argue that the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel does not
    apply in this case because their claims derive from SHEC’s “general obligations
    imposed by” the ECCA and the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore their claims
    stand independent of the Bylaws. See In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 
    293 S.W.3d 182
    ,
    184 n.2 (Tex. 2009) (noting that equitable estoppel is inapplicable when the
    substance of a claim arises not directly from the contract, but from general
    obligations imposed by state or federal law). We find this argument unpersuasive.
    While it is true that both the ECCA and the Internal Revenue Code contain
    regulations applicable to SHEC, neither the ECCA nor the Internal Revenue Code
    can be the source of the putative class claims because neither provides for a private
    cause of action against a non-governmental actor such as SHEC. See Denton Cty.
    Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Hackett, 
    368 S.W.3d 765
    , 781–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    2012, pet. denied) (holding that the ECCA does not provide a member of an electric
    cooperative with a private right of action against the cooperative for breach of
    fiduciary duty because the ECCA creates no fiduciary duty); Alpert v. Riley, 
    274 S.W.3d 277
    , 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (holding that
    there can be no private cause of action for alleged violations of regulations
    11
    promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code except against the U.S. Government
    because the tax code’s administrative remedies were intended by Congress to be an
    exclusive enforcement scheme). Thus, despite the inclusion of references to the
    ECCA and the Internal Revenue Code in their pleadings, the only viable causes of
    action for Berry and Cano’s putative class claims arise from, and do not stand
    independent of, the Bylaws. See, e.g., Denton Cty Elec. 
    Co-op., 368 S.W.3d at 783
    (noting that where an electrical cooperative’s bylaws were, by their own terms,
    contractual in nature, putative class’s proper recourse was a breach of contract claim
    rather than a claim for breach of statutory duty).
    On appeal, Berry and Cano also argue that, although their “claims may, in
    some respects, touch upon the 2012 or 2014 Bylaws,” the doctrine of direct benefits
    estoppel does not apply to them because their claims do not “depend on the existence
    of” the specific arbitration provision contained in the Bylaws. This argument ignores
    the fact that the arbitration provision is but one part of a larger, comprehensive
    contract, and it is the very principle of the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel that
    prevents a party from enforcing the parts of a contract that benefit him while seeking
    to invalidate the parts that do not. See Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 
    211 S.W.3d 302
    ,
    307 (Tex. 2006) (“When a party’s right to recover and its damages depend on the
    agreement containing the arbitration provision, the party is relying on the agreement
    12
    for its claims.”). As discussed herein, the class claims asserted in this case arise
    directly from the contract that Berry and Cano seek to enforce; therefore direct
    benefits estoppel applies.
    B.    Dispute Within Scope of Agreement
    In addition to establishing the existence of an enforceable arbitration
    agreement, SHEC must also establish that the dispute at issue falls within the scope
    of the provision. “Once a valid arbitration agreement is established, a ‘strong
    presumption favoring arbitration arises[,]’ and we resolve doubts as to the
    agreement’s scope in favor of arbitration.” 
    Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 850
    (quoting Ellis
    v. Schlimmer, 
    337 S.W.3d 860
    , 862 (Tex. 2011)).
    Berry and Cano argue that the arbitration provision cannot be enforced against
    them because claims arising before the bylaws were amended in 2012 cannot
    procedurally fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. To determine
    whether claims fall within or outside of the scope of an arbitration agreement, we
    look to the factual allegations rather than the legal claims asserted. 
    Id. In their
    pleadings, Berry and Cano complain of excessive compensation for
    officers and directors of the cooperative as compared to hours worked, citing only
    compensation paid and hours worked in 2014. They complain of failure to return
    excess revenue, identifying only revenues received by the cooperative in 2011 and
    13
    2014. They allege a failure to retire capital credits, referencing patronage capital
    reported in the years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and attaching as exhibits (1) SHEC’s
    2014 IRS filing; (2) a chart listing revenues SHEC returned to members from 2011
    through 2014; (3) a comparative analysis of revenues returned to members of other
    electric cooperatives from 2012 through 2014; and (4) SHEC’s 2014 Annual Report.
    Furthermore, Cano, the only named plaintiff that is an actual member of the
    cooperative, first attained his membership in 2012. Any “capital credits that [have]
    accrued to him during his membership,” could only have accrued after that date.
    Finally, asserting that SHEC’s pre-2012 conduct cannot be subject to the 2012
    Bylaws ignores that it is Berry and Cano themselves who seek to impose the
    contractual obligations contained in that instrument against SHEC. The vast majority
    of the factual allegations that have been asserted by Berry and Cano do not,
    procedurally, fall outside of the scope of the 2012 Bylaws. Moreover, “to come
    within the scope of the arbitration provision, a party’s allegations need only be
    factually intertwined with arbitrable claims or otherwise touch upon the subject
    matter of the agreement containing the arbitration provision.” In re Bath Junkie
    Franchise, Inc., 
    246 S.W.3d 356
    , 367 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.).
    Accordingly, viewing Berry and Cano’s factual allegations and resolving any doubts
    14
    regarding the provision’s scope in favor of arbitration, we find that the putative class
    claims are within the scope of the agreement.
    C.    Affirmative Defenses to Arbitration
    Having found that SHEC met its threshold burden, we consider now whether
    Berry and Cano, as the parties opposing arbitration, have met their burden to
    establish an affirmative defense to enforcement. See J.M. Davidson, 
    Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227
    .
    1.     Illusory Agreement
    Berry and Cano assert that the arbitration agreement is illusory and
    unenforceable because SHEC maintained a unilateral right to amend its Bylaws and
    thereby change the arbitration provision to avoid performance.
    A challenge to a contract’s validity or enforceability on the basis that the
    agreement is illusory is a challenge to the consideration supporting the contract. See
    In re 24R, Inc., 
    324 S.W.3d 564
    , 567 (Tex. 2010). A stand-alone arbitration
    agreement requires binding promises on both sides in order to be enforceable, as that
    mutual promise is the only consideration exchanged to create the contract. In re
    AdvancePCS Health L.P., 
    172 S.W.3d 603
    , 607 (Tex. 2005). However, when an
    arbitration clause is but one part of a larger underlying contract, the required
    consideration can be provided by the rest of the parties’ mutual obligations. See id.;
    15
    see also Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Ayers, No. 09-05-226-CV, 
    2005 WL 3006844
    ,
    at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 10, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). Berry and Cano
    do not contest the sufficiency of consideration to support the underlying contract in
    this matter; to the contrary, they steadfastly rely upon the asserted validity of the
    2012 Bylaws as a contract that they seek to enforce against SHEC. As we have
    already determined that the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel prevents Berry and
    Cano from selectively enforcing the provisions of the 2012 Bylaws that benefit them
    while simultaneously attacking the provision they do not like, we reject their
    argument that the lack of independent consideration allows them to carve out the
    distasteful provisions of a contract they otherwise seek to enforce. See 
    Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 848
    (rejecting a non-signatory’s attempt to invalidate an arbitration
    provision in a trust agreement based on lack of consideration because the party had
    accepted benefits under the agreement and was suing to enforce its terms); In re Lyon
    Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    257 S.W.3d 228
    , 233 (Tex. 2008) (noting that “arbitration clauses
    generally do not require mutuality of obligation so long as adequate consideration
    supports the underlying contract”). “As equitable defensive theories, direct benefits
    estoppel and promissory estoppel promote fairness by holding a party to its position
    in the performance of an agreement or in bringing litigation.” Rachal, 
    403 S.W.3d 16
    at 848; see also FirstMerit 
    Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 755
    (holding that “a litigant who sues
    based on a contract subjects him or herself to the contract’s terms”).
    2.     Procedural Unconscionability
    Berry and Cano further asserted in the trial court that the arbitration agreement
    is procedurally unconscionable because many of the cooperative’s members have no
    choice of electrical service providers and no bargaining power in relation to the
    Bylaws. These bare factual assertions were contained in unverified pleadings and
    were otherwise not supported in the trial court by any affidavits or other evidence,
    and Berry and Cano do not advance the argument or brief the issue on appeal.
    “A party seeking to avoid arbitration on unconscionability grounds bears the
    burden of proof.” Amateur Athletic 
    Union, 499 S.W.3d at 107
    . Although a reviewing
    court will, in the absence of findings of fact or conclusions of law, presume that a
    trial court made any necessary finding of fact to support a ruling, we cannot imply a
    factual finding that is not supported by evidence. See Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO
    Gazprom, 
    414 S.W.3d 142
    , 150 (Tex. 2013). Without any evidence supporting a
    claim of unconscionability, we find that Berry and Cano failed to meet their burden
    on this affirmative defense.
    17
    3.     Class Claims are Not Arbitrable
    Finally, Berry and Cano argue that their putative class action claims are not
    arbitrable because the arbitration provision contained in the 2012 Bylaws does not
    specifically consent to class arbitration. In support of this argument, they rely upon
    an opinion from the United States Supreme Court in Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v.
    AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., which held that “a party may not be compelled under the
    FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
    that the party agreed to do so.” 
    559 U.S. 662
    , 684 (2010). We find Berry and Cano’s
    reliance on Stolt–Nielsen misplaced, as that case does not stand for the proposition
    that a claimant can avoid an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement by
    asserting claims on behalf of an entire class; rather, it addressed under what
    circumstances an arbitrator could compel parties in arbitration to proceed as a class.
    See 
    id. at 685;7
    see also Robinson v. J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
    817 F.3d 193
    ,
    197 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that “Stolt–Nielsen does not overrule prior Supreme
    7
    Notably, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the underlying proceedings
    had already determined that Stolt-Nielsen was entitled to compel arbitration of the
    antitrust claims brought against it by AnimalFeeds International and other claimants
    in several consolidated cases. See Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
    559 U.S. 662
    , 667–68 (2010); see also JLM Industries, Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 
    387 F.3d 163
    (2nd Cir. 2004). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties did not dispute
    that the claims had to be arbitrated; the question was whether, once in arbitration,
    the arbitration panel had the authority to allow AnimalFeeds International to proceed
    on behalf of a class over Stolt-Nielsen’s objection. 
    Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668
    .
    18
    Court and Fifth Circuit decisions requiring questions of arbitrability, including the
    availability of class mechanisms, to be deferred to arbitration by agreement”);
    Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Tex., Inc., 
    343 F.3d 355
    , 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (providing that where arbitration agreement language
    is broad, it is the arbitrator, rather than the court, that “should decide whether class
    arbitration is available or forbidden”). Parties have a right to contract for arbitration;
    however, “there is no entitlement to proceed as a class action.” AutoNation USA
    Corp. v. Leroy, 
    105 S.W.3d 190
    , 195–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
    no pet.) (rejecting the notion that the right to proceed on a class-wide basis
    supersedes a contracting party’s right to compel arbitration). Thus, where a claimant
    seeks to bring claims on behalf of a class, an otherwise valid arbitration provision
    must be enforced and the issue of class certification becomes one of contract
    construction appropriately left to the arbitrator. See In re Wood, 
    140 S.W.3d 367
    ,
    369 (Tex. 2004). We therefore reject Berry and Cano’s argument that their attempt
    to achieve class certification nullifies an otherwise enforceable arbitration
    agreement.
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order denying SHEC’s
    motion to compel arbitration and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration
    19
    and staying further proceedings as to Berry and Cano’s class action claims pending
    arbitration.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    ______________________________
    CHARLES KREGER
    Justice
    Submitted on December 28, 2016
    Opinion Delivered September 28, 2017
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
    20