Monroe Henry Preston v. State ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    ______________________________
    No. 06-11-00129-CV
    ______________________________
    MONROE HENRY PRESTON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 6th Judicial District Court
    Lamar County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 22654, 22863, 22864
    Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Following a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, Monroe Henry Preston was
    convicted of one count of delivery of cocaine in an amount of one gram or more, but less than four
    grams within a drug-free zone (case number 22654), and two counts of delivery of less than one
    gram of cocaine as a habitual offender (case numbers 22863 and 22864). On January 26, 2009,
    the trial court issued a notice of withdrawal of funds from Preston’s inmate trust account in each
    case, pursuant to Section 501.014 of the Texas Government Code. 1 On November 9, 2011,
    Preston filed a “Motion to Recind [sic] Withdrawal of Funds from Inmate Trust Account and
    Restore Funds to Inmate Trust Account” in each case. The trial court denied Preston’s motion.
    On appeal, Preston complains of withdrawal of $75.00 for attorney’s fees in cases 22863
    and 22864, $350.00 for attorney’s fees in case 22654, and a $600.00 fee for an investigator in case
    22654. Preston argues that the trial court failed “to afford appellant due process in making a
    fact-specific determination that appellant had the financial resources to offset” the attorney’s fees,
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the calculation of attorney’s fees, and claims
    the court erred in compelling reimbursement for the “investigator fees when the trial record clearly
    demonstrat[ed] that an investigator was not warranted or necessary because . . . [he] entered a plea
    in open court.” We find that Preston’s plea was pursuant to a plea agreement and that he waived
    these complaints during the plea bargain process. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    1
    See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.014 (West Supp. 2011).
    2
    The terms of Preston’s signed plea admonishments contain the following:
    Garnishment of Inmate Accounts to Pay Fines, Court Costs and Court Fees
    Upon court order, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (hereinafter “the
    Department”) may withdraw, seize or garnish funds from an inmate’s trust account
    to pay court fees, costs and fines associated with this conviction. As part of this
    plea agreement you:
    1.      Agree not to object to, challenge, protest or otherwise contest, in any
    manner, the withdrawal, seizure or garnishment of funds from your inmate trust
    account by the Department for the payment of court fees, costs and fines associated
    with this conviction.
    2.      Waive the right to object to, challenge, protest or otherwise contest, in any
    manner, the calculation of the amount of court fees, costs and fines associated with
    this conviction to be withdrawn, garnished or seized by the Department from your
    inmate trust account.
    3.      Waive the right to be served with legal process or notice of any kind
    (including any writ of garnishment, application, accompanying affidavit(s), bill(s)
    of costs or court order) in any way pertaining or related to the withdrawal,
    garnishment or seizure of funds from your inmate trust account by the Department
    for the payment of court fees, costs and fines associated with this conviction.
    4.      Waive any legal, equitable or administrative process or procedure
    (including by inmate grievance or other internal Department method) to regain
    funds, or to prevent withdrawal, garnishment or seizure of funds, from your inmate
    trust account by the Department for the payment of court fees, costs and fines
    associated with this conviction.
    5.      Waive, forego, surrender and relinquish any property right to any funds
    withdrawn, garnished or seized from your inmate trust account by the Department
    to pay court fees, costs and fines associated with this conviction.
    6.     Waive the right to the appointment of legal counsel to pursue any legal,
    equitable or administrative proceeding to prevent the Department from
    withdrawing, garnishing or seizing funds from your inmate trust account to pay any
    unpaid fine, court costs or court fees or to regain the same.
    3
    Texas law permits garnishment of an inmate’s trust account when such has been authorized
    by the trial court of conviction. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.014(e) (West Supp. 2011).
    “Texas courts have long recognized that prisoners have a property interest in their inmate trust
    accounts,” and must be afforded some measure of due process. Harrell v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 315
    ,
    319 (Tex. 2009). A defendant, however, may also affirmatively, voluntarily, and knowingly
    waive any rights afforded to him—even constitutional due process rights. Wheeler v. State, 
    628 S.W.2d 800
    , 802 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Franks v. State, 
    513 S.W.2d 584
    , 585 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1974); In re Doyle, No. 06-08-00094-CV, 
    2008 WL 4329041
    (Tex. App.––Texarkana
    Sept. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defendant can waive right to complain of alleged due process
    requirements in connection with garnishment from inmate trust fund account).
    Further, the concept of a plea agreement has been equated to a contract. Moore v. State,
    
    295 S.W.3d 329
    , 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ex parte Williams, 
    637 S.W.2d 943
    , 948 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1982).       Plea bargaining consists of the prosecutor’s concessions regarding
    punishment, lesser charges, or reduction in counts in exchange for a defendant’s plea of guilty or
    nolo contendere. See 
    Williams, 637 S.W.2d at 948
    . Such an agreement may contain a wide
    variety of stipulations, including a stipulation that the defendant waives the right to appeal. See
    
    Moore, 295 S.W.3d at 331
    –32; Ex parte Delaney, 
    207 S.W.3d 794
    , 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    The record before us shows Preston affirmatively, intelligently, voluntarily, knowingly,
    and unambiguously waived his right to contest or appeal any future garnishment proceeding to
    4
    collect fees, costs, and fines connected with his underlying criminal conviction. Thus, the trial
    court did not err in denying Preston’s motion to rescind withdrawal of funds from his inmate trust
    account.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Bailey C. Moseley
    Justice
    Date Submitted:       March 14, 2012
    Date Decided:         March 15, 2012
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-11-00129-CV

Filed Date: 3/15/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021