in the Interest of M.L.L. and R.J.L., Children ( 2005 )

                                                             11th Court of Appeals

                                                                  Eastland, Texas

                                                             Memorandum Opinion

In the Interest of M.L.L. and R.J.L., children

No.  11-04-00294-CV -- Appeal from Comanche County

John A. Labrado, Jr. appeals from the trial court=s order terminating his parental rights to his two children, M.L.L. and R.J.L.^[1]  We affirm.

In his sole issue on appeal, Labrado argues that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court=s order of termination.  We review these propositions under a heightened standard. In our review of a legal insufficiency claim, we will examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.   In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 149 S.W.3d 814 (Tex.App. - Eastland 2004, no pet=n). We must assume that the fact finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding.  In re J.F.C., supra.  In a factual sufficiency review, we will give due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.   In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex.2002); Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, supra. We determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State=s allegations.  In re C.H., supra.  We also consider whether any disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., supra at 266.

In its order, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Labrado had:

[K]nowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children;^[2]

[E]ngaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children;^[3]

[F]ailed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the father to obtain the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the children=s removal from the parent.^[4]

The trial court further found that termination of Labrado=s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.^[5]

 AEndanger@ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or a less than ideal environment, but the conduct need not actually injure the child nor be directed at the child.  Phillips v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, supra. AEndanger@ means Ato expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.@  Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987).  The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (Department) need not establish the specific danger to the child=s well‑being as an independent proposition; the danger may be inferred from parental misconduct.  In the Interest of J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.App. ‑ Texarkana 1995, writ den=d). We will examine the record and determine, in accordance with the standards set out above, whether the Department met its burden of proof.

 On June 23, 2003, M.L.L. and R.J.L. were removed from the home owned by Labrado=s father, due to neglect, lack of supervision, risk of physical abuse, and the dangerous and unsanitary conditions in which they were living.  M.L.L. and R.J.L. resided at the home with Labrado and Labrado=s father and stepmother.

Labrado was referred to counseling with William Thomas Gustavus on August 12, 2003. Labrado did not begin attending the sessions until April 26, 2004.  Labrado attended five sessions from April 26, 2004, until June 14, 2004.  Labrado did not attend any further sessions until October 2004.  Gustavus testified at the termination hearing that Labrado has no capacity to successfully parent any child.  Gustavus stated that, although Labrado had developed an awareness of his anger problems, it would take months or years before his behavior was modified.  Gustavus stated that the children would be at a Aconsiderable risk@ if returned to Labrado.

Melodee Huggins, a licensed professional counselor, testified that she counseled M.L.L. and R.J.L.  Huggins stated that R.J.L. was hyperactive and difficult to control.  R.J.L. hit, cursed, threatened to Acut@ people, and threatened to burn down people=s houses.  R.J.L. told Huggins that Labrado licked R.J.L.=s Abutt@ and Apeepee.@ Huggins stated that Labrado was unable to handle R.J.L.=s behavioral problems.

Huggins further testified that M.L.L. reported that Labrado put baby food on her genitals and Alicked@ it off.  M.L.L. also told Huggins that Labrado made M.L.L. lick baby food off of Labrado=s Abottom.@  M.L.L. further told Huggins that her grandfather, who lived in the home with the children, inserted a spoon in her Afront@ and Aback@ and then made M.L.L. pull out the spoon.  Huggins testified that it would endanger the children to return them to Labrado and that termination of Labrado=s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

There was evidence presented that Labrado was arrested on three charges of indecency with a child involving other family members.  These charges were subsequently dropped.  At the time of termination, Labrado was on community supervision for brandishing a knife in a store.  The record also shows that Adult Protective Services was called to the Labrado home to investigate Labrado=s abuse of his father.

Labrado testified at the hearing and admitted arguing with his father.  Labrado said that he hit the walls on various occasions when he was angry and left holes in the walls of the home.  Labrado said that he had hit the wall with his fist and left a hole when he was angry with R.J.L.  Labrado admitted to spanking M.L.L. and R.J.L. with a belt, which left bruises on M.L.L. on one occasion.  Labrado testified that, when he was a child, his father spanked him until he could not sit down for a day or two.  Labrado acknowledged that he might have pushed R.J.L. on occasion.

Labrado testified that the home where he currently resides with his father and stepmother is more appropriate for raising children than the house where they were residing when the children were removed. However, Labrado stated that the house does not have gas to provide heat or hot water for bathing.  Labrado acknowledged that the house is not suitable for the children without having gas.  Labrado further acknowledged that he would need to provide beds and other furniture for the children before they came to live in the house.  Labrado denied sexually abusing the children and stated that he would no longer spank them.  Labrado testified that he attended parenting classes and that he has worked on his problems with anger.

Without question, sexual abuse is conduct that endangers a child=s physical or emotional well‑being. In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 796 (Tex.App. ‑ Texarkana 2004, no pet=n). There was evidence that both Labrado and his father sexually abused the children.  There was also evidence that Labrado was physically abusive to both the children and his father.  Additionally, there was evidence presented that the house where Labrado resides is not a suitable environment for the children.  Although Labrado had made attempts to comply with the Family Service Plan, there was evidence presented that he continued to be a danger to the children. We find that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court=s finding that Labrado  knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children and that he engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.  We also find that the evidence supports the trial court=s finding that termination is in the best interest of the children.  Only one statutory ground is required to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.  In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.2003). Labrado=s sole issue on appeal is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

July 14, 2005

Not designated for publication. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(a).

Panel consists of:  Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.

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^[1]The mother of the children voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.

^[2]TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon 2002).

^[3]TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon 2002).

^[4]TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. ' 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon 2002).

^[5]TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. ' 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002).