in Re Lea Percy McLaurin , 467 S.W.3d 561 ( 2015 )

Opinion issued April 30, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00920-CV
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IN RE LEA PERCY MCLAURIN, Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
OPINION
Relator Lea Percy McLaurin has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
challenging her confinement pursuant to an order holding her in contempt for
failing to pay attorney’s fees assessed as sanctions.* On November 14, 2014, after a
preliminary review of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we ordered Lea
*
The underlying case is In the Matter of the Marriage of Lea Percy McLaurin
and Scott Sutton McLaurin, cause number 2009-06775, pending in the 309th
District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Sheri Y. Dean
presiding.
McLaurin’s release upon her posting of a bond in the amount of $500.00, pending
a final determination of her petition. Because we conclude that the trial court’s
order impermissibly confines Lea McLaurin for failing to pay a debt, we grant her
petition for writ of habeas corpus, release her from the bond, and order her
discharged from custody.
Background
Lea Percy McLaurin and her ex-husband, real party in interest Scott Sutton
McLaurin, were divorced on September 3, 2010. In 2011, Lea filed a post-
judgment action to enforce certain terms of the final divorce decree. Specifically,
Lea claimed that Scott failed to execute documents transferring nine savings bonds
to her. She also contended that Scott failed to surrender a diamond held in a safety
deposit box and certain coins, Christmas ornaments, plates, stuffed animals, family
photographs, and videos. In response, Scott filed a motion requesting sanctions on
the basis that Lea’s enforcement case was frivolous and filed in bad faith without
reasonable inquiry. The trial court issued a final judgment denying Lea’s requested
relief and granting Scott sanctions in the amount of $52,378.88 as reimbursement
for attorney’s fees in the case. The judgment required that Lea pay the judgment
amount of $52,378.88 by June 12, 2014. On May 20, 2014, Lea filed an appeal
from the judgment that is currently pending in this court (appellate case number
01-14-00710-CV).
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On July 3, 2014, Scott filed a “Petition for Enforcement and Order to
Appear” requesting that the trial court hold Lea in contempt for failing to pay the
sanctions judgment by the June 12 deadline. Scott’s petition sought an order
confining Lea in the Harris County jail for a period of up to 180 days and
thereafter until the judgment is paid. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
entered an interim order requiring that Lea pay the judgment amount on or before
November 13, 2014. The parties were further ordered to appear on the payment’s
due date, at which time the court would decide whether the interim order had been
followed.
At the subsequent hearing, the trial court issued an “Order Holding
Respondent in Contempt for Failure to Pay Sanctions and for Commitment and
Judgment for Sanctions.” In the contempt order, the trial court found that (1) Lea
was ordered to pay sanctions on April 8, 2014; (2) Lea was charged with contempt
for failure to pay the sanctions on or before June 12, 2014; (3) Lea had the ability
to make the sanctions payment of $53,373.88; (4) Lea contemptuously disobeyed
the court’s order by failing to timely pay the sanction amount; (5) Scott incurred
$13,020.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees in the enforcement proceeding that should
be assessed against Lea; and (6) Scott incurred $283.24 in court costs in bringing
the enforcement action that should be assessed against Lea.
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The contempt order held Lea in both criminal and civil contempt. The
criminal contempt portion of the order sentenced Lea to confinement in county jail
for 180 days as punishment for violating the court’s original order requiring
payment of $52,378.88 in sanctions. The civil contempt portion provided that,
upon serving her sentence for criminal contempt, Lea shall continue to be confined
in the county jail until she purges herself of contempt of court by (1) paying the
$52,378.88 set forth in the judgment, (2) paying an additional $13,020.00 for
Scott’s attorney’s fees incurred in the enforcement proceeding, (3) paying $283.24
for Scott’s court costs incurred in the enforcement proceeding, and (4) paying
$63.00 to the district clerk for the commitment and stenographer fee. On
November 13, 2014, pursuant to the contempt order, Lea was taken into custody
and confined in the Harris County Jail.
On November 14, 2014, Lea filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging her confinement under the contempt order. The petition’s central
argument is that the commitment order is void because it unconstitutionally
imprisons Lea for a debt. On the same day, this Court issued an order releasing Lea
from confinement upon her posting of a bond in the amount of $500.00, pending a
final determination of her petition.
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Analysis
This habeas corpus proceeding originating in our court is a collateral attack
on a contempt judgment. See Ex parte Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967);
In re Griffith, 434 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig.
proceeding). The purpose of the habeas corpus proceeding is not to determine the
relator’s ultimate guilt or innocence, but only to ascertain whether she has been
confined unlawfully. See Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979);
Griffith, 434 S.W.3d at 643; In re Munks, 263 S.W.3d 270, 272 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). A writ of habeas corpus will issue if a
trial court’s contempt order is void because the court lacked the power to issue the
order or failed to afford the relator due process of law. See In re Henry, 154
S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005); Ex parte Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1996).
The relator bears the burden of showing that a contempt order is void and
not merely voidable. See Munks, 263 S.W.3d at 272–73. Until the relator has
discharged her burden of showing her entitlement to relief, the contempt order is
presumed valid. See In re Parr, 199 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding). On review, we do not weigh the proof and
determine “whether it preponderates for or against the relator;” we determine only
whether the contempt order is void. Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259–60
(Tex. 1995).
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As a general rule, a person who willfully disobeys a valid court order may be
held in contempt and is subject to punishment by imprisonment for a prescribed
period of time (criminal contempt) and may be ordered imprisoned until he or she
complies with the order (civil contempt). See Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656, 658
(Tex. 1993); Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545–46 (Tex. 1976). However,
the Texas Bill of Rights provides that “[n]o person shall ever be imprisoned for
debt.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18. Therefore, “the failure to comply with an order to
pay a ‘debt’ is not contempt punishable by imprisonment.” Hall, 854 S.W.2d at
658; see also Tucker v. Thomas, 419 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. 2013). An adjudicated
debt “may be enforced by other legal processes, such as execution or attachment of
property, but not by imprisonment of the adjudicated debtor.” In re Nunu, 960
S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1997); Hall, 854 S.W.2d at 658.
In this case, Lea argues that the contempt order is void because it imprisons
her for failing to pay a debt—the attorney’s fees assessed as sanctions. Scott argues
that the contempt order is valid because it does not imprison Lea for failure to pay
a debt, but rather for failure to comply with a sanctions order requiring the
payment of attorney’s fees. We hold that the contempt order is void because it
subjects Lea to imprisonment for failure to pay a debt.
Attorney’s fees and costs awarded in proceedings to enforce child support
payments are authorized by the Family Code, and the resulting obligation is not
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considered a debt and may be enforced through a contempt judgment. See TEX.
FAM. CODE. ANN. § 157.167(a) (West 2014); Guillory, 442 S.W.3d at 692; see also
In re Jih, No. 14-03-01184-CV, 2003 WL 22707113, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2003, orig. proceeding) (“A trial court cannot allow
collection of attorney’s fees by contempt proceedings except in cases where child
support is ordered.”). In Hall, the Supreme Court of Texas explained that “[t]he
obligation which the law imposes on spouses to support one another and on parents
to support their children is not considered a ‘debt’ within Article I, section 18, but
a legal duty arising out of the status of the parties.” 854 S.W.2d at 658. This
exception is inapplicable to the case at hand because the attorney’s fees assessed
against Lea were not related to enforcement of support obligations or any other
statutory obligations between the parties.
Scott argues that the contempt order does not imprison Lea for failing to pay
a debt, but rather imprisons her for disobeying a court order requiring payment of
attorney’s fees as sanctions, and the trial court acted within its authority to enforce
its sanctions order. We disagree. “Although a trial court is clearly authorized to
order the payment of costs and attorney’s fees as sanctions . . . the obligation to
pay created thereby is a debt and the debtor may not be imprisoned for failing to
pay it.” In re Smith, No. 04-02-00360-CV, 2003 WL 1191408, at *2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Mar. 12, 2003, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus challenging
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order providing that relators would be imprisoned for contempt if they failed to pay
attorney’s fees assessed as sanction); see also In re K.D.W., No. 07-08-0049-CV,
2008 WL 4889997, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 13, 2008, no pet.) (attorney’s
fees awarded for violation of divorce decree were a debt and, thus, were not
enforceable by contempt); Ex parte Jackson, 706 S.W.2d 712, 713–14 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1986, orig. proceeding) (holding that $1,450 “fine” relator was
ordered to pay as sanction for discovery abuse was a debt, and order to pay it could
not be enforced by imprisonment).
Accordingly, contempt judgments ordering imprisonment for disobeying a
sanctions order to pay attorneys’ fees or costs are void as an unconstitutional
imprisonment for a debt. See In re Gonzalez, No. 04-02-00799-CV, 2003 WL
1917332, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 23, 2003, orig. proceeding)
(granting habeas petition and holding that contempt order imprisoning relator for
failing to pay attorney’s fees assessed as sanctions for discovery abuse was void);
Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, orig. proceeding)
(granting habeas petition and holding that contempt order imprisoning relator for
failing to pay discovery costs, including attorney’s fees, assessed as sanctions for
discovery abuse was void); Ex parte Rogers, 633 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1982, orig. proceeding) (granting habeas petition and holding that trial
court lacked authority to enforce payment of attorney fees and costs assessed
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against relator by contempt proceedings); see also Tracy v. Tracy, 219 S.W.3d 527,
531 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that contempt order threatening to
confine former wife for failing to pay attorney’s fees assessed for violating divorce
decree was void because it threatened imprisonment for a debt).
Scott relies on Ex parte Conway, 843 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding), as contrary authority supporting the
proposition that a sanction for payment of attorney’s fees is not a debt and that Lea
may be imprisoned for failure to pay the attorney fees. Like this case, Conway was
an original habeas proceeding in which the relator challenged a contempt judgment
imprisoning him for failing to pay attorney’s fees assessed as a sanction. Conway,
843 S.W.2d at 766. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the habeas petition on
the basis that the “order holding relator in contempt concerned not the collection of
separately adjudicated attorney’s fees, instead, relator was found in contempt for
failing to obey a court order to pay sanctions for abuse of the discovery rules” Id.
at 767. Conway did not address the issue specifically raised in the petition before
this court: whether imprisonment for failure to pay attorney’s fees assessed as a
sanction is an unconstitutional imprisonment for a debt. The constitutional issue
was not addressed in Conway and, indeed, the word “debt” does not appear
anywhere in the Conway opinion. Accordingly, we do not view Conway as
persuasive authority on the issue raised before us, which is whether a contempt
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judgment ordering imprisonment for failing to pay attorneys’ fees imposed as a
sanction is void as imprisonment for a debt. The authorities that have addressed the
constitutional issue have held that such contempt orders are void and, therefore,
granted petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging imprisonment under the
orders. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2003 WL 1917332, at *1; Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d at 680;
Rogers, 633 S.W.2d at 671.
Finally, Scott argues that even if the portion of the order imprisoning Lea for
civil contempt is void, the remaining portion imprisoning her for criminal
contempt should be enforced. But Lea cannot be imprisoned pursuant to either
civil or criminal contempt for failing to a pay a debt. Accordingly, any
imprisonment of Lea under the contempt order is void. See Jackson, 706 S.W.2d at
714 (commitment order imprisoned relator for failure to pay a debt and “[s]ince
[relator] could not be imprisoned for at least one of the alleged acts of contempt, it
follows, and we so hold, that the entire commitment order is tainted and void”).
Conclusion
We hold that the contempt order imprisoning Lea McLaurin is void because
it imprisons her for failure to pay a debt. In light of this holding, we need not
address the other arguments in the petition. We grant the petition for writ of habeas
corpus and order relator discharged from custody under the contempt order. We
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further order that relator be released from the bond posted to secure her conditional
release. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.
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