Edward Lee Mayfield v. State ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00343-CR
___________________________
EDWARD LEE MAYFIELD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1517743D
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Edward Lee Mayfield attempts to appeal his conviction following a
charge bargain. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Background
In the indictment, the State charged Mayfield with two second-degree-felony
aggravated assaults. The alleged dates and complainants were the same. What differed
was the alleged deadly weapon. In the first count, the State alleged that Mayfield used
or exhibited a knife. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2). In the second count, the
State alleged that Mayfield used or exhibited a cellular phone. See id.
The indictment also contained a repeat-offender notice, which raised the
punishment range for both offenses to that of a first-degree felony. See id. § 12.42(b).
In April 2019, the State waived count one, Mayfield confessed to count two
and to the repeat-offender notice, and the court deferred sentencing while the
probation department prepared a presentence-investigation report (PSI). The trial
court’s “Certificate of Proceedings” shows that Mayfield entered an “open [guilty]
plea” to count two. The “Written Plea Admonishments” show an “open plea” with
“waive count[] one.”1
1
A nonexistent count three was also purportedly waived.
2
In August 2019, after the PSI had been prepared, the trial court sentenced
Mayfield to 40 years in the penitentiary. Under the heading “Terms of Plea Bargain: (if
any),” the judgment recites, “Open plea to the court w/psi; waive count[] one.”2
Mayfield appealed, but the trial court’s “Certification of Defendant’s Right of
Appeal” showed that he was appealing a conviction following a plea bargain and that
he had no right to appeal. Based on the certification, we informed Mayfield that we
might dismiss his appeal unless he (or any other party) filed a response showing
grounds for continuing it. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P.
25.2(a)(2).
Mayfield responded. He argues that the certification is incorrect because there
was neither a punishment bargain nor a charge bargain.
Because there was no agreement about punishment, Mayfield asserts that there
was no punishment bargain. We agree. In that sense, the plea before the trial court
was an “open” one because the actual punishment assessed was “was left to the
discretion of the trial judge.” See Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 341–42 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009); Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no
pet.) (stating that an open plea is (1) one with a charge bargain but not a sentence
bargain or (2) no plea bargain whatsoever).
2
The judgment also notes the State’s waiving a nonexistent count three.
3
Mayfield then argues that there was no charge bargain either because the State’s
waiving the first paragraph did not change the punishment range. Both the first and
second counts were second-degree felonies, and the enhancement paragraph applied
equally to both. Furthermore, the two offenses were committed against the same
person, on the same date, and during the same criminal episode, and were charged in
the same indictment, so he asserts that even if he had been convicted of both
offenses, they would have run concurrently. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03. Because
the punishment range was not affected in the least, Mayfield argues, there was no
charge bargain. We disagree.
The Relevant Law
“Charge-bargaining involves questions of whether a defendant will plead guilty
to the offense that has been alleged or to a lesser or related offense, and of whether
the prosecutor will dismiss, or refrain from bringing, other charges.” Shankle v. State,
119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see Thomas v. State, 516 S.W.3d 498, 502
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Kennedy, 297 S.W.3d at 341. A charge bargain means a “plea
bargain whereby a prosecutor agrees to drop some of the counts or reduce the charge
to a less serious offense in exchange for a plea of either guilty or no contest from the
defendant.” Harper, 567 S.W.3d at 455 (quoting Charge Bargain, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014)); see also Hodge v. State, No. 05-18-00549-CR, 2019 WL 3212150, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“A ‘charge bargain’ refers to an arrangement whereby the State agrees to drop some
4
of the charged counts or reduce the charge to a less serious offense in exchange for a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”); Dever v. State, No. 02-07-00233-CR, 2008 WL
3179936, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“In ‘charge-bargaining,’ a defendant agrees to plead guilty
to the offense formally alleged or to some lesser or related offense and the State
agrees to dismiss, or refrain from bringing, other charges.”).
“An agreement to dismiss a pending charge, or not to bring an available charge,
effectively puts a cap on punishment at the maximum sentence for the charge that is
not dismissed.” Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813; see Thomas, 516 S.W.3d at 502; Kennedy, 297
S.W.3d at 341. “An agreement to dismiss a pending charge, or not to bring an
available charge, effectively caps punishment at the maximum sentence for the charge
that remains.” Hodge, 2019 WL 3212150, at *3; see Mosley v. State, No. 06-19-00099-CR,
2019 WL 2402273, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication).
Discussion
Here, the State dropped count one, which alleged that Mayfield used a knife as
a deadly weapon, and Mayfield pleaded guilty to count two, which alleged a cellular
phone as the deadly weapon. Mayfield’s punishment was capped to count two. That
fits the definition of a charge bargain. See Shankle, 119 S.W.3d at 813.
5
Mayfield argues that because (1) his punishment range after he pleaded guilty
was the same as his punishment range before he pleaded guilty and (2) the sentences
would have run concurrently, the punishment cap never changed. We disagree.
Before the plea bargain, Mayfield faced two convictions and two sentences.
Even if the sentences would have run concurrently, in its discretion, the trial court
was not obligated to assess the same punishment for both offenses. After the plea
bargain, Mayfield faced only one conviction—for the offense involving the cellular
phone and not the offense involving the knife—and one sentence. We do not have to
decide if it was a particularly good charge bargain. We must decide only whether it
was a charge bargain, and it was. See Kennedy, 297 S.W.3d at 342.
Because Mayfield had no right to appeal as a result of his charge bargain with
the State and because the trial court’s certification correctly shows that Mayfield is
without a right of appeal, we dismiss his appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: November 27, 2019
6