Kathleen Kelly Potter v. Kevin Potter ( 2018 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-18-00748-CV
Kathleen Kelly Potter, Appellant
v.
Kevin Potter, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF BASTROP COUNTY
NO. 06-11191, HONORABLE BENTON ESKEW, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Kathleen Kelly Potter filed a notice of appeal regarding an order in a suit seeking to
modify a parent-child relationship and filed an accompanying affidavit of indigence in cause number
03-18-00653-CV. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1 (setting out when party is indigent for civil cases). After
Potter filed her notice of appeal and affidavit of indigence, the Bastrop County district clerk, the
court reporter, and Kevin Potter each filed a challenge to Potter’s claim of indigency, and the county
court at law scheduled a hearing on the matter. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(f)(1), (3) (providing that
clerk, party, or court reporter may file motion to require declarant to pay costs), (5) (stating that
declarant may not be ordered “to pay costs without an oral evidentiary hearing” and specifying that
“the burden is on the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs”). At the conclusion of the
hearing, the county court at law determined that Potter is not indigent, and the county court at law
subsequently issued an order setting out its ruling. Following that ruling, Potter filed a motion in
this Court challenging the county court at law’s order sustaining the contest to her indigency
declaration. See id. R. 145(g) (setting out procedure for appealing indigency determination by
trial court).
Having reviewed the motion and the record, we cannot conclude that the county court
at law’s order constituted an abuse of discretion. See Basaldua v. Hadden, 298 S.W.3d 238, 241
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (explaining that trial court’s order sustaining contest is
reviewed under abuse of discretion standard and that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs only when the
trial court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles or in an arbitrary or unreasonable
manner”). Accordingly, we deny Potter’s motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145(g)(4) (directing appellate
courts to “rule on the motion at the earliest practicable time”).
Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Bourland
Filed: December 7, 2018
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