James H. Watson and Others Similarly Situated v. City of Southlake ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-18-00143-CV
___________________________
JAMES H. WATSON AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant
V.
CITY OF SOUTHLAKE, Appellee
___________________________
No. 02-18-00151-CV
___________________________
JAMES H. WATSON AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant
V.
CITY OF ALLEN, CITY OF AMARILLO, CITY OF ARLINGTON, CITY OF
AUSTIN, CITY OF BALCH SPRINGS, CITY OF BALCONES HEIGHTS,
CITY OF BASTROP, CITY OF BAYTOWN, CITY OF BEDFORD, CITY OF
BURLESON, CITY OF CEDAR HILL, CITY OF CONROE, CITY OF COPPELL,
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, CITY OF DALLAS, CITY OF DENTON, CITY OF
DUNCANVILLE, CITY OF EL PASO, CITY OF ELGIN, CITY OF FARMERS
BRANCH, CITY OF FORT WORTH, CITY OF FRISCO, CITY OF GARLAND,
CITY OF GRAND PRAIRIE, CITY OF HALTOM CITY, CITY OF HUMBLE,
CITY OF HURST, CITY OF HUTTO, CITY OF IRVING, CITY OF JERSEY
VILLAGE, CITY OF KILLEEN, CITY OF LEAGUE CITY, CITY OF LITTLE
ELM, CITY OF LONGVIEW, CITY OF MARSHALL, CITY OF MESQUITE,
CITY OF NORTH RICHLAND HILLS, CITY OF RICHLAND HILLS, CITY OF
ROANOKE, CITY OF ROUND ROCK, CITY OF TOMBALL, CITY OF
UNIVERSITY PARK, CITY OF WATAUGA, AMERICAN TRAFFIC
SOLUTIONS, INC., AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, LLC, XEROX STATE
& LOCAL SOLUTIONS INC., AND THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 153rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 153-278080-15, 153-298996-18
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Birdwell, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Birdwell
OPINION
Appellant James H. Watson challenges the constitutionality of the state and local
laws that provided for automated red-light cameras. He sues on behalf of a putative
class of citizens, seeking a declaration and injunction against enforcement of these red-
light-camera laws, as well as the return of the fines that he and other citizens were
assessed.
In this consolidated appeal, Watson contends that the trial court erred by
granting pleas to the jurisdiction in favor of all but one defendant. While Watson’s
appeal was pending, the Texas Supreme Court addressed a nearly identical set of
arguments against the constitutionality of red-light-camera laws, and it rejected the
appellant’s challenges on grounds of standing, immunity, and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Garcia v. City of Willis, No. 17-0713, 2019 WL 1967140, at
*3–7 (Tex. May 3, 2019). Also while this appeal was pending, the Legislature undid the
whole of the red-light-camera statute, repealing it and replacing it with a measure that
generally prohibited the use of red-light cameras for traffic enforcement. Act of
May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 372, H.B. 1631, §§ 2, 6; see Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§ 707.020. Thus, following the guidance of Garcia, and accounting for the effect of the
Legislature’s repeal, we reject Watson’s arguments and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2002, the Texas Office of Attorney General issued an opinion suggesting that
under state law at the time, cities could not use red-light cameras to impose civil
3
penalties. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0460 (2002). In 2007, the Legislature
responded to that opinion by enacting chapter 707 of the transportation code, which
authorized municipalities to establish, by ordinance, a system of red-light cameras and
civil fines. See Act of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1149, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws
3924 (former Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 707.001–.019). Under the former statute,
participating municipalities could assess a civil fine of up to $75 for red-light violations,
along with a late fee of up to $25 if payment was not timely made. Id. (former Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 707.007). If the penalty was not paid at all, the statute authorized
the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles to refuse to renew the vehicle’s registration.
Id. (former Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.017(a)). The statute provided that persons
charged with violations could contest the penalty at an administrative hearing. Id.
(former Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.014(a)).
After the enactment of chapter 707, the City of Southlake adopted a red-light-
camera ordinance, as did many other municipalities. Southlake’s ordinance provided
that violations were subject to a civil fine of $75, a $25 late fee, and additional fees if
the violator’s check was returned for insufficient funds.
On Halloween of October 2014, Watson, a resident of Louisiana, was cited for
violating Southlake’s ordinance. It is undisputed that Watson did not take advantage
of his administrative remedies. Instead, he filed suit in district court. Watson alleged
that he was not in the vehicle or even in the state of Texas at the time of the purported
violation, and he did not give permission to whoever was driving his vehicle. Watson
4
alleged that he nonetheless paid the $75 fine under duress, fearing that he would be
assessed late fees, would be refused renewal of his registration, and would suffer damage
to his credit score.
However, Watson did not simply sue Southlake for the return of his $75. Rather,
Watson sought class certification and purported to sue on behalf of all others who had
been affected by Texas’s red-light-camera laws. To that end, Watson sued
municipalities throughout Texas that had enacted red-light-camera ordinances. Watson
also sued Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., the private company that administered
Southlake’s red-light-camera program, as well as three other similarly situated private
administrators: American Traffic Solutions, Inc.; American Traffic Solutions, LLC; and
Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc. Finally, Watson’s petition named the State of Texas
as defendant for its role in enacting the unconstitutional enabling statute. In all, he
sought the return of millions of dollars that had been, he said, wrongfully “fleeced”
from citizens; he alleged an amount in controversy of well over a million dollars.
Watson alleged several claims:
• unconstitutional takings;
• reimbursement of the civil fines;
• injunction prohibiting the government defendants from enforcing their red-
light-camera laws;
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• declaratory judgment that the red-light-camera laws were unconstitutional under
several provisions of the Texas constitution; and
• claims for common law misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices
violations against the private administrators.
Before long, many of the government defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction.
In its plea, the State of Texas argued that it was not involved in the issuance of Watson’s
fine, and Watson therefore lacked standing to bring claims against the State. According
to the State, it was purely passive in the matter, and Watson had suffered a cognizable
injury only at the hands of Southlake and Redflex—the entities which had issued his
ticket. The State further reasoned that even if Watson had standing, his claims were
barred by sovereign immunity. Many of the municipalities and private administrators
voiced their own standing and immunity arguments. Other municipalities contended
that Watson’s claims were barred due to his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On April 6, 2018, the trial court rendered two orders concerning the pleas to the
jurisdiction, from which Watson appeals. In one order, the trial court granted
Southlake’s plea to the jurisdiction on the basis of immunity. Watson subsequently filed
an accelerated interlocutory appeal of that order in appellate cause number 02-18-
00143-CV.
In another order, the trial court granted pleas to the jurisdiction in favor of all
defendants except Southlake and Redflex, reasoning that Watson had no standing to
6
raise his claims against the State, the other municipalities, or the private administrators
who were not involved in Watson’s ticket. The trial court subsequently severed these
claims and rendered a final judgment dismissing them with prejudice. Watson timely
appealed this final judgment in appellate cause number 02-18-00151-CV. Together, the
order and the judgment left Redflex as the only remaining defendant in the case. We
consider Watson’s appeals together.
II. STANDING & MOOTNESS
The trial court implicitly concluded that Watson had standing to sue Southlake
and Redflex, but it explicitly concluded that he lacked standing to sue any of the other
defendants who were not involved in his particular ticket.
By what we deem his first issue, Watson challenges the trial court’s ruling that he
lacked standing to sue any of these other defendants. Before we consider his issue,
however, we take up sua sponte the question of whether Watson had standing to bring
prospective claims against any defendant in this appeal.
A. Applicable Law
Standing is a question of law that we review de novo. Heckman v. Williamson Cty.,
369 S.W.3d 137, 149–50 (Tex. 2012). The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively
demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 150. When assessing a plea to the
jurisdiction, our analysis begins with the live pleadings. Id. We construe the plaintiff’s
pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent.
Id. Because it is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, standing cannot be waived
7
and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d
477, 484 (Tex. 2018).
“In Texas, the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a
real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Id. Under
Texas law, the standing inquiry begins with determining whether the plaintiff has
personally been injured. Id. at 485. The second element requires that the plaintiff’s
alleged injury be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct. Id. To establish the third
standing requirement, a plaintiff must show that there is a substantial likelihood that
the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury. Id.
Standing is a “prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter
jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140,
at *2. We are “duty-bound” to explore potential standing problems sua sponte. See id.
B. Watson Lacks Standing to Raise Prospective Claims for Relief
Watson seeks two forms of prospective relief. First, he seeks a declaration that
multiple sections of the statute—and the ordinances enacted under that statute—are
unconstitutional. Second, he seeks injunctive relief prohibiting all defendants from
enforcing or collecting money under these red-light-camera laws. Watson also raises
several claims for retrospective relief, including claims for takings and reimbursement.
In Garcia, the court faced similar claims for prospective and retrospective relief.
According to the Garcia court, the standing doctrine did not foreclose Garcia’s
retrospective claims, but Garcia lacked standing to bring his prospective claims for
8
declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at *3–4. The court reasoned that Garcia had already
paid his civil fine, and he had not pleaded that he faced any further threat of imminent
harm under the statute. Id. at *3. Garcia had resolved his only infraction, and the threat
of new infractions was “speculative” at best. Id. Garcia therefore had “no concrete or
particularized stake in the validity or future application” of the red-light-camera laws
that was distinguishable from the public at large. Id. at *3–4. “With no personal stake
in the future application of the ordinance or relevant state statutes, Garcia lack[ed] the
particularized interest for standing that prospective relief requires.” Id. at *4.
The same reasoning holds true here. Having resolved his only violation by
paying the civil fine, Watson has put any imminent threat of injury into the past. The
prospects that Watson, who is a resident of Louisiana, will face any further
consequences under Texas’s red-light-camera laws are remote to the point of being
“conjectural or hypothetical.” Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485 (cleaned up) (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (plurality op.)); see
Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding threat of future injury
“conjectural,” in challenge to texting-while-driving ordinance, where any future fine was
“contingent upon her once again driving while using her cell phone and receiving a
citation under the Chicago ordinance”). Watson may yet have standing to raise
retrospective claims against the State and Southlake, the parties who allegedly injured
him directly. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485. However, as to his claims for prospective
relief, he “stands in the same shoes as any other citizen who might potentially be fined
9
for running a red light.” See Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140, at *4. He therefore lacks
standing to raise prospective claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against any
defendant in this appeal.
C. Watson Lacks Standing to Sue Other Municipalities and Private
Administrators for Retrospective Relief
We next take up the question presented by Watson’s first issue: whether he had
standing to bring retrospective claims against any of the other municipalities and private
administrators that were not involved in his ticket. Watson maintains that despite the
lack of direct harm, he nonetheless has standing to sue them on behalf of the putative
class under the “juridical link” doctrine. Watson argues that under this doctrine,
standing exists as to all defendants in the case, even those who were not involved in his
ticket. As we explain, the juridical link doctrine is inapplicable here, and Watson cannot
use that doctrine to bring even retrospective claims against defendants who never
harmed him.
A plaintiff who brings a class action, rather than just suing on his own behalf,
must still prove that he individually has standing to sue. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 151.
The court must consider this threshold question even before reaching the separate issue
of whether it can certify the putative class. Id. Just as it must dismiss a case where the
plaintiff lacks standing to bring any of his claims, a court must dismiss a class action for
want of jurisdiction if the named plaintiff entirely lacked individual standing at the time
he sued. Id. But a plaintiff who seeks to represent a class, yet lacks standing on some
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of the purported class’s claims, does not completely lack standing to bring any claims.
Id. For every claim, there must be a named plaintiff with standing; “a claim survives
the initial standing inquiry so long as at least one named plaintiff has standing to bring
it.” Id. at 152.
To show standing, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must be “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s conduct because “a court [can] act only to redress injury that fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at
485. Thus, generally, a plaintiff cannot represent those having causes of action against
whom the plaintiff has no cause of action and from whose hands he has suffered no
injury. Cedar Crest Funeral Home, Inc. v. Lashley, 889 S.W.2d 325, 331 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1993, no writ) (citing La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 462 (9th Cir.
1973)). “This rule applies even if the plaintiffs’ injuries are identical to those of the
parties they are representing.” Id.
However, Texas has recognized two exceptions to this rule: “(1) situations in
which all injuries are the result of a conspiracy or concerted scheme among the
defendants; and (2) instances in which all defendants are juridically related in a manner
that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would be expeditious.” TCI Cablevision
of Dall., Inc. v. Owens, 8 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. dism’d)
(quoting Cedar Crest, 889 S.W.2d at 331); Tex. Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Wood, 994
S.W.2d 796, 806–07 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on reh’g);
11
see Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 843 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991)
(recognizing the “juridical link” exception), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 893
S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994). A “juridical link” is some legal relationship which relates all
defendants in a way such that single resolution of the dispute is preferred to a
multiplicity of similar actions. Leeper, 843 S.W.2d at 55. A juridical linkage is most often
found where all defendants are officials of a single state and are charged with enforcing
or uniformly acting in accordance with a state statute, rule, or practice of statewide
application that is alleged to be unconstitutional. TCI Cablevision, 8 S.W.3d at 843
(quoting Cedar Crest, 889 S.W.2d at 332). “In that situation, allowing a class suit against
a defendant class really is an alternative means of permitting plaintiffs to sue the state
itself.” Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953
(W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). Thus, “if
all the defendants took part in a similar scheme that was sustained either by a contract
or conspiracy, or was mandated by a uniform state rule, it is appropriate to join as
defendants even parties with whom the named class representative did not have direct
contact.” Payton v. Cty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Fallick v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423–24 (6th Cir. 1998), and Moore v. Comfed Sav. Bank,
908 F.2d 834, 838–39 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Watson contends that the juridical link doctrine is implicated here because he
has alleged that all defendants—the State, the municipalities, and the private
administrators—were uniformly acting pursuant to a statute that is unconstitutional.
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Watson claims that the juridical link doctrine therefore endows the class with standing
as to all defendants, even those who were not directly involved in the ticket issued to
him. As support, Watson cites the Seventh Circuit’s justification for the juridical link
doctrine: once the requirements of class certification are met, the true plaintiff is the
class as a whole, and if that class plaintiff has been wronged by all defendants, the class
has standing to sue all defendants. See id. at 678–79; Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d
239, 248 (5th Cir. 2008) (same justification).
There is one problem with Watson’s argument: in this case, there is no class. In
his live petition, Watson prayed for certification of a class, but in the two and a half
years that Watson’s suit was on file, he did not pursue class certification any further
than this. Watson never filed a motion for class certification; he did not request a
hearing on this issue, and at the hearing on the defendants’ pleas to the jurisdiction, he
did not press the issue; he never asked for a ruling on class certification, and the trial
court never made one; and Watson has not raised the issue of class certification on
appeal. Watson’s attempt at class certification therefore falls short under the rubrics of
error preservation1 and assignment of error.2
1
“Rule 33.1(a) requires a timely and ruled-upon objection to preserve error.” Seim
v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a));
see Northrup v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 72 S.W.3d 16, 22 n.4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2002, pets. denied) (applying preservation requirements to class certification).
“We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not reverse the
2
judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.” Davis v. Mueller,
13
In this posture, Watson cannot hope to proceed under his juridical linkage
theory. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, class certification is a precondition for the
juridical link doctrine:
This doctrine is premised on the notion that the class, not the class
representative, is the relevant legal entity for the purpose of Article III
justiciability concerns. Because no class has been certified and because,
for the reasons discussed below, Audler’s direct claims must be dismissed,
he cannot serve as the representative of any properly certified class.
Therefore, even were we to recognize the juridical link doctrine as a basis
for standing, Audler could not invoke it successfully. Without the
prospect of class certification, Audler’s claims against the Class
Defendants are nothing more than attempts to assert the injuries of others
and therefore must be dismissed for lack of standing.
Audler, 519 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted). In our view, this rule is sound, because the
juridical link doctrine does not operate as a shortcut that would allow Watson to entirely
bypass the necessity for standing and the requisites for class certification, including
“commonality” and “typicality.”3 Rather, the doctrine operates as a specialized
appendage to those tests, slightly modifying the standing requirement of traceability and
the class requirement of typicality to account for the special relationship among
528 S.W.3d 97, 103 n.38 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.
1993)).
3
Under Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff seeking class
certification must satisfy four requirements: (1) numerosity (“the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable”); (2) commonality (“there are questions of
law[] or fact common to the class”); (3) typicality (“the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”); and (4)
adequacy of representation (“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class”). Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(a); Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425,
433 (Tex. 2000).
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defendants.4 But it cannot be applied without satisfying the tests for both standing and
class certification, in modified form, at the same juncture in the case.
4
Some courts hold or imply that the juridical link doctrine relates to standing. See
Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004); Payton v. Cty. of Kane, 308 F.3d
673, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2002); Thompson v. Bd. of Educ. of Romeo Cmty. Sch., 709 F.2d 1200,
1205 (6th Cir. 1983). Other courts say the doctrine relates to the requirements of class
certification. See Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins., 683 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2012); Fallick v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998); Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662,
669 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated in part on other grounds, 478 U.S. 385, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
In our view, Texas cases show that the juridical link doctrine operates as a
specialized modification to the requirements of both standing and class certification.
As to standing, the doctrine modifies the requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury
must be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct; under the juridical link doctrine,
this element is satisfied so long as the named plaintiffs’ injuries, as a whole, are fairly
traceable to the juridically related defendants. See Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d
239, 248 (5th Cir. 2008). Similar reasoning was applied by the Texas Supreme Court in
Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 158 (Tex. 2012). The Heckman court
found the plaintiff class had standing to sue three county court at law judges, id., even
though there was “undisputed evidence that a visiting judge” had committed the alleged
constitutional infraction against the named plaintiffs and “not any of the defendant
county court at law judges,” id. at 144–45. The Heckman court reasoned that these
defendants could justifiably be united for purposes of standing because the plaintiffs
had sued them in their official capacity, effectively filing suit against the office of the
court as a whole. Id. at 158. The court reached this conclusion as part of its analysis
concerning the second element of standing, which asks whether the plaintiff’s alleged
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 157. By virtue of the same
reasoning, the juridical link doctrine modifies the standing element of traceability,
allowing the plaintiff class to trace its injury to a group of juridically related defendants.
See id. Indeed, the Beaumont Court of Appeals has held that a class had standing to
trace its injuries to a group of juridically linked defendants, even when not every
defendant had harmed every plaintiff. See Peters v. Blockbuster, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 295, 306
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.).
As to class certification, several courts, including this one, have held that the
doctrine modifies the requirement of typicality. See Tex. Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Wood, 994 S.W.2d 796, 806–07 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.);
Cedar Crest Funeral Home, Inc. v. Lashley, 889 S.W.2d 325, 331 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993,
15
Without a bona fide attempt at class certification, there is no need to consider
whether the juridical link test is satisfied. If the plaintiff fails to pursue class
certification, that plaintiff has no right to maintain suit on behalf of the unnamed.5
Without that right, it is entirely pointless to consider whether that plaintiff can also
maintain suit against strangers who never harmed him, but only harmed the unnamed.
Watson has not presented, preserved, or briefed his attempt to obtain class
certification. He therefore cannot maintain claims based on juridical linkage, and his
only standing is to pursue claims against those who harmed him. Because Watson has
not alleged—and cannot allege—that he suffered any injury that is traceable to the other
defendant municipalities and private administrators, he has no standing with regard to
these defendants. The trial court therefore did not err in granting their pleas to the
jurisdiction.
no writ); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 843 S.W.2d 41, 53–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994).
In sum, the party seeking to apply the juridical link doctrine must still satisfy the
tests for standing and class certification as part of the same exercise—considering
standing first and then class certification—albeit with slight modifications to their
elements of traceability and typicality.
5
Until a class action is certified, a suit brought as a class action is treated as if it
were brought by the named plaintiffs suing on their own behalf. Dall. Fort Worth Int’l
Airport Bd. v. Cox, 261 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Williams, 958 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.);
Palais Royal, Inc. v. Partida, 916 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig.
proceeding).
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D. We do not Determine Whether Watson has Standing to Sue the State or
Whether the Claims Discussed Above are Moot
Also within his first issue, Watson argues he has standing to sue the State, and
the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. Watson cites no authority that would
inform our analysis of this question.
However, we need not determine whether Watson has standing to sue the State.
While an analysis of standing would have bearing on the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, as we explain, there are two other jurisdictional concerns—immunity from
suit and exhaustion of administrative remedies—that bar his claims against the State in
any event. Even assuming that Watson has standing to sue the State, then, a lack of
jurisdiction stands in the way of Watson’s claims against the State for other reasons. See
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2307 (1999) (holding that
courts need not address standing when other concerns are “logically antecedent” and
equally dispositive). We therefore need not resolve this question today.
The recent repeal of the enabling statute would seem to provide yet another
possible reason to decide against Watson on all of his claims: mootness. A case
becomes moot when there ceases to be a justiciable controversy between the parties or
when the parties cease to have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. State ex rel.
Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (op. on reh’g). A case can become moot at
any time, including on appeal. Id. When a case becomes moot, the court loses
jurisdiction and cannot hear the case. Id. But a case is not rendered moot simply
17
because some of the issues become moot during the appellate process. Id. If only some
claims or issues become moot, the case remains “live,” at least as to other claims or
issues that are not moot. Id.
But given our resolution of the standing inquiry, we need not consider whether
the statute’s repeal mooted Watson’s prospective claims or his claims against any
defendants in this appeal other than the State and Southlake; we have already
determined that Watson may not bring those claims due to lack of standing. See Tex.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Salazar, No. 03-11-00478-CV, 2013 WL 5878905, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Austin Oct. 31, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Given our ultimate resolution
that the district court never had jurisdiction over those claims, we need not address
whether those claims were mooted by changes to the governing statutes and rules
occurring after the district court issued its judgment.”).
Rather, it is enough to say that Watson’s retrospective claims against the State
and Southlake are not moot. Even if the repeal had wholly “obviated” the “need to
seek a declaration voiding” the statute, “the repeal did not remedy any harm” that might
have been caused under the statute prior to its repeal. City of Bedford v. Apartment Ass’n
of Tarrant Cty., Inc., No. 02-16-00356-CV, 2017 WL 3429143, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Aug. 10, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Put differently, the government “cannot
extract millions in unlawful fees and fines, decide the whole thing was a mistake, keep
the money, and insist the whole matter is moot.” Lowenberg v. City of Dall., 261 S.W.3d
18
54, 59 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). “For those who paid, the controversy remains real.”
Id. Thus, there remains an active controversy regarding Watson’s retrospective claims.
F. Summary
Watson’s standing does not extend (1) to any defendant besides the State and
Southlake or (2) to his prospective claims against any defendant at all. Watson’s claims
against Redflex are not at issue in this appeal. 6 We therefore proceed to explain why
other doctrines bar Watson’s remaining retrospective claims against the State and
Southlake.
III. IMMUNITY
We have already held that Watson has no standing to raise his prospective claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief. We therefore need not consider what we deem to
be Watson’s second issue, in which he argues that his claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief are not barred by immunity.
In his third issue, Watson argues that his claim for reimbursement of the civil
fine he paid is not barred by immunity. He argues that this claim is not subject to
immunity because the fine was (1) paid under duress and (2) assessed under an
unconstitutional body of law, and thus the fine was (3) never the government’s rightful
property in the first instance.
6
Watson has outstanding claims for DTPA violations and common law
misrepresentation against Redflex. However, unlike Southlake, Redflex could not file
an interlocutory appeal of these claims. Thus, we do not address them.
19
Watson correctly observes that there is an exception to immunity when an
unconstitutionally assessed fine is paid under duress. However, following the
controlling guidance of Garcia, we conclude that Watson did not pay his fine under
duress, and he is not entitled to bring a claim under this exception.
Political subdivisions of the state, including cities, share in Texas’s inherent
sovereign immunity. Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140, at *4. Immunity from suit implicates
a court’s jurisdiction. Dall. Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013) (per
curiam).
Texas law recognizes a narrow exception to immunity when a plaintiff seeks
reimbursement of an allegedly unlawful tax, fee, or penalty that was paid involuntarily
and under duress. Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140, at *5. “A common element of duress in
all its forms . . . is improper or unlawful conduct or threat of improper or unlawful
conduct that is intended to and does interfere with another person’s exercise of free
will and judgment.” Id. This compulsion “must be actual and imminent, and not merely
feigned or imagined.” Id. “[D]uress is established where the unauthorized tax or fee is
‘required,’ ‘necessary,’ or ‘shall’ be paid to avoid the government’s ability to charge
penalties or halt a person from earning a livelihood or operating a business.” Id.
(quoting Dall. Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868, 879 (Tex. 2005)).
“Succinctly, the decision faced is to comply or close up.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20
The court held that duress was not shown because Garcia had the option to
pursue an administrative hearing to contest liability on the fine. Id. at *6 (citing former
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 707.014(a)). Such a request would temporarily remove the
immediate obligation to pay the fine, and it would potentially have allowed Garcia to
avoid the fine altogether. Id. The court reasoned that because Garcia did not invoke
this “automatic reprieve from payment,” he could not claim that he paid his fine under
duress. Id. “There is no compulsion—much less imminent compulsion—if payment
may be delayed simply by contesting the underlying citation.” Id.
Applying this reasoning here, we conclude that Watson did not pay his fine under
duress. Watson admits that he did not avail himself of the opportunity to contest his
fine in an administrative hearing. He therefore had, but discarded, the chance for an
abeyance of the penalty. He cannot now claim that imminent compulsion forced his
hand. See id.
Both Southlake and the State have immunity from this claim. See id. Watson’s
claim for reimbursement therefore fails as a matter of law. We overrule Watson’s third
issue.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction
After filtering Watson’s claims for standing and immunity, the only remaining
cause of action at issue in this appeal is Watson’s claim for takings. In Garcia, the court
21
relied on exhaustion of administrative remedies to dispense with a similar takings claim.
See id. at *7.
However, within his fourth issue, Watson raises at least one exhaustion argument
not considered by the Garcia court. He directs our attention to article V, section 19 of
the Texas constitution, which provides that justice of the peace courts shall have
“exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters where the amount in controversy is two hundred
dollars or less.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 19. Watson notes that there are no exceptions to
this rule. He observes that the amount in controversy in any given red-light-camera
case is a civil penalty of $75, plus a late fee of $25 if the penalty is not timely paid. Act
of May 16, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1149, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 3924 (former Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 707.007). He contends that jurisdiction to consider such a case
therefore rests solely with the justice of the peace courts. Citing cases dating back to
1849, Watson contends that where the state constitution vests jurisdiction over a subject
matter exclusively in a particular court, the Legislature cannot confer jurisdiction over
that subject matter to any other tribunal. See Johnson v. Happell, 4 Tex. 96, 99 (1849).
Watson contends that the Legislature therefore had no right to provide for
administrative resolution of red-light-camera cases outside the exclusive jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace courts. By extension, he reasons that his claims cannot be barred
for failure to exhaust an administrative remedy that is void under the Texas constitution.
While Watson’s argument is novel, this case presents no occasion to consider it,
because Watson’s claims far exceed the $200 threshold that demarcates a justice of the
22
peace court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Watson’s claims focused on $75 fines, but he
purported to plead thousands of such fines on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated. For the amount in controversy, he referred to rule 47(c)(5), which governs
suits in which a party seeks “monetary relief over $1,000,000.” See Tex. R. Civ. P.
47(c)(5). He further pleaded that the government defendants had “fleeced the
registered owners of vehicles like Watson and others similarly situated[] for a total sum
well in excess of $128 million,” not including the additional revenues collected by
private administrators like Redflex. Thus, the figures discussed in his live petition give
some indication of the handsome relief that Watson envisioned for himself and many
other unnamed plaintiffs.
When multiple plaintiffs assert claims against a defendant, their claims are
aggregated to determine the amount in controversy. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.009;
Dubai Petro. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 n.4 (Tex. 2000) (op. on reh’g). In the
jurisdictional context, the phrase “amount in controversy” means the sum of money or
the value of the thing originally sued for. In re City of Dall., 501 S.W.3d 71, 73 n.1 (Tex.
2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Usually, the amount in controversy is determined
by the amount the plaintiff seeks to recover, not merely what the plaintiff is likely to
recover. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. 2007).
By aggregating the claims of purported class members, Watson pleaded an
amount in controversy over $1,000,000. Thus, the amount in controversy far exceeds
the $10,000 ceiling for what a justice of the peace court may consider, see Tex. Gov’t
23
Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(1); Tex. R. Civ. P. 500.3(a)–(d), let alone the $200 threshold for
what such a court must consider under its exclusive jurisdiction. See Tex. Const. art. V,
§ 19. We therefore need not address Watson’s argument concerning exclusive
jurisdiction in order to resolve this appeal. Any attempt to do so would be purely
advisory and would thus fall outside our jurisdiction under the state constitution. See
Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6. We overrule Watson’s fourth issue without expressing any
opinion concerning this argument.7
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
We next discuss Watson’s retrospective claim for unconstitutional takings against
Southlake and the State, which unlike his reimbursement claim is not barred by
immunity. See Garcia, 2019 WL 1967140, at *6. In his fifth issue, Watson says his funds
have been unlawfully taken for public use pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, and
he is therefore entitled to the reasonable value of the taken property—i.e., the amount
of the fine itself. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a) (“No person’s property shall be taken,
damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation
being made . . . .”). Watson’s argument is that an administrative officer would have had
We also decline to express any opinion concerning the Dallas Court of Appeals’s
7
recent holding on this argument. See City of Richardson v. Bowman, 555 S.W.3d 670, 683–
84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied).
24
no authority to resolve his takings claim, and Watson should therefore not be required
to exhaust a meaningless administrative “remedy” before proceeding to court.
In Garcia, the Texas Supreme Court dealt with a similar takings claim and a nearly
identical argument against exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Garcia, 2019 WL
1967140, at *7. Garcia argued that the hearing officer had no authority to resolve his
takings claim, and he was therefore not required to pursue administrative remedies
before bringing that claim in court. Id. at *1. The Garcia court disagreed, reasoning that
it was immaterial whether the hearing officer could resolve all of his claims, so long as
the hearing officer could render relief that would have mooted those claims. Id. at *7.
“The question here is not whether an administrative hearing could have resolved all of
his claims, constitutional or otherwise.” Id. “Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the
hearing officer had the authority to render Garcia’s claims moot.” Id. “Simply put, the
administrative proceeding could have obviated the need for Garcia’s takings claim in
district court because it had the potential to moot that claim.” Id. For that reason, the
court held that Garcia was nonetheless required to pursue administrative remedies,
regardless of the nature of his claims. Id.
We follow this reasoning here. Pursuit of administrative remedies might have
yielded a determination that Watson was not liable for a civil fine at all. He was
therefore required to exhaust his administrative remedies, which might have mooted
his takings claim against the State and Southlake. See id. The trial court therefore did
25
not err in granting a plea to the jurisdiction as to the State and Southlake. We overrule
Watson’s fifth issue.
V. SEVERANCE
In his sixth issue, Watson contends that the trial court erred by severing his
claims against all defendants other than Southlake and Redflex. Watson contends that
his claims against all defendants were integrally linked, such that the suits could not be
maintained separately. As support, he cites the rule that severance is proper only if
(1) the controversy involves multiple causes of action, (2) the severed claim would be
the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is
not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues.
In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding).
But the trial court did not sever these actions so that they could be maintained
separately. Instead, the trial court severed these actions so that they could be finalized
and appealed separately. 8 Regardless of whether the claims could be maintained
separately, “a trial court may sever dismissed claims from remaining claims in order to
8
In the same vein, Watson cites Combs v. Chevron, Inc., 319 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g), which according to Watson stands for
the proposition that “where the trial court dismisses some causes of action based upon
a plea to the jurisdiction, the court cannot sever those claims from remaining claims
since it does not have jurisdiction over the causes.” Watson misreads that case, which
instead stands for the proposition that a trial court may not sever and separately
maintain jurisdiction over a matter as to which a plea to the jurisdiction should have
been granted. See id.
26
render an otherwise interlocutory judgment final and appealable.” Aviation Composite
Techs., Inc. v. CLB Corp., 131 S.W.3d 181, 187 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no
pet.); see Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2001) (“After the trial court dismissed
Hotze’s claim for lack of standing, he could have sought a severance so that the
dismissal against him would have been an appealable final judgment. In that event,
both the court of appeals and this Court would unquestionably have had jurisdiction
over his claim.”). Indeed, it is common practice to grant a plea to the jurisdiction as to
certain claims and then sever those claims for purposes of finalization. See, e.g., Martinez
v. Val Verde Cty. Hosp. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex. 2004) (reciting, as
uncontroversial background, the fact that the trial court sustained a plea to the
jurisdiction and severed related claims, thereby finalizing judgment as to those claims);
Campos v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 385 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Joyner v. DeFriend, 255 S.W.3d 281, 282 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (same).
Courts permit severance principally to avoid prejudice, do justice, and increase
convenience. State, 355 S.W.3d at 613. A trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether severance should be granted. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co.,
793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g); In re Estate of Preston, 346 S.W.3d 137,
168 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). Based on these considerations, multiple
courts have rejected the very argument that Watson raises here. See Dayne v. Tex. Dep’t
of Family & Protective Servs., No. 13-10-00679-CV, 2011 WL 4998872, at *9 (Tex. App.—
27
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 20, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Noell v. Air Park
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 827, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
The trial court could have rationally determined that it would serve the interest
of convenience to finalize its orders regarding all defendants except Southlake and
Redflex. See State, 355 S.W.3d at 613. We therefore conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its broad discretion by ordering severance. See Noell, 246 S.W.3d at 837. We
overrule Watson’s sixth and final issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
For want of standing, Watson’s prospective claims fail, as do his retrospective
claims against all defendants in this appeal except the State and Southlake. For reasons
of immunity, Watson’s claim for reimbursement against the State and Southlake also
fails. Finally, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Watson’s claim for
takings—his last remaining claim against the State and Southlake—fails as well. Each
of these failures is jurisdictional. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 484 (standing); City of Houston
v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (exhaustion); Juarez, 420 S.W.3d
at 41 (immunity). The trial court therefore did not err in granting pleas to the
jurisdiction as to these parties. 9
Watson has not argued that the dismissal in appellate cause number 02-18-
9
00151-CV should have been without prejudice. A court of appeals may not reverse a
trial court’s judgment in the absence of properly assigned error. Davis v. Mueller, 528
S.W.3d 97, 103 n.38 (Tex. 2017). We therefore do not consider whether the dismissal
should have been without prejudice.
28
In appellate cause number 02-18-00151-CV, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
dismissing Watson’s claims against all defendants besides Southlake and Redflex. In
appellate cause number 02-18-00143-CV, we affirm the trial court’s order granting
Southlake’s plea to the jurisdiction. Watson’s sole remaining claims are against Redflex.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Delivered: September 19, 2019
Also, certain municipalities have filed motions seeking to be dismissed from this
appeal. Because we hold that Watson lacked jurisdiction to sue any government
defendant involved in this appeal, we deny these motions as moot.
29