in the Interest of W.A.B., III, a Child ( 2019 )


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  • Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 21, 2019.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-18-00181-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF W.A.B., III, A CHILD
    On Appeal from the 311th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2013-04887
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This is an appeal from a default judgment in a suit to modify a parent-child
    relationship. In a single issue, appellant (“Father”) argues that the trial court erred
    by denying Father’s motion for continuance of the trial setting based on his
    attorney’s unavailability. Because we conclude that Father failed to preserve his
    complaint for appellate review and that, in any event, the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    Background
    A Harris County family district court signed a final decree of divorce on
    January 31, 2014, dissolving the marriage between Father and Mother. The court
    also signed an agreed order in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship
    (“SAPCR”) pertaining to Mother’s and Father’s son, W.A.B., III. Several years
    later, Father filed a petition to modify the SAPCR order, alleging a material and
    substantial change in W.A.B.’s circumstances. Mother filed a counterpetition,
    seeking a modification of issues regarding, inter alia, medical treatment,
    education, and possession of the child. Mother also sought an increase in child
    support payments.
    The Harris County district court set this case for a bench trial at 9:00 a.m. on
    Monday, October 16, 2017, and provided notice to all counsel.
    On Thursday, October 12, 2017, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Father’s
    counsel received an email from the court manager for the 10th Judicial District
    Court of Galveston County calling Father’s counsel to trial at 9:00 a.m. on Monday
    October 16, 2017, in Galveston—the same date and time as the SAPCR trial
    setting in Harris County. The Galveston case was a felony criminal prosecution.
    Father filed a motion for continuance in the Harris County District Clerk’s
    office at 8:54 p.m. on Sunday, October 15, 2017. Father sought a continuance of
    the October 16, 2017 trial setting in the SAPCR proceeding due to the conflicting
    felony criminal trial setting in Galveston County. The motion for continuance was
    verified and attached a copy of the email from the Galveston County district court
    manager advising counsel of his obligation to appear for trial on October 16, 2017,
    at 9:00 a.m. The motion for continuance also alleged that counsel’s unavailability
    was not the result of Father’s own fault or negligence, “as prior to Wednesday,
    October 11, 2017, [counsel] believed that the [criminal case] would not be reached
    2
    for trial until the following week at the earliest.” The record does not show that
    Father attempted to obtain a hearing date and time for the Harris County district
    court to consider the motion for continuance.
    When the Harris County district court called the docket for this case at 9:00
    a.m. on Monday, October 16, 2017, neither Father nor his counsel appeared. The
    court apparently recessed until the afternoon, and then proceeded “on a post-
    answer default basis” at 1:43 p.m. that day. Mother’s counsel was present and
    stated on the record that she received an email from Father’s counsel the prior
    evening advising that he would be filing a motion for continuance due to the
    conflicting Galveston County trial setting.      Mother’s counsel found it “very
    concerning” that Father’s counsel did not provide notice of the conflict until late
    Sunday evening on October 15 when counsel learned of the conflict on Thursday
    October 12. The court made no express ruling on the motion for continuance and
    proceeded to hear testimony on the petitions to modify the SAPCR order. After
    Mother testified, the trial court orally rendered judgment granting Mother’s
    counterpetition and awarding $6,023.24 in attorney’s fees.          The trial court
    subsequently signed a final judgment on November 7, 2017.
    After the trial court signed the default judgment, Father filed a motion to set
    aside the judgment. Although the trial court set the motion for a hearing at
    Father’s request, the court’s docket sheet indicates that neither Father nor his
    counsel appeared, and the “matter was passed.”
    Analysis
    Father appeals the default judgment. In one issue, he argues that the trial
    court erred in denying the motion for continuance based on his attorney’s
    unavailability.
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    A.    Preservation of Error
    A trial court is not required to consider a motion that is not brought to its
    attention. See Murphree v. Cooper, No. 14-11-00416-CV, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at
    *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re
    Smith, 
    263 S.W.3d 93
    , 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding).
    Showing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that
    the motion was brought to the trial court’s attention or presented to the trial court
    with a request for a ruling. See Murphree, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at *1; 
    Smith, 263 S.W.3d at 96
    ; see also Quintana v. CrossFit Dallas, L.L.C., 
    347 S.W.3d 445
    , 448-
    49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (filing motion for continuance, and setting
    motion for hearing, was insufficient to bring the motion to the attention of the trial
    court). When the record does not show that a motion for continuance was filed and
    brought to the trial court’s attention before final judgment is rendered, any error is
    not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Murphree, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at *1.
    Father filed his motion for continuance of the SAPCR trial setting
    approximately twelve hours before trial was set to begin. He did not set the motion
    for a hearing. Neither Father nor his counsel appeared at the time set for trial to
    present and argue the merits of Father’s motion for continuance. The record does
    not show that Father presented the motion for continuance to the trial court with a
    request for a ruling or otherwise brought it to the trial court’s attention before the
    final judgment was rendered. The record also reveals no ruling on the motion.
    Thus, appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Tex. R.
    App. P. 33.1(a); Murphree, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at *1.
    B.    The Trial Court’s Discretion
    Presuming Father preserved error and that the trial court denied the motion
    for continuance, we nonetheless conclude the trial court would not have abused its
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    discretion. As the sole basis for his motion, Father contends that he was entitled to
    a continuance because his counsel had a conflicting trial setting in another court
    that took priority over the present case.
    We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance for a
    clear abuse of discretion and on a case-by-case basis. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint
    Venture, 
    145 S.W.3d 150
    , 161 (Tex. 2004) (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v.
    Marchand, 
    83 S.W.3d 789
    , 800 (Tex. 2002)). A clear abuse of discretion is shown
    when a trial court reaches a decision “so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount
    to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” 
    Id. Generally, a
    motion for continuance will not be granted without “sufficient
    cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation of law.”
    Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. The “absence of counsel will not be good cause for a
    continuance or postponement of the cause when called for trial, except it be
    allowed in the discretion of the court, upon cause shown or upon matters within the
    knowledge or information of the judge to be stated on the record.” Tex. R. Civ. P.
    253; see also Villegas v. Carter, 
    711 S.W.2d 624
    , 626 (Tex. 1986).
    It was incumbent upon Father’s attorney to promptly notify the trial court of
    the conflicting trial settings. See Sec. Admin. Jud. Reg., Reg. R. Admin. 10.2.1
    (local rule providing that an attorney assigned to trial in two different cases on the
    same day has a duty to notify the affected courts of the conflicting trial settings as
    soon as they are known); see also Harris Cty. Fam. R. 8.7 (“It is the duty of
    counsel to report promptly to the court immediately upon learning of a conflicting
    engagement that might preclude that counsel’s availability for trial. Failure to do
    so may result in sanctions.”). Father’s counsel failed to notify the trial court of the
    conflicting settings as soon as he was aware of them, which was no later than
    Thursday, October 12, 2017. See In re K.A.R., 
    171 S.W.3d 705
    , 711 (Tex. App.—
    5
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (noting that appellant’s attorney failed to notify
    trial court of conflicting settings as soon as she was aware of them, “which was no
    later than” the date she received notice of the trial court’s order setting case for
    trial). Father’s counsel did not file the motion for continuance until 8:54 p.m.
    Sunday, October 15, 2017, three days after receiving notice of the conflict and
    approximately twelve hours before trial was set to commence in this case. Father’s
    counsel thus deprived the trial court of the opportunity of resolving the setting
    conflict with the presiding judge of the 10th District Court in Galveston County. 1
    See Sec. Admin. Jud. Reg., Reg. R. Admin. 10.2.2 (stating that, “[i]nsofar as
    practicable, Judges should attempt to agree on which case has priority”). The
    motion for continuance also did not state why Father’s counsel failed to take earlier
    steps to avoid the conflicting settings. See Murphree, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at *3;
    Reyna v. Reyna, 
    738 S.W.2d 772
    , 775 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (counsel
    failed to take reasonable steps to avoid conflict).
    For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court would not have abused its
    discretion in denying the motion for continuance based on Father’s assertion of a
    conflicting trial setting that allegedly had priority. See 
    K.A.R., 171 S.W.3d at 711
    (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance based on
    conflicting trial setting in criminal case in another county because attorney for non-
    appearing party did not promptly notify trial court of conflicting setting upon
    learning about it); see also Murphree, 
    2012 WL 2312706
    , at *3 (same); Spearman
    v. Tex. Dep’t of Corrs., 
    918 S.W.2d 23
    , 24-25 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1996, no writ)
    (same).
    1
    The October 12 email from the 10th Judicial District court manager states: “If any
    attorney has a conflict with other cases set for trial, the Court requests the cause number and
    court in which there is a conflict, so that those cases can be monitored.” There is no indication in
    this record that Father’s counsel alerted the 10th District Court in Galveston to the conflicting
    settings.
    6
    We overrule Father’s sole issue on appeal.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/       Kevin Jewell
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Jewell and Bourliot and Former Justice Michael
    Massengale, sitting by assignment.
    7