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 2015-03

in the Interest of B.T., Jr. and S.T., Minor Children ( 2015 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00069-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF B.T., JR.
AND S.T., MINOR CHILDREN
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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 177,250-B
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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R.D. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s $35,788 child-support arrearage
judgment. We affirm.
Background Facts
Mother and B.T. (Father) divorced in Arkansas on June 20, 2007. Father
received custody of their two children (B.T., Jr. and S.T.), and Mother was
ordered to pay child support. Specifically, the divorce decree ordered Mother to
“continue to pay child support in the sum of $127.00 per week in accordance with
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
the Temporary Order entered on March 20, 2007, pending further orders of this
Court.” The March 20, 2007 temporary order required Mother to pay $127 per
week in child support “commencing Friday, March 16, 2007.”
In 2011, Father moved to Wichita Falls with the children.              Mother
registered the Arkansas divorce decree in Texas in July 2012.            Jurisdiction
subsequently transferred for all matters involving the parties or children from the
original Arkansas court to the Texas trial court. Father filed a motion to confirm
child support arrearage and for enforcement in September 2012 and a first
supplemental motion in September 2013.
After a hearing on Father’s first supplemental motion, 2 the trial court found
that Mother’s total arrearage amounted to $35,788 after a $5,600 set-off and
found her in contempt. Mother then filed this appeal.
Discussion
In Mother’s only issue, she challenges the decree as being incapable of
supporting an arrearage judgment for child support. Specifically, she claims that
the decree is ambiguous and not sufficiently definite because it did not state a
payment start date.
Arrearage judgments are enforceable as long as the child support
obligation is “sufficiently definite and certain.” Office of Attorney Gen. v. Wilson,
    24 S.W.3d 902
    , 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (quoting Gross v. Gross,
2
Mother disputed that she had been properly served with the original
motion. Father agreed to proceed solely on the supplemental motion.
2
    808 S.W.2d 215
    , 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)). To be
enforceable by contempt, a child support obligation must “set forth the terms of
compliance in clear, specific[,] and unambiguous terms so that the person
charged with obeying the decree will readily know exactly what duties and
obligations are imposed upon him.”
    Id. at 906 
    (quoting Ex parte Acker,
    949 S.W.2d 314
    , 317 (Tex. 1997)). In reviewing a child support order for clarity
or ambiguity, we view the divorce decree “‘as a whole’ and apply basic common
sense.”
    Id. (quoting Ex 
    parte Johns,
    807 S.W.2d 768
    , 774 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, orig. proceeding)).
In this case, the final divorce decree ordered Mother to “continue to pay
child support . . . in accordance with the Temporary Order.” The temporary order
provided a start day for child support payments as “commencing Friday,
March 16, 2007.”    The final divorce decree, by expressly incorporating the
temporary order, explicitly details Mother’s child support payment obligations,
including the start date. See
    id. (holding that 
    divorce decree that incorporated
previous modification order detailing payment obligations was enforceable by
contempt or money judgment).
Mother’s comparison of the present decree to that in Acker is
unpersuasive. In Acker, the divorce decree stated only that payment obligations
were to begin on “June 1” without specifying a
    year. 949 S.W.2d at 317
    . Here,
the temporary order provided the day, month, and year upon which payments
were to begin. Reading the divorce decree in this case, Mother should have
3
readily known what duties and obligations were imposed upon her. We therefore
overrule Mother’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DAUPHINOT, J., concurs without opinion.
DELIVERED: March 26, 2015
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