Kris Michael Lewis Turnbull v. State ( 2013 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-11-00145-CR
    Kris Michael Lewis Turnbull, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 64061, THE HONORABLE MARTHA J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Kris Michael Lewis Turnbull appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating him
    guilty of the offense of theft and sentencing him to ten years in prison. See Tex. Penal Code
    § 31.03(a), (e)(5); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(b). On appeal, he contends the evidence
    was insufficient to prove that he violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision.
    Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of adjudication.
    BACKGROUND
    On March 13, 2009, Turnbull pled guilty to the offense of theft of property valued
    at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, a third degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(a),
    (e)(5). Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed him on
    community supervision for a period of five years. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(a). The
    conditions of Turnbull’s community supervision included, among other things, that he (1) neither
    commit nor be convicted of any offense against the laws of the State of Texas, any other state, or the
    United States (condition 1); and (2) not own, possess, use, or transport a firearm or ammunition
    (condition 16). In its motion to adjudicate guilt, filed eight months later, the State alleged that
    Turnbull violated these two conditions on September 26, 2009, by committing the offense of capital
    murder, namely, intentionally causing the death of Timothy Manning by shooting him with a firearm
    while in the course of committing the offense of robbery of Timothy Manning. Turnbull was tried
    and convicted for that capital murder in Bell County cause number 65621, at a jury trial held a few
    weeks before the adjudication hearing.1
    The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to adjudicate on February 20, 2011.
    Both the trial and the adjudication hearing were in the same court before the same judge. In addition,
    the same attorneys represented Turnbull at both proceedings. At the hearing, Turnbull pled not true
    to all the allegations in the motion.2 The State requested that the court consider the evidence from
    the capital murder trial conducted earlier that month as evidence supporting the allegations of
    violation. When questioned by the trial court, defense counsel indicated that the defense had “[n]o
    legal objection” to the trial judge considering the testimony and evidence she previously heard in that
    trial. The trial judge indicated that she would consider that evidence for purposes of the allegations
    1
    Turnbull appealed his capital murder conviction in cause number 65621, and that appeal
    is currently pending in this Court as our appellate number 03-11-00118-CR. We affirm that
    judgment of conviction in an opinion delivered today. Turnbull v. State, No. 03-11-00118-CR (Tex.
    App.—Austin Oct. 24, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    2
    In addition to the two previously mentioned violations alleged in paragraphs A (committing
    the offense of capital murder) and B (possessing or using a firearm), paragraphs C through J of the
    motion to adjudicate alleged violations of condition 21 of his supervision that required Turnbull to
    pay certain fees in connection with his supervision.
    2
    in the motion to adjudicate, in essence taking judicial notice of the evidence introduced at the trial.
    See Barrientez v. State, 
    500 S.W.2d 474
    , 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (when same trial court judge
    presides over both revocation hearing and trial of offense that is basis for revocation, trial court can
    take judicial notice of evidence introduced in that prior proceeding); Staten v. State, 
    328 S.W.3d 901
    ,
    906 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (same); Akbar v. State, 
    190 S.W.3d 119
    , 123 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (same). After hearing testimony from a community
    supervision officer about the technical violations alleged in paragraphs C through J, the trial court
    found that Turnbull had violated the conditions of his supervision as alleged in paragraphs
    A through J.     The court revoked Turnbull’s deferred adjudication community supervision,
    adjudicated him guilty of the theft offense, and sentenced him to ten years in prison. See Tex.
    Penal Code § 12.34; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(b). Turnbull appeals the judgment
    adjudicating guilt.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    If the State alleges that a defendant on deferred adjudication has violated a condition
    of community supervision, he is entitled to a hearing for the trial court to determine whether to
    proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the original charge. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12,
    § 5(b). This determination is reviewable in the same manner as a community supervision revocation
    hearing conducted in a case in which an adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. Id.; see Leonard
    v. State, 
    385 S.W.3d 570
    , 572 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“[T]he hearing on whether the defendant
    violated the terms of community supervision may be called an ‘adjudication hearing,’ but it is
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    governed by the same rules as a hearing to revoke community supervision and is, in practical terms,
    a hearing on whether to revoke the defendant’s deferred adjudication community supervision.”).
    We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for abuse of
    discretion. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. State,
    
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). An abuse of discretion occurs “only when the trial
    judge’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable minds
    might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 
    842 S.W.2d 667
    , 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In a community
    supervision revocation proceeding, the State has the burden of proving a violation of the conditions
    of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763
    –64;
    Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The State satisfies this burden when
    the greater weight of the credible evidence before the court creates a reasonable belief that a
    condition of probation has been violated as alleged. 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764
    ; Jenkins v. State,
    
    740 S.W.2d 435
    , 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial
    court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision. 
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    –94.
    We view the evidence presented in a revocation proceeding in the light most
    favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Garrett v. State, 
    619 S.W.2d 172
    , 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);
    Mauney v. State, 
    107 S.W.3d 693
    , 695 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). The trial court is the sole
    judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. 
    Garrett, 619 S.W.2d at 174
    ; 
    Mauney, 107 S.W.3d at 695
    . When more than one violation of the conditions
    of community supervision is found by the trial court, proof by a preponderance of the evidence of
    any one of the alleged violations is sufficient to support revocation. Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    ,
    4
    926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Atchison v. State, 
    124 S.W.3d 755
    , 758 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet.
    ref’d). Thus, to prevail on appeal, an appellant must successfully challenge all of the trial court’s
    findings that support revocation. Jones v. State, 
    571 S.W.2d 191
    , 193–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
    Silber v. State, 
    371 S.W.3d 605
    , 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The trial
    court’s judgment will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient under any ground alleged. See Dunavin
    v. State, 
    611 S.W.2d 91
    , 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
    PROOF OF VIOLATION
    Turnbull maintains that the trial court erred in considering the evidence from the
    capital murder trial because that evidence was derived from the erroneous admission of (1) a
    surveillance video recording depicting him shooting the victim in the head and (2) a firearms report
    concerning the results of ballistics testing conducted on the murder weapon. He argues that, absent
    this evidence, the evidence is insufficient to support adjudication. However, when the State offered
    the evidence from the capital murder trial for the court’s consideration in the adjudication hearing,
    Turnbull’s attorney affirmatively stated that he had “no legal objection.” A defendant affirmatively
    waives his right to have the trial court determine the admissibility of evidence when he states he has
    “no objection” to the evidence when it is offered by the State. Holmes v. State, 
    248 S.W.3d 194
    , 200
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Bouyer v. State, 
    264 S.W.3d 265
    , 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no
    pet.). Turnbull therefore waived any claim on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting that
    evidence and considering it in the adjudication proceeding. See 
    Holmes, 248 S.W.3d at 200
    .
    The evidence adduced at the trial of cause number 65621, the capital murder trial, is
    summarized in our opinion in cause number 03-11-00118-CR.                   See Turnbull v. State,
    5
    No. 03-11-00118-CR (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 24, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). That evidence—including the surveillance video recording showing Turnbull shooting
    the victim in the back of the head and immediately stealing money from the cab company owner’s
    office—is legally sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Turnbull violated the
    conditions of his community supervision by committing the offense of capital murder and by
    possessing or using a firearm, as alleged in paragraphs A and B in the motion to adjudicate.
    Furthermore, evidence aside from the complained-of surveillance video recording
    demonstrated that Turnbull possessed a firearm while he was on community supervision. First, there
    was a recording of a jail phone call wherein Turnbull explained to his girlfriend, Tamera Bernd, how
    he ended up in possession of three guns stolen from her father, two of which he sold and one that
    he kept—the Browning 9 mm that was used in the murder. Also in evidence was a copy of a letter
    Turnbull wrote to Bernd following that phone conversation, again explaining how he came to be in
    possession of the guns stolen from her father. In addition, Mike Ferrell, a friend of Turnbull’s and
    co-worker of the deceased, testified that a week or two before the murder Turnbull offered to sell
    him a silver .357 revolver. Ferrell testified that Turnbull had the weapon and showed it to him when
    he offered it for sale. Thus, evidence exclusive of the surveillance video recording depicting
    Turnbull shooting the victim established that Turnbull possessed a firearm in violation of the
    conditions of his community supervision. Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any
    one of the alleged violations is sufficient to support revocation or adjudication, see 
    Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926
    , this evidence alone supports the adjudication of Turnbull’s guilt.
    6
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Turnbull’s deferred
    adjudication community supervision and adjudicating him guilty. We overrule Turnbull’s sole point
    of error.
    CLERICAL ERROR IN JUDGMENT
    We note, however, that the judgment adjudicating guilt contains a clerical error. The
    judgment reflects that the trial court found that Turnbull violated the conditions of his community
    supervision as alleged in paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, and K. However, the record reflects
    that the State abandoned paragraph K, and the trial court did not find the violation alleged in
    paragraph K to be true. This Court has authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary
    information is available to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.2(b); Bigley v. State, 
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27–28
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to delete the trial court’s finding that
    Turnbull violated the conditions of community supervision as alleged in paragraph K of the motion
    to adjudicate. See Mendez v. State, No. 03-11-00732-CR, 
    2012 WL 3601098
    , at *1 (Tex.
    App.—Austin Aug. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying
    judgment to properly reflect trial court’s findings on allegations supporting adjudication before
    affirming judgment adjudicating guilt in frivolous appeal under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967)).
    CONCLUSION
    As modified, the judgment adjudicating guilt is affirmed.
    7
    __________________________________________
    Melissa Goodwin, Justice
    Before Justices Puryear, Rose, and Goodwin
    Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed
    Filed: October 24, 2013
    Do Not Publish
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