College Retail LLC v. Jefferson Central Appraisal District ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-18-00182-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
COLLEGE RETAIL LLC,
Appellant,
v.
JEFFERSON CENTRAL
APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee.
On appeal from the 58th District Court
of Jefferson County, Texas.
OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Perkes
Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant College Retail LLC appeals the dismissal of its ad valorem tax challenge
against Jefferson Central Appraisal District (JCAD), appellee. 1 By its single issue,
1 This cause is before the Court on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont pursuant
to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
College Retail argues that the trial court erred by granting the JCAD’s plea to the
jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
College Retail owns real property in Jefferson County in which it leases space to
Conn’s Home Plus. The JCAD values property in Jefferson County for tax purposes.
On May 18, 2017, College Retail filed a protest of its 2017 property taxes. Conn’s also
filed a protest dated May 31, 2017, and filed an affidavit to be used at the Appraisal
Review Board (ARB) scheduled for July 6, 2017. The JCAD advised College Retail and
Conn’s that Conn’s affidavit could not be used at the hearing unless College Retail
withdrew its protest. See TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 41.413(b). College Retail withdrew its
protest on June 24, 2017. Conn’s agent appeared at the protest hearing. The Notice
of Determination of Protest and Order Determining Protest is dated July 25, 2017, and
reflects no change in value.
College Retail filed suit in district court in Jefferson County on September 17, 2017,
seeking a reduction in the assessed value of its property. It complained that the
valuation was over market and unequal. Its original petition included a copy of the ARB
determination which identified the property street address, the property account number,
the tax year at issue, the legal description of the property, the case number, the property
ID number, and reproduced the notice of final order within the petition. The JCAD filed
a plea to the jurisdiction and a general denial in response. After some discovery, College
73.001. Because this is a transfer case, we apply precedent of the Ninth Court of Appeals to the extent it
differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
Retail filed its first amended petition as College Retail LLC, as the property owner and for
its tenant, Conn’s. The JCAD responded. The JCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction
challenged the trial court’s power to hear College Retail’s appeal on the ground that
College Retail failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court heard the
plea to the jurisdiction on February 14, 2018, and dismissed College Retail’s suit with
prejudice. This appeal followed.
II. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
College Retail’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erroneously granted the
plea to the jurisdiction. It argues that the purposes of administrative exhaustion were
fulfilled here because the ARB heard and rejected challenges to the valuation of the
property on the grounds of over market and unequal valuation, the grounds the owner
complains of in this suit.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The Texas Tax Code provides detailed administrative procedures for those who
contest their property taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.01–.71; Cameron Appraisal
Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006); see also Jefferson County Appraisal
Dist. v. Morgan, No. 2012 WL 403861, 2012 WL 403861, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
Feb. 9, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Administrative decisions are final if not appealed to
the district court. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(a). The administrative procedures are
“exclusive” and most defenses are barred if not raised therein. Id. § 42.09(a)(2). “[W]e
have repeatedly held that a taxpayer’s failure to pursue an [ARB] proceeding deprives the
courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes.” Rourk, 194
3
S.W.3d at 502 (citing Matagorda County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P.,
165 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2005)). If no proper party seeks judicial review of the board’s
decision within the statutory time period, the district court does not acquire subject-matter
jurisdiction over the petition for review, and the board’s valuation becomes final when the
statutory time period expires. Storguard Invs., LLC v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 369
S.W.3d 605, 611–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
When determining whether a party has exhausted its administrative remedies, we
rely on the statute that created the remedy. See Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487
S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016) (describing agency’s statutory authority to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse). Statutory
construction is an issue of law that we review de novo. Loasiaga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d
248, 254–55 (Tex. 2012); Am. Hous. Found. v. Calhoun County Appraisal Dist., 198
S.W.3d 816, 818 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, pet. denied); Franks v.
Woodville Indep. Sch. Dist., 132 S.W.3d 167, 169, n.3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no
pet.). Our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent
which we determine from the entire act, not just its isolated portions. TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 312.005; State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Am. Housing
Found., 198 S.W.3d at 818.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party challenges the court’s
authority to determine the subject matter of the action. Harris County v. Sykes, 136
S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.
2000). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Nueces
4
County v. Hoff, 153 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Montgomery Cty. Hosp. Dist.
v. Smith, 181 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
B. Remedies for Property Owners
“Generally, only the property owner has standing to seek judicial review of an
[ARB] order in the district court.” Storguard Invs., LLC, 369 S.W.3d at 610–11; TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. §§ 42.01–.031 (conferring right of appeal to property owners, certain lessees,
chief appraiser, county, and taxing unit). However, lessees of certain real property may
file a protest to the taxing authority but; “[t]he protest provided by this subsection is limited
to a single protest by either the property owner or the lessee.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§§ 41.413(b), 42.015 (appeal from protest); see Dolenz, Life Estate v. Dallas Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 293 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Here,
Conn’s filed a protest and appeared at the ARB hearing through its tax consultant.
Conn’s protest was unsuccessful. Conn’s did not appeal to the district court, although
as lessee, it exhausted its administrative remedies. The structure of the tax code
permitted either the owner or the lessee to file a protest, not both. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 41.413(b).
C. Discussion
The JCAD focuses on § 1.111(d) that provides an owner may not designate more
than one agent to represent an owner in connection with an item of property, and notes
that College Retail designated O’Conner & Associates regarding the property leased to
Conn’s. However, JCAD ignores § 41.413(b) which provides that “[t]he lessee who
protests “is considered the owner of the property for purposes of the protest.” TEX. TAX
5
CODE ANN. § 41.413(b). Additionally, “[t]he [ARB] shall deliver a copy of any notice
relating to the protest and of the order determining the protest to the owner of the property
and the person bringing the protest.” Id. § 41.413(c). The lessee is still “considered the
owner of the property for purposes of the appeal. The chief appraiser shall deliver a
copy of any notice relating to the appeal to the owner of the property and to the person
bringing the appeal.” Id. § 42.015(b). There is also a right to intervene by one with
standing in a suit that was timely filed. See id. § 42.016.2 Finally, in § 42.21(h), the
trial court:
has jurisdiction over an appeal under this chapter brought on behalf of a
property owner or lessee and the owner or lessee is considered to have
exhausted the owner’s or lessee’s administrative remedies regardless of
whether the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as the owner or lessee
of the property or correctly describes the property so long as the property
was the subject of an appraisal review board order, the petition was filed
within the period required by Subsection (a), and the petition provides
sufficient information to identify the property that is the subject of the
petition. Whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the petition or
whether the property needs to be further identified or described must be
addressed by means of a special exception and correction of the petition by
amendment as authorized by Subsection (e) and may not be the subject of
a plea to the jurisdiction or a claim that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the
2 Section 42.016 provides:
A person is entitled to intervene in an appeal brought under this chapter and the person
has standing and the court has jurisdiction in the appeal if the property that is the subject
of the appeal was also the subject of a protest hearing and the person:
(1) owned the property at any time during the tax year at issue;
(2) leased the property at any time during the tax year at issue and the
person filed the protest that resulted in the issuance of the order under
appeal; or
(3) is shown on the appraisal roll as the owner of the property or as a
lessee authorized to file a protest and the person filed the protest that
resulted in the issuance of the order under appeal.
TEX. TAX. CODE. ANN. § 42.016.
6
plaintiff’s administrative remedies. If the petition is amended to add a
plaintiff, the court on motion shall enter a docket control order to provide
proper deadlines in response to the addition of the plaintiff.
Id. § 42.21(h) (emphasis added).
College Retail’s property went through the ARB and received an order determining
protest under the same theories presented by the property owner here, that the taxation
is unequal and incorrect. Because the tax code does not allow both the owner and
lessee to present the challenge jointly, and the lessee chose not to appeal, JCAD asserts
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the owner’s appeal.
Although a court should interpret a statute by reference to its language alone when
it can do so, courts are not confined to isolated statutory words or phrases; instead they
review the entire act to determine legislative intent. See Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327;
Town & Country Suites, L.C. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 461 S.W.3d 208, 211–21
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Am. Hous. Found., 198 S.W.3d at 818.
Subsection 42.21(h) compels a different result than that reached by the trial court.
It specifically addresses the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and it is also the more
recently amended statute. Subsection (h) was added in 2013. See Acts of 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., Ch. 1259 (H.B. 585). Section 42.01(a)(1) has been substantially unchanged
since 2000.
The JCAD admitted that College Retail’s suit was timely filed, College Retail’s
original and amended petitions clearly and unequivocally identify the property at issue by
including the notice of final order with all of the identifying property information, the
property was the subject of an ARB order, and the JCAD filed no special exceptions that
7
appear in the record. As a result, the trial court had jurisdiction as set out in § 42.21(h).
Accordingly, we sustain College Retail’s sole issue. We express no opinion as to
whether Conn’s was properly added to the lawsuit as that issue is not before us.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
22nd day of August, 2019.
8