William M. Windsor v. Sam Round ( 2019 )


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  •                          IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-14-00355-CV
    WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    SAM ROUND,
    Appellee
    No. 10-15-00069-CV
    WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    KELLIE MCDOUGALD,
    Appellee
    No. 10-15-00092-CV
    WILLIAM WINDSOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    JOEYISALITTLEKID, ET AL,
    Appellees
    From the 378th District Court
    Ellis County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 88611
    CONCURRING OPINION
    In these proceedings, the Court now affirms the trial court’s orders that: granted
    Round’s special appearance, granted McDougald’s motion for sanctions, and dismissed
    Windsor’s underlying suit in the trial court case number 88611 for want of prosecution.
    I would have dismissed these proceedings three years ago which would have had the
    same effect.1 See Nos. 10-14-00355-CV, Windsor v. Round; 10-14-00392-CV, Windsor v.
    Fleming, 10-15-00069-CV, Windsor v. McDougald; and 10-15-00092-CV, Windsor v.
    Joeyisalittlekid, et al. (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 3, 2016, Gray, C.J., dissent to Orders) (not
    designated for publication). The effect of the opinion and resulting judgments is to affirm
    the trial court’s orders granting a special appearance, sanctions, and a dismissal. Thus,
    while I do not join the Court’s opinion, I respectfully concur in the effect of the Court’s
    judgments.
    As I noted in my dissent to the referenced orders on August 3, 2016, the simple
    action of again striking Windsor’s brief was obviously inadequate to address the
    1
    Another Windsor proceeding was disposed of by this Court on August 7, 2019: 10-14-00392-CV, Windsor
    v. Fleming.
    Windsor v. Round
    Windsor v. McDougald
    Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al.                                                           Page 2
    overarching problem in that Windsor has exhibited a flagrant disregard for the legislative
    enactments and the rules of the judicial branch and has, at every turn, demonstrated a
    complete disregard for the orderly administration of justice. He has frustrated the
    judicial process and used it as a tool of oppression against his victims and as a means to
    delay the ultimate disposition of proceedings in which he was involved, many of which
    he started. Windsor failed to follow explicit orders of this Court and filed unnecessary
    and frivolous notices of appeal, motions, and new proceedings. In my opinion, it is long
    past the time, and this Court would be totally justified, to dismiss these appeals, thus
    affirming the trial court’s orders about which Windsor complains.
    While the Court goes into some extensive history of this proceeding, it is
    worthwhile to be familiar with and understand the result of Windsor’s pattern and
    litigation techniques. Windsor had so burdened the federal courts that a federal court
    rendered an order enjoining him from filing any proceeding in a state or federal court
    without the prior approval of a federal judge in the district where the proceeding was to
    be filed. Windsor has argued that we are not bound by this federal injunction. He may
    be right in his argument that a State of Texas court is not bound by it. Windsor convinced
    the trial court to ignore the injunction.
    Windsor is wrong, however, to think that he is not bound by this federal
    injunction. He is also wrong to think that we cannot act upon his violation of that
    Windsor v. Round
    Windsor v. McDougald
    Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al.                                                 Page 3
    injunction; his failure to comply with it. In this regard, he had been advised to seek
    approval for the filings not only of the proceedings he had filed in Ellis County, but also
    of the various appeals he had filed in this Court.
    Eventually, Windsor requested and obtained a setting for a hearing before a
    federal district court to seek the court’s approval to file these proceedings. When the date
    for the hearing approached, Windsor rescheduled the hearing so that he could attend
    telephonically. When the scheduled date for the rescheduled telephonic hearing was
    near, he unilaterally cancelled the hearing.
    As the district court found, the proceeding was not dismissed because it was moot.
    The hearing was dismissed because the filing party, Windsor, asked that it be dismissed.
    This left Windsor in the legal position in state court, this Court, that he was in before the
    federal court proceeding was dismissed at his request. Windsor was in violation of the
    injunction because it was filed without the federal court’s approval.
    And when the trial court and this Court were diligently trying to proceed to hear
    and consider and resolve his complaints, Windsor filed a petition for removal of the
    proceeding to South Dakota. The effort to remove his case to a federal court in another
    state was destined for failure because there is no legal basis for a plaintiff in a state court
    proceeding that selected the venue in the first instance to then remove it to federal court.
    Further, removal of a pending Texas state court proceeding to a South Dakota federal
    Windsor v. Round
    Windsor v. McDougald
    Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al.                                                      Page 4
    court is so unsupported by any legal authority and lacking in any legal basis that it can
    only have been intended for an improper purpose.            Moreover, by removing the
    proceeding to a federal district court, he was in direct violation of the previously
    mentioned federal pre-filing injunction because he was entering a federal court by the
    removal petition and had not obtained the approval of a federal judge to do so.
    By these two specific actions, as well as his many others, it is clear that Windsor
    has no regard for the proper and orderly administration of justice and is using the process
    to trifle with our patience and our jurisdiction, making a mockery of the judicial process.
    See Browning v. Ryan, 
    756 S.W.2d 379
    , 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Humble
    Exploration Co. v. Browning, 
    677 S.W.2d 111
    , 114 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
    See also Spence v. State National Bank, 
    5 S.W.2d 754
    , 756 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt
    adopted). Accordingly, I would dismiss these appeals without regard to the merits and
    would thus not engage in the waste of time and resources of spending 38 pages to address
    6 issues, several of which the Court finds are either not preserved or that they are
    inadequately briefed.
    We have previously dismissed another of Windsor’s appeals. See Windsor v.
    Joeyisalittlekid, No. 10-15-00199-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7354 (Tex. App.—Waco July 16
    2015, no pet.) (mem. op) (appeal dismissed noting Windsor’s efforts to mislead the court
    and the failure of Windsor to follow the court’s instructions). We should have done the
    Windsor v. Round
    Windsor v. McDougald
    Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al.                                                   Page 5
    same thing with these appeals three years ago. Because the Court effectuates the right
    result by now affirming the trial court’s orders granting a special appearance, sanctions,
    and dismissal, which is the functional equivalent to dismissing the appeals, I respectfully
    concur in the Court’s judgments but not the opinion or basis thereof.
    TOM GRAY
    Chief Justice
    Concurring Opinion issued and filed August 28, 2019.
    Windsor v. Round
    Windsor v. McDougald
    Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al.                                                  Page 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-14-00355-CV

Filed Date: 8/28/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/29/2019