in the Interest of C.S.L v. ( 2018 )


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  •                                   Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-17-00691-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.-L.V., L.J.V., and C.C.V.
    From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2016-PA-02681
    Honorable Richard Garcia, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Sitting:          Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
    Karen Angelini, Justice
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: March 14, 2018
    AFFIRMED
    Brittany1 appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her children, C.S.-
    L.V. (born in 2011), L.J.V. (born in 2014), and C.C.V. (born in 2016). She contends there is legally
    and factually insufficient evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best
    interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Brittany’s
    parental rights. The Department removed the children based on allegations of drug use by and
    domestic violence between Brittany and the children’s father. The case proceeded to a bench trial,
    1
    To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, parents are referred
    to by their first names and children are referred to by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West
    2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
    04-17-00691-CV
    at which Brittany and Department caseworkers Alysha Kraft and Stephanie Banks testified. The
    trial court thereafter terminated Brittany’s parental rights to the children, 2 finding she knowingly
    endangered the children, constructively abandoned the children, used a controlled substance in a
    manner that endangered the children, and failed to comply with provisions of her court-ordered
    family service plan. The trial court also found termination of her parental rights was in the
    children’s best interest. Brittany appeals, challenging only the legal and factual sufficiency of the
    evidence to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
    evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2016). To determine whether this
    heightened burden of proof was met, we employ a heightened standard of review to determine
    whether a “factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the
    State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 25 (Tex. 2002). “This standard guards the
    constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court
    must have for the factfinder’s role.” In re O.N.H., 
    401 S.W.3d 681
    , 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2013, no pet.). We do not reweigh issues of witness credibility but defer to the factfinder’s
    reasonable determinations of credibility. In re J.P.B., 
    180 S.W.3d 570
    , 573 (Tex. 2005).
    A legal sufficiency review requires us to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable
    to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or
    conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    , 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume
    the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have
    done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found
    2
    The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father, who has not appealed the order terminating
    his parental rights.
    -2-
    04-17-00691-CV
    incredible. 
    Id. But we
    may not simply disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding;
    to do so would not comport with the heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
    
    Id. When conducting
    a factual sufficiency review, we evaluate “whether disputed evidence is such
    that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.”
    
    Id. The evidence
    is factually insufficient “[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
    that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
    factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” 
    Id. CHILDREN’S BEST
    INTEREST
    The best-interest determination is a wide-ranging inquiry, and the Texas Supreme Court
    has set out some factors relevant to the determination:
    •   the desires of the child;
    •   the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
    •   the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
    •   the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
    •   the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
    •   the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
    •   the stability of the home or proposed placement;
    •   the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child
    relationship is not a proper one; and
    •   any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
    Holley v. Adams, 
    544 S.W.2d 367
    , 372 (Tex. 1976). The list is not exhaustive, and not every factor
    must be proved to find that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re 
    C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27
    .
    Evidence of only one factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or
    conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when undisputed evidence
    shows that the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety. 
    Id. “Evidence that
    the parent
    has committed the acts or omissions prescribed by section 161.001 may also be probative in
    determining the child’s best interest; but the mere fact that an act or omission occurred in the past
    does not ipso facto prove that termination is currently in the child’s best interest.” In re O.N.H.,
    -3-
    
    04-17-00691-CV 401 S.W.3d at 684
    (internal citation omitted). “A factfinder may infer that past conduct
    endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent.”
    In re D.M., 
    452 S.W.3d 462
    , 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
    A. The Evidence
    Caseworker Kraft testified the children came into the Department’s care due to concerns
    about the parents’ drug use and domestic violence. She testified the children’s father admitted to
    marijuana usage, neglect, and domestic violence, but that Brittany denied all of the allegations.
    Kraft stated Brittany tested positive for methamphetamines, and that her main concern for Brittany
    was drug treatment. Kraft also stated that to the best of her knowledge, Brittany had done nothing
    to address her drug use.
    Kraft further testified Brittany was given a family service plan that included services for
    domestic violence, individual counseling, mental health assessments, and parenting. According to
    Kraft, Brittany had not completed any of those services and did not give any reason for not
    engaging in those services other than stating “she did not believe she needed services.”
    Furthermore, Kraft testified Brittany had no visits with the children, did not provide anything for
    the children’s birthdays, and provided no financial support. She also stated Brittany refused to
    provide information about her living arrangements.
    Kraft testified the children were placed with their paternal grandmother, and the children
    have a strong bond with her. She testified the children’s grandmother wants to care for the children
    permanently. Kraft stated that when the children came into the Department’s care, the children
    were delayed academically and socially; they complained about a lack of food and ate “onions
    straight of the refrigerator”; and the oldest child C.S.-L.V. acted as a parent for his younger
    siblings. According to Kraft, the children have improved while they have been in their
    grandmother’s care and are now in therapy.
    -4-
    04-17-00691-CV
    Kraft also noted there was an incident when Brittany went to see the children at their
    grandmother’s house “at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning.” She stated the children’s
    grandmother called the police and Brittany was transported away. Kraft opined that this incident
    was disruptive and adversely impacted the children. She explained C.C.V. had fewer sudden
    outbursts and incidents of physical aggression during his stay with his grandmother, but after the
    3:00 a.m. incident with Brittany, his behavior deteriorated before improving again.
    Caseworker Banks testified Brittany admitted using drugs and also tested positive for
    methamphetamines. She testified Brittany failed to engage in any of her services or provide an
    explanation for that failure. Banks stated her main concerns with Brittany and the children’s father
    was domestic violence, drug use, and the failure to participate in any of the recommended services.
    Banks testified C.C.V., Brittany, and the children’s father all stated there was domestic violence
    in the parents’ relationship, and Brittany would have bruises on her arm, appear “under the
    influence,” and become “irate and hostile and not want to answer questions.”
    Brittany testified she attended “12-step meetings” and counseling, has “done research,”
    and she planned to start domestic violence classes after the trial had started. She also stated she
    had just obtained her ID, planned to get a job, and that her home does not currently have a place
    for the children to stay and sleep and have their own room. Brittany described a situation when
    C.S.-L.V. shook C.C.V. when he was an infant and she took C.C.V. to the hospital. Brittany
    testified she “was covered in bruises, so [the Department was] alerted.” Brittany denied that she
    actually used drugs, and said her admission about using drugs was made out of fear. She also
    explained that when she visited the children at their grandmother’s house at 3:00 a.m., she had
    recently learned her best friend and her two children were “hit and killed by car” and she “did not
    want to be that person who hadn’t gotten to say goodbye to [her] kids in case it happened to [her].”
    -5-
    04-17-00691-CV
    B. Analysis
    Although there was no direct evidence of the children’s desires, there is evidence that the
    children were bonded with their grandmother. There is also evidence showing a pattern of domestic
    violence and Brittany’s drug use, and that Brittany refused to address those issues. Furthermore,
    the evidence supports an inference that Brittany lacks employment and a suitable home for the
    children. Additionally, there is evidence showing the children have improved in their
    grandmother’s care, and that their grandmother is meeting the physical and emotional needs of the
    children. Having considered all of the evidence admitted at trial, we hold a reasonable factfinder
    could form a reasonably firm belief or conviction that termination of Brittany’s parental rights is
    in the children’s best interest. See In re 
    J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266
    .
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-17-00691-CV

Filed Date: 3/14/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021