Terri Leann Jones Dronet v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-11-00444-CR
____________________
TERRI LEANN JONES DRONET, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
_____________________________________________ ___________________
On Appeal from the 75th Judicial District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CR26673
___________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Under a plea agreement to cap punishment at twenty years, Terri Leann
Jones Dronet pleaded guilty to the murder of her husband, Robert Dronet. The trial
court followed the provisions of the plea agreement and sentenced her to twenty
years in prison. Dronet raises issues concerning the deportation admonishment, the
trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, and alleged constitutional violations.
Because Dronet pleaded guilty under a plea bargain, however, she can only appeal
rulings on pretrial motions and matters on which the trial court gave her permission
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to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see also Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d
338, 340-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 812-13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). We conclude that our jurisdiction has not been invoked
regarding the admonishment issue; that the trial court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress; that Dronet’s statement to law enforcement was voluntary; and
that she did not invoke her right to counsel during the interview with police. We
affirm the judgment.
DEPORTATION ADMONISHMENT
Dronet argues the trial court erred in failing to give her the required
deportation admonishment during the guilty plea hearing. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4) (West Supp. 2012). We cannot address the argument
because the trial court did not give Dronet permission to appeal this issue. Our
jurisdiction has not been properly invoked to address the deportation
admonishment. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B).
THE INTERVIEWS
Stating she shot her husband, Terri Dronet placed a 911 call. Officers came
to the residence. Robert Dronet was dead. Terri Dronet was read her Miranda
rights at the scene. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1996).
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At the request of one of the officers responding to the call, Terri Dronet went
to the Liberty County Sheriff’s Office the night of the shooting to give a statement.
During that interview, she maintained that her husband threatened her with a gun,
and she shot him in self-defense.
The next day the officer called Dronet and asked if she would come in for
another interview. Dronet agreed to do the second interview and arrived at the
Liberty County Sheriff’s Office within thirty minutes of the phone call. As he did
with the first interview, the officer told Dronet that she was not in custody, not
under arrest, and could leave at any time. He advised her orally and in writing of
her Miranda rights. She acknowledged that she understood the warnings; she
agreed to waive any rights and speak with him. He conducted both interviews in
the interview room at the sheriff’s office. A female law enforcement official was
present in the room during each interview.
The interviewing officer told Dronet that an effort was being made to see if
her story was corroborated by evidence obtained by law enforcement at the scene.
He also explained that an autopsy had been performed, and the direction of the
bullets was now known. Dronet continued to maintain that Robert had threatened
to shoot her and pointed his gun at her, and it was then that she shot him.
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Approximately forty-seven minutes into the interview, the following
exchange occurred:
Dronet: Do I need to get a lawyer?
Officer: Do what now?
Dronet: Do I need to get a lawyer?
Officer: Well, that’s going to be, that’s going to be your, that’s going to
be your choice.
No further mention of a lawyer was made.
After about fifty minutes, Dronet left the interview room to take a break.
After approximately seven minutes, the interview resumed. Dronet then reiterated
that Robert had told her he was going to kill her. But she also stated that Robert did
not have a gun that night. She testified that after she shot him, she retrieved a gun
from a box and put the gun in his hand. At the conclusion of the interview, Dronet
left the sheriff’s office. She was arrested the next day.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Dronet’s attorney filed a motion to suppress, and stipulated during the
motion-to-suppress hearing that the motion only challenged Dronet’s statements
during the second interview. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542,
547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of the historical facts that the record supports, and we review de
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novo the trial court’s application of the law to facts that do not turn on credibility
and demeanor. Id. When the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine
whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, supports those findings. Id. at 548. We review the court’s legal ruling de
novo unless the court’s explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are
also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id.
During the second motion-to-suppress hearing, Dronet recounted that she
met the officer in 2002 and began talking with him when she started working at the
high school. He would come to the school to show “the law support of anti[-
]drugs.” She testified she sometimes stopped off at his office. She explained that
the relationship progressed to sexual encounters, which ended when a hurricane
went through the area and the two were preoccupied with repairs and other
priorities. She indicated they crossed paths at times after that, but the sexual
encounters had stopped.
As a result of this relationship, Dronet felt that she and the officer were good
friends. And she explained that, once a person has a physical relationship, “you
trust them in a way.” She testified she went to the sheriff’s office for the first
interview with the officer, because he was the “captain,” “but he was my friend
first.” “He was my friend before, during.” “I had no reason to feel like he . . .
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would do anything that wasn’t supposed to be done.” Dronet acknowledged she
had no photographs, no letters, no cards, and no videos to support her claim of a
sexual relationship. Dronet stated she kept their relationship private.
Dronet also testified that during the second interview, the officer’s demeanor
changed. He essentially informed her at one point that her account of the events did
not match up with the observations and forensics from the crime scene. Dronet
testified she believed he would have told her if she needed an attorney or not, and
she had no reason to question that belief because she still considered him her friend
and confidant.
The offier testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing. He stated Dronet was
not in custody at the time of the second interview; her freedom was not restrained
in any way; and she was not under arrest. He indicated he told her she could leave
if she wanted to. Although he explained he knew Dronet prior to the murder, he
testified he never had a sexual relationship with her, and he never hugged or kissed
her. He acknowledged he had cell phone conversations with her, and he talked to
her in person. He explained that she was one of more than 300 cell phone contacts.
The officer described his interview technique as being sympathetic, friendly,
and receptive towards the person he was interviewing. He explained that, through
use of this technique, he encourages the person to talk to him, to trust him---so that
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he or she will tell the truth. He indicated his technique could be described as a low-
key friendly style.
VOLUNTARINESS
Dronet raised voluntariness and invocation-of-right-to-counsel issues in her
motion to suppress. Rule 25.2(a), as well as the trial court’s certification of her
right to appeal, permits her appeal of these issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a).
Dronet argues that the interviewing officer “improperly utilized a position of trust,
as well as of intimacy with [her],” “improperly interrogated” her, and obtained an
involuntary confession. Dronet asserts that due process requires that an officer who
has a personal and sexual relationship with an accused should never be the officer
who interrogates the suspect. Essentially, her argument is that the alleged
relationship she had with the officer rendered her statement involuntary.
At the suppression hearing, counsel stipulated the interviews were non-
custodial. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
20. At the May 30, 2013 hearing, Defendant testified that she and
[the officer] had a sexual relationship.
21. At the May 30, 2013 hearing, [the officer] testified that he and
Defendant never had a sexual relationship.
22. The Defendant presented no evidence other than her testimony
that a sexual relationship existed between her and [the officer],
no photographs, no videos, no correspondence of any kind.
23. The Court finds that Defendant’s testimony is not credible.
24. The Court finds that Defendant and [the officer] did not have a
past sexual relationship.
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25. At the May 30, 2013 hearing, Defendant stipulated that she was
not in custody during her May 29, 2007 and May 30, 2007 taped
interviews.
....
28. The conditions under which Defendant made the statements were
voluntary in nature.
The record supports the trial court’s findings.
A defendant’s statement may be used in evidence against her if it “was
freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules
hereinafter prescribed [in the Code of Criminal Procedure].” Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (West 2005). Under article 38.22, a statement even in a non-
custodial interview may under certain circumstances be involuntary. See
Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 171-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (West 2005). And, in the absence of
custody, due process may be violated by admitting confessions that are not
voluntarily given. See Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996); Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 731-32 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010,
pet. ref’d).
The determination of whether a defendant’s statement is voluntary is an
“application of law to a fact question.” Garcia v. State, 15 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). When the defendant presents evidence that raises a
voluntariness question, the State must controvert that evidence and prove
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voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720,
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A defendant’s statement may be involuntary for
federal due process purposes “only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a
nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Alvarado v. State,
912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
The ultimate question in determining voluntariness is whether the accused’s
“‘will was overborne’ by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
confession.” See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326,
147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93
S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)); Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). We must consider the “totality of the circumstances[.]” See
Moseley v. State, 223 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007), aff’d, 252
S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
The second interview was conducted in the interview room at the Liberty
County Sheriff’s Office. Dronet went there voluntarily for the interview. She was
not under arrest, not in handcuffs, and not restrained in any other way. She was
free to leave the room at any time or to terminate the interview. There is nothing in
the record suggesting that the physical location of the interview, its length or the
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number of persons present during the interview amounted to a coercive setting.
The officer read Dronet her Miranda rights (including the right to an attorney), and
Dronet also signed written Miranda warnings. Dronet asked the officer during the
interview if she needed an attorney, and he told her it was her choice. Neither she
nor he mentioned an attorney again. She was not denied any essential needs during
the interview; she took a short break, left the room, and then returned to the
interview.
The record does not show the interview technique was a coercive one or that
the technique resulted in an overbearing of Dronet’s will. The officer testified the
technique was designed to encourage a suspect to tell the truth. He made no
promises to Dronet and did not threaten her. Dronet’s testimony did not change
until the officer told her the forensics and evidence did not support her claims. The
trial court found there was no sexual relationship between Dronet and the officer.
We give almost complete deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. When the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the record
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Dronet’s will was not overborne and her
statement was voluntary. We overrule issue two.
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INVOCATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In her supplemental brief, Dronet argues the trial court erred in denying her
motion to suppress and in admitting the last thirteen minutes of her second
interview. She contends she invoked her right to counsel, and yet the interview
continued. At approximately forty-seven minutes into the interview, Dronet asked,
“Do I need to get a lawyer?” The officer responded, “Well, . . . that’s going to be
your choice.” Dronet did not ask for an attorney at that point. She did not mention
an attorney for the rest of the interview. Neither did the officer. Further, she
testified at the suppression hearing, that when she asked the officer if she needed a
lawyer, she was asking for his opinion; she stated she was not requesting a lawyer.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling a criminal
suspect to bear witness against herself. Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 74-75
(Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 256 (2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend
V). Only if the suspect voluntarily and intelligently waives her Miranda rights,
including the right to have an attorney present during questioning, may her
statement be introduced into evidence against her at trial. Id. at 75. Under Davis v.
United States, “[i]nvocation of the Miranda right to counsel, ‘requires at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of
a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,
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459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 178, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991)). The Supreme Court
repeated this principle in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250,
2259-60, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). The suspect must “‘unambiguously’” request
counsel. Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). “If an accused makes a statement
concerning the right to counsel ‘that is ambiguous or equivocal’ or makes no
statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation. . . or ask questions to
clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights.” Id., 130
S.Ct. at 2259 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62). Dronet did not unequivocally
assert her right to counsel. We overrule her issues. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
DAVID GAULTNEY
Justice
Submitted on February 19, 2013
Opinion Delivered August 28, 2013
Do Not Publish
Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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