Carlton E. Brantner v. George M. Robinson ( 2019 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00335-CV
CARLTON E. BRANTNER,
Appellant
v.
GEORGE M. ROBINSON,
Appellee
From the 87th District Court
Freestone County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-17-072-B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal, appellant, Carlton E. Brantner, advancing pro se, challenges the trial
court’s granting of a summary judgment in favor of appellee, George M. Robinson. In
what we construe as two issues, Brantner argues that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment in favor of Robinson on limitations grounds as to claims Brantner
brought in his original petition. Brantner further asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to consider his remaining causes of action. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
As indicated in his original petition, Brantner’s claims all pertain to Robinson’s
actions as Brantner’s trial counsel in a criminal matter. Specifically, Brantner contends
that:
On Feb. 9, 2015 George M. Robinson (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”
or “Robinson”) wrote a letter to Carlton E. Brantner “Petitioner” in regards
to a plea agreement presented to petitioner by defendant and County
Attorney Chris Martin on Jan. 22, 2015. Defendant recommended that
petitioner accept the plea agreement as it was presented affording a chance
for parole at (50%) or when half of sentence was complete. Petitioner
accepted and signed the agreement based on the chance for parole and
petitioner[‘]s concerns over the effectiveness of defendant in an actual trial.
Defendant continues to explain that as he and County Attorney, in their
discussion of the offer prior to presenting it to petitioner, understood the
charge to provide parole. Apon [sic] further research, defendant admits
that he and County Attorney had a misunderstanding of the law and
through miscommunication, erroneously advised petitioner his chance for
parole.
Apparently, a motion for new trial and an 11.07 writ were filed based on this purported
error on behalf of Brantner. However, according to Brantner, the motion for new trial
and 11.07 writ were denied.
Thereafter, on March 2, 2017, Brantner filed his original petition in the trial court,
requesting the following:
A declaration that the acts and omissions described herein violated
Plaintiff’s [Brantner] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
A preliminary and permanent injuction [sic] ordering defendant; George
Robinson to stop causing harm by slander, libel, or in any other form of
retaliation.
Brantner v. Robinson Page 2
...
Compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000 for each act, violation, or
omission as discribed [sic] herein and as follows.
1. Damages for deficient performance as trial counsel, providing
erroneous advise [sic], and miscommunication leading to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
2. Damages for deficient performance in filing the Motion for New
Trial in not utilizing all available argument in strategy for relief.
3. Damages for deficient performance in keeping Plaintiff up to
date and current in regards to the Motion being overruled and
deadline on filing an appeal.
4. For committing perjury on the Aug. 15, 2016 affidavit for falsely
stating as fact what evidence state had (videos from computer,
letters to victim), and what department investigated.
5. For not reviewing the discovery and other available evidence, for
basing his affidavit to reflect that of County Attorney’s with the
intent to do harm.
6. For violating Attorney-Client Priviledge [sic], and for stating as
fact an opinion on said affidavit in violation of the Rules of Texas
Jurisprudence Forms: Pleading and Practice Chapter 16.
Robinson filed an answer, asserting special exceptions, a general denial, and the
affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and waiver. Robinson also filed a traditional
motion for summary judgment, arguing that Brantner did not plead any cognizable cause
of action other than claims of “Negligence-Legal Malpractice” and that the statute of
limitations had run by the time Brantner filed his March 2, 2017 original petition.
Brantner v. Robinson Page 3
After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Robinson
on his affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Specifically, in its summary-judgment
order, the trial court stated:
The Court finds Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law because Plaintiff’s claims are solely for Negligence-Legal Malpractice.
A two year statute of limitations period applies pursuant to
TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §16.003(a). Plaintiff was aware of his
injury on February 12, 2015 and further finds that Plaintiff’s petition was
not filed until March 2, 2017, which time of filing was beyond the 2 year
applicable limitations period for filing such a claim.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a summary judgment de novo.
Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007);
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Our review is limited to
consideration of the evidence presented to the trial court. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Mathis v. Restoration Builders, Inc.,
231 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail on a
traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). A defendant
moving for summary judgment must either: (1) disprove at least one element of the
plaintiff's cause of action; or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element
Brantner v. Robinson Page 4
of an affirmative defense to rebut the plaintiff's cause. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339,
341 (Tex. 1995). The movant must conclusively establish its right to judgment as a matter
of law. See MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986); see also Shah v. Moss, 67
S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex. 2001) (noting that a defendant moving for summary judgment on a
statute of limitations affirmative defense must prove conclusively all elements of that
defense). A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as to
the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
816 (Tex. 2005).
If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to raise
a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Centeq Realty, Inc. v.
Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). The evidence raises a genuine issue of material
fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of
the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754,
755 (Tex. 2007). We take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, and we indulge
every reasonable inference and resolve any doubt in the non-movant's favor. Dorsett, 164
S.W.3d at 661.
III. BRANTNER’S NEGLIGENCE-LEGAL-MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
In his first issue, Brantner complains that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment as to his Negligence-Legal-Malpractice claims on the ground of
statute of limitations. We agree.
Brantner v. Robinson Page 5
In his original petition, Brantner asserted six claims against Robinson for deficient
performance as trial counsel, including Robinson’s purported misrepresentation
regarding the plea agreement and the possibility of parole and the handling of a
subsequent motion for new trial. Even construing Brantner’s pleadings liberally, these
claims sound in legal malpractice. See Stallworth v. Ayers, 510 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“A cause of action that arises out of bad legal
advice or improper representation is legal malpractice.” (citations omitted)); see also
Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied)
(“Professional negligence, or the failure to exercise ordinary care, includes giving a client
bad legal advice or otherwise improperly representing the client. For example, a lawyer
can commit professional negligence by giving an erroneous legal opinion or erroneous
advice, by delaying or failing to handle a matter entrusted to the lawyer’s care, or by not
using a lawyer’s ordinary care in preparing, managing, and prosecuting a case.” (internal
citations omitted)).
In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909
S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995). In Peeler, a criminal defendant filed suit against her defense
attorney, alleging malpractice and other claims. Id. at 496. Citing primarily public-policy
concerns, the Peeler Court held that, as a matter of law, the criminal defendant’s own
conduct was the sole proximate cause of her indictment and conviction and,
consequently, her claimed damages. Id. at 495-96. As such, the Peeler Court concluded
Brantner v. Robinson Page 6
that, absent exoneration on direct appeal or post-conviction relief, a criminal defendant
may not sue his or her attorney for malpractice. Id. at 497-98.
Applying Peeler to the case at bar yields a finding that Brantner cannot pursue a
malpractice cause of action against Robinson, his trial counsel, unless and until he has
been exonerated on direct appeal or through post-conviction relief. See id. at 498.
Therefore, because Brantner’s conviction has not been overturned, as a matter of law, he
cannot prove causation for any claim against Robinson, especially considering his
malpractice claims are not cognizable at this time. See id. at 495-98; see also Golden v.
McNeal, 78 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2002, pet. denied)
(“Furthermore, legal malpractice is essentially a claim for professional negligence. To
recover under malpractice, negligence, or the DTPA, a plaintiff must prove causation.”
(internal citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, Robinson asserted a statute-of-limitations defense in his summary-
judgment motion, and the trial court granted Robinson summary judgment expressly on
Robinson’s statute-of-limitations defense.
A statute of limitations is a procedural device operating as a defense to limit the
remedy available from an existing cause of action. Cadle Co. v. Wilson, 136 S.W.3d 345,
350 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the
statute of limitations begins to run, when facts come into existence that authorize a
claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194,
Brantner v. Robinson Page 7
202 (Tex. 2011) (op. on reh'g) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d
211, 221 (Tex. 2003)); see Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d
507, 514 (Tex. 1998).
In light of Peeler, Brantner was not authorized to file suit against Robinson until
his conviction is overturned—something that has not yet happened. See 909 S.W.2d at
497-98. Accordingly, Brantner’s cause of action has not yet accrued and, thus, cannot be
barred by the statute of limitations. See id.; Cooper v. Trent, 551 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“We conclude that the claims alleged by
Cooper, if true, would undermine the validity of her criminal conviction. Therefore, until
she has proved her conviction has been reversed, overturned, or invalidated in some
manner, her claims have no basis in law and were properly dismissed on Trent’s Rule 91a
motion.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Exxon Corp., 348 S.W.3d at 202; see Johnson
& Higgins of Tex., Inc., 962 S.W.2d at 514. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Robinson on the basis of the statute of
limitations. See Tex. Mun. Power Agency, 253 S.W.3d at 192; Valence Operating Co., 164
S.W.3d at 661; see also Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 495-98; Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157. We sustain
Brantner’s first issue.
IV. BRANTNER’S PURPORTED OTHER CLAIMS
Although he did not specifically allege any causes of action other than those
sounding in legal malpractice in his original petition, Brantner attempts to convert many
Brantner v. Robinson Page 8
of his claims to causes of action for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
fraud, violations of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, slander, and breach of
fiduciary duty in his appellant’s brief and complains that the trial court did not consider
these claims. We construe this as his second issue.
Earlier, we concluded that the claims contained in Brantner’s original petition
sound in legal malpractice. The anti-fracturing rule prevents plaintiffs from converting
what are actually professional-negligence claims against an attorney into other claims,
such as fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See Won Pak v. Harris, 313 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (citing Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr., P.C., 284
S.W.3d 416, 426-27 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)); Gruber, 241 S.W.3d at 693; see also
Echols v. Gulledge & Sons, LLC, No. 10-13-00419-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 10190, at *12
(Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because Brantner’s claims
sound in legal malpractice, and because the anti-fracturing rule prevents Brantner from
converting his legal-malpractice claims against his trial counsel into other claims, we
overrule Brantner’s second issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Brantner’s first issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Brantner v. Robinson Page 9
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray concurring)
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed August 14, 2019
[CV06]
Brantner v. Robinson Page 10