Robert Babcock v. State ( 2013 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-12-00332-CR
________________________
ROBERT MONROE BABCOCK, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Donley County, Texas
Trial Court No. 3738, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding
June 13, 2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Robert Monroe Babcock was convicted of the capital murder of his four-year-old
son and sentenced to life imprisonment. He raises four issues in challenging that
conviction, all of which relate to his mental competency. Those issues involve 1) the
trial court decision to admit three statements he gave to law enforcement officers
though they were allegedly involuntary, 2) the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense,
and 3) the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on the purportedly lesser-included
offense of criminally negligent homicide. We affirm the judgment.
Background
Appellant, a single man, first learned he was a father in August 2010, at which
time the child was four years old. The boy’s mother was using methamphetamine and
not properly caring for the child so around December 1, 2010, appellant obtained
custody. In statements to law enforcement officers, appellant admitted he first struck
the child on Christmas Eve. From that point on, he struck the boy daily for allegedly
lying to him, missing the toilet when he urinated, and hitting appellant.
On January 4, 2011, paramedics were called to the home because the child was
unresponsive. He was covered with bruises on his face, neck, hands, abdomen, chest,
lower lumbar, buttocks, and genitals. The boy never regained consciousness and died
the next day. The cause of death was complications from blunt force injuries to the
head.
Issues 1 and 2 – Motion to Suppress and Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant gave three separate statements to law enforcement officers. Those
statements were admitted into evidence over his objection. According to appellant, they
were inadmissible because he purportedly suffered from a head injury that affected his
“executive functions” and ability to control impulses or conduct. We overrule the issue.
The standard of review is one of abused discretion. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d
235, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Furthermore, we examine the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether that discretion was abused. Id. at 239.
Appellant voluntarily accompanied Sheriff Charles Blackburn to his office on
January 4 after his son had been transported to the hospital. Although appellant rode in
the sheriff’s vehicle, he was not in hand restraints. The sheriff testified that appellant 1)
was not under arrest but he was the primary suspect, 2) had been read his Miranda
2
warnings both at his house and prior to the interview in the sheriff’s office, 3) signed a
written waiver of those rights, 4) was not promised anything or threatened, 5) did not
appear to be emotionally distraught, 6) never asked to terminate the interview, 7) never
requested an attorney, and 8) was not denied food, water, or cigarettes. The interview
lasted two and one-half hours, and the sheriff was not aware of any prior head injuries
that appellant had suffered. At the end of the interview, he was arrested.
The second interview took place on January 5 and was conducted by Texas
Rangers Jamie Downs and Jay Fisher in the sheriff’s office. Before the interview
started, appellant was informed that his son had died, was again read his Miranda
rights, and again indicated that he understood them. Other testimony revealed that he
never requested an attorney, was not coerced or threatened, was not promised
anything, and was not denied basic necessities. Furthermore, he did not appear to be
under the influence of drugs or alcohol and displayed a generally calm demeanor. That
interview lasted two hours. Ranger Downs had been told by appellant’s mother prior to
the interview that appellant had been injured in a serious car accident years earlier
which could have diminished his capacity. Nonetheless, appellant was considered to be
lucid when interviewed and capable of providing appropriate answers to questions.
The third interview took place at appellant’s request on January 8 and lasted one
and one-half hours. Ranger Downs and Sheriff Blackburn conducted that interview.
Appellant was read his rights for a fourth time and agreed again to speak to the officers.
The interview was described as non-confrontational.
Although not presented at the suppression hearing, there was further evidence at
trial that appellant had been examined by Dr. Phillip J. Davis, a psychologist. The latter
acknowledged that though appellant suffered brain trauma potentially affecting his
3
executive functioning, it was not of the ilk to render him insane or unable to differentiate
between right and wrong. Outside the presence of the jury, this same witness also
testified that appellant’s statements at issue were voluntarily made.
Evidence of a mental condition may be relevant to whether one has voluntarily
confessed. See Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 172-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
However, nothing in the record here suggests that any mental impairment from which
appellant suffered prevented him from acting voluntarily under the circumstances and at
the time of his confession or that the impairment affected his thought processes. See
Darnes v. State, 118 S.W.3d 916, 921-22 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d) (noting
that nothing in the record suggested that a mental condition known as “intermittent
explosive disorder” from which the defendant allegedly suffered prevented him from
acting voluntarily in giving his confession); see also Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317,
338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (stating that although expert testimony indicated that the
defendant may suffer from mental illness, the evidence indicated that he was not
suffering from a psychosis at the time he gave interviews to police). Moreover, an
expert opined that appellant’s statements were voluntary. Given this, we cannot say
that the trial court lacked legal or factual basis (that is, abused its discretion) in rejecting
appellant’s complaint and admitting the statements.
And, to the extent that appellant also questions the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his conviction, we first note that he was charged with intentionally and
knowingly causing the death of his son by striking him with his hand. In the
aforementioned statements, he admitted to shoving the child back into the wall which
had a hole in it and punching him in the head five to ten times. He was also the child’s
primary caregiver and the only one living in the house with the child at the time.
4
Additionally, medical evidence indicated that the child’s injuries were not accidental and
that he suffered from extensive bruising. This is some evidence from which the jury
could infer beyond reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly killed his
son.
Issue 2 – Insanity Defense
Appellant contends that the evidence conclusively proved he was insane at the
time of the assaults due to his brain trauma. We overrule the issue because one expert
testified that appellant’s trauma did not render him insane at the time. So, at best, the
evidence created an issue of fact for the jury to resolve, and we will not second guess
the manner in which it resolved the matter. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 n.13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Instruction on Lesser-Included Offense
Appellant finally contends that the trial court should have submitted a charge on
the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide. 1 We overrule the issue.
Appellant again turns to the evidence of his brain trauma and its purported effect
on his ability to control his actions as basis for his request. The argument posited is that
the “evidence . . . found in Dr. Phillip J. Davis’ testimony that Appellant’s head injuries
created in Appellant a condition which Dr. Davis testifies is ‘disinhibition . . . an inability
to stop one’s behavior’ . . . [is] . . . some evidence from which the jury could decide that
though Appellant should have been aware of the risk of death to the child he was not.”
Yet, nowhere are we cited to evidence suggesting that an inability to “arrest” or stop
behavior affects one’s ability to formulate a particular mens rea. Nor are we cited to
1
The jury was charged on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and manslaughter.
5
evidence suggesting that appellant’s conduct occurred automatically or reflexively
without him first having to develop some mens rea.
As said by Dr. Davis (the expert upon whom appellant relied in proffering his
argument), the affliction is “not the same as a severe mental illness affecting the
individual's ability to recognize that her or his behavior was wrong. It's an incident of
abnormal brain activity making it difficult, if not impossible, to arrest one's behavior.”
This tends to suggest that appellant was quite capable of engaging in thought
processes and understanding the nature and consequences of his conduct. He simply
had difficulty in stopping conduct potentially attributable to those processes. And
without evidence suggesting that appellant’s brain trauma prevented him from
developing the requisite mens rea to commit murder, we cannot conclude that the
evidence of the trauma somehow negated his ability to intentionally or knowingly kill.
See Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (stating that
one is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if proof of the lesser offense
is included within the proof necessary to establish the greater and there is some
evidence which would permit a jury to rationally find that if the defendant is guilty, he is
guilty only of the lesser offense) (emphasis added); accord Yzaguirre v. State, 394
S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (refusing to hold that the trial court erred in
omitting the lesser-included offense of robbery because “there was no evidence . . . that
appellant committed only the crime of robbery . . . .”).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
6