Wanda June Crenshaw McDaniel v. Karon K. Connelly, Charles D. Holley, and Weldon Holley, Individually and as Next Friends of Thelma Sparkman ( 2008 )


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  •                           NUMBER 13-08–230-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    WANDA JUNE CRENSHAW MCDANIEL,                                        Appellant,
    v.
    KAREN K. CONNELLY, CHARLES D. HOLLEY,
    AND WELDON HOLLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    AS NEXT FRIENDS OF THELMA SPARKMAN,                                 Appellees.
    On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
    of Nueces County, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Vela
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
    Appellant, Wanda June Crenshaw McDaniel appeals an interlocutory order granting
    a temporary injunction in favor of Appellees, Karon K. Connelly, Charles D. Holley and
    Weldon Holley, individually, and as next friends of Thelma Sparkman (“Sparkman”). By two
    issues, McDaniel complains that the order should be dissolved because there was no
    evidence to support the trial court’s order and because the injunction order fails to define
    the acts to be enjoined. We reverse and remand.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Karon Connelly, Charles D. Holley, and Weldon Holley, individually, and as next
    friends of Thelma Sparkman filed suit against Wanda June Crenshaw McDaniel, alleging
    claims of libel and slander, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sparkman
    and McDaniel are sisters. Sparkman, and her children as next friends, assert that McDaniel
    "set on a mission to seize Sparkman’s assets" and executed a plan to isolate and alienate
    Sparkman from her family and friends after the death of Sparkman’s husband. The
    pleadings claim that Sparkman is an incapacitated person.           Sparkman also sought
    injunctive relief prohibiting McDaniel from communicating or interfering with Sparkman,
    including representing herself as Sparkman’s caregiver or spokesperson. After a hearing
    where no sworn testimony was introduced, the trial court granted Sparkman’s request for
    a temporary injunction.
    II. APPLICABLE LAW
    A trial court has discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a temporary
    injunction. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    , 204 (Tex. 2002). To obtain a
    temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against the
    defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) probable, imminent, and
    irreparable injury. 
    Id. at 204.
    As a prerequisite to a temporary injunction, probable right to
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    recovery and probable injury must be established by competent evidence adduced at a
    hearing. Millwrights Local Union No. 2484 v. Rust Eng’g Co., 
    433 S.W.2d 683
    , 686 (Tex.
    1968). In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the proof required to support
    a judgment issuing a temporary injunction may not be made by affidavit. 
    Id. A sworn
    petition does not constitute evidence. Id.; Rogers v. Howell, 
    592 S.W.2d 402
    , 403 (Tex.
    Civ. App.–Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
    III. ANALYSIS
    The trial court held a hearing. However, no evidence was introduced by Sparkman.
    Connelly, Sparkman’s attorney and daughter, explained to the court the reasons she was
    seeking relief on her mother’s behalf. Connelly was neither sworn as a witness, nor was
    the oath waived. Counsel for McDaniel suggested that an evidentiary hearing was required.
    However, no witnesses were ever sworn.
    Remarks by counsel are not competent evidence unless the attorney is actually
    testifying. Bay Fin. Sav. Bank v. Brown, 
    142 S.W.3d 586
    , 590 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2004,
    no pet.). No competent evidence was presented showing a probable right to relief or
    irreparable injury. Absent such evidence, we conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion in issuing the temporary injunction. We sustain appellant’s first point of error.
    Because this issue is dispositive, we do not address appellant’s second issue. See TEX .
    R. APP. P. 47.1.
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    IV. CONCLUSION
    The order granting the temporary injunction is reversed, the injunction is dissolved
    and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
    ROSE VELA
    Justice
    Memorandum Opinion delivered and
    filed this 3rd day of July, 2008.
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