in Re Milo Cradale Williams, Relator ( 2014 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-14-00224-CV
    IN RE MILO CRADALE WILLIAMS, RELATOR
    Original Proceeding
    July 14, 2014
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    Relator, Milo Cradale Williams, has filed in this Court an original proceeding he
    has identified as a petition for writ of mandamus. After having studied the relief he
    seeks by way of his petition, we construe his petition as an application seeking post-
    conviction habeas corpus relief from a final felony conviction in trial court cause number
    55,244-D.1 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West Supp. 2013). We will
    dismiss his petition for want of jurisdiction.
    1
    Trial court cause number 55,244-D is the criminal cause in which, in 2006, he was convicted of
    a 2001 murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. We considered and affirmed said conviction on direct
    appeal. See Williams v. State, 
    290 S.W.3d 407
    (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    Relator’s Contentions
    First, Relator identifies himself as a cestui que vie trust, an archaic legal term
    which we have roughly translated in this particular presentation as a person entitled to
    an equitable estate, as opposed to a legal one. He does not identify an underlying
    cause in which such a status is relevant. He then goes on to complain that the trial
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction but again fails to identify the nature of the
    underlying cause over which the trial court purportedly lacked jurisdiction. He next
    focuses on the special appearance he filed in the trial court, referring to the copy he
    attached in the appendix to his petition. Relator continues, lodging several contentions
    regarding a void judgment. He then makes passing references to statutes of limitations
    and repose before he begins a brief discussion regarding defective pleadings. Again,
    Relator has yet to identify the nature of the underlying proceedings of which he has
    these many complaints.
    Finally, his intention becomes at least partially clear in his request for relief, when
    he asks this Court to compel Respondent, the Honorable Don Emerson, presiding judge
    of the 320th District Court, to answer Relator’s pleadings by either (1) entering an order
    vacating the judgment in cause number 55,244-D for want of jurisdiction or (2) provide
    findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the trial court’s jurisdiction of “Third Party
    Interest Intervenor under Injury.”    Indeed, the special appearance to which Relator
    referred earlier in his petition was filed in cause number 55,244-D per the district clerk’s
    inmate correspondence reply form confirming receipt of said filing. As we have noted,
    trial court cause number 55,244-D is the criminal proceeding in which Relator was
    convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
    2
    Because Relator specifically asks that we compel Respondent to declare void the
    trial court’s judgment of conviction, we interpret the relief he seeks as in the nature of
    habeas corpus. “We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of
    the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it.” State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 
    603 S.W.2d 829
    , 833 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 71). With that, we
    can only construe Relator’s petition in the case at bar as one seeking post-conviction
    relief from a final felony conviction. Such relief is governed by Article 11.07 of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and is outside of our jurisdiction. See Ex parte
    Alexander, 
    685 S.W.2d 57
    , 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
    Jurisdiction over Article 11.07 Applications
    Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure vests exclusive jurisdiction
    over post-conviction relief from final felony convictions in the Texas Court of Criminal
    Appeals. See Padieu v. Court of Appeals of Tex., Fifth Dist., 
    392 S.W.3d 115
    , 117
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (per curiam); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, §
    5.   Consequently, intermediate “appellate courts have scrupulously declined to
    intervene in pending Article 11.07 actions, noting [the Texas Court of Criminal
    Appeals]’s exclusive jurisdiction.” 
    Padieu, 392 S.W.3d at 117
    (citing In re McAfee, 
    53 S.W.3d 715
    , 717–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (per
    curiam)). Article 11.07 simply contains no role for the intermediate courts of appeals;
    the only courts to which Article 11.07 refers are the convicting court and the Texas
    Court of Criminal Appeals. In re 
    McAfee, 53 S.W.3d at 718
    . “Should an applicant find it
    necessary to complain about an action or inaction of the convicting court, the applicant
    may seek mandamus relief from the [Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals.” 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    3
    CONST. art. V, § 5). Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to grant the relief Relator
    has requested in his petition.2
    Conclusion
    Because we lack jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, we dismiss Relator’s
    petition.
    Mackey K. Hancock
    Justice
    2
    Even if we were to construe Relator’s petition as one seeking mandamus relief, he has failed to
    show that Respondent had a ministerial duty to vacate the 2006 murder conviction and, therefore, has
    likewise failed to show himself entitled to the relief requested. Additionally, to the extent Relator’s
    alternative request for findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the trial court’s jurisdiction of “Third
    Party Interest Intervenor under Injury” may also be fairly understood as a request for mandamus relief, we
    likewise conclude that Relator has failed to show himself entitled to such relief. To be entitled to
    mandamus relief, a relator must show that he or she has no adequate remedy at law to redress the
    alleged harm and that he or she seeks to compel a ministerial act, one not involving a discretionary or
    judicial decision. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals, 
    236 S.W.3d 207
    , 210
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    4