Josephine Alicia Gallardo v. State ( 2011 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-10-00288-CR
    Josephine Alicia Gallardo, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 09-193-K368, HONORABLE BURT CARNES, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury found appellant Josephine Alicia Gallardo guilty of possessing more than four
    ounces of both cocaine and methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety
    Code Ann. § 481.112 (West Supp. 2010).            The jury assessed punishment at eight years’
    imprisonment for the cocaine possession and at ten years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the
    methamphetamine possession, with the latter punishment probated. In a single point of error,
    appellant contends that the trial court erred by overruling her motion to suppress evidence. We
    overrule this contention and affirm the convictions.
    On February 6, 2009, police officers executed a search warrant at 404 Yucca Drive
    in Round Rock, a house occupied by appellant and Brandon Valverde. During this search, the
    officers seized the controlled substances and other evidence tending to prove appellant’s guilt of the
    charged offenses. Appellant contends, as she did below, that the affidavit in support of the search
    warrant did not give the magistrate probable cause to believe that controlled substances and related
    paraphernalia would be found in the house.1
    No search warrant may issue unless a sworn affidavit is first presented to the
    magistrate setting forth sufficient facts to show that probable cause exists for its issuance. Tex. Code
    Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(b) (West Supp. 2010). A search warrant affidavit must be interpreted
    in a common sense and realistic manner, recognizing that reasonable inferences may be drawn from
    the affidavit. Hespeth v. State, 
    249 S.W.3d 732
    , 737 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref d). A
    reviewing court must give the issuing magistrate’s determination of probable cause great deference,
    and the decision to issue the warrant will be sustained if the magistrate had a substantial basis for
    concluding that probable cause was shown. Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 236-37 (1983);
    Swearingen v. State, 
    143 S.W.3d 808
    , 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Davila, 
    169 S.W.3d 735
    ,
    738 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).
    The affiant in this case was Officer Jerry Floyd. After describing his general
    knowledge of controlled substance crimes based on his training and experience, Floyd detailed the
    facts on which he based his belief that appellant and Valverde possessed controlled substances and
    related paraphernalia at their residence:
    1
    The State urges that appellant failed to preserve the alleged error because she did not reurge her
    objection when the evidence was offered and admitted at trial. The rule is, however, that when the
    trial court overruled a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, error is preserved and the defendant need
    not subsequently object to the admission of the same evidence during the trial. Garza v. State, 
    126 S.W.3d 79
    , 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
    2
    • In June 2008, an anonymous source told Floyd that Valverde was selling cocaine
    at his residence, which was said to be 1607 Dale Cove in Round Rock. This
    informer also told Floyd that Valverde drove a white Chevrolet pickup truck with the
    license plate 4ZYD49. A license plate check confirmed that the truck was registered
    to Valverde at the Dale Cove address.
    • In the course of his investigation, Floyd learned that Valverde had moved to
    404 Yucca Drive in Round Rock. Floyd began to conduct surveillance at this
    address and, using driver’s license photographs obtained from the department of
    public safety, he identified Valverde and appellant entering and leaving the house on
    a daily basis.
    • On September 3, 2008, Floyd was conducting surveillance at 404 Yucca Drive
    when a white male driving a Ford pickup truck knocked on the door, was admitted,
    and left four minutes later. At Floyd’s request, a traffic officer stopped the Ford
    pickup after it left the Yucca Drive address. The driver and sole occupant was
    identified as Terry Sharp. The officer found 1.9 grams of cocaine in the pickup.
    • On October 21, 2008, Floyd was again watching the Yucca Drive house when a
    white male driving a Ford Ranger knocked, was admitted, and left about four minutes
    later. At Floyd’s request, a traffic officer stopped the Ranger after it left the suspect
    premises. The driver and sole occupant was identified as Brendon Pertolanitz. The
    officer found 1.1 grams of cocaine in the Ranger. Pertolanitz was taken to the police
    station where he was advised of his rights and interviewed by Floyd. He told Floyd
    that he had purchased the cocaine at the Yucca Drive house from a woman he knew
    as Josie after first making arrangements by telephone. Pertolanitz told Floyd that he
    had purchased cocaine at 404 Yucca Drive on several occasions, either from Josie or
    from a man he knew as Brandon. Pertolanitz identified appellant’s driver’s license
    photograph as Josie and Valverde’s driver’s license photograph as Brandon.
    • On February 3, 2009, Floyd was conducting surveillance at 404 Yucca Drive when
    a black male driving a PT Cruiser was admitted into the house and left less than a
    minute later. Floyd followed the man as he drove away in the PT Cruiser and then
    detained him. The man, identified as Clifton Armstrong, had 0.7 grams of cocaine
    in his shirt pocket. After being taken to the police station and advised of his rights,
    Armstrong told Floyd that he had purchased the cocaine from Josie at
    404 Yucca Drive after first making arrangements by telephone. He said that he had
    purchased cocaine from Josie and Brandon twelve times in the past eighteen
    months. Armstrong identified appellant’s driver’s license photograph as the Josie
    from whom he had purchased cocaine at 404 Yucca Drive and Valverde’s drivers
    license photograph as the Brandon from whom he had purchased cocaine at
    that address.
    3
    • On February 3, 2009, Floyd ran a criminal record check on Valverde and learned
    that he had fifteen arrests for various offenses including controlled substance delivery
    and possession. On February 4, 2009, Floyd learned from city records that the
    utilities at 404 Yucca Drive were in Valverde’s name.
    Appellant makes several challenges to the affidavit. First, she urges that the
    information received from the anonymous informer in June 2008 regarding drug sales at 1607 Dale
    Cove was unreliable because appellant and Valverde did not live at that address. To the contrary,
    the affidavit stated that Valverde’s truck was registered at that address. That Valverde moved to
    404 Yucca Drive does not, in itself, render the informer’s tip unreliable.
    Next, appellant argues that the September 3, 2008 incident involving Terry Sharp did
    not contribute to a finding of probable cause because there was no showing that Sharp obtained the
    cocaine at 404 Yucca Drive. This would be a more persuasive argument if this were the only alleged
    drug transaction described in the affidavit. However, in light of the information describing the
    actions and statements of Brendon Pertolanitz and Clifton Armstrong on October 21, 2008 and
    February 3, 2009, the discovery of cocaine in Sharp’s possession following his visit to 404 Yucca
    Drive adds some measure of support to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.
    Third, appellant argues that the information received from Pertolanitz was stale,
    having been obtained by Floyd over three months before the affidavit was presented to the
    magistrate. Once again, this argument would be more persuasive if the Pertolanitz incident were the
    only alleged drug transaction described in the affidavit. Given the information regarding the
    purchase of cocaine by Armstrong on February 3, 2009, three days before the warrant issued, and
    the information regarding Sharp’s activities the previous September, the magistrate could reasonably
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    conclude that the Pertolanitz transaction was part of a larger body of evidence demonstrating an
    ongoing drug-trafficking enterprise at 404 Yucca Drive. See State v. Bradley, 
    966 S.W.2d 871
    ,
    875-76 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).
    Finally, appellant contends that the information received from Pertolanitz and
    Armstrong was not credible because both men were under arrest for possessing the cocaine at the
    time they gave the statements incriminating appellant. Appellant relies on the opinion in State
    v. Wester, 
    109 S.W.3d 824
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). In that case, a man named Elliott was
    found to be in possession of marihuana after a traffic stop. 
    Id. at 825.
    During questioning following
    his arrest, Elliott told officers that he had purchased the marihuana from Wester at Wester’s
    residence. 
    Id. Based solely
    on Elliott’s statement, a warrant was issued to search Wester’s house.
    
    Id. at 826.
    The court of appeals held that Elliott’s statement to the police lacked credibility because
    Elliott “was a suspect under arrest for the very drugs he claimed to have purchased from Wester and
    was being interrogated at the police station when he gave his statement.” 
    Id. at 827.
    Appellant’s case is distinguishable from Wester. Insofar as the affidavit in that case
    reflected, Elliott’s statement following his arrest was the first time the police had ever heard of
    Wester. Floyd, on the other hand, was already investigating Valverde as a possible drug dealer when
    he witnessed both Pertolanitz and Armstrong enter and quickly leave the Yucca Drive house. The
    statements they gave to Floyd were corroborated by the officer’s observations of their activities on
    the days in question and by the other information Floyd had accumulated during his investigation.
    Moreover, Pertolanitz and Armstrong were able to identify photographs of appellant and Valverde,
    who Floyd already knew lived at 404 Yucca Drive.
    5
    We conclude that the totality of the information contained in the affidavit gave the
    magistrate a substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue the search warrant. The point of
    error is overruled, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    __________________________________________
    J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice
    Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Henson and Goodwin
    Affirmed
    Filed: May 19, 2011
    Do Not Publish
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