Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. v. Guillermo R. Pechero M.D.Ruben D. Pechero M.D. Maplestar Orthopedics, P. A. ( 2015 )


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  •                          NUMBER 13-13-00552-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    NOLANA OPEN MRI CENTER, INC.,                                             Appellant,
    v.
    GUILLERMO R. PECHERO, M.D.,
    RUBEN D. PECHERO, M.D., AND
    MAPLESTAR ORTHOPEDICS, P.A.,                                              Appellees.
    On appeal from the 93rd District Court
    of Hidalgo County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
    Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. (“Nolana”) attempts to appeal a judgment rendered
    against it in favor of appellees, Guillermo R. Pechero, M.D., Ruben D. Pechero, M.D.,
    and Maplestar Orthopedics, P.A. (“Maplestar”), following a bench trial. On February 27,
    2014, appellees filed a motion to show authority through which they contend that counsel
    for appellant lacks the authority to bring this appeal. On March 13, 2014, Nolana filed a
    response to the motion, and, on March 19, 2014, appellees filed a reply brief in support
    of their motion to show authority. This Court abated and remanded this matter to the trial
    court in order for it to consider the foregoing matters regarding the legal authority of
    Nolana’s counsel to act as attorney of record for Nolana and to file a notice of appeal on
    its behalf. After reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, we
    dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    I. BACKGROUND
    According to the live pleadings, on or about February 1, 2008, Jose Castro d/b/a
    JD Surgical Associates purchased the assets of Nolana, a medical facility that performed
    magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) tests, from appellees, Ruben Pechero, M.D. and
    Guillermo Pechero, M.D. The assets included the goods, furniture, fixtures, equipment,
    all existing contracts, the center, license, accounts receivable, names and client lists, the
    name, and company stock.         The only asset that was specifically excluded from the
    purchase was the magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI) machine, and it appears that
    Castro agreed to rent the MRI machine from Ruben and Guillermo. According to Castro,
    Ruben and Guillermo promised to refer their patients to Nolana and represented that the
    revenue from these referrals would be more than sufficient to cover the costs to rent the
    MRI Machine. Shortly thereafter, Castro made Agustin "Gus" Garcia an equal partner in
    the business.
    2
    After the sale, Ruben and Guillermo began referring worker's compensation
    patients, attorney-referred patients, and Medicare/Medicaid patients to Nolana in accord
    with the alleged agreement. For patients that had been referred by attorneys, Nolana
    entered into letters of protection with the attorneys that represented the injured patients.
    Nolana asserted that Ruben and Guillermo contacted the referring attorneys and
    instructed them that payments owed to Nolana be paid to them. Nolana did not receive
    any payments for the attorney-referred patients and questioned Ruben; Ruben responded
    "that is my money." In November 2010, Ruben and Guillermo stopped referring patients
    to Nolana.
    In July 2008, the MRI machine became non-functional. That same month, Nolana
    and Maplestar, an entity owned and operated by Guillermo, entered into an agreement
    whereby Maplestar would lease a MRI machine to Nolana for $20,000.00 to $25,000.00
    a month. After signing the lease agreement, Castro and Garcia became concerned that
    the agreement might be “invalid” and did not pay the lease price for the machine, but
    instead paid “approximately $60,000.00 which it believed would be a more accurate
    estimate of the true rental value of the MRI Equipment.”
    Nolana brought suit against Guillermo, Ruben, and Maplestar alleging that they
    had engaged in a civil conspiracy, or were jointly and severally liable, for fraudulent
    inducement, conversion, violations of the Theft Liability Act, see TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
    § 31.03 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.), and tortious interference with contract.
    Nolana sought declaratory judgment regarding its rights under the equipment rental
    agreement with Maplestar and further sought actual and exemplary damages.
    3
    Maplestar answered and counterclaimed against Nolana on grounds that Nolana
    failed to pay Maplestar the rental payments for the leased MRI machine. Maplestar
    brought causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment,
    promissory estoppel, conversion, and negligence.        Maplestar asserted that Nolana’s
    lawsuit was frivolous.
    Ruben filed a third party petition against Agustin “Gus” Garcia and Joe Castro
    alleging that he served as a guaranty for their “purchase” of an MRI machine and that,
    despite their promises, they failed to pay for the MRI machine.
    Guillermo and Ruben also filed a counterclaim against Nolana. According to their
    counterclaim, Ruben owned the office space occupied by Nolana.                 Ruben thus
    counterclaimed against Nolana for breach of lease and quantum meruit. Both Guillermo
    and Ruben alleged that Nolana’s lawsuit was frivolous and brought in bad faith and for
    the purpose of harassment.
    The case was originally set for trial on April 15, 2013, but was reset until April 18,
    2013. The transcript of the hearing held on April 15, 2013 shows that the defendants
    had filed an emergency motion to show authority on grounds that Nolana was
    unrepresented by counsel and was not in good standing with the State of Texas. At the
    hearing, Castro testified that he and Garcia each owned fifty percent of Nolana and that
    they were the two directors for Nolana. Castro testified that he had settled his claims
    with the defendants and, as part of that agreement, agreed to grant the defendants a
    limited power of attorney authorizing and directing the defendants to vote Castro’s 50
    percent interest in Nolana to oppose the prosecution or defense of the lawsuit.
    4
    On April 18, 2013, Guillermo, Ruben, and Maple Star filed a “Bench Brief in
    Support of Emergency Motion to Show Authority” alleging:
    1. On April 15, 2013, the above matter was called for final trial on the
    merits. Defendants were present and appeared by and through their
    attorneys. Jose Castro ("Castro") and Agustin Garcia ("Garcia"), the
    principals of Plaintiff Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. ("Nolana Open MRI"),
    were present in the courtroom when the case was called. Castro and Garcia
    each claim to own a 50 percent interest in Nolana Open MRI and that they
    are the only directors of the company. At the time the case was called,
    Garcia announced to the Court that his attorney, Jesus Villalobos, would be
    arriving in the courtroom shortly to make an appearance in this matter. Mr.
    Villalobos represents Garcia, individually, in other pending lawsuits
    involving claims by Garcia against Defendants Guillermo R. Pechero and
    Ruben D. Pechero. At that time, Defendants' counsel announced that
    Nolana Open MRI had not complied with its franchise tax requirements and
    was not in good standing with the Texas Comptroller's Office meaning that
    Nolana Open MRI could not prosecute or defend its claims in this cause
    and that Nolana Open MRI had no authority to retain new counsel. The
    Court decided to recall the case once Mr. Villalobos arrived in the
    courtroom.
    2. At that time the case was re-called, Mr. Villalobos announced that
    he had just been contacted by Garcia to represent Nolana Open MRI in the
    matter and that he needed additional time to get acquainted with the case.
    Counsel for Defendants again announced to the Court that Nolana Open
    MRI was not in good standing for failure to meet its franchise tax
    requirements. Counsel also announced that Castro had settled with
    Defendants and, as part of the settlement agreement, had granted
    Defendants a limited power of attorney to vote his 50 percent interest in the
    company on any litigation matters, including: (i) opposing the prosecution
    or defense of the Lawsuit by Nolana Open MRI; (ii) opposing Nolana Open
    MRI's retention of new counsel in the Lawsuit; (iii) opposing any request for
    a continuance by Nolana Open MRI of any hearing and/or the trial in the
    Lawsuit; (iv) opposing the filing of any post-judgment motions, appeals,
    mandamus petitions and bills of review by Nolana Open MRI of matters in
    the Lawsuit; (v) opposing reinstatement of Nolana Open MRI with the Texas
    Secretary of State or Texas Comptroller's Office; and (vii) in any other
    manner Defendants may desire as it relates in any way to the Lawsuit. At
    that time, Defendants also filed their Emergency Motion to Show Authority
    and presented it to the Court. Mr. Villalobos then requested a brief recess
    to review the motion and the settlement agreement and to discuss the
    5
    matter with Garcia and Castro. Defendants incorporate herein by reference
    their Emergency Motion to Show Authority filed April 15, 2013.
    3. After the recess, the case was re-called and Mr. Villalobos
    announced that he was appearing as counsel for Nolana Open MRI. Mr.
    Villalobos also announced that the company had been reinstated by Garcia,
    who purportedly used his personal credit card to pay the amounts owed on
    the franchise taxes. No evidence of the transaction was offered to the Court.
    Defendants' counsel again urged the Emergency Motion to Show Authority
    on grounds that Mr. Villalobos had not shown that he was authorized to
    represent Nolana Open MRI because there were no resolutions, minutes or
    contracts approving his representation; there was no documentation
    showing that Nolana Open MRI was in good standing to prosecute or
    defend its claims; and that pursuant to the Settlement Agreement between
    Defendants and Castro, Garcia could not unilaterally act on behalf of Nolana
    Open MRI and retain Mr. Villalobos as counsel and/or reinstate the
    company. Counsel also pointed out that Mr. Villalobos had not filed a Notice
    of Appearance or any other written pleading appearing on behalf of Nolana
    Open MRI.
    4. Mr. Villalobos requested additional time in which to research and
    brief the issue of whether he could represent Nolana Open MRI in this
    cause. Before the conclusion of the hearing, the attorneys were allowed to
    examine Castro regarding his settlement agreement with the Defendants.
    Castro confirmed that he had granted Defendants a limited power of
    attorney on litigation matters. Exhibit "B", Transcript of Hearing on April 15,
    2013. The Court reset the trial in the cause to April 18, 2013 and ordered
    that Defendant's Emergency Motion to Show Authority be considered at that
    time.
    5. On April 16, 2013, attorney Raul Medina filed an Appearance of
    Counsel on behalf of Nolana Open MRI. The appearance is signed by Mr.
    Medina and on behalf of Jesus Villalobos of the law firm of Villalobos &
    Villalobos. See Exhibit "C", Appearance of Counsel. For the same reasons
    that Mr. Villalobos cannot show his authority to represent Nolana Open MRI,
    Mr. Medina cannot show he is authorized to represent the company in this
    cause. Defendants submit this Brief in Support of its Emergency Motion to
    Show Authority for the Court's consideration.
    On April 18, 2013, the trial court convened. Counsel for Nolana stated on the
    record that he concurred with opposing counsel that Garcia was “not involved in this case
    in any manner,” and “[h]e’s not an owner.” Because he is not an owner, “he can’t hire
    6
    someone.” “And as a result, Mr. Medina and I are asking the Court to allow us to
    withdraw from this.” Medina confirmed that they had concluded that the Pecheros did
    not sell Nolana and there was never a transfer of ownership.                          “Mr. Garcia has no
    business here. And he has no business in hiring us to represent another corporation.
    So, we mistakenly filed a notice of appearance believing that there was authority. I agree
    with them. There isn’t, and we’re asking to be allowed to withdraw, both myself and Mr.
    Medina.” The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the motion
    to show authority as moot.1
    On April 18, 2013, the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts issued a “Certificate
    of Account Status” showing the Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. was “not in good standing
    as it has not satisfied all franchise tax requirements.” This document shows the taxpayer
    number as 17428864056.
    The Final Judgment rendered on April 18, 2013 in this case provides:
    On April 15, 2013, this case was called for trial. After hearing
    arguments of counsel, the Court recessed the trial and reconvened the trial
    on April 18, 2013. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Guillermo R. Pechero,
    M.D. ("Guillermo Pechero"), Ruben D. Pechero, M.D. ("Ruben Pechero"),
    and Maple Star Orthopedics, P.A. appeared by and through their counsel
    of record, having announced ready for trial. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
    Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc., although given proper and adequate notice
    of trial, failed to appear. Although Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    requested a jury, the jury fee has not been paid and the Court proceeded to
    determine all fact questions. The record contains conflicting information
    whether Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. is in good standing with the State of
    Texas. The Court resolves the conflict by finding Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc. was not in good standing as of April 15, 2013, when this case
    was called for trial. The Court determined it had jurisdiction over the
    subject matter and the parties in this proceeding. The Court took judicial
    1 Upon appeal, counsel for Nolana stated that “Nolana did not participate in the trial of this case
    on April 18, 2013 because the trial court erroneously ruled without hearing evidence that Appellant had
    lost its right to do business in Texas and would not allow [its] counsel to participate.”
    7
    notice of all documents in its file and of all proceedings in this cause and—
    after considering the pleadings and official records on file in this cause and
    the evidence presented by Guillermo Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple
    Star Orthopedics, Inc. on liability, actual damages, exemplary damages and
    attorney's fees—finds that judgment should be rendered for Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star against Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc.
    It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Maple
    Star Orthopedics, P.A. have and recover judgment against Nolana Open
    MRI Center, Inc. in the amount of Five Hundred Forty Seven Thousand
    Three Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($547,300.00); and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Maple Star
    Orthopedics, P.A. have and recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc. exemplary damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
    Dollars and 00/100 ($500,000.00) based on clear and convincing evidence
    that Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc., acting through its principals, collected
    and converted for personal use thousands of dollars of accounts receivable
    in repeated violation of this Court's Temporary Restraining Order,
    Temporary Injunction Order, and Amended Temporary Injunction Order and
    the Texas Civil Theft Act; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Ruben
    Pechero have and recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    in the amount of Three Hundred Seventy Three Thousand Eight Hundred
    Ninety-One Dollars and 81/100 ($373,891.81); and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Ruben
    Pechero have and recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    exemplary damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars and
    00/100 ($500,000.00) based on clear and convincing evidence that Nolana
    Open MRI Center, Inc. converted tangible personal property belonging to
    Ruben Pechero in violation of the Texas Civil Theft Act; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero have and recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    in the amount of Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Five and
    81/100 ($89,925.81); and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. each have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. pre-judgment
    8
    interest on their respective awards at the rate of 5% per year from February
    25, 2011, until rendition of this judgment; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. Three Hundred
    Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty One Dollars and 55/100
    ($360,881.55) as reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses;
    and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. a conditional
    award of Ten Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($10,000.00) as reasonable and
    necessary attorney's fees in the event of Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.'s
    unsuccessful motion for new trial to the trial court; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. a conditional
    award of Thirty Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($30,000.00) as reasonable
    and necessary attorney's fees in the event of Nolana Open MRI Center,
    Inc.'s unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeals; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. a conditional
    award of Thirty Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($30,000.00) as reasonable
    and necessary attorney's fees in the event of Nolana Open MRI Center,
    Inc.'s further unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment for court costs against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.;
    and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. have and
    recover judgment against Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc. post-judgment
    interest at the rate of 5% per year on the total judgment from the date of
    judgment until paid; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all claims
    and causes of action asserted by Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.'s against
    9
    Guillermo Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. are
    frivolous and brought in bad faith and for purposes of harassment in
    violation of Rule 13, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and Chapter 9, Texas
    Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and that Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    take nothing on its claims and causes of action against Guillermo Pechero,
    Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc.; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Maple Star
    Orthopedics, Inc. shall have all rights, title and interest in Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc.'s accounts receivables; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Nolana
    Open MRI Center, Inc. and its principals, officers, directors, agents,
    employees, representatives, attorneys, and all those acting in concert
    therewith, including without limitation Jose "Joe" Castro and Agustin "Gus"
    Garcia, are hereby permanently enjoined from collecting, using, converting,
    wasting, concealing, or otherwise disposing of any of Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc.'s accounts receivables. Any and all of Nolana Open MRI
    Center, Inc.'s accounts receivables received by Nolana Open MRI Center,
    Inc. and/or its principals, officers, directors, agents, employees,
    representatives, attorneys, and all those acting in concert therewith shall be
    immediately delivered to Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc., Attn: Guillermo
    Pechero. M.D. at 1005 E. Nolana Loop, McAllen, Texas 78504. Maple Star
    Orthopedics, Inc. and its designated agents, representatives, and/or
    attorneys may contact any person or entity owing any monies on Nolana
    Open MRI Center, Inc.'s accounts receivables and direct such persons or
    entities to pay any and all amounts owed to Nolana Open MRI Center, Inc.
    directly to Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. pursuant to this Final Judgment; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the District
    Clerk shall refund the cash bond deposited into the registry of the Court
    pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order entered April 12, 2012, and
    issue one check payable to KITTLEMAN, THOMAS & GONZALES, PLLC-
    TRUST ACCOUNT, in the amount of $1,000.00 and release said check to
    counsel, Kittleman, Thomas & Gonzales, PLLC; and
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. are awarded
    any and all other injunction bonds and/or cash bonds filed by Nolana Open
    MRI Center, Inc. in this cause and the District Clerk is ordered to issue any
    checks for such amounts payable to KITTLEMAN, THOMAS & GONZALES,
    PLLC TRUST ACCOUNT and release said check to counsel, Kittleman,
    Thomas & Gonzales, PLLC; and
    10
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Guillermo
    Pechero, Ruben Pechero, and Maple Star Orthopedics, Inc. shall have all
    writs of execution and other process necessary to enforce this judgment.
    This judgment disposes of all parties and all claims in this cause, and
    is final and appealable. All relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
    This appeal ensued. On February 27, 2014, appellees filed a motion to show
    authority alleging that Nolana’s appellate counsel lacked the authority to bring this appeal.
    According to their motion, Nolana’s appellate counsel informed the trial court that they
    were not authorized to represent Nolana in the underlying suit. On March 13, 2014,
    appellant filed a response stating that Garcia was an officer, director, and part owner of
    Nolana, and that Garcia and Castro authorized the bringing of this lawsuit. “The fact that
    Mr. Castro who was never a party to this case in the trial court, but settled his personal
    claims without the benefit of counsel . . . has no bearing on the right of appellant to go
    forward with this restricted appeal. . . .” On March 19, 2014, appellees filed a reply to
    the response.
    In light of the foregoing sequence of events, this Court abated and remanded this
    matter to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the authority
    of counsel for Nolana to prosecute this appeal. At the hearing, Garcia testified that he
    owned Nolana equally with Castro and that Nolana was in good standing with the State
    of Texas.    Garcia confirmed that he had retained counsel to represent Nolana to
    prosecute this appeal.
    Exhibits introduced into evidence at the abatement hearing indicate that Nolana
    Open MRI Center, Inc. had its authority to transact business in Texas revoked on
    February 21, 2014 for failing to pay a franchise tax return and/or pay state franchise tax;
    11
    Garcia as “director” applied for reinstatement and, on April 23, 2014, was reinstated to
    active status and was eligible for reinstatement through May 15, 2015.
    Counsel for Nolana further introduced a “Partnership Agreement” made by “Nolana
    Open MRI Inc. DBA Nolan Open MRI Services; a Texas Limited Partnership (Company)
    and its members Agustin G. Garcia and Joe Castro (JD Surgical Associates).” This
    agreement provides:
    The Members have the right to manage the Company's business.
    The Members may delegate to another person the authority to perform
    specified acts on behalf of the Company. If a Member dies or is unable to
    act, the Company will be managed by the remaining member or by the
    person the deceased Member last designated in writing to manage the
    Company. That person will have full authority to jointly manage the
    Company.
    Counsel for Nolana contended that this agreement illustrated Garcia’s authority to retain
    counsel; however, the actual entity involved in this lawsuit and appeal is Nolana Open
    MRI Center, Inc. Upon abatement, the trial court entered an order stating, in pertinent
    part, as follows:
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    1.     Nolana MRI is a Texas corporation. There exists a question as to
    the corporation’s standing with the State of Texas.
    2.     On March 20, 2013, the Court permitted Javier Villalobos to withdraw
    as counsel for Nolana MRI. At the time the motion to withdraw was
    granted, no substitute attorney appeared to represent Nolana MRA.
    3.     Jose Castro has a 50% ownership interest in Nolana MRI, a Texas
    corporation.
    4.     Jose Castro did not consent to Counselors filing a notice of appeal
    or prosecuting an appeal on Nolana MRI’s behalf.
    5.     Agustin Garcia did have a 50% ownership in Nolana MRI.
    12
    6.    On April 11, 2013, Jose Castro entered into a valid and enforceable
    agreement with Movants entitled, Settlement Agreement and Mutual
    Release (“the Settlement”).         Under the Settlement, Castro
    irrevocably granted Movants a limited power of attorney to vote his
    interest in Nolana MRI for the purpose of (1) opposing Nolana MRI’s
    prosecution or defense in this proceeding; (2) opposing Nolana
    MRI’s retention of new counsel in this proceeding; and (3) opposing
    any appeal by Nolana MRI in this proceeding. Movants did not
    authorize Counselors to either file a notice of appeal or prosecute an
    appeal on Nolana MRI’s behalf. Agustin Garcia did.
    7.    On April 15, 2013, Movants filed a verified motion to show authority.
    The Court permitted Counselors to make appearances on Nolana
    MRI’s behalf on this date.
    8.    On April 16, 2013, Raul Medina formally filed a notice to appear as
    co-counsel for Nolana MRI. In this notice, Medina represented that
    his co-counsel would be Jesus Villalobos Jr.
    9.    On April 18, 2013, the Court permitted Counselors to appear on
    Nolana MRI’s behalf. On the same date, the Court granted
    Counselor’s request to withdraw as Nolana MRI’s attorneys and
    forewent deciding the merits of Movants’ motion to show authority
    because the motion had been rendered moot.
    10.   On October 14, 2013, Counselors filed a Notice of Restricted Appeal,
    wherein they asserted that the Court did not permit them to
    participate at the April 18 trial in this case. In fact, Counselors asked
    to withdraw and their request was granted.
    11.   On March 13, 2014, Counselors filed a Response to Motion to Show
    Authority with the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, wherein Counselors
    asserted that this Court did not permit them to appear on Nolana
    MRI’s behalf on April 15, 2013. In fact, Counselors did appear on
    behalf of Nolana MRI and then requested to withdraw.
    12.   On April 29, 2014, pursuant to an order form the Thirteenth Court of
    Appeals, the Court held a hearing (“the abatement hearing”) where
    it heard argument and received evidence relating to the motion to
    show authority. At this hearing, Counselors marked as “Exhibit 3” a
    document that they purported was Nolana MRI’s operating
    agreement (“the Agreement”).
    13
    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    1.     The Court concludes that it has an insufficient basis for finding that
    the Agreement is applicable to Nolana MRI and that the Agreement
    is ambiguous as to whether one member may unilaterally retain legal
    counsel for Nolana MRI.
    2.     The Court concludes that the Agreement is ambiguous as to whether
    a member with a non-majority interest in Nolana MRI can make
    management and delegation decisions for Nolana MRI. The
    conclusion is that there is a 50-50 split in ownership of this
    corporation. Therefore, it would be a draw with respect to authority
    to appeal on behalf of Nolana MRI.
    4.     On April 18, 2013, Counselors repeatedly stated to the Court that
    Garcia was incapable of authorizing Counselors to represent Nolana
    MRI in this proceeding (“the subject statements”). In considering
    the ambiguity in the agreement and Counselors’ statements that
    Agustin Garcia was incapable of authorizing Counselors to represent
    Nolana MRI, the Court concludes that is the “tie breaker” as the Court
    has been given no justification to disregard these admissions.
    II. JURISDICTION
    We are obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting our jurisdiction over an
    appeal. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 
    139 S.W.3d 671
    , 673 (Tex. 2004). Standing is a
    component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Douglas v. Delp, 
    987 S.W.2d 879
    , 882 (Tex.
    1999); Martin v. Clinical Pathology Labs., Inc., 
    343 S.W.3d 885
    , 887–88 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 2011, pet. denied); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 
    252 S.W.3d 299
    , 304
    (Tex. 2008) ("A court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standing
    to assert it.") (footnote omitted). The issue of standing cannot be waived, and we may
    examine standing sua sponte if necessary. See 
    Martin, 343 S.W.3d at 888
    ; see also
    Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 
    852 S.W.2d 440
    , 445–46 (Tex. 1993) (noting
    that standing "may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court").
    14
    When an appellate court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over an appeal, it
    must dismiss the appeal. M.O. Dental 
    Lab, 139 S.W.3d at 673
    .
    III. MOTION TO SHOW AUTHORITY
    There is a general presumption that an attorney is acting with authority; however,
    that presumption is rebuttable. Breceda v. Whi, 
    187 S.W.3d 148
    , 152 (Tex. App.—El
    Paso 2006, no pet.); Kelly v. Murphy, 
    630 S.W.2d 759
    , 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Rule 12 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits any
    party to challenge an attorney's authority to prosecute or defend a lawsuit:
    A party in a suit or proceeding pending in a court of this state may,
    by sworn written motion stating that he believes the suit or proceeding is
    being prosecuted or defended without authority, cause the attorney to be
    cited to appear before the court and show his authority to act. The notice
    of the motion shall be served upon the challenged attorney at least ten days
    before the hearing on the motion. At the hearing on the motion, the burden
    of proof shall be upon the challenged attorney to show sufficient authority
    to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of the other party. Upon his failure
    to show such authority, the court shall refuse to permit the attorney to
    appear in the cause, and shall strike the pleadings if no person who is
    authorized to prosecute or defend appears. The motion may be heard and
    determined at any time before the parties have announced ready for trial,
    but the trial shall not be unnecessarily continued or delayed for the hearing.
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 12; see Kindle v. Wood Cnty. Elec. Co-op, Inc., 
    151 S.W.3d 206
    , 210 (Tex.
    App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied). The Rule's primary purpose is to enforce a party's right
    to know who authorized the suit. Angelina Cnty. v. McFarland, 
    374 S.W.2d 417
    , 422–23
    (Tex. 1964); In re Sassin, No. 08-12-00308-CV, 
    2014 WL 3385106
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—El
    Paso July 11, 2014, orig. proceeding). Rule 12's purpose is also to discourage and
    cause the dismissal of suits brought without authority so as to protect parties from
    groundless suits. See In re Gravitt, 
    371 S.W.3d 465
    , 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    15
    Dist.] 2012 [mand. denied], orig. proceeding).
    The challenged attorney must appear before the trial court to show his authority to
    act on behalf of his client. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12; R.H. v. Smith, 
    339 S.W.3d 756
    , 762 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Boudreau v. Fed. Trust Bank, 
    115 S.W.3d 740
    , 741 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). At the hearing on the motion, the challenged attorney
    bears the burden of proof to show the requisite authority. 
    Smith, 339 S.W.3d at 762
    ;
    
    Boudreau, 115 S.W.3d at 741
    . When resolving the motion, the trial court considers and
    weighs the evidence presented at the hearing. In re Guardianship of Benavides, 
    403 S.W.3d 370
    , 376 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); 
    Smith, 339 S.W.3d at 762
    –
    63. Typically, a challenged attorney satisfies his burden if he produces an affidavit or
    testimony from his client indicating the attorney was retained to provide representation in
    the case. See 
    Boudreau, 115 S.W.3d at 742
    ; Spigener v. Wallis, 
    80 S.W.3d 174
    , 184
    (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.).
    Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to show authority for an
    abuse of discretion. Urbish v. 127th Jud. Dist. Court, 
    708 S.W.2d 429
    , 432 (Tex. 1986);
    In re Guardianship of 
    Benavides, 403 S.W.3d at 373
    ; 
    Smith, 339 S.W.3d at 762
    . A trial
    court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to
    guiding rules or principles. Iliff v. Iliff, 
    339 S.W.3d 74
    , 78 (Tex. 2011). A trial court also
    abuses its discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. 
    Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 78
    ; Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). With respect
    to factual findings, an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
    trial court.   City of Dallas v. Vanesko, 
    189 S.W.3d 769
    , 771 (Tex. 2006); In re
    16
    Guardianship of 
    Benavides, 403 S.W.3d at 373
    . Instead, a party challenging those
    findings must establish that the trial court could have reached only one decision. See 
    id. (citing Walker
    , 827 S.W.2d at 840); In re Guardianship of 
    Benavides, 403 S.W.3d at 373
    .
    IV. ANALYSIS
    The fundamental issue in dispute is whether Garcia had the authority to hire
    counsel to represent Nolana in this appeal. Garcia and Castro are equal owners of
    Nolana, and Castro did not consent to hiring counsel or prosecuting this appeal. Given
    that the equal owners did not agree, there was neither unanimous consent nor a majority
    vote to authorize this litigation. The partnership agreement introduced into evidence at
    the hearing on abatement references a different entity than that involved in this lawsuit,
    but even so, does not address the situation here, where the two owners and members of
    the entity disagree regarding a business matter. The record is effectively devoid of
    evidence or argument regarding application of the Texas Business Organizations Code.2
    There was no proof in this case of any of the provisions of the corporate charter or by-
    laws, and there was no attempt to prove that one or the other member of the corporation,
    as member or officer or shareholder, had invested Garcia with the authority to hire counsel
    and conduct litigation on the part of Nolana where its members were in conflict. In this
    regard, we note that, generally, the pursuit of litigation is not considered to fall within the
    parameters of the ordinary course of business so as to authorize one member of a
    2 As recently stated by the Texas Supreme Court, ordinarily, a corporation must be managed by a
    board of directors. Ritchie v. Rupe, 
    443 S.W.3d 856
    , 869 n.12 (Tex. 2014) (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE
    ANN. § 21.401(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.)). Under certain circumstances, however,
    corporations may be managed directly by shareholders. See 
    id. (citing TEX.
    BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§
    21.101(a)(2), 21.714(b)(1),(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.)). In such cases, the persons or
    entities managing the corporation act in the capacity of directors and are treated as directors. 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.106(a)–(b), 21.725–.726(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.)).
    17
    corporation to direct the action of filing suit or appeal. Kiepfer v. Beller, 
    944 F.2d 1213
    ,
    1218 (5th Cir. 1991); Harrison v. City of San Antonio, 
    695 S.W.2d 271
    , 275 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio 1985, no writ); Robert Nanney Chevrolet Co. v. Evans & Moses, 
    601 S.W.2d 411
    , 413 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ); Capital Bank v. Am. Eyewear, Inc.,
    
    597 S.W.2d 17
    , 20 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ); Valley Int’l Props., Inc. v.
    Brownsville Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 
    581 S.W.2d 222
    , 227 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi
    1979, no writ); Square 67 Dev. Corp. v. Red Oak State Bank, 
    559 S.W.2d 136
    , 138 (Tex.
    Civ. App.—Waco 1977, writ ref'd); Templeton v. Nocona Hills Owners Ass'n, Inc., 
    555 S.W.2d 534
    , 538 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ); see In re CorrLine Int'l, LLC,
    
    516 B.R. 106
    , 138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); see also St. Star Designs, LLC v. Gregory,
    No. H–11–0915, 
    2011 WL 3925070
    , at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2011). The same is true
    of equal shareholders. See Kaspar v. Thorne, 
    755 S.W.2d 151
    , 154 (Tex. Civ. App.—
    Dallas 1988, no writ).
    As stated previously, we generally presume that an attorney is acting with
    authority. See 
    Breceda, 187 S.W.3d at 152
    . However, in this case, the presumption
    that Nolana’s counsel had the authority to represent Nolana on appeal has been rebutted
    by the trial court's multiple findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are supported
    by the record, that Garcia did not have the authority to unilaterally retain counsel to
    represent Nolana. We hold, therefore, that counsel for Nolana lacked standing to bring
    this appeal. See 
    id. IV. CONCLUSION
    18
    Based on the foregoing, we grant appellees’ motion to show authority insofar as it
    requests that we determine whether or not Nolana’s counsel possessed authority to
    prosecute this appeal and to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
    dismiss this cause for lack of jurisdiction.
    GREGORY T. PERKES
    JUSTICE
    Delivered and filed the
    12th day of February, 2015.
    19