Jeri Lynn Ross Skipper and Robert Boyd Skipper v. Valerie Meek, William C. Meek, Lauren Robins and Arts From the Heart ( 2006 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    444444444444444
    NO. 03-05-00566-CV
    444444444444444
    Jeri Lynn Ross Skipper and Robert Boyd Skipper, Appellants
    v.
    Valerie Meek, William C. Meek, Lauren Robins, and
    Arts from the Heart, Appellees
    44444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 02-1793, HONORABLE RONALD G. CARR, JUDGE PRESIDING
    44444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this defamation suit filed by appellants Jeri Lynn Ross Skipper and Robert Boyd
    Skipper (the “Skippers”) against appellees Valerie Meek, William C. Meek, Lauren Robins, and Arts
    from the Heart, the Skippers appeal the trial court’s rendition of a no-evidence summary judgment
    in favor of the appellees. Because the Skippers failed to produce sufficient evidence to raise a fact
    issue on the elements of their claims, we affirm the summary judgment rendered by the trial court.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Founded in 1998 by Valerie and William Meek and Lauren Robins, Arts from the
    Heart (“AFTH”) is a local, non-profit organization in Wimberley that provides art programs to the
    city’s youth. The organization is funded by donations and grants, including a grant from the Texas
    Commission on the Arts. Valerie Meek served as executive director of the organization. In 2002,
    the organization provided after-school workshops at various campuses in town, including a chess
    club and workshop. Jeri Skipper served on the AFTH board along with William Meek and Lauren
    Robins. Robert Skipper taught chess in after-school workshops for elementary and middle school
    students. He maintained a personal website on the Internet, referencing the chess club, chess
    activities, and other personal interests.
    On April 25, 2002, Jeri Skipper sent a year-end e-mail message to chess club parents
    identifying the children who would be receiving trophies and commenting,
    It has been a tough semester for scheduling and working through things. For those
    of you who read THE ONION online, you may agree with this recent headline: What
    does not kill me makes me whinier.
    Following the Skippers’ names and telephone contact information, the message contained a reference
    to Robert Skipper’s website which contained a link to the chess club. On the website, in addition
    to a link to the home page for the AFTH chess club, Robert Skipper included a list of “favorite
    links.” The favorite links included websites for The Onion, a satirical publication, and Snopes, also
    known as the Urban Legends Reference Pages.
    Lauren Robins, the board vice president, learned of the Skippers’ website from board
    president Barbara Day who received Jeri Skipper’s e-mail. After viewing the website, Robins alerted
    another member of the board. Concerned that both links contained mature-content material, Robins
    attempted to call Jeri Skipper but was unable to reach her. Later that evening, she encountered Jeri
    Skipper at a play at the local theater and they engaged in a contentious conversation about the
    2
    website. Jeri Skipper told Robins that she had never read The Onion and acknowledged that the
    reference to it in her e-mail was a mistake. Robins also had a heated exchange with Robert Skipper.
    As Robins explained that the linked sites contained inappropriate materials for children, Robert
    Skipper accused Robins and the AFTH board of harassing him and his wife. Robins memorialized
    the encounter with the Skippers in a memorandum dated May 1.1
    On May 4, the AFTH executive committee—composed of Day, Robins, Valerie
    Meek, and the board secretary, Donna Gaddie—met and, after seeking legal advice, forwarded a
    letter to the Skippers requesting the removal of the link for the AFTH chess club from the Skippers’
    website and disassociating the Skippers from the organization. The letter also stated,
    When the existence of this unauthorized Art From The Heart Chess Club home page
    came to our attention yesterday, we also discovered that you have linked it on the
    Skipperweb website, under the heading of “Favorite Links,” to a website which is not
    intended for readers under 18 years of age. We have serious concerns about your
    having done this. As an organization serving youth we absolutely can not allow an
    individual(s) to associate our organization’s name in their advertisement or
    1
    In her memorandum, Robins described “attempted conversations and conversations with
    Jeri Skipper and Robert Skipper on April 25, 2001[sic].” She wrote,
    That afternoon I had been told by Barbara Day, President of the Board of Arts
    from the Heart (AFTH), of an email letter sent from Jeri and Robert Skipper to
    the parents of the children in the Chess Club. In the email was a reference to a
    website called the Onion. When I was read the contents of the web site I found
    them lewd and offensive and certainly not something that should be affiliated
    with AFTH. Immediately, I called Jimmy Ash, a member of the Board of AFTH
    and someone who had been able to communicate with Jeri, and told him of the
    situation. He said he’d check into it. I suggested we call Marion Running and
    he suggested I speak with Jeri first. I then tried Jeri. Once I left a message on the
    answering machine asking Jeri to give me a call; the second time I called, her
    daughter said that Jeri was “unavailable.” Robins then described her encounter
    with the Skippers at the theater that evening.
    3
    promotion of websites not intended for minors. We will not allow anyone, under the
    auspices of Arts From the Heart, to expose students enrolled in one of our programs
    to the type of information found on the linked website of concern. We ask for your
    prompt attention to correcting this matter.
    Attached to the letter were a printed copy of the contents of the Skippers’ homepage, excerpts from
    The Onion and Snopes websites,2 Jeri Skipper’s April 25 e-mail, Robins’s May 1 memorandum, and
    a three-page excerpt of chapter 43 of the Texas Penal Code relating to offenses involving obscenity.
    The letter and attachments were identified in the pleadings and summary judgment evidence as
    Exhibit A.
    Jeri Skipper responded to the letter by e-mail on May 6 with a copy to AFTH board
    members:
    I am unaware of the existence any [sic] Executive Committee, and I disagree with
    your description of the facts below; however, Robert took care of this request
    immediately following an unpleasant exchange over the phone with board member
    Bill Meek on Friday night, the day before you wrote this.
    [The website] has been online for five years (two of those supporting the AFTH
    chess program.) This is the first complaint we have had, and Robert dealt with it
    right away. All you had to do was ask. . . . I’m sorry you went to so much trouble
    and expense to draft this letter and send it registered mail. It was unnecessary.
    2
    The excerpts included five pages of the April 24 and May 1, 2002 on-line editions of The
    Onion with headlines that included “Car Salesman Three Desks over Going On And On About Chick
    He Banged Last Night,”and “Teen Sex Linked to Drugs and Alcohol, Reports Center for Figuring
    Out Really Obvious Things”; and six pages from the May 6, 2002 on-line edition of Snopes.com
    containing a reference page for “Sex” that included hyperlinks to sections on “adultery, aphrodisiacs,
    bestiality, caught in the act, celebrities, high school confidential, homosexuality, juvenilia, kinky sex,
    mistaken identities, penile pranks, pornography, pregnancy, prostitution, revenge, and tattled tales,”
    along with other mature-content material.
    4
    I took the liberty of copying the rest of the board members in this reply, since you
    apparently forgot to do that in your email to us. If I were in their shoes, I would want
    to know.
    Because AFTH provided its programs through the schools and the Skippers’ website
    also contained a link to the Wimberley Independent School District, on May 8, Valerie Meek and
    Robins met with school superintendent Dr. Marian Running and provided her a copy of the Exhibit
    A materials. They discussed with Running the inappropriateness of the website links and whether
    they should notify the parents of the chess club members. Dr. Running was able to access and view
    the linked websites only after overriding the district’s filtering software.
    Dr. Running in turn was concerned that the Skippers’ website contained links to the
    school district as well as to St. Mary’s University where Robert Skipper teaches. She contacted
    Robert Skipper’s department chair by e-mail, advising that “we are doing what we need to to get him
    to take off the WISD link that he calls unofficial.” Finding that the links “seem to be of questionable
    value, and in poor taste,” by memorandum dated May 13, Skipper’s department dean instructed him
    to remove all inappropriate websites and linkages. Running also spoke with Robert Skipper about
    removing the school district link, and he agreed to remove it. The Onion and Snopes links were
    removed from the Skippers’ website.3
    The Skippers sued Valerie Meek, William Meek, Lauren Robins, and AFTH,
    claiming appellees had defamed them by making statements that the Skippers “were promoting
    pornography and/or obscenity to children in the course of operating a chess club.” Specifically, in
    3
    In their petition, the Skippers assert that the “all of the links” complained of were removed
    by May 13.
    5
    their amended petition, the Skippers alleged that appellees made the following false and defamatory
    “oral and/or written” statements:
    •   the Skippers “were engaged in criminal sexual behavior in the course of
    operating a chess club”;
    •   the Skippers “were promoting pornography and/or obscenity to children in the
    course of operating a chess club”;
    •   the Skippers “encouraged, promoted, referred and/or directed children to go to
    The Onion or The Urban Legends Reference Pages, or ‘Snopes,’ websites”;
    •   by the links, the Skippers “were exposing and subjecting children to obscene
    and/or pornographic material”;
    •   by the links, the Skippers “violated criminal sexual statute(s) of the State of
    Texas”;
    •   that the Skippers “promoted, encouraged, and/or directed children to go to [the
    website];
    •   that “any child visited The Onion or Snopes websites as a result of an act” of the
    Skippers;
    •   that “pornography and/or obscenity were accessible from the Chess Club
    webpage maintained by Robert Skipper”;
    •   that the Skippers “promoted obscenity and/or pornography”; and
    •   that the Skippers by having links to The Onion and Snopes websites on their
    website “promoted pornography.”
    The Skippers allege that these statements are contained in Exhibit A which is attached
    to the amended petition. In their petition, the Skippers allege that Valerie Meek first published “a
    packet of material” known as Exhibit A to her husband and fellow board member, William Meek.
    Valerie Meek and Lauren Robins then published Exhibit A to Dr. Running at their meeting at the
    6
    school district office. The petition then alleges that Dr. Running published an e-mail to Robert
    Skipper’s department chair at St. Mary’s. The final complained-of publications occurred when
    Lauren Robins and William Meek published Exhibit A to others.
    After extensive discovery, appellees filed a no-evidence motion for summary
    judgment asserting, inter alia, that (i) the statements were not defamatory; (ii) any statements made
    regarding the Skippers were true; (iii) the statements were not published to a third person; (iv) any
    statements were made without actual malice, or the Skippers failed to show the statements were
    made without the requisite degree of care; and (v) the Skippers have no evidence to support any of
    the elements of the causes of action alleged. In their motion, appellees particularize each element
    of the causes of action challenged. The trial court granted the motion without stating a specific
    ground. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    Standard of Review
    After adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment on the
    ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which
    an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must
    specify which essential elements of the opponent’s claim or defense lack supporting evidence. Once
    the party seeking the no-evidence summary judgment files a proper motion asserting that there is no
    evidence of an element of a claim on which the non-movant would have the burden of proof at trial,
    the burden then shifts to the non-movant to bring forth evidence that raises a fact issue on the
    challenged element. See Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 
    979 S.W.2d 68
    , 71 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998,
    7
    no pet.). To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the non-movant must set forth more than a
    scintilla of probative evidence as to each challenged element. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
    In reviewing a summary judgment, we assume all the evidence favorable to the non-
    movant is true, indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, and resolve any
    doubts in favor of the non-movant. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    51 S.W.3d 573
    , 577 (Tex. 2001). When, as here, the trial court’s order does not specify the ground or grounds
    on which summary judgment is rendered, we will affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds
    stated in the motion is meritorious. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 
    858 S.W.2d 374
    , 380
    (Tex. 1993); Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 
    96 S.W.3d 475
    , 480 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
    Defamation
    The Skippers contend that the letter requesting removal of the AFTH link from the
    Skippers’ website and terminating their association with AFTH, when read in context with its
    attachments, accuses them of promoting pornography and obscenity to children under their direction
    and exposing or subjecting children to “sexual conduct.” They assert that “Exhibit ‘A,’ as a whole,
    falsely publishes that the Skippers promoted and advertised the sexual conduct that is reflected in
    the excerpts from the Onion and the Snopes websites.” The Skippers assert causes of action for libel,
    slander and conspiracy.4 They allege the same statements were made “orally and/or in writing,” and
    4
    Because the conspiracy claim is premised on the libel and slander claims, our resolution
    of the defamation causes of action necessarily disposes of the conspiracy claim. See Ernst & Young,
    L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    51 S.W.3d 573
    , 583 (Tex. 2001)
    8
    that the statements were reduced to writing and communicated in written form as Exhibit A.
    Appellees respond that the alleged statements were not defamatory nor made with malicious or
    negligent intent. They also urge that the statements were not false and were statements of opinion.
    Libel and slander are both forms of defamation. Austin v. Inet Techs, Inc., 
    118 S.W.3d 491
    , 496 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Slander is a false oral statement about an
    ascertainable person that is published to a third person without legal excuse. Randall’s Food Mkts.,
    Inc. v. Johnson, 
    891 S.W.2d 640
    , 646 (Tex. 1995). Libel is defamation expressed in written form.
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001 (West 1997).
    To prove a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
    defendant published a statement of fact, (2) the statement was defamatory, (3) the statement was
    false, (4) the defendant acted negligently in publishing the false and defamatory statement,5 and (5)
    the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 
    978 S.W.2d 568
    , 571 (Tex.
    1998). The initial issue for our determination is whether the words used were “reasonably capable
    of a defamatory meaning.” Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., 
    723 S.W.2d 653
    , 654 (Tex. 1987).
    Here, the issue is whether the language in Exhibit A is capable of bearing the meaning ascribed to
    it by the Skippers and whether that meaning is capable of a defamatory meaning. See id.; H. O.
    Merren & Co., Ltd. v. A. H. Belo Corp., 
    228 F. Supp. 515
    , 517 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff’d, 
    346 F.2d 568
    (5th Cir. 1965).
    5
    Defamatory statements are “published” if they are communicated orally, in writing, or in
    print to some third person capable of understanding their defamatory import and in such a way that
    the third person did so understand. Austin v. Inet Techs, Inc., 
    118 S.W.3d 491
    , 496 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Abbott v. Pollock, 
    946 S.W.2d 513
    , 519 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ
    denied).
    9
    Whether a statement is defamatory is a question of law to be determined by the court.
    Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 
    38 S.W.3d 103
    , 114 (Tex. 2000); Carr v. Brasher, 
    776 S.W.2d 567
    ,
    569 (Tex. 1989); 
    Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 654
    ; Abbott v. Pollock, 
    946 S.W.2d 513
    , 519 (Tex.
    App.—Austin 1997, writ denied). We construe as a matter of law language that is unambiguous on
    its face and find it not actionable if it lacks a defamatory meaning. A jury should only be permitted
    to determine the statement’s meaning and the effect on the listener if the language is ambiguous.
    
    Abbott, 946 S.W.2d at 519-20
    ; see also 
    Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114
    ; 
    Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655
    .
    An allegedly defamatory statement “should be construed as a whole in light of the
    surrounding circumstances based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the
    entire statement.” 
    Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114
    ; see also 
    Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655
    . Whether a
    statement is defamatory depends upon the meaning a reasonable person would attribute to a
    publication, and not to a technical analysis of each statement. 
    Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 116
    ; 
    Abbott, 946 S.W.2d at 520
    . Language is to be given its plain, ordinary, and natural meaning. H. O. 
    Merren, 228 F. Supp. at 518
    . If the reader must struggle to see how and whether the words defame, as a matter
    of law the words are not defamatory. We may not permit a forced and strained interpretation in order
    to obtain an innocent reading or a libelous one. 
    Id. at 517.
    A statement is defamatory if it tends to injure the person’s reputation, exposing the
    person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury, or if it tends to impeach that person’s
    honesty, integrity, or virtue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001 (West 1997); see also
    Basic Capital 
    Mgmt., 96 S.W.3d at 480
    ; 
    Abbott, 946 S.W.2d at 519
    ; Free v. American Home
    Assurance Co., 
    902 S.W.2d 51
    , 54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).                        A
    10
    communication that is merely unflattering, abusive, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing, or that hurts
    only the plaintiff’s feelings, is not actionable. H.O. 
    Merren, 228 F. Supp. at 518
    ; Rawlins v. McKee,
    
    327 S.W.2d 633
    , 635 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see 1 Robert D. Sack,
    Sack on Defamation § 2.4.1 at 2-12 (3d ed. 2006).
    Indeed, the allegedly defamatory statements themselves are elusive in this case. In
    their original petition, the Skippers claim two published statements—that Valerie Meek and Lauren
    Robins stated “orally and/or in writing” that “the Plaintiff [sic] was engaged in criminal sexual
    behavior” and “was promoting pornography to children” in the course of operating a chess club
    affiliated with AFTH. They asserted ten statements “orally and/or in writing” in their amended
    petition. In their response to the motion for summary judgment, the Skippers included thirteen
    statements. In their brief on appeal, they reference several pages of alleged statements identified in
    their response to the original motion. We will confine our discussion to the statements set forth
    above and alleged in the amended petition, which is their live pleading.
    Although the essence of the Skippers’ complaint is the Exhibit A material, the
    statements alleged in their petition to be defamatory do not appear in Exhibit A. As they state in
    their response to the motion for summary judgment, “Exhibit ‘A’ holistically makes many
    statements.” With respect to each “oral and/or written” statement in the amended petition as set forth
    above, the Skippers claim that “[a]s a whole” Exhibit A makes that particular statement and “it is
    spun into criminal conduct.” With the juxtaposition of the letter and attachments, the Skippers claim
    that Exhibit A makes the statement that the Skippers were engaged in criminal sexual behavior and
    promoting obscenity to children.
    11
    A fair reading of Exhibit A does not yield a defamatory meaning to the words as they
    were used verbatim or in their context. The May 4 letter from the executive committee simply states
    that the Skippers were not authorized to include the AFTH link on their website and that the link to
    mature-content websites is inappropriate. The inclusion of excerpts from the linked websites and
    relevant statutory material does not alter the meaning of the letter or convert the communication into
    an accusation that the Skippers have committed a crime. The letter—even with attachments—does
    not accuse the Skippers of any crime or question their honesty, integrity, or virtue. The criticism is
    related to the Skippers’ work with AFTH, which is a natural and proper concern of the executive
    committee members. On its face, the letter was an admonishment, and the attachments of the
    website excerpts and penal code provisions provided the context for the committee’s concerns. The
    inclusion of The Onion and Snopes excerpts makes it clear that it is the linked websites—and not
    the Skippers’ website—that contain the mature-content materials and are of concern to the board.
    Giving Exhibit A its plain and ordinary meaning, the committee merely lodged an
    objection to the unauthorized use of the AFTH chess club link juxtaposed to links facilitating access
    to websites containing mature-content material. The attachment of the website excerpts served to
    highlight the objectionable material found on the websites and not to accuse the Skippers of being
    purveyors of the material.
    In his deposition, William Meek testified that he called Robert Skipper immediately
    after viewing an excerpt from The Onion website. Testifying that he did not think it was Robert
    Skipper’s intent to promote the pornography on the linked websites, Meek called Skipper because
    the mature-content material was made available to children, “by accident or not.” “What I said was
    12
    that there was a site that linked Arts from the Heart to adult literary stuff that was x-rated and adult
    oriented. I never made comments or observations that I felt like it was promoting pornography.”
    Meek stated that he “felt like if a parent saw it with his child and was irate enough to cause a big
    stink in a town that small, yeah, it could undermine the whole organization.” Likewise, Lauren
    Robins testified that she was concerned about the content of the two websites, that she thought the
    material on the two websites was obscene, and that the executive committee consulted a lawyer: “We
    were confused about what our—how we could protect the students and what our liability would be
    if a parent found out about this connection to the Skipper website.” At her deposition, Valerie Meek
    testified that the board was concerned that children might discover the websites through the
    Skippers’ links and thought it inappropriate that the links be included on a website also containing
    a link to the AFTH chess club. She testified that she feared the organization could lose its funding
    from the Texas Commission on the Arts.
    Reading Exhibit A verbatim or in its entirety, we cannot say that it conveyed the
    statements to the ordinary reader with the defamatory meaning that the Skippers ascribed to it; nor
    may the statements be fairly or reasonably read to ascribe a defamatory meaning. Cf. Greenbelt Pub.
    Ass’n v. Bresler, 
    398 U.S. 6
    , 13-14 (1970) (“No reader could have thought that either the speakers
    at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words were charging [the plaintiff] with the
    commission of a criminal offense.”). The Skippers assert that the statements accuse them of
    engaging in sexual behavior and promoting pornography to children and that the inclusion of copies
    of the obscenity chapter of the penal code converts the communication into an accusation that they
    have committed a crime. No reasonable person, reading the letter with the attached materials, would
    13
    conclude that the Skippers were being accused of engaging in illegal activity. 
    Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655
    . In this case, the trial court properly rejected the Skippers’ attempt to transform permissible
    speech into actionable defamatory statements.
    Moreover, the Skippers have not raised a fact question as to whether the actual
    statements published by appellees are either true6 or constituted only opinion,7 and are, therefore, not
    actionable. A cause of action for libel arises when one publishes a false defamatory statement of
    fact. 
    Abbott, 946 S.W.2d at 519
    . For a statement to be actionable in defamation, it must expressly
    or impliedly assert facts, and the facts must be objectively verifiably false. Milkovich v. Lorain
    Journal Co., 
    497 U.S. 1
    , 18 (1990). Appellees claim that the Skippers are unable to adduce evidence
    that any of the statements were false or that they were statements of fact as opposed to statements
    of opinion. The Skippers were required to come forward with sufficient facts to raise a fact issue
    concerning the falsity of the complained-of statements. See KTRK Television v. Felder, 
    950 S.W.2d 100
    , 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). This they failed to do.
    In the letter, the executive committee members expressed “serious concerns” over
    Skipper’s inclusion of The Onion and Snopes websites which were “not intended for readers under
    18 years of age.” They also expressed their concerns that students enrolled in their programs could
    be exposed to the “type of information found on the linked website[s].” Exhibit A contains two
    6
    See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
    475 U.S. 767
    , 776 (1986) (private plaintiff
    required to prove falsity in order to protect utterance of “truth”); Randall’s Food Mkts. v. Johnson,
    
    891 S.W.2d 640
    , 646 (Tex. 1995); Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 
    96 S.W.3d 475
    ,
    480 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
    7
    Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
    418 U.S. 323
    , 40 (1974) (assertions of fact are actionable); El
    Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 
    706 S.W.2d 797
    , 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
    14
    categories of statements allegedly made by appellees: the first category involves statements that the
    website contains links to inappropriate material, and the second involves appellees’ opinions
    regarding the improper nature of the website links. The Skippers presented no evidence to show that
    these statements were false or, with regard to the second category, that the statements were anything
    other than appellees’ opinions. The Skippers have failed to carry their burden to raise a fact issue
    as to these challenged elements.
    CONCLUSION
    Because the Skippers failed to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine
    issue of material fact as required by Rule 166a(i), and the alleged statements were not defamatory
    as a matter of law, we conclude that the district court properly rendered judgment in favor of the
    appellees. Having determined that the trial court did not err in granting appellees’ motion for
    summary judgment, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    __________________________________________
    Jan P. Patterson, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Patterson and Pemberton
    Affirmed
    Filed: July 21, 2006
    15