Charles Brandon v. State ( 2005 )


Menu:
  •                                  NO. 07-04-0551-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    APRIL 18, 2005
    ______________________________
    CHARLES BRANDON,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
    NO. 47,417-A; HON. HAL MINER, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Opinion Regarding Dismissal
    ________________________________
    Before QUINN, REAVIS, and CAMPBELL, JJ.
    Before us lies the question of whether we have jurisdiction over the attempt of
    Charles Brandon to appeal his conviction. The record discloses that his notice of appeal
    was not filed with the trial court clerk until November 22, 2004. It was due by November
    18, 2004. To avoid dismissal, appellant contends, via his “Motion for Continuation of
    Appeal,” that the notice was timely because he had delivered it to the trial court judge
    before the deadline expired, even though the court clerk did not receive it until after the
    deadline lapsed.1 We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(c)(1) states that an appellant perfects his appeal
    by filing a written notice “with the trial court clerk.” TEX . R. APP . P. 25.2(c)(1). At bar, the
    notice was filed with the trial court before the deadline, but appellant did not file it with the
    trial court clerk until after it lapsed. Thus, the notice was untimely. See Ovalle v. State,
    No. 05-97-00251-CR, 
    1997 WL 251967
    (Tex. App.–Dallas May 15, 1997, pet. ref’d)
    (dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction even though the letter evincing the
    appellant’s desire to appeal was filed with the court coordinator instead of the court clerk);
    see also Miller v. State, No. 10-03-0089-CR, 
    2003 WL 21666086
    (Tex. App.–Waco July
    9, 2003, pet. granted) (holding that even though notice was given to the trial court on day
    of sentencing, it was not timely filed with the clerk when it was received after notice was
    due).
    Appellant relies on Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. American National Fire Ins. Co., 
    928 S.W.2d 226
    (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1996, no writ) and Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental & Sales
    v. NCR Corporation, 
    787 S.W.2d 371
    (Tex. 1990) as support for his contention that
    because the district clerk is the agent of the trial court, the trial court must actually be the
    principal. So, the argument goes, by giving the trial court notice, appellant simply gave
    notice to the party to whom notice was to be given in the first place, the principal.
    1
    Attached to the “Motion for Continuation of Appeal” is a copy of a letter from trial counsel, dated
    November 16, 2004, to the trial court and requesting the latter to sign the enclosed notice of appeal and
    certify appellant’s right to appeal. The trial court did so on November 18, 2004. Trial counsel, further,
    requested that the trial court file the notice with the “District Clerk.” Appellant concedes that the notice was
    not filed with the court clerk until November 22, 2004. Furthermore, he did not file a motion to extend the
    deadline by which to perfect his appeal within 15 days from the date the notice was due.
    2
    Assuming the accuracy of those two cases, we nonetheless note that they involved civil
    appeals.   Ours is not of that ilk; it is criminal. More importantly, not only are the
    procedures governing civil appeals construed differently from those involving criminal
    appeals but also our Court of Criminal Appeals requires strict compliance with appellate
    procedure governing criminal appeals. Olivo v. State, 
    918 S.W.2d 519
    , 524-25 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1996); State v. Zavala, 
    17 S.W.3d 356
    , 357-58 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, pet
    ref’d). Thus, we do not find either Birmingham or Mr. Penguin controlling.
    Though we have no jurisdiction over the appeal, we would admonish appellant that
    he may still be able to obtain relief by seeking an out of time appeal from the Texas Court
    of Criminal Appeals. Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 
    802 S.W.2d 241
    (Tex. Crim. App.
    1991) (out-of-time appeal from final felony conviction may be sought by filing a writ of
    habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). And,
    with that admonishment, we deny appellant’s motion to continue the appeal and dismiss
    the cause for want of jurisdiction.
    Per Curiam
    Do not publish.
    3