State v. Douglas Carranza ( 2017 )

NUMBER 13-17-00059-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS CARRANZA, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of
Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Douglas Carranza filed his motion for rehearing on November 2, 2017. We deny
the motion, withdraw our prior opinion and judgment issued on October 19, 2017, and
substitute this opinion and judgment in its place.
By one issue, appellant the State of Texas argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by granting appellee Carranza’s motion for new trial. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Carranza was charged with family violence assault against Marissa Ortiz. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 49, 2017 R.S.). After
cross-examining Ortiz at trial, Carranza’s attorney asked that she be kept as a recall
witness; she was retained as such for the remainder of the trial.
On the second day of trial, Carranza’s attorney received missing pages of a report
that revealed that Ortiz was cited for disorderly conduct, specifically “fighting,” when she
was fourteen years old. Carranza’s attorney tried to introduce evidence of the disorderly
conduct during trial, but the trial court sustained the State’s objection that it should not be
admitted because it constituted evidence of a crime that occurred more than ten years
ago and was not a crime of moral turpitude. Carranza was found guilty and was
sentenced to sixty days in jail, suspended for a period of twelve months.
Carranza filed a motion for new trial, alleging that the State committed a Brady
violation by not disclosing the missing pages of the report sooner. See Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). At the hearing on motion for new trial, Carranza’s attorney alleged
that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to timely disclose favorable evidence. He
testified that he obtained the missing pages of the record on the second day of trial, the
same day that he noticed they were missing. However, he also admitted that he was not
aware of the facts concerning Ortiz’s citation for disorderly conduct or the disposition of
that citation. He also acknowledged that he did not ask for a continuance and that Ortiz
was still available for recall when he received the missing pages from the State.
The trial court granted the motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Mercier, 164 S.W.3d 799, 812 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005,
pet. ref’d).
A judge may grant or deny a motion for new trial ‘in the interest of justice,’
but justice means in accordance with the law. A judge may not grant a new
trial on mere sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or simply because he
believes the defendant received a raw deal or is innocent.
State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing State v. Herndon,
215 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Thus, a trial court does not abuse its
discretion if the defendant: “(1) sets forth a specific and valid legal ground for relief in
their motion, (2) points to evidence in the record (or sets forth evidence) that substantiates
the same legal claim, and (3) shows prejudice under the harmless-error standards of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 591.
A defendant must show the following requirements to establish
a Brady violation: (1) the State suppressed evidence; (2) the suppressed
evidence is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the suppressed evidence is
material. Favorable evidence for these purposes is any evidence that, if
disclosed and used effectively, may make the difference between conviction
and acquittal. Evidence is material for Brady purposes only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.
The materiality prong incorporates a requirement that the defendant
is prejudiced by the State’s failure to disclose the evidence. When
information is disclosed mid-trial, the prejudice inquiry involves determining
whether the disclosure came in time to make effective use of it at trial. If
the defendant received the material in time to use it effectively at trial, his
conviction should not be reversed just because it was not disclosed as early
as it might have and should have been.
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Fears v. State, 479 S.W.3d 315, 327 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. ref’d) (internal
citations omitted). Although we defer to the underlying factual findings made by the trial
court in its decision, we review de novo the materiality prong of a Brady claim. See Ex
Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 664 n.17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting Carranza’s motion
for new trial without valid legal grounds. We agree with the State.
The only legal basis Carranza raised in his motion for new trial was the alleged
Brady violation. The State admits to the first prong and acknowledges that the missing
pages to the report should have been disclosed to Carranza earlier. See id. However,
even assuming, arguendo, that the second prong was met and the missing pages were
favorable, the State argues that Carranza failed to establish that the missing pages of the
report were material. “When Brady evidence is disclosed during the trial, we inquire
whether the defendant was able to effectively use the material despite the delay.” Id. at
328. In the present case, Ortiz was available for recall; however, Carranza did not explain
why he did not take the opportunity to recall and cross-examine Ortiz again. See id.
(holding that the defendant did not demonstrate the third prong of his Brady claim when
the witness against whom the evidence in question might have been used was still
available for recall but the defendant did not recall the witness). Furthermore, Carranza
did not request a continuance after learning about the missing pages, which either
“waives the error or at least indicates that the delay in receiving the evidence was not
truly prejudicial.” Apolinar v. State, 106 S.W.3d 407, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003), aff’d, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Perez v. State, 414 S.W.3d
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784, 790 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (finding that the defendant waived
its Brady complaint because he did not request a continuance once the evidence in
question was disclosed by the State); Young v. State, 183 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d) (same); Williams v. State, 995 S.W.2d 754, 762 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1999, no pet.) (same).
On appeal, Carranza largely argues that we should defer to the trial court’s
decision to grant a new trial. However, while we defer to the trial court’s factual findings,
we review de novo whether Carranza established the materiality prong of his Brady claim.
See Ex Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d at 664 n.17. Carranza vaguely claims that he could
have conducted a “more thorough investigation” if the evidence had been disclosed
sooner. However, as discussed above, this argument is betrayed by Carranza’s actions
at trial; after receiving the evidence in question, Carranza did not request a continuance
or recall Ortiz for cross-examination. This strongly suggests that the evidence was not
truly prejudicial. See Apolinar, 106 S.W.3d at 421. Furthermore, in a similar case, the
Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that it was entirely speculative to suppose that
offense reports in which the victim had been charged with crimes of violence could have
led to the discovery of additional witnesses favorable to the defense and that such
speculation did not establish Brady materiality. See Allen v. State, 473 S.W.3d 426, 457
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 517 S.W.3d
111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
We conclude that Carranza failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the
late disclosure of Ortiz’s criminal record. See Fears, 479 S.W.3d at 327. Thus, Carranza
was unable to establish the materiality prong of his Brady claim, and the trial court abused
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its discretion in granting Carranza’s motion for new trial. See Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 593.
We sustain the State’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the trial court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
16th day of November, 2017.
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